The popularisation of factional politics in the IRI from Khatami to Rouhani by Nekouei, Navid
1 
 
The London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE POPULARISATION OF FACTIONAL POLITICS IN THE 
IRI FROM KHATAMI TO ROUHANI 
 
 
 
 
 
NAVID NEKOUEI 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted to the Department of Government of the London School of Economics for 
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, August 2016. 
2 
 
 
 
 
AUTHORSHIP OF DECLARATION 
 
 
 
I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree 
of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work 
other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case 
the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly 
identified in it). 
 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, 
provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced 
without my prior written consent. 
 
I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights 
of any third party. 
I declare that my thesis consists of 110,973 words.  
7 August 2017 
Navid Nekouei
3 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The fundamental research topic of this thesis is: to determine the extent to which the 
emergence and evolution of factional groups and their politics have been conditioned 
by their conception of ‘the role of people’ in the political arena. It will also explore 
their perceptions of societal demands and expectations in a different period of the IRI’s 
short history. In other words, it aims to trace and explain the evolution of 
popularisation of factional politics in the IRI. To answer this question, I also elaborate 
another related question: the extent to which the emergence and evolution of certain 
factional groups have been conditioned by the character of personal relationships 
between key, leading actors in each group. These two interrelated issues represent the 
most important omissions in the academic literature on factional politics in the IRI. 
Therefore, by definition, I will show how, with the death of Khomeini in 1989 and the 
consequent decentralisation of ideological production in the IRI, forcing factional 
groups to reach out of the institutional context and seek popular electoral support in 
order to successfully compete in factional struggles within the institutions of the IRI. 
As a result, societal demands and/or the elite’s perception of these demands became 
an important element in the dynamics of factional politics in the post-Khomeini era. 
Various factions articulated their conceptions of ‘the role of people’ in the IRI’s 
politics-rooted in and justified by their respective interpretations of Khomeinism. 
Theses competing conceptions of the ‘role of people’ in the IRI engendered the 
emergence of series of discourses and slogans within the framework of Khomeinism 
aimed to justify the factions’ claims of being the representatives of popular demands 
and Khomeinism. Furthermore, the members of the elite of the IRI, both those who 
participated in the revolution and their offspring, have a long personal history with 
each other. Positive and negative feelings that emerged from any of these experiences, 
I intend to show, at some key points have played roles of various degrees of importance 
in the emergence and evolution of certain factional groups and their actions in vital 
political events, such as the controversial 2009 elections and its aftermath. The thesis 
will draw its theoretical base and methodology from the literature on hybrid regimes, 
faction in democratic and party-based systems, and faction in absolutist systems, in 
addition to the existing literature on factional politics in the IRI dealing with the 
institutional context.
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Introduction 
Factional politics has been at the centre of political life in the Islamic Republic of Iran 
(IRI) since its establishment in 1979, in the wake of the overthrow of the Pahlavi 
Dynasty (1925–1979). Despite the revolutionary ideology’s emphasis on United 
Islamism and the continuous exhortations of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the father 
of the revolution and the IRI, for unity amongst the varied revolutionary and regime 
politicians and political groups, factional politics have continued to play, a decisive 
role in the politics and policy-making of the IRI. 
Despite the important role of factional politics, the limited existing academic 
research on factions falls into one of two categories. The first constitutes works such 
as Akhavi’s Elite Factionalism in the Islamic Republic of Iran; 1  Siavoshi’s 
Factionalism and Iranian Politics: The Post-Khomeini Experience;2 and Entessar’s 
Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran: Domestic and Foreign Policy Implications.3 
These studies are primarily descriptive, providing an outline of the IRI’s political and 
ideological landscape and of the major factional groups and their leading personalities. 
As a whole, these works pay no or little attention to the causes surrounding the 
emergence and spread of factions. Little attention is paid to their links with the Islamic 
state and to the shape and form of their struggles with each other in both the electoral 
and non-electoral fields. 
The second category consists of two major works, Bahman Baktiari’s 
Parliamentary Politics in Revolutionary Iran: The Institutionalization of Factional 
                                                 
1 Shahrough Akhavi, "Elite Factionalism in the Islamic Republic of Iran," Middle East Journal 41 
(1987).  
2 Sussan Siavoshi, "Factionalism and Iranian Politics: The Post-Khomeini Experience," Iranian 
Studies 25, no. 3/4 (1992), 25-70. 
3 Nader Entessar, "Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran: Domestic and Foreign Policy 
Implications," Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 17, no. 4 (1994), 21-43. 
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Politics and Mehdi Moslem’s Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran. 4  These 
studies are characterised by a deeper analysis of the institutional causation of the 
emergence and evolution of factional groups. It is worth noting, no specialised work 
on factional politics in the IRI has been published since 2002. Baktiari’s work 
attempted to take the study of factional politics to a higher level by examining the 
modus operandi of factions in pursuing their political goals in the legislative branch. 
Nonetheless, he too ended up producing a piece that was more descriptive than 
analytical in nature. 
Moslem’s book is considered the major work on this topic given his 
examination of the causal relationship between the nature and attributes of the Iranian 
State as well as the emergence and evolution of factions. He also examined how, in 
this context, the factions compete with one other. He believed, while factions express 
their differences and challenge each other’s views on an ideological plane, the struggle 
for power among them is conducted through institutional battles. In support of this 
claim, he focused on a common mode of factional contest: the misuse of state 
institutions and their unique powers. He believed, “Rather than being an ad-hoc 
phenomenon, factional politics in Iran are, by and large, patterned and predictable.”5  
Moslem advanced the academic debate on this issue by drawing attention to the 
role played by Constitutional ambiguities of the Constitution. He also focused on fluid 
interpretations of Islam in creating the conditions for the emergence of factions and 
giving them the ideological and political opportunity to create new platforms. By 
forming alliances between rivals, it held to their claim of being doctrinaire. 
                                                 
4 Bahman Baktiari, Parliamentary Politics in Revolutionary Iran: The Institutionalization of Factional 
Politics (University Press of Florida, 1996); Mehdi Moslem, Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran 
(Syracuse University Press, 2002).  
5 Ibid. 8–9. 
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Amongst the other works touching on the issue of factional politics within a 
broader examination of the political dynamic of the IRI, Khatami and Gorbachev: 
Politics of Change in the Islamic Republic of Iran and the USSR6 should be mentioned. 
In Shakibi’s examination of the politics of change under Khatami, he brought a new 
perspective to the dynamics of factional politics in the IRI.  
Earlier works, the most important of which are introduced above, rely on the 
assumption that elite factional struggles are primarily guided by, and a consequence 
of, traditional intra-elite wrangling over political and economic power. Society and 
societal demands and expectations do not play a significant role in them. The people 
are spectators. Shakibi shows, to an extent, how the factional fighting in the immediate 
post-Khomeini period, spilt over into the domain of popular, electoral politics and gave 
birth to the Reformist Movement. 
Few books concerning the factional politics have been published in Persian. 
Similar to the wider literature on this subject, they do not move beyond description of 
different factions or political history of these factions. Shadlou’s Ahzab Va Jenah-ha-
ye Siasi-ye Iran-e Emruz [Political Parties in Contemporary Iran,]7 similar to Darabi’s 
Jaryan Shenasi-ye Siasi Dar Iran [Study of Different Political Schools in Iran,] 8 
provide comprehensive information detailing different IRI political groups and parties, 
their statutes and their main political figures.  
However, they do not move beyond this typology.   Ghazal Yaq’s Etelaf-ha-ye 
Siasi Dar Jomhuri-ye Islami-ye Iran [Political Coalition in the IRI,]9 attempts to move 
                                                 
6 Zhand Shakibi, Khatami and Gorbachev: Politics of Change in the Islamic Republic of Iran and the 
USSR (IB Tauris, 2010). 
7 Abbas Shadlu, Ahzab Va Jenah-ha-ye Siasi-ye Iran-e Emruz [Political Parties in Contemporary Iran] 
(Vozara, 1379/2000). 
8 Ali Darabi, Jaryan Shenasi-ye Siasi Dar Iran [Study of Different Political Schools in Iran], 4 ed. 
(Pazhuheshgah-e farhang va andishe-ye Islami, 1388/2009). 
9 Iman Hosein Ghazal Yaq, Etelaf-ha-ye Siasi Dar Jomhuri-ye Islami-ye Iran [Political Coalition in 
the IRI] (Markaz-e Asnad-e Iran-e Islami, 1391 (2011)). 
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beyond this typology and political history of different factions and provide insight into 
the dynamics behind the emergence of different factions. However, it falls short of 
producing any rigid argument. It does not give any attention to the role of society in 
these political struggles. Moreover, this book follows a certain political agenda given 
the factional affiliation of its publisher, as well as its judgmental narrative regarding 
certain political factions, particularly his analysis of the political actions of the 
Reformists. 
This thesis builds on and contributes to this literature by examining two 
elements of factional politics in the IRI that remain under-researched. First, by starting 
with Shakibi’s point, concerning the spilling over of factional fighting into the 
electoral arena at the close of the Rafsanjani Presidency (1989–1997), I will determine 
the extent to which the emergence and evolution of factional groups and their politics 
have been conditioned by elite perceptions of societal demands and expectations in the 
Khatami and Ahmadinejad periods.  
Therefore, axiomatically, by starting with Moslem’s focus on the institutional 
context of factional fighting, I will show how, with the death of Khomeini in 1989 and 
the consequent decentralisation of ideological production in the IRI, factional groups 
were forced to reach out of the institutional context and seek popular electoral support 
to compete successfully in factional struggles within IRI institutions. Given the 
context, the IRI’s two methods are open in elucidating societal demands and 
expectations, and the factions’ understanding of them: 1) the speeches and slogans, 
especially those of electoral campaigns, of the various factions; and 2) election results. 
The second element focuses on the extent to which the emergence and 
evolution (and sometimes destruction) of certain factional groups has been conditioned 
by the character of personal relationships between key, leading actors in each group. 
12 
 
None of the literature on factional politics in the IRI has broached this topic. The 
critical assumption is ideological beliefs are the catalyst for the emergence of factional 
groups, which then engage in struggles for power and/or economic interest. The reason 
for the continuing struggles remains ideological, at least in rhetorical terms.  
However, the members of the IRI elite, both those who participated in the 
revolution and their offspring, have a long personal history with each other. The 
majority have either familial and/or marital links, or shared experiences in prison, the 
revolution, seminary, university, the Iran–Iraq War, or even, in some instances, 
childhood. I will show how positive and negative feelings that emerged from any of 
these experiences have played, at some key points, roles of various degrees of 
importance in the emergence and evolution of certain factional groups, their actions, 
and in vital political events, such as the controversial 2009 elections.  
Even Persian-language literature and research on politics in the IRI that has 
been published in the country has not systematically examined this issue. Only recently 
has it been broached. Hojjataleslam Hadi Khamenei, brother of the current Leader of 
the Revolution, Ali Khamenei, and his political critic, in an interview with the leading 
sociopolitical journal, alluded to this point, which is expanded in this thesis. In 
response to a question on whether ideology was the main cause of the spread of 
factional fighting, in particular in the mid-1980s and 1990s, he stated: “No. Until now 
there has been no analysis on the leftist and rightist elements which would allow me 
to say so-and-so was a rightist and so-and-so was a leftist.” (The two main factional 
groups at the beginning of the revolution which were the starting groups for subsequent 
factions.)  
“Back in 1985, someone asked me ‘What is the cause of these differences (and 
factional fighting)?’ I simply said to him, ‘The desire for power on the part of a 
13 
 
personal social group (of political players). It is only power driven by a desire to help 
one’s friends and limit those you dislike. The desire for this power is not rooted in 
ideology, but rather in personal tendencies (in regard to other political players). In the 
end, no one is yet ready to confess to this reality.’”10 
This thesis examines the role of personal relationships in factional politics 
regarding key events and decisions in the post-Rafsanjani period. Because of the 
challenges involved in conducting research on this issue, this type of relationship and 
its influence on political events and factional politics remains unexamined. The 
method used here revolved around piecing together information from published 
memoirs, interviews and news items in leading journals and newspapers for the period 
under review.  
I also conducted interviews with few past and present leading figures from 
these factions. Nonetheless, this thesis only focuses on the key IRI political players, 
particularly those whose roles were to a large extent significant in the popularisation 
of factional politics, namely Ali Khamenei, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, 
Mohammad Khatami, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hassan Rouhani. Therefore, to put 
their relationship in better context, parts of this thesis mentions the personal history of 
these elites and their historical background. 
The theoretical and methodological guides for this thesis come from three main 
sources, in addition to the literature on factional politics in the IRI. First, the regime 
type of the IRI needs to be located in the theoretical literature on hybrid regimes. 
However, in this regard, the IRI differs from the general theoretical examples of a 
hybrid regime. 11  The Constitutional split between republican institutions, namely 
                                                 
10 Mehrnameh, vol. 2, Azar 1390 (January 2012). 
11
 Houchang E Chehabi, "The Political Regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Comparative 
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elected executive and legislative branches, and revolutionary ‘Islamic’ institutions, the 
most powerful being the Supreme Leader Office (SLO) and the Guardians Council 
(GC), is checking the popular power of the republican institutions, This reflects the 
tension between revolutionary promises of creating an Islamic state and of establishing 
republicanism.  
The IRI was established and legitimised as a hybrid regime, a concept redefined 
here as a derivative of neither democracy nor authoritarianism, but rather a distinct 
political structure embodying both republican and authoritarian institutions that 
coexist with and exert pressure on each other. These characteristics distinguish it from 
the regimes coined hybrid in the literature.12 
Since electing the Reformist Presidency of Mohammad Khatami in 1997, there 
has been a tendency to view the IRI case in the context of literature on a transition to 
democracy. Moreover, the literature on hybrid regimes is grounded in said literature.13 
                                                 
Perspective," Government and Opposition 36, no. 1 (2001); Leonardo Morlino, "Are There Hybrid 
Regimes? Or Are They Just an Optical Illusion," European Political Science Review 1, no. 2 (2009); 
Matthijs Bogaards, "How to Classify Hybrid Regimes? Defective Democracy and Electoral 
Authoritarianism," Democratization 16, no. 2 (2009); Payam Mohseni, Leah Gilbert, "Beyond 
Authoritarianism: The Conceptualization of Hybrid Regimes," Studies in Comparative International 
Development (SCID) 46 (2011). 
12 For general information about the hybrid regime and their categories within the dichotomy of 
authoritarian/democratic regimes see:  
Larry Diamond. "Thinking About Hybrid Regimes," Journal of Democracy 13, no. 2 (2002): 21-35. 
13 The transitional approach was the dominant perspective, especially in Comparative Studies during 
the 1980s and 90s. From the late 90s until present, to break this "transition paradigm," some scholars 
considered these countries "neither democratic nor in transition toward democracy” and called them 
"authoritarianism with adjectives,” such as "competitive authoritarian" or "electoral authoritarian." 
Main works on the transitional approach see:  
S.P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1991); Dankwart A Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic 
Model,” Comparative Politics 2, no. 3 (1970): 337-63; J Grugel. Democratization: A Critical 
Introduction. (Palgrave, 2002).  
For critical overview of transitional paradigm see:  
Thomas Carothers, "The End of the Transition Paradigm,” Journal of Democracy 13 IS, no. 1 (2002),: 
5-21.  
Within this framework and debates on path dependency of democratisation see:  
J.J Linz and A.C. Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, 
South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).  
For this shift to authoritarianism with adjectives see:  
A. Przeworski, Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 
1950-1990, (Cambridge University Press, 2000); Larry Diamond, "Thinking About Hybrid Regimes." 
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This study takes the position that neither of these approaches is appropriate to the IRI 
case.  
Therefore, this thesis is foremost about factional politics and their overflow into 
electoral politics. In other words, the popularisation of factional politics. It then 
touches on democratisation, but as an element and a weapon of factional politics. This 
thesis is not about democratisation, but rather factional politics, which emphasises a 
more dispassionate approach, avoiding the dominant cultural ideological and 
teleological trappings of contemporary democratisation and transition studies. The 
objective here is ‘simply’ to understand the causes, the nature and the outcomes of 
various processes of change in factional politics in the IRI as they were reflected in the 
country’s sociopolitical landscape and institutional structure, without presuming a 
final destination such as Western liberal democracy.  
Second, this redefined concept of hybridity is the starting point for 
understanding the emergence of factional politics and for finding the proper theoretical 
and methodological approaches for its examination and analysis. In other words, the 
hybridity of the IRI means factional politics are also hybrid. The IRI shares 
characteristics of factional politics in democratic and semi-democratic states, given the 
holding of elections and the existence of political associations and parties participating 
in the electoral field.14 The literature on factional politics in democratic and semi-
                                                 
Journal of Democracy 13, no. 2 (2002): 21-35; S. Levitsky and L. Way, Competitive 
Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War (Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
14 Frank P. Belloni, Dennis C. Beller, ed., Faction Politics: Political Parties and Factionalism in 
Comparative Perspective (ABC-Clio, 1978); Kim Eric Bettcher, "Factions of Interest in Japan and Italy: 
The Organizational and Motivational Dimensions of Factionalism," Party Politics 11, no. 3 (2005); 
Belloni. Faction Politics 339–58; Françoise Boucek, "Rethinking Factionalism: Typologies, Intra-Party 
Dynamics and Three Faces of Factionalism," Party Politics 15, no. 4 (2009): 455–85; S.W. Schmidt, 
ed. Friends, Followers, and Factions: A Reader in Political Clientelism (University of California Press, 
1977); Gary W. Cox, Frances McCall Rosenbluth, and Michael F. Thies, "Electoral Reform and the 
Fate of Factions: The Case of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party," British Journal of Political Science 
29, no. 1 (1999): 33–56. 
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democratic states makes a contribution to the theoretical approach to IRI factions, but 
weak political party structure and their links to the revolutionary institutions of the IRI 
limit their usefulness.  
Third, the IRI factional politics shares significant similar dynamics with those 
of absolutist systems in which power is held by one figure. A useful example of this is 
France’s Louis XV and Louis XVI, whose existing research on its factional politics, 
offers a methodology relevant to researching one aspect of the IRI’s factional politics. 
15 
These studies mainly look at factions as a social entity, whose members have 
joined together to advance their interests through generally legitimate and legal 
means.16 These groups were formed based on blood, patron-client relationships, or 
other bonding relations, either long or short-term. What is interesting in these historical 
periods is how factions operate in power struggles outside the party organisation, and 
mostly as a social group, but within the political sphere.  
The importance of this literature is its focus is on the role of factions in 
absolutist or authoritarian systems where the ultimate source of power is a single 
individual, such as a king, or, in the Iranian case, the Supreme Leader. In these 
systems, factions not only organically emerge as a result of the centralisation of 
absolutist power, but their emergence is encouraged by that absolute power. In short, 
the old modus operandi of divide and rule. However, if a faction is not skillfully 
handled by the absolute power, it can lead to weakening, paralysis and even collapse 
of the state. Some examples of this are the role of a faction in bringing about the closing 
                                                 
15 Roger. Mettam, Power and Faction in Louis XIV's France (B. Blackwell, 1988); John Hardman, 
French  Politics, 1774-1789: From the Accession of Louis XVI to the Fall of the Bastille (Longman, 
1995); Julian Swann, Politics and the Parliament of Paris under Louis XV, 1754-1774 (Cambridge 
University Press, 1995). 
16 Geoffrey Pridham, "Party Systems, Factionalism and Patterns of Democratization: Cross‐National 
Comparisons in Southern Europe," Democratization no.21 (1995): 27. 
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of the Parliament of Paris under Louis XV, or in the weakening of the Bourbon state 
under Louis XVI, which led to the bankruptcy and the implosion of the French 
absolutist state. 
In sum, the two fundamental and inherently related research topics of this thesis 
are:  
1) To determine the extent to which the emergence and evolution of factional 
groups and their politics have been conditioned by their perceptions of societal 
demands and expectations in the Khatami and Ahmadinejad periods.   
2) To determine the extent to which the emergence and evolution of certain 
factional groups has been conditioned by the personal relationships between key, 
leading actors in each group.  
These two interrelated issues represent the most important omissions in the 
literature on factional politics in the IRI. In the investigation of these two topics in this 
thesis, a new dynamic/process is introduced called the popularisation of factional 
politics. Throughout this thesis, the popularisation of factional politics refers to several 
interrelated points.  
First, it refers to the increasing attention of competing factions and political 
elites to electoral/republican institutions and consequently the ways through which 
they tried to gain control of these institutions. Second, it highlights the elite’s 
increasing emphasis on popular demands or what the people want. Or in political 
discourses of some factions, what the people should want. Third, popularisation 
inherently implies a process or trend. However, this evolution is not linear or 
deterministic. It is both a part and a reflection of the dynamics of change in wider 
political dynamics. Thus, in itself, this thesis considers popularisation to have no 
intrinsic value. For instance, popularisation does not necessarily mean a move towards 
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Western liberal democracy.  
According to political circumstances and conditions at certain points of this 
study in addressing the issue of the popularisation of factional politics and the role of 
personalities, focus swings from factional competition to inter-elite competition. 
Given the significant role of elites in factional struggles, it should not be forgotten that 
inter-elite competition is generated by the process of popularisation and at the same 
time adds to the popularisation of factional politics which is the underlining theme of 
this thesis. Given the fluid nature of factions, the role of elites becomes significant. 
While inter-elite competitions create opportunities for different social groups to pursue 
their political and social agenda and political factions to increase their power at the 
top, at the same time, the claims of being a representative of certain popular social 
demands have been increasingly used as a tool in inter-elite politicking and factional 
politics. 
In order to show the evolution of the popularisation of factional politics and 
provide the situational and contextual elements necessary for the comparative analysis 
of these variables, this thesis follows a chronological framework. It is not, however, a 
comprehensive study of the political history of modern Iran. Its goal is to move beyond 
this narrative and use it as a context to investigate systematically and analytically the 
two main research questions mentioned above.  
The thesis will draw its theoretical base and methodology from the literature on 
hybrid regimes, factions in democratic and party-based systems, and factions in 
absolutist systems, in addition to the existing literature on factional politics in the IRI 
dealing with the institutional context. To address the process of this popularisation of 
factional politics and the role of personal relations in this process, a wide variety of 
primary sources, the bulk of which have not yet been used in political studies of the 
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IRI, are utilised. 
In dealing with these primary sources, a few points have been taken into the 
account given the methodological and empirical approach of this thesis and the nature 
of this literature. Firstly, for the quotations and/or statements of political groups and/or 
political elites mainly three different sources were used: official websites, 
autobiographies or memoirs, newspapers or news websites.  If a quotation has been 
taken from an official website, the complete link of that particular quotation is 
mentioned in the footnote. In using the quotation from newspapers, the factional 
affiliation of the newspaper has been considered. These factional affiliations are 
introduced when different factions are investigated in different chapters. Regarding 
the memoirs, care has been given to the fact that the views of the person may be biased 
about himself and/or others.  
Secondly, the principal methodological prerequisites of qualitative historical 
research concerning primary sources has been taken into account. This is true, 
particularly in the study of the dynamics of factional struggles and elite interactions 
during the Ahmadinejad and Rouhani periods. There has been little, if any, 
comprehensive studies or literature on the personalities and IRI political dynamics of 
these periods.  
For instance, the factional affiliation of different newspapers or websites or 
media, as well as other forms of primary sources, have been taken into account in 
analysing, criticising or rejecting certain arguments as well as presenting an alternative 
argument or presenting a narrative. In addition, context, namely time and place, has 
been carefully taken into account in these cases. For instance, the information about 
the neo-Conservative, Saeed Jalili, and his views are extracted from his writings, 
including his PhD thesis and/or journals affiliated to the neo-Conservatives.  
20 
 
In this vein, memoirs of IRI political elites contributed to the main arguments 
of this thesis as well as explaining the dynamics of the popularisation of factional 
politics. Rafsanjani’s detailed memoirs provide great insight into the factional 
dynamics from the viewpoint of one of the key IRI political players.17 They also show 
the evolution of his personal views and his powerful position in the first decade of the 
revolution.  
However, since these memoirs are published with almost a 25 year gap, they 
do not cover the main portion of this thesis’s timeline.  Ali Akbar Nateq Nouri’s 
memoir, as the Secretary of the main Conservative organisation, JRM, and the main 
rival of Khatami in the 1997 Presidential election, provides an insight into the way he 
and thus the Conservatives interpreted the emergence of the Reformists.18 Hassan 
Rouhani’s memoirs about the time he was the secretary of Supreme Council for 
National Security (SCNS) and in charge of the negotiation with the Western countries 
and IAEA about the IRI nuclear programme, on the one hand, provides a glimpse of 
the IRI decision making process with regard to national security issues.  
On the other hand, it gives great details about the evolution of Iranian nuclear 
program. It also, to a certain degree, sheds light on the extent to which factional politics 
have played a role in the trajectory of IRI nuclear programme directions from the 
perspective of a person in a supervisory position.19 The memoir of Mohammad Javad 
Zarif, IRI foreign minister (2013-current,) provides great detail into how foreign policy 
was interpreted by different factional groups.20 Mahdavi Kani’s memoir, in addition 
                                                 
17 A series of his memoirs have been published beginning in 1981. The latest published volume of his 
memoirs was in 1991. Full list of these memoirs are provided in Bibliography. 
18, Morteza Mirdar, Khatarat-e Akbar-e Nateq Nouri [Memoir of Nateq Nouri] (Markaz-e Asnad-e 
Enghelab-e Islami, 2005). 
19 Hassan. Rouhani, Amnyiat-e Melli Va Diplomacy [National Security and Diplomacy] ( Majma-e 
Tashkhis-e Maslahat, 2012). 
20 Mohammad Mehdi Raji, Agha-ye Safir [Mr. Ambassador] (Nashr-e Ney 2013). 
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to the memoirs of Mohammad Rayshari and Nateq Nouri, added to the understanding 
of the viewpoints and ideologies of the Conservatives and their main political 
organisation, JRM, from the perspective of some of its leading members.21  
Given the complex nature of IRI politics and the empirical approach which has 
been implemented throughout this thesis, it will not be possible to provide any 
tentative conclusion without the contribution of a wide range of academic literature 
touching on different aspects of the IRI politics, society, economy and culture. The 
full details of this literature are provided in the bibliography.  
Nonetheless, the analysis of Katouzian22 and Gheissari and Nasr23 about the 
relationship between the state and society in the IRI contributed to the arguments of 
dynamics of factional politics and its popularisation in this work. Arjomand’s24 and 
Martin’s25 studies on the Khomeinism and the role of ideology in the IRI politics 
contributed to the debates about the Khomeinism and its role in the emergence of 
factions and popularisation of factional politics.  
Mirssepasi 26  and Dabashi’s 27  works on trajectories of various intellectual 
discourses and the relationship between them and modernity in the formation of the 
IRI were helpful arguments in understanding the emergence of different political 
discourses explained in this thesis and its influence on factional politics. 
                                                 
21 Mirdar, Khaterat-e Akbar; Mohammad Mohammadi Reyshahri, Khatere-ha, [Memories]. 5 vols.: 
(Markaz-e Asnad-e Enghelab-e Islami, 2007); Gholamreza Khaje Sarvi, Khaterat-e Ayatollah 
Mahdavi Kani  [Memoir of Mahdavi Kani] (Markaz-e Asnad-e Enghelab-e Islami, 2008). 
22 Homayou Katouzian, The Persians: Ancient, Mediaeval and Modern Iran (Yale University Press, 
2010).  
23 Ali Gheissari and S.V.R. Nasr, Democracy in Iran: History and the Quest for Liberty (Oxford 
University Press, 2006). 
24 Saeid Amir Arjomand, After Khomeini: Iran under His Successors) Oxford University Press, 2009(. 
25 Vanessa Martin, Creating an Islamic State: Khomeini and the Making of New Iran (I. B. Tauris, 
2000). 
26 Ali Mirsepassi, Intellectual Discourse and the Politics of Modernization: Negotiating Modernity in 
Iran (Cambridge University Press, 2000); Ali Mirsepassi, Democracy in Modern Iran: Islam, Culture, 
and Political Change (NYU Press, 2010). 
27 Hamid Dabashi, Theology of Discontent: The Ideological Foundation of the Islamic Revolution in 
Iran (Transaction Publishers, 1993). 
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Keshavarzian’s28 insightful work on the evolution of the Bazar and Bazaris class and 
the dynamics of their relationship with the IRI helped to better understand the social 
support base of certain factions. In addition to this literature, there is much literature 
in which different chapters of this thesis speak of.   
As briefly mentioned above, the emergence of Khatami and the Reformists, on 
the one hand, prompted scholarly works exploring this movement, mostly through the 
framework of mainstream democratisation theories, particularly as a case study for the 
examination of theories of transition to democracy.29 It became a case study to reject 
the claims of an impossibility of the emergence of democracy in the Middle East and 
Iran.30  
However, the demise of the Reformists and the rise of Ahmadinejad to power 
encouraged scholars of democratisation studies to investigate different factors shaping 
their claimed idea of an Iranian path of transition to democracy. The role of personality 
and the leadership of Khatami in the emergence and demise of this movement were 
highlighted.31 Several works placed the Khatami Era in the context of IRI history. For 
instance, this period was considered as a phase in a long process of state building 
                                                 
28 Arang Keshavarzian, Bazaar and State in Iran: The Politics of the Tehran Marketplace (Cambridge 
University Press, 2007). 
29 Hossein Bashiriyeh, "Civil Society and Democratisation During Khatami's First Term," Global 
Dialogue 3, no. 2/3 (2001); Said Amir Arjomand, "Democratization and the Constitutional Politics of 
Iran Since 1997," Polish Sociological Review (2001); L. Boroumand, “Prospects for Democracy in 
Iran." Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 4(2)(2003): 99; Anoushiravan Ehteshami, "Islam, 
Muslim Polities and Democracy," Democratization 11, no. 4 (2004); Nader Hashemi, Islam, 
Secularism, and Liberal Democracy: Toward a Democratic Theory for Muslim Societies (OUP USA, 
2009); 
30 For these claims that democracy is alien to Islam and the Middle Eastern mindset see:  
Heather Deegan, The Middle East and Problems of Democracy (Open University Press, 1993); Steven 
Dorr, "Democratization in the Middle East,” Global Transformation and the Third World, (Boulder, 
CO: Lynne Rienner, 1993): 131-57; Elie Kedourie, Democracy and Arab Political Culture 
(Routledge, 2013).  
For critical view on this approach see: Nasser Momayesi, "Iran's Struggle for Democracy,” 
International Journal on World Peace (2000): 41-70. 
31 Shakibi, Khatam; Ghoncheh Tazmini, Khatami's Iran: The Islamic Republic and the Turbulent Path 
to Reform (I.B.Tauris, 2009); Jahangir Amuzegar, "Khatami's Legacy: Dashed Hopes," The Middle 
East.  
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attempts and promotion of democracy.32  
Another approach considered it a continuation of ‘Constitutional politics’ and 
another phase of the IRI revolution.33 The emergence of new literature on a hybrid 
regime challenging the dichotomy of autocracy/democracy introduced a new 
framework for investigating the Iranian Reformist's experience.34 This period was also 
investigated through the lens of discourse analysis.35  
Moreover, in another series of literature on this period, the intellectual 
discourse of the Reformists and/or ‘religious intellectualism’ was placed in general 
debates of the relationship between modernity and religion. The history of 
intellectualism in Iran and its experience with Western notions of modernity was, 
therefore, revisited and re-investigated. These works also contributed to a wider 
literature responding to the claims of the incompatibility of Islam and democracy 
imposed by culturists that had acquired momentum following the 9/11 attacks.36 
Sociological, economic and anthropological outcomes of this period were also 
investigated.37 Factional politics of this period were mentioned in a large number of 
these studies, however, they have not been substantially studied in themselves.  
Given the contemporary nature of the Ahmadinejad period, domestic politics 
of this period has not been fully studied. Few works touched on the examination of his 
                                                 
32 Gheissari and Nasr, Democracy in Iran. 
33 Arjomand, After Khomeini. 
34 Payam Mohseni and Leah Gilbert, "Beyond Authoritarianism: The Conceptualization of Hybrid 
Regimes," Studies in Comparative International Deelopment (SCID) 46 (2011). 
35 Mehran Kamrava, Iran's Intellectual Revolution, vol. 29 (UK: Cambridge University Press 
Cambridge, 2008). 
36 Mirsepassi and Ramin Jahanbegloo, Iran: Between Tradition and Modernity (Lexington Books, 
2004); F. Jahanbakhsh, Islam, Democracy and Religious Modernism in Iran, 1953-2000: From 
Bāzargān to Soroush (Brill, 2001); Kazem Alamdari, "The Power Structure of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran: Transition from Populism to Clientelism, and Militarization of the Government," Third World 
Quarterly 26, no. 8 (2005). 
37 Behzad Yaghmaian, Social Change in Iran: An Eyewitness Account of Dissent, Defiance, and New 
Movements for Rights (SUNY Press, 2002); Mehri Honarbin-Holliday, Becoming Visible in Iran: 
Women in Contemporary Iranian Society, vol. 14 (IB Tauris, 2013). 
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personality and the emergence of the neo-Conservatives as a new faction. 38 
Nonetheless, given the concurrence of Ahmadinejad’s second term Presidency with 
the eruption of the Green Movement, although only a short time has passed since these 
events unfolded, a large body of literature has emerged exploring the different 
sociopolitical and cultural aspects of this movement, its emergence, the question of its 
demise and its future. Inside Iran, the state media outlets, including national TV and 
radio, propagate the official narrative of events.  
Additionally, a large number of mostly state-sponsored books were published 
propagating this official narrative of events. In return, many expatriate activists, 
including those who had to leave Iran because of their involvement in the protests, 
propagated their own narratives, which were published in IRI opposition journals 
and/or in the new media outlets established after 2009. Most of the academic works, 
however, were written in English or French and published outside Iran, given the 
political sensitivity of the regime.  
This literature investigates various elements of this uprising from different 
perspectives and within different schools of thought. The emergence, evolution, 
dynamics and characteristics of the collective identity amongst the protestors,39 as well 
as the movement, were discussed mostly from the perspective of the social movement 
theories. 40  The effect of social media on this movement and its dynamics was 
                                                 
38 Anoushiravan, Ehteshami and Mahjoob Zweiri, Iran and the Rise of Its Neo-conservatives: The 
Politics of Tehran's Silent Revolution (I. B. Tauris, 2007); Jahangir Amuzegar, "Islamic Social Justice, 
Iranian Style," Middle East Policy 14, no. 3 (2007). 
39 Omid Payrow Shabani, "The Green's Non‐Violent Ethos: The Roots of Non‐Violence in the Iranian 
Democratic Movement," Constellations 20, no. 2 (2013); Shabnam J Holliday, Defining Iran: Politics 
of Resistance (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2013); Elisabeth Jane Yarbakhsh, "Green Martyrdom and the 
Iranian State," Continuum 28, no. 1 (2014); Arash Reisinezhad, "The Iranian Green Movement: 
Fragmented Collective Action and Fragile Collective Identity," Iranian Studies 48, no. 2 (2015);  
Elisabeth Yarbakhsh, "Defining Iran: Politics of Resistance," Asian Studies Review 39, no. 2 (2015). 
40 Ali Ansari, Daniel Berman, and Thomas Rintoul, "Preliminary Analysis of the Voting Figures in 
Iran’s 2009 Presidential Election," Chatham House and the Institute of Iranian Studies, University of 
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discussed.  
Some argued these new technologies have influenced the mobilisation of 
protestors whilst also providing a tool for regime surveillance and the easier targeting 
of the dissidents,41 and how social media led to an increase in the price of oil, and 
consequently indirectly helped the regime in their suppression.42 The class structure 
this movement, as well as its tactics and the use of symbols, was also explored.43 This 
movement was compared to the recent Arab uprisings.44 The relationship between 
these events and factional politics have not been fully investigated.  These events while 
resulting from popularisation of factional politics, as will be discussed in Chapter Five, 
also became a turning point in the process of the popularisation of factional politics.  
Vitally, this movement was interpreted and used by different people. They have 
a varying degree of discontent of the status-quo, ranging from the Khatami Reformists 
to secular Iranians whose roots go back to before the revolution. However, there is no 
data on the arrangement of participating groups. In other words, the Green Movement 
was a broad coalition from religious Reformists to secularists to anarchists. 
Moreover, numerous works covering this period (2005-current), focused on IRI 
foreign policy. IRI foreign policy, particularly regarding the Western countries, has 
been the subject of many studies since the establishment of the IRI in 1979. A wide 
                                                 
St Andrews 21 (2009); Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel, The People Reloaded: The Green 
Movement and the Struggle for Iran's Future (Melville House Pub, 2010); Hamid Dabashi and Navid 
Nikzadfar, The Green Movement in Iran (Transaction Publishers, 2011); Payam Akhavan et al., Civil 
Society and Democracy in Iran (Lexington Books, 2011). 
41 Saeid Golkar, "Liberation or Suppression Technologies? The Internet, the Green Movement and the 
Regime in Iran," International Journal of Emerging Technologies and Society 9, no. 1 (2011). 
42 Kevin Cross, "Why Iran's Green Movement Faltered: The Limits of Information Technology in a 
Rentier State," SAIS Review of International Affairs 3 0, no. 2 (2010). 
43 Kevan Harris, "The Brokered Exuberance of the Middle-Class: An Ethnographic Analysis of Iran's 
2009 Green Movement," Mobilization: An International Quarterly 17, no. 4 (2012): 435-455. 
44 Jubin M Goodarzi, "Middle East Authoritarianisms: Governance, Contestation and Regime 
Resilience in Syria and Iran, ed. Steven Heydemann and Reinoud Leenders (Stanford University 
Press, 2013); Civil Society in Syria and Iran: Activism in Authoritarian Contexts, ed. Aarts Paul and 
Cavatorta Francesco (Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner Publishers), Perspectives on Politics 12, no. 02 
(2014). 
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variety of literature has covered different aspects of IRI foreign policy through 
different schools of thoughts within various disciplines, including history, 
international relations, politics, social theories, international law, and conflict studies.  
Socialisation of IRI revolutionary foreign policy has been one of the main questions 
attracting academic attention, particularly in the disciplines of international relations 
and politics.  
With the election of Khatami in 1997 and his continuation of the normalisation 
approach of the Rafsanjani period, certain theories gained momentum with regard to 
the socialisation of the IRI underlining the inevitability of international socialisation 
of revolutionary regimes.45 These arguments were similar to the same approach to the 
end of history paradigm which considered liberal democracy as the inevitable end 
point of political regimes.  However, the significant change of rhetoric with regard to 
the West during the Ahmadinejad Presidency undermined these arguments. In other 
words, Ahmadinejad’s comments, as well as following a new direction in the IRI 
relationship with the IAEA, over development of IRI nuclear programme, resembled 
a return to the revolutionary foreign policy of the first decade of IRI. This puzzled 
these academics.  
To explain this continuation of revolutionary foreign policy different theories 
were introduced. Some put more weight on international elements such as the lack of 
systematic pressure,46 lack of information to the leader,47 or structural geopolitics.48 
Others underlined the importance of Constitutional structure and domestic ideological 
                                                 
45 Shah Alam, "The Changing Paradigm of Iranian Foreign Policy under Khatami,” Strategic Analysis 
24, no. 9 (2000): 1629-53. 
46 Kenneth N. Waltz, "Reflections on Theory of International Politics,” Neorealism and its Critics 
(1986): 327. 
47 S.M. Walt, Revolution and War (Cornell University Press, 1996). 
48 Trita Parsi, Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States (Yale 
University Press, 2007). 
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settings.49 However, with the election of Hassan Rouhani as President (2013), once 
again the IRI diplomatic approach changed towards the direction of international 
socialisation. This U-turn is reflected in the diplomatic resolution of disputes over the 
nature of the IRI nuclear programme between the IRI and the Western countries and 
UN. Thus, most of the recent works on IRI politics focused on the IRI foreign 
diplomacy and/or the extent to which international sanctions has influenced the IRI 
foreign policy.50 
Numerous works on IRI foreign policy agree, there is a close connection 
between the IRI domestic politics and the trajectory of its foreign policy. 51  The 
importance of factional politics in the investigation of IRI foreign policy is not a new 
subject. However, this thesis introduces popularisation of factional politics, necessary 
to investigate the symbiotic relationship between these dynamics, as well as the foreign 
policy of the IRI, especially with regard to the West. With the exacerbation of factional 
politics and spread of ideological production of the IRI, gradually, the issue of foreign 
policy became an important element in the popularisation of factional politics.  
In other words, foreign policy became popularised. Groups with certain 
political views, be it conservatives or liberal, have transformed their foreign policy 
views into slogans and goals and have campaigned on them knowing that there is 
                                                 
49 Fred Halliday, Revolution and World Politics: The Rise and Fall of the Sixth Great Power (Duke 
University Press, 1999). 
50 S.H Mousavian and S. Shahidsaless, Iran and the United States: An Insider’s View on the Failed 
Past and the Road to Peace (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2014); K. Simpson, U.S. Nuclear Diplomacy 
with Iran: From the War on Terror to the Obama Administration (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 
2015); B. Kaussler and G.P. Hastedt, Us Foreign Policy Towards the Middle East: The Realpolitik of 
Deceit (Taylor & Francis, 2017). 
51 Rouhollah K Ramazani, Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Response in the Middle East (JHU 
Press, 1988); Anoushiravan Ehteshami, "Iran's New Order: Domestic Developments and Foreign 
Policy Outcomes,” Global Dialogue 3, no. 2/3 (Spring 2001): 45-52.  
For a very recent investigation of this relation see:  
Maximilian Terhalle, "Revolutionary Power and Socialization: Explaining the Persistence of 
Revolutionary Zeal in Iran's Foreign Policy,” Security Studies 18, no. 3 (2009): 557-86; Thomas 
Juneau, Squandered Opportunity: Neoclassical Realism and Iranian Foreign Policy (Stanford UP, 
2015); Baktiar, Parlimentary; Arjomand, After Khomeini. 
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viable a constituency.   Given the role of people in the centre of these debates and the 
characteristics of the IRI, there is no consensus on the definition of national interest of 
the IRI beyond near region. This, in turn, means national interests are increasingly 
popularised. It is hoped this dynamic could contribute to debates about the IRI foreign 
policy and its relationship with domestic politics.  
For the purpose of this study, we need to determine what constitutes a faction 
in the context of the IRI. In general, factions are highly dependent on the sociocultural 
and political context. There is, therefore, no single general definition of factions. Yet 
factions can not be defined based only on their organisational characteristics.52 In other 
words, they often work as a “cluster of personal relationships” rather than “disciplined 
collectives.” 53  
This thesis, largely based on the literature of factions in the IRI, initially 
considers factions in the context of the IRI as sociopolitical entities with a loose 
organisational structure. While the factional identity remains based on a shared 
ideology, it is also based on shared strategies, shared objectives and personal ties. One 
is considered to be affiliated with a particular faction if one identifies oneself with that 
faction, and/or is perceived to be affiliated with that faction by society and/or other 
elites. Indeed, these two do not always coincide. In most cases, however, they do 
correspond with each other. In sum, factions in the IRI emerge as reflections of 
ideologies and as personal relationships. In the body of this work, a clearer definition 
of what constitutes factions will emerge. 
Certain characteristics make factions different to political parties in the context 
of the IRI. Factions in the IRI have a low scale of clarity and transparency in their 
organisational structure and are thus less accountable for their decisions and actions 
                                                 
52 Belloni, Faction Politics, 3-16. 
53 Schmidt, Friends, Followers, 7-8. 
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compared to political parties. Factions in the IRI are more inclusive, yet more elusive 
than parties, given they have no fixed or clear boundaries.  
An example can help explain the complexity and elusiveness of the IRI factions 
and their dependence on the sociopolitical context. Rafsanjani is one of the founding 
members of ‘The Society of Militant Clergy’ (Jame’h-ye Rowhaniyyat-e Mobarez, 
JRM), a political organisation affiliated to traditional Conservatives. However, he is 
also considered the father of the Modern Right faction, a technocrat faction which 
emerged in 1994–95, despite the fact that he is not even a member of the main political 
party of this faction, Kargozaran. Rafsanjani was also considered a Reformist in the 
2009 and 2013 Presidential elections by part of society and the political elites. In 
Persian, ‘band,’ ‘jenah’ or even ‘hezb’ (party) refer interchangeably to factions, 
depending on the context.  
Iran does not have a history of true political parties. Iran experienced a 
Constitutional Revolution in 1906, which made sufficient provisions for the 
emergence of a political party system was to be the base of the new political order. 
However, during Pahlavi rule (1924–1979), except for a brief period (1941–1953), no 
genuinely independent parties were allowed to operate. After the Revolution, the new 
Islamic Republic created a single party, the Islamic Republic Party (IRP), which 
collapsed in 1986 due to internal divisions.  
A myriad of causes have played a role in the lack of institutionalisation and 
durability of political parties in Iran in the context of authoritarian regimes.54 As this 
thesis shows, the issues of official political parties are very sensitive since they 
represent a division of the political body into competing groups. Such divisions go 
                                                 
54 Javad Etaat, "Zamineh-ha va Mavan'-e Tahazzob Dar Iran," [Obstacles for Party 
Institutionalisation in Iran] (Hamshahri 1378/2000).  
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against the idea of an Islamic Movement based in unity. Nonetheless, with the 
popularisation of factional politics, one can say factions or their correspondent 
political organisations, act as prototype political parties, to an extent. 
To set the framework for understanding the ideological causes of factional 
struggles, Chapter One, Khomeini and Khomeinism, introduces the ideological 
components of Khomeinism and the contradictions in this ideology that emerged as a 
result of Khomeini’s reaction to changing circumstances and events. It outlines the 
institutional hybrid structure of the IRI. This hybrid structure, in turn, produces intense 
factional struggles and provides the conditions for the emergence of two forms of 
factional struggles, one in the electoral arena, the other within the institutional context 
around the Supreme Leader, simultaneously conducted by factions.  
The last section provides an outline of the main characteristics of two major 
factions during the Khomeini period and the ideological causes for their struggles. 
Collectively, these three sets of analysis provide the institutional, historical and 
ideological background of the IRI and factional politics necessary for an examination 
of this thesis’s main research questions, dealing primarily with the evolution and 
dynamics of factional politics from the end of the Rafsanjani period (1997), and with 
the influence of personal links and relationships on such evolution. 
Chapter Two, The Emergence of Popularisation of Factional Politics, details 
the socioeconomic and geopolitical challenges facing the IRI after the death of 
Khomeini and the end of the Iran–Iraq War, in the context of its Constitutional 
contradictions. Ideological dynamics and rivalries among political elites — 
specifically, between Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the President, and, Ali 
Khamenei, the Supreme Leader – constituted the first steps towards popularisation of 
factional politics. The Rafsanjani Presidency (1989–1997) played a vital role in this 
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process.  
This chapter explores the relationship between Rafsanjani and Khamenei, and 
their personalities and shared experiences until the death of Khomeini. It examines 
how social and economic challenges in the context of the IRI institutional set-up 
shaped and influenced ideological challenges. In other words, how the IRI, similar to 
other revolutionary and/or ideological states, faced the challenge of reconciling its 
ideology with the reality of governing an increasingly complex society. Finally, it 
examines how the interaction of human agency, factional struggles and hybrid 
characteristics of the IRI formed a dynamic resulting in an increasingly influential role 
of popular politics in the political life of the IRI. 
Chapter Three, Popularisation of Factional Politics (1997–2005), investigates 
how various factional groups attempted to define and implement competing concepts 
of the ‘role of people’ in IRI politics. It examines the roots and extent to which these 
attempts have influenced society’s public opinion and the dynamics of power within 
the IRI framework in this period. The election of Mohammad Khatami as President in 
1997 marked a new phase in the popularisation of politics.  
The question of ‘the role of people’ in IRI politics — or the republican aspect 
of the IRI – became an underlining theme of the debates in this period. This question 
had always been a significant element in IRI politics. From this period on, the 
responses to this question offered by factions, exercised a strong influence on societal 
expectation, as well as societal and elite perception. By presenting these factions with 
new political and ideological context, it also serves to concern the question and 
ultimately the nature of the IRI.  
Khatami sought to strengthen republican institutions justified by his 
interpretation of Khomeinism and based on slogans such as the importance of civil 
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society. In response, Khamenei and the Conservatives propagated a different definition 
of the ‘role of people’ in politics rooted in their interpretation of Khomeinism, and 
conception of the revolution’s values. These two divergent trends — empowering the 
Islamic/revolutionary pillar versus the republican dimension — influenced factional 
politics, intellectual debates, public discourses and the types of societal demands each 
faction propagated in this period.  
Therefore, this chapter explains the importance of Khatami’s election and 
reviews Khatami’s political thoughts and the theoretical premises of the ‘role of 
people’ in his discourse. It reviews the main intellectual debates surrounding the ‘role 
of people.' Finally, it investigates the extent to which these different responses and 
slogans have concomitantly evolved into the institutional battles in the IRI, and 
influenced the dynamics of factional politics and personal rivalry. 
Chapter Four, Populism and the Neo-Conservatives (2005–2009), investigates 
the emergence of the neo-Conservatives as a new faction in the popularisation of 
factional politics. The neo-Conservatives emerged with their interpretation of 
Khomeinism that stressed social justice and socioeconomic concerns. Their emergence 
can be contributed to two broad factors. On the one hand, they emerged to fill the 
vacuum created following the disappointment of a large part of society in the ‘political 
development’ paradigm of the Reformists and/or in the Reformist's ability to provide 
sustainable political or economic change. The eight-year experience of the Khatami 
period taught the Conservatives the importance of popular support and its role in 
acquiring power in the republican institutions.  
By capitalising on the populist aspects of Khomeinism, part of the 
Conservatives successfully increased their popular support. In sum, this chapter 
explores the causes behind the emergence of the neo-Conservatives and their political 
33 
 
identity and place in a factional setting. It briefly introduces the key members of this 
faction and their relationships with the main political elite actors, namely Khamenei 
and Rafsanjani. Lastly, it examines the extent to which the populist policies of 
Ahmadinejad have influenced society, factional politics and the concept of the ‘role of 
the people’ in IRI politics.  
Chapter Five, Popular Politics from Below (2009–2013), investigates the 
influence of the 2009 popular uprising called the Green Movement. It also examines 
the the participants of the Green Movement and ‘sedition’ (Fetneh, hereafter, Fetneh) 
in the IRI’s official narrative, on factional politics. Additionally, this chapter presents 
the IRI’s hybrid characteristics, while examining the new challenges it presented for 
the system. The controversial 2009 Presidential election was a turning point in popular 
politics and the popularisation of factions in the IRI. It represented the confrontation 
of social forces demanding change in the IRI political attitude regarding the ‘role of 
people.’  
These contentious events were suppressed and, consequently, the guardian 
institutions, and Khamenei gained great institutional authority at the cost of their/his 
popular legitimacy. Furthermore, to address the challenges of the system engendered 
by these events, the IRI placed at the centre of its propaganda campaign the nuclear 
programme.  
This chapter also investigates the dynamics and main figures in the 2009 
electoral debates. It aims to investigate the consequent institutional and legitimacy 
challenges this election and subsequent events imposed on the regime. It explores the 
reactions of the regime and the extent to which these reactions have influenced the 
popularisation of factional politics, and led to new international and domestic 
sociopolitical consequences. Finally, the embedded institutional contradiction 
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between the electoral institutions and the guardian ones are evaluated under the new 
power balance.  
Chapter Six, Foreign Policy and Factional Politics, explains the processes that 
led to the electoral popularisation of foreign policy witnessed in the 2013 election. It 
explores the important elements of Khomeinism that played a role in the rhetorical 
popularisation of IRI foreign policy in the post-Khomeini era. It examines the main 
issues regarding foreign policy after Khomeini’s death, why these issues were 
important to different factions, and how different factions treated these issues in the 
subsequent elections of Khatami and Ahmadinejad.  
This chapter aims to investigate the symbiotic relationship between the 
popularisation of factional politics and IRI foreign policy. The chapter also examines 
the international context in which these factional discourses evolved. It is not possible 
to state, the popularisation of foreign policy took place only in a reaction to domestic 
politics. The last section provides a review of the two main approaches in foreign 
policy by the time of the 2013 Presidential election. This chapter focuses on IRI 
foreign policy doctrine with regard to the West and the US from the domestic 
perspective, given its role in IRI ideology.  
Chapter Seven, The Rouhani Presidency (2013–current), investigates how, 
when faced with increasing domestic and international challenges, the IRI once again 
changed its official policy agenda and allowed limited political openness. It pays 
particular attention to the extent to which the resilience embedded in the hybrid 
characteristics of the IRI has allowed these sudden shifts of policies.  
During the Presidential election of 2013, Khamenei opened the political space, 
given the increased social discontent, international isolation and worries over the 
regime’s legitimacy, which faced him. The sanctions on the IRI’s nuclear programme 
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during this election and foreign policy, had become major elements in factional 
politics. Electoral debates in this chapter also explore the extent to which the 
interrelated issues of the popularisation of the IRI’s nuclear programme and 
geopolitical conditions have influenced the popularisation of factional politics and the 
fate of negotiations on the Iranian nuclear programme.  
The seven chapters of this thesis, including the Introduction, set a comparative 
framework and adequate analytical arguments to offer answers to the main topics of 
this research. It aims to provide a comprehensive definition of the factions, factional 
politics and popularisation of factional politics in the IRI, in order to answer the main 
research questions of this thesis. Additionally, this study contributes to the literature 
on hybrid regimes, contentious politics, factional politics, and democratisation and 
change.  
The transliteration system is that of Iranian Studies. Established Anglicised 
form has been preferred to the transliterated version (i.e., Majlis instead of Majles). 
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Chapter One 
Khomeinism and Khomeini One: Chapter 
The ideology of Khomeinism has no single definition. Although in principle, 
Khomeini’s speeches, writings and remarks could provide a guide to understanding its 
dynamics. Khomeini himself changed the ideological parameters of Khomeinism in 
the pre- and post-revolutionary periods because of fluctuating circumstances. 1 
Therefore, as this thesis shows, a myriad of contradictions are at the base of 
Khomeinism allowing politically diverse figures, such as the Reformist President, 
Mohammad Khatami, the populist, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Mir Hossein Mousavi, 
the leader of the Green Movement, and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Leader of the 
Revolution and Khomeini’s successor, to claim to represent the true ideals of 
Khomeinism. Moreover, Khomeinism has evolved since the death of Khomeini as a 
result of the factional struggles.  
 The goal of this section, therefore, is to present the themes and contradictions 
in Khomeini’s thinking and politics that lay at the base of his struggle against the 
Pahlavi monarchy, and of its successor state, the IRI. These themes and contradictions 
provide the theoretical and ideological framework in which the factional groups 
emerge, evolve, and struggle with each other. 
Khomeinism was, and is, foremost an attempt to create a universal utopian 
modernity superior to that of the West and, until 1991, that of the Communist East. 
Khomeini claimed, through the religionisation of society led by an Islamic state, the 
disinherited masses, disoriented by the consequences of the Pahlavi rapid 
                                                 
1 For Khomeinism and a different interpretation of Khomeinism, see also:  
Ervand Abrahamian, Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic (University of California Press, 
1993); Daniel Brumberg, Reinventing Khomeini: The Struggle for Reform in Iran (University of 
Chicago Press, 2001). 
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modernisation project, would create an Islamic utopian modernity in this life which 
would also offer them rewards in the afterlife.  
A new interpretation of Islam is at the centre of Khomeinism. In the 1960s, 
Khomeini offered a political reading of Islam under the name of velayat-e faqih. His 
views were, at the time, contrary to mainstream Shiʿi tradition.2 Most of the Shiʿi 
Ulama considered the direct involvement of clerics in politics and governance to be 
demeaning to their clerical religious role.  
Khomeini rejected this view: “Some began to propagate that Islam is an 
ideology about praying and a personal relationship between the people and the creator. 
Therefore, it has nothing to do with politics… due to intense propaganda, even the 
clerics believed that Islam has nothing to do with politics; or with governance.”3  
Khomeini placed the establishment of an Islamic government as one of the 
historical pillars of Islam and the duty of Muslims during the time of occultation of 
Hidden Imam – the last of the Shiʿa saints.4 “The idea that Islam should govern is not 
a new idea. It was part of the initial plan of Islam to establish divine government 
worldwide. However, because of the negligence of Muslims, as well as exploiting 
attempts of colonialists, [this idea has been marginalised] …”5. In his book, Islamic 
Government, he defined velayat-e faqih as follows: “If some efficient person, who is 
endowed with the two characteristics of leadership, rises and establishes a government, 
he will possess the same guardianship which the noble Prophets had in directing the 
                                                 
2 For an analysis of Islamic state in Khomeini’s ideology and in Shia tradition see:  
Vanessa Martin, Creating an Islamic State: Khomeini and the Making of New Iran (I. B. Tauris, 
2000).  
3 Ruhollah Khomeini, Sahifeh-ye Imam (The Institute for Compilation and Publication of Imam 
Khomeini’s Works, 1983-1990): vol. 4, 16.  
On another occasion, Khomeini stated: “The clerics were not supposed to get involved in any affairs 
related to politics and the sociopolitical problems of an ―Islamic country.” Ibid., vol. 14, 159. 
4 In Persian, different names refer to last Shia Saint. Throughout this thesis the title of ‘Hidden Imam’ 
is mainly used.  
5 Khomeini, Sahifeh, vol. 21, 74. 
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society, and all the people will have to obey him.”6 
Khomeini considered Islam a key ideology offering a comprehensive response 
to the people’s needs. In other words, Khomeinism claimed to represent an Islam of a 
new historical era that was an ideological base for a superior universalist modernity. 
Khomeini underlined: “Islam and the Islamic government are divine phenomena that 
ensure the utmost happiness of its followers in this world and the afterlife... [these two] 
could end the oppression tyranny and repression, and corruption and … create perfect 
humans.”7 Khomeini claimed that, Islam is a “substantial guide” which has responses 
to all of the issues of human life, and it is what is missing in almost all of the current 
prevalence ideologies— Capitalism and Communism.8  
From the Iranian perspective, both Communism and liberal-Capitalism are 
elements of the West. Khomeini emphasised universalist characteristics of this Islamic 
modernity, arguing his audience were not only Iranians but all Muslims and 
‘downtrodden’ (Mostazafin). 9  Khomeini, therefore, saw nationalism as something 
alien to Islam and a device created by the West to divide the Islamic community; 
“Enthusiasm for nation and nationalism, is baseless in Islam… It is Islam which is the 
basis (of all).”10 Despite this stress on universalism and hostility to nationalism and 
specifically Iranian nationalism, domestic political circumstances forced the IRI to 
accommodate Iranian national feelings.  
At the centre of this ideological project was the creation of a new person. 
                                                 
6 Fundamentals of the Islamic Revolution Selections from the Thoughts and Opinions of Imam 
Khomeini (R), trans. M. J. Khalili and S. Manafi Anari (The Institute for Compilation and Publication 
of Imam Khomeini’s Works (International Affairs Department), 2000), 143. 
7 Khomeini, Sahifeh,vol. 21, 393. 
8 Khomeini, Sahifeh-ye Imam: An Anthology of Imam Khomeini’s Speeches, Messages, Interviews, 
Decrees, Religious Permissions, and Letters (The Institute for Compilation and Publication of Imam 
Khomeini’s Works (International Affairs Department), 2008), vol. 15, 481–2. 
9 Khomeini, Sahifeh, vol. 13, 144–5. 
10 Ibid., vol. 14, 307–8.  
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Khomeini placed this creation of a new person in a religio-historical framework “[The 
prophets] sought to make a new person. Whenever this new person was made, 
everything else would be achieved… Different [pro-West] regimes, linked to 
foreigners, and similar to them did not want eastern countries to construct a new 
person” This new person he referred to should have certain characteristics which 
would enable him to be at the forefront of Khomeinism and to play the vital role in the 
triumph of Khomeini’s project on different levels.  
“A (true) man is trustworthy. He acts for the sake of Allah and he is for Allah. 
His life is for Allah. His death is for Allah. Such a being can never be a servant to the 
foreigners and act against his country.”11 This new person, homo Islamicus, would be 
the building block of his ‘Islamic ideal society’ (‘jame’h-ye ideal-e Islami’). In this 
man-making project, Khomeini assigned a special role to the Ulama.12 
The main aspects of Khomeinism dealt with the moral purification of society 
and propagating an Islamic identity while giving attention to social justice. Khomeini 
argued, the moral purification and the purification of the soul are means to stop tyranny 
and cut the roots of all the revolts (toghyan).13  
Khomeini believes humans, if left unattended, will inevitably be evil: “If (the 
carnal soul of) man is left unharnessed, he is bound to claim: ―I am your Lord and 
the Highest! The purpose of the ‘besat’ (selection of prophet by God) is to harness this 
defiant and rebellious soul and to purify it.”14 Khomeini believed, “The religion of 
Islam, at the same time of telling man to worship Allah and how to worship Him, tells 
him also how to live... There is no movement or act done by the individual or the 
                                                 
11 Ibid., vol. 8, 60–62. 
12 Ibid., vol. 6, 352–3.  
13 Khomeini, Sahifeh-Ye Imam an Anthology, vol. 14, 333–5. 
14 Ibid., vol. 14, 336.  
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society without lacks a relevant Islamic precept.”  
Therefore, the Ulama should play a role in all the affairs of the society, “since 
Islam undertakes the guidance of the society in all affairs and dimension,”15 Khomeini 
emphasised the need to restructure all aspects of state institutions. He proclaimed, we 
“should transform our educational and judicial systems, as well as the ministries and 
government offices that are now run on Western lines or in a slavish imitation of 
Western models and make them compatible to Islam. Thus demonstrating to the world 
true social justice and the cultural, economic and political independence.”16  
The Islamisation of educational institutions became an important pillar of his 
project, as he considered universities and schools to be the main institutions for making 
the new person, homo Islamicus. They were amongst the sensitive areas targeted by 
enemies of the IRI: “…we are not afraid of an economic blockade, we are not afraid 
of military invasion. What frightens us is cultural dependence. We are afraid of an 
imperialistic university. We are afraid of a university which educates our youth in such 
a way to make them serve the West.”17 He believed: “If teachers are left free to train 
our children and our youth in any way they desire, it is bound to lead to deviation and 
is also against the sublime teachings of Islam.”18 He demanded that “Universities are 
to be fundamentally changed. They must be rebuilt anew so as to educate our youths 
Islamically. Together with acquiring knowledge, there should be Islamic education. 
There should not be a Western education.”19  
Khomeinism gave special attention to cultural elements. Historiography, 
literature and art were to be modified with the aim of helping to create the homo 
                                                 
15 Khomeini, Fundamentals of the Islamic, 116. 
16 Hamid Algar, Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini (Mizan Press, 
1980): 226. 
17 Khomeini, Fundamentals of the Islamic, 221. 
18 Khomeini, Sahifeh-Ye Imam an Anthology, vol. 14, 147–8. 
19 Khomeini, Fundamentals of the Islamic, 221. 
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Islamicus. For instance, media, cinema and theatre were viewed suspiciously as 
imported Western tools only serving the exploitive West. “Radio, TV, the press and 
cinema and theatre are effective means of doping and ruining nations, especially the 
young. Within the past century, particularly in its second half, no effort was spared in 
using these means to blacken Islam and the clergy, while propagating for the Western 
and (Communist) Eastern imperialists...”20  
Therefore, similar to the Stalinist approach, he promoted the idea that artists and 
their works should be in the service of Islam and the spread of revolution.21 Khomeini 
stressed: “We will uproot all Western cultural influence and will set up a just Islamic 
government. Western laws must be uprooted and replaced by Islamic ones.”22  
Khomeinism granted itself the right to interfere in the private sphere of its 
subjects to ensure adherence to its norms. Personal behaviour became the 
government’s interest. Khomeini attacked different Western lifestyles and called for 
state intervention in order to save the homo Islamicus from corruptive Western 
influences so homo Islamicus could concentrate on making a utopian society. Different 
youth activities and entertainment were banned, including singing, dancing, playing 
chess or billiards, and drinking alcohol, while casinos and cabarets were closed.  
Khomeini proclaimed, in regard to entertainment, “Islam opposes whatever 
leads man to futility and to estrangement from himself. Drinking wine is prohibited in 
Islam, and films turning man away from his high morality are also prohibited.”23 The 
IRI expanded local mosques and religious libraries to replace these banned activities. 
The IRI also made the people’s attire a matter of state intervention. It introduced an 
                                                 
20 Khomeini, Sahifeh, vol. 21, 436–8. 
21 Ibid., vol. 21, 139.  
22 Ibid., vol. 5, 119–20.  
23 Khomeini, Fundamentals of the Islamic, 256. 
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Islamic dress code and criminalised non-adherents. Wearing the veil (hejab) for 
women became mandatory, and men could not wear short-sleeve shirts or shorts in 
public, or shave their beards. However, Khomeini seemed to contradict himself when 
he issued a decree obliging officials to respect the private sphere of the people.24 The 
boundaries of the private sphere and the state’s jurisdiction played a significant role in 
the popularisation of factional politics in the post-Khomeini era. 
Social justice for the masses was another main pillar of Khomeinism. Khomeini 
argued: “The history of the prophets is well known. They emerged in order to mobilise 
the needy… to establish social justice.”25  He stressed, the issue of social justice 
distinguished the IRI from other regimes: “The issue of social justice is the main 
difference between the humane Islamic regime and other regime forms."26 Given the 
role social justice played in the mobilisation of Khomeini’s support base, in addition 
to its inherent popular characteristics, it became one of the major issues in the 
dynamics of the popularisation of factional politics.  
To deliver the promises of social justice, Khomeini criticised the Western and 
Soviet economic models, while propagating an Islamic economy. “It is the 
responsibility of the Ulama and the scholars of Islam to prepare constructive plans and 
programs covering the interests of the deprived and the bare-footed, to replace the 
unjust economy ruling over the world of Islam… Naturally, to carry out the objectives 
of Islam in this world.”27 However, he considered the main goals of the revolution to 
be their religious, spiritual ones. “Yet, popular legitimacy of Khomeinism was to a 
significant degree dependent on the IRI’s ability to provide the conditions for 
                                                 
24 Khomeini, Sahifeh, vol. 17, 139. 
25 Khomeini, Fundamentals of the Islamic, 430.  
26 Khomeini, Sahifeh, vol. 8, p. 255. 
27 Khomeini, Fundamentals of the Islamic, 204. 
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economic growth, social justice, and a decent standard of living.”28  
For Khomeini, the spread of revolution became a part of the revolution which 
would ensure the endurance and success of the new regime.29 “We shall export our 
experiences to the whole world… without the smallest expectation in return. It is 
certain that exporting the experiences will result in nothing but the blossoming of 
victory, independence and the application of the precept of Islam for all the nations in 
chains.”30 He underlined that the revolution is not confined to Iran and the people 
should endure hardship while the state strove to export its revolution.  
Our authorities should know that our revolution is not confined 
to Iran. The revolution of the people of Iran is the starting point 
of the great Islamic Revolution of the world, under the banner of 
the Imam al-Mahdi (Hidden Imam)… So that Allah may bestow 
His favour upon Muslims and all the people of the world by 
deciding his appearance to take place in the present age… The 
government of the Islamic Republic is to do its best to manage 
the people… but it does not mean to divert them from the great 
objectives of the Revolution, i.e., the establishment of a world-
wide Islamic government.31  
 
Almost a year after the revolution, Iraq invaded Iran. By 1982, the war entered 
a new phase after Iran regained control of territories initially captured by Iraq. In this 
context, Khomeini was propagated as the leader of a universal Islamic revolution that 
would stand against the two superpowers to prove to all Muslims they can be liberated 
from the yoke of oppressor regimes that are ‘puppets of US government.’ Khomeini 
placed war as one of the major aspects of the revolution whose goal was a victory by 
eliminating all ‘seditionists’ (Fetnehgaran) from the world.32  
However, by 1988, the continuation of the war seemed impossible, given 
Western support for Iraq and rising domestic socioeconomic difficulties. Nonetheless, 
                                                 
28 Shakibi, Khatami, 94. 
29 Khomeini, Sahifeh, vol. 17, 381; Ibid., vol. 19, 23–4. 
30 Khomeini, Fundamentals of the Islamic, 383. 
31 Ibid., p. 385. 
32 Khomeini, Sahifeh, vol. 17, 112.  
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ending the war without reaching its goals seemed a serious ideological and legitimacy 
challenge to Khomeinism. It was seen as a defeat and a retreat from the revolutionary 
rhetoric propagated since Iraq’s invasion. 
 In January 1988, Khomeini issued a decree to address a domestic political 
deadlock, which several months later used as one of the justifications for accepting the 
ceasefire. “Khomeini solidified and institutionalised the concept of ‘state interest’ 
(maslahat) that subordinated the interests of religious and universalist Islam to those 
of the Islamic Iranian state.”33 
The government, which is a branch of the absolute guardianship 
of the Messenger of Allah (s), is one of the primary laws of Islam, 
and it takes precedence over all secondary laws including prayer, 
fasting and Hajj. The ruler may demolish a mosque or house 
along a highway... The ruler can unilaterally annul religious 
contracts forged with the people in case the contracts are against 
the interest of Islam and the country. He can prevent any affair—
devotional or else—whose occurrence is against the interests of 
Islam as long as it is so. The government can temporarily stop 
the performance of Hajj, which is one of the important religious 
obligations, at times when it is against the interests of the Islamic 
country.34 
 
 This decree also provided more room for the expansion and intensification of 
factional politics, as is shown in subsequent chapters. 
Khomeini also effectively used different democratic slogans during and after 
the revolution. He emphasised the importance of freedom, democracy and the 
participation of the people in politics. However, as was shown, this was a reflection of 
his own interpretation of these concepts.  
Shortly before the success of the revolution, he proclaimed, freedom of 
expression and of belief were among the main elements of the emerging regime: 
“Islam, more than any other religion, and more than any creed, gives freedom to 
                                                 
33 Shakibi, Khatami, 88. 
34 Khomeini, Sahifeh-ye Imam an Anthology, vol. 20, 426–7. 
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religious minorities, as they, too, must enjoy their natural rights which Allah has 
granted to all humanity… In the Islamic Republic the Communists are free to express 
their beliefs.”35 Khomeini also underlined the compatibility of Islam and democracy: 
“Democracy is inherent in Islam. The people are free in Islam, both in expressing their 
ideas and in practicing them, so far as there is no plot and so long as they do not 
propose issues that may misguide the Iranian generation.”36  
Just a few months before the triumph of the revolution, he defined the role of 
people in the new government: “It is every nation’s primary right to decide their fate 
and to decide the form and the kind of their government by themselves.” 37  In 
December 1978, in response to a question about the characteristics of the new regime, 
he proclaimed: “We intend to replace the monarchical regime with an Islamic 
government in its true sense. We will hold a referendum on the republican system and 
since the Iranians are all Muslims, they will vote for it. After their confirmation, the 
Islamic Republic will be established.”38  
On different occasions, he made people the main supervisor of the regime. “The 
whole nation is duty-bound to exercise supervision over these (state’s) affairs… If I 
took a wrong step or made a wrong move, it would be the people’s duty to tell me so, 
to tell me to watch my step,” but, this supervisory role was mainly to ensure the IRI 
did not deviate from Islamic norms: “It is the duty of all to supervise all the affairs that 
concern Islam.”39 He also referred to the dual characteristics of the IRI: “Briefly 
speaking, government is the government of Islam and people. The Majlis is from the 
people; vote is from the people and no one is under the command of any official or 
                                                 
35 Khomeini, Fundamentals of the Islamic, 291. 
36 Khomeini, Sahifeh-ye Imam an Anthology, vol. 5, 455. 
37 Khomeini, Fundamentals of the Islamic, 307.  
38 Khomeini, Sahifeh-ye Imam an Anthology, vol. 5,140.  
39 Ibid., vol. 8, 5. 
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officials.”40 On another occasion, he highlighted popular sovereignty: “All must know 
that there is no power today that is able to impose one single representative on the 
nation… Therefore, today the responsibility is with the nation.”41 
Seemingly in contradiction to these statements, he made clear: Islam was to be 
the base for this new superior modernity and clerics had a special role in its 
construction. After the victory of the revolution, he changed his position somewhat: 
“We have changed our mind about what we said in the press interviews. Temporarily, 
the country will be run by the Ulama, but when it can be run by the non-Ulama, the 
Ulama would return to their posts of guiding the people… and hand the executive 
establishments over to those who are working for Islam…. Let them say: It is the 
country of the mollahs, the government of the akhunds, and the like… but no, we will 
not go out of the arena.”42 
The role of Khomeini in the future regime changed over the years. In the 1960s, 
when Khomeini introduced the thesis of velayat-e faqih, he considered the role of faqih 
as the head of the state apparatus. During the time he spent in Paris at the time of the 
revolution, Khomeini described his future role: “In future, I will continue the role that 
I have right now. I will guide and direct. If the need arises, I will intervene. If treachery 
emerges, I shall struggle against it. But I shall not have any role in the government.”43  
However, after the revolution, he became the head of state and institutionalised 
the role of vali-ye faqih. Thus, “such statements created a degree of ambiguity about 
the political and institutional relationship between the position of the religious leader 
and the state. This issue would become paramount once he passed away in 1989.”44 
                                                 
40 Ibid., vol. 18, 277.  
41 Ibid., vol. 12, 158. 
42 Khomeini, Sahifeh, vol. 16, 302-3. 
43 Khomeini, Sahifeh-ye Imam an Anthology, vol. 3, 174. 
44 Shakibi, Khatami, 90. 
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While Khomeini emphasised the importance of republicanism and the role of foqaha 
in the government, he left an ambiguity about the institutional and political relationship 
between them. This became a catalyst for the factionalisation of politics and their 
popularisation. 
Institutionalised Khomeinism 
During the revolutionary period, Khomeini promised an Islamic Republic. He also 
promised the creation of a new universal modernity, rooted in Khomeinist Islam. 
Although, he did not specify how the Islamic and republican elements would coexist 
within a Constitutional and political framework. The institutionalisation of 
Khomeinism reflected both these goals and their political tensions and contradictions 
with each other. The state was divided into revolutionary and republican institutions, 
which continue to play a large role in the factional and popular politics of the Islamic 
Republic. 
Revolutionary Institutions 
Just a few months after the Iranian revolution, on the 1 April 1979, Iran was officially 
declared an Islamic Republic.45 Khomeini proclaimed this the “first day of God’s 
government.”46 In an election on 3 August, 73 people were selected as members of an 
Assembly of Experts (AofE) to review the draft of a new Constitution. On 3 December 
1979, the Constitution was ratified after a series of intense debates. Khomeini 
attempted to institutionalise his perception of the Islamic Republic.  
 Thus, he used his authority to integrate the sharia into the Constitution. In his 
                                                 
45 In a two-day nationwide referendum, 98.2 percent of Iranians voted ‘yes’ to the new form of Iranian 
government, known as an Islamic Republic.  
46 Khomeini, Sahifeh, vol. 5, 233. 
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decree to the AofE drafting the Constitution, he underlined the need to “Make sure 
that our Constitution is within the framework of the law of the sharia. If any one or all 
the members negate the sharia, they are not our representatives.”47 As a result, despite 
the presence of republican institutions in the Constitution, “The revolutionary, clerical-
run institutions held real power. The force limiting the power of all institutions was 
Khomeini’s charismatic authority and unique position above them.”48  
 Khomeini’s original thesis of ‘Islamic Government’ put emphasis on the 
absolute power of clerics, the leader and Islamic governance. Once the revolution 
gained momentum, he modified his rhetoric. Speaking of an Islamic Republic, he gave 
the impression at the time the role of republican institutions being sometimes superior 
or equal to revolutionary institutions. However, after the revolution succeeded, and by 
the end of his life, he returned to his original thesis. Therefore, he attempted to 
integrate republicanism and religious sharia law in the Constitution. He also ensured 
the clergy gained a significant role.49 However, the tensions in Khomeinism between 
republican and revolutionary institutions remained. 
Khomeini’s institutionalisation of vali-ye faqih, symbolised the supremacy of 
revolutionary and Islamic pillars over the republican institutions. The attempts to 
institutionalise the principle of vali-ye faqih were reflected in seven articles of the IRI 
Constitution.50 Article 5, written and proposed by Mohammad Beheshti, the leader of 
IRP and Khomeini’s confidante, underlines the faqih’s authority over the people: “In 
the Islamic Republic of Iran… The sovereignty of the command [of God] and religious 
leadership of the community [of believers] is the responsibility of the jurisprudent 
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(faqih) who is just, pious, courageous, knowledgeable about his era, a capable 
administrator, and is recognised and accepted by the majority of people as leader.”51  
In addition to these characteristics, he should also have “scholarly 
qualifications and piety for issuing religious rulings (fatva) and serving as the marja,’” 
as well as “political and social insight, courage, power and sufficient administrative 
abilities for leadership.”52  
The Constitution also established the Assembly of Experts, which comprises 
high-ranking clerics who are elected after a vetting process. Its main responsibility is 
the selection of the Supreme Leader and even has the authority to dismiss the leader if 
“he is incapable of fulfilling his legal responsibilities,” or “becomes deficient in one 
of the qualifications,” or “from the offset he has been lacking in some of the 
qualifications.”53 However, since the vetting of this assembly is exercised by the 
Guardian Council (GC), whose members are directly appointed by the Supreme 
Leader, he can use his authority to ensure the composition of the Assembly remains 
loyal to him.  
According to Article 110, the authority of the Supreme Leader is almost 
extensively over all institutions and official bodies of government. He has power over 
the military, the GC, the judiciary, the economic foundations and religious institutions. 
He also signs the decrees appointing the President after an election and dismissing him 
after impeachment. This Constitutional preparatory made the Supreme Leader the 
main pillar of the regime.  
In this Constitution, the position of Supreme Leader was tailored for Khomeini. 
The criteria of being sources of imitation (Marja’-e Taqlid) made the Supreme Leader 
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respected due to his religious credentials. However, the additional criteria requiring 
the Supreme Leader to be proficient in administrative issues made him a political 
figure who should guide the nation to its historical/revolutionary goal of reaching the 
utopian vision, whilst standing above the factional infighting as a spiritual mentor.  
Khomeini “fulfilled this dual function, given the respect he inspired because of 
his roles in the revolution and the establishment of the IRI, in addition to his clerical 
ranking and charismatic authority. Khomeini, as the leader, sat above all other 
institutions and factions, leaning primarily on no-one, and playing one against 
another.”54 Yet, no successor could have played such a role fully, given that any 
successor would lack the charismatic authority of the father figure of the revolution.  
Though, to accommodate political reality, certain political and institutional 
aspects of this Constitutional position had to be changed. By the time of his death, 
Khomeini ordered the establishment of a new assembly to revise the Constitution in 
order to solve increasing institutional deadlocks and utilise the Supreme Leader’s 
institution for the possible successor.  
In the new Constitution, the leadership council and condition of being the grand 
Ayatollah (Marja’iyyat), were dropped and the main criteria became the Leader’s 
sociopolitical knowledge. The responsibilities of the Supreme Leader were expanded 
in two ways. He came to determine the overall policies of the IRI after consultation 
with the Expediency Council; and, “Supervision of the proper execution of the general 
policies of the system."55 Although the goal of this revision was to solve the inherent 
Constitutional contradictions between different state institutions, the new Constitution 
left many of them untouched. Therefore, these moves added to the existing complexity 
of the context of factional politics and gave momentum to the future popularisation of 
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factional politics.  
The institutionalisation of Khomeinism created several revolutionary 
institutions, touching on almost all aspects of social, cultural, economic and political 
life. These institutions gained their legitimacy through the need to safeguard the 
revolution or its Islamic nature. Sitting on the top of these guardian institutions 
remained the Supreme Leader with his institutional authority. 
Three months after the revolution, Khomeini issued a decree establishing the 
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC). Its mission is to safeguard the revolution. 
The IRGC was established to organise revolutionary armed groups which emerged 
during the revolution. They were meant to be an alternative military force to the army, 
given the Khomeinists’ lack of confidence in the army and their fear of a possible 
coup.56 Article 150 of the Constitution institutionalised the role of the IRGC: “The 
Islamic Revolution Guards Corps… will remain in effect in order to continue its role 
of protecting the revolution and its achievements.”57  
The ambiguities hidden in the term “guarding the revolution and its 
achievements” gave the IRGC enough room to justify its different interventions and 
policies over time. When Khomeini was alive the IRGC could not act independently. 
However, after his death, and with the pluralisation of Khomeinism, the IRGC justified 
its activities under the claims of defending the revolution and its achievements based 
on its claims of having the correct interpretation of Khomeinism. The republican 
pillars have little or no scrutiny over the IRGC. Efforts during the Rafsanjani and 
Khatami eras to bring it under the control of the Executive Republican branch were 
unsuccessful.  
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However, in response to these attempts of the Executive branch, and due to the 
dynamics of factional politics, the links between the IRGC and the Supreme 
Leadership Office (SLO) increasingly strengthened, given their institutional ties. The 
Supreme Leader enjoys the IRGC’s loyalty in exchange for providing them protection 
against the republican bodies. With its financial empowerment and sociopolitical 
activities, the IRGC became a very influential player in factional politics and in the 
institutional power balance of the post-Khomeini era.  
The revolutionary/Islamic pillar of the IRI encompasses a political-economic 
system to ensure the protection of its economic and political interests. The main pillars 
of this system are economic foundations (bonyads). These institutions emerged to 
fulfil socioeconomic promises of the revolution for part of its main supporters. Some 
of these foundations represented the institutionalisation of part of the traditional 
religious role of clerics, such as management of endowments and religious incomes of 
holy shrines and their estates.  
Similar to the leftists’ push for social justice, Khomeini’s slogan of the 
“government of ‘downtrodden’” was one of the main factors in unifying the lower and 
lower-middle-class’ support behind the revolution. Thus, soon after the revolution, 
these foundations were established to respond to the socioeconomic needs of these 
groups. They are charity organisations independent of republican institutions. They 
soon evolved into one of the main political and financial sources of the revolutionary 
institutions. For instance, weeks after the revolution, bonyad-e Mostazafan (later 
bonyad-e Janbazan va Mostazafan) the Foundation of the Downtrodden, was 
established.  
The Mostazafan Foundation soon became one of the IRI’s financial behemoths 
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with assets of more than 20 billion dollars by the late 1980s.58  Even though the 
combined budget of the foundations is almost half of the state budget, the Executive 
Branch has almost no oversight over their activities. The foundations are accountable 
only to the SLO. Their dependence on the SLO provides them with certain protection 
against the attempts of republican institutions to reform their special conditions of tax 
exemption and/or their financial activities. These foundations play a crucial political 
and economic role, given they employ a large part of the labour force directly or 
indirectly and offer certain social welfare services to the families of the lower class 
and the families of their workers.  
The SLO ensures the protection of the political and economic interests of the 
revolutionary institutions in other ways. The SLO, as commander of all armed forces, 
controls the security, police and military institutions. Amongst these forces, such as 
Basij and IRGC, some are autonomous from the oversight of any republican 
institution, and a few are unofficially linked to the SLO, such as Ansar-e Hezbollah 
and plain-clothes militia, (‘lebas shakhsi’).  
‘Harasat’ is a division in all state administrative organisations and educational 
institutions, responsible for matters of security, and controlling the personnel’s 
adherence to IRI cultural and political norms. Purging Committees ‘Gozinesh,' 
responsible for ensuring the morality and Islamic revolutionary adherence of the 
personnel, are active in government organisations and educational institutions. 
Importantly, the Organisation of Islamic Propaganda is under the control of the SLO. 
Its main duties are “propagation of Islamic thoughts”, “defending the Revolution’s 
ideals” and “uncovering the cultural conspiracies of IRI’s enemies." 59  Islamic 
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associations in the industries and other state organisations empower this control over 
society.  
In the universities, in addition to Harasat and the Purging Committee, the 
University Basij and representatives of vali-ye faqih, the University Jihad had been 
established after the revolution following the cultural revolution with the responsibility 
of Islamicisation of the universities under the direct supervision of the Supreme 
Council for the Cultural Revolution (SCCR). The Friday Prayer Leader (FPL) is 
another important position playing a significant role in state propaganda and protecting 
the political-cultural interests of the revolutionary institutions. The Supreme Leader 
directly appoints its Leaders.  
Thus, they enjoy greater authority compared to state representatives, such as 
mayors and governors. After the revolution FPL became the symbol of the IRI’s 
“ideological power on the local level, [which] concentrates on propagation and the 
defence of the concept of velayat-e faqih and the expression of the political viewpoints 
of the regime’s top political clerics in the revolutionary institutions.”60 
The 12-member GC, the upper house of parliament, is a main revolutionary 
supervisory body that checks the power of the republican lower house of parliament, 
the Majlis. The GC comprises six jurists in Islamic ordinance, appointed directly by 
the Supreme Leader and six specialists in the IRI civil law. The civil jurists are 
nominated by the head of the judiciary and appointed by the Majlis. Based on the 
Constitution, the GC has two main responsibilities. First, it must ensure legislation 
passed by the Majlis is compatible with the Constitution and the Islamic precepts.61  
If the GC finds passed legislation against the Constitution or Islamic criteria, it 
will send it back to the popularly elected Majlis. Second, the GC considers itself 
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responsible for ‘supervision’ and oversight of almost all state elections and 
referendums, from the Presidency to the AofE. A series of deadlocks soon emerged 
between the GC and other republican institutions, in particular, the Majlis. The GC 
judges legislation based on its interpretation of Khomeinism. Thus, with the 
emergence of different readings of Khomeinism, the tensions between the GC and the 
Majlis escalated over time. During the Khomeini era, these disputes were mostly 
settled by the direct or indirect intervention of Khomeini. However, after his death, 
settling these deadlocks became another source of tension between different factions, 
and the subject of public debates.  
The GC’s supervisory role in elections is one of the main reflections of tension 
between revolutionary guardianship and different aspects of republicanism. It is a tool 
which enables the GC to influence the elections directly by implementing a selective 
approach towards different political groups. This prerogative of the GC has been the 
subject of many factional and political debates.  
Initially, the GC used to vet the cases of only those proposed candidates whose 
credentials were rejected by the ‘Supervisory Committee.' The Supervisory Committee 
was a body under the control of the Interior Ministry responsible for vetting Majlis 
candidates. Thus, the GC could theoretically expand the competitive aspects of the 
election. However, the GC changed its vetting process which all the candidates had to 
pass. Thus, the GC used its position as a powerful political tool to contain and to 
control the power of different political groups. By the election to the second Majlis, in 
1984 the GC eliminated moderate liberal MPs, claiming they were against the velayat-
e faqih thesis. Later on, in 1991, the GC interpreted its supervisory role as ‘mandatory’ 
(estesvabi) and ‘comprehensive’ (’am) supervision.  
Consequently, it expanded its control over the electoral processes even further. 
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The GC expanded its vetting criteria to approve only those potential candidates who 
had shown their Islamic convictions and loyalty to the regime and importantly the 
velayat-e mutlaqeh-ye faqih thesis. 62  The GC increasingly used its revolutionary 
institutional power for political purposes. The members of the GC, actively involved 
in factional politics, used their institutional prerogative for political and factional 
purposes.  
Through vetting, they removed their factional rivals.63 The changes in the GC’s 
responsibilities faced the opposition of the Majlis, but mostly due to the Khamenei’s 
intervention as the Supreme Leader, these regulations passed. However, the attempt to 
reform the election law and the GC’s prerogatives remained one of the main factional 
political issues reflecting deeper tensions between the revolutionary element and the 
republicanism of the IRI. 
One of the main reflections of the republicanism of Khomeinism is the lower 
house of parliament, the Majlis. Based on the Constitution, the Majlis enjoys a wide 
range of duties and responsibilities, including legislative and “examining all the affairs 
of the country.”64 MPs are elected through multi-candidate elections and each MP “has 
the right to express his views on all internal and external affairs of the nation.”65  
The Majlis establishes laws, drafts and passes legislation, and approves 
International treaties, protocols, contracts and agreements.66 It is responsible for the 
examination and approval of the annual budget, approval of government’s “taking and 
giving of loans or grants-in-aid, domestic and foreign,”67 and approval of any state-of-
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emergency. All ministers need to obtain a vote of confidence from the Majlis. The 
Majlis can remove ministers and even the President from office. Khomeini 
continuously emphasised the importance of the Majlis. He called it “the head of the 
establishment of the IRI.”68 In the post-Khomeini era and during the Khatami period, 
the Reformists propagated themselves as true Khomeinists. They referred to these 
expressed views of Khomeini to push their agenda. However, Khomeini’s position, as 
well as that of the Constitution, remains ambiguous. 
The question of the IRI’s source of sovereignty was discussed in the debates 
prior to the ratification of the Constitution in 1979 and in the debates during its revision 
in 1988. During the Khatami era, this ambiguity in the Constitution of the IRI’s source 
of sovereignty became a hotly debated political and factional issue. Article 2 of the 
Constitution considers divine sovereignty as the main source of the IRI legitimacy.  
It defines the IRI as its belief in “one God (“There is no God but God”), the 
exclusive attribution of sovereignty and the legislation of law to Him, and the necessity 
of surrender to His commands.”69 Article 56 reaffirms, “absolute sovereignty over the 
world and the human being belongs to God.” However, it also considers God made 
people “sovereign over their social destiny. No one can take this divine right away 
from human beings or apply it to the interests of a special person or group.” 70 
Expressly, people are considered “trustee[s] of sovereignty.”  
Khomeini strengthened the SLO by considering its ‘guardianship’ (velayat) 
‘absolute,' which was then institutionalised in the revised Constitution under the new 
title of velayat-e motlaqeh-ye faqih. This made the question of sovereignty further 
ambiguous. This Constitutional contradiction translated into tension between 
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revolutionary and republican state institutions. 
During the Khomeini era, the winner of the disputes between the Majlis and the 
GC largely depended on the position of Khomeini and not on the power of the people 
or their elected MPs. Although, after Khomeini’s death, this dynamic changed, to an 
extent. The institutional authority of the Majlis increased. Due to the escalation of 
factional politics and disputes between the Majlis and the GC, once again the 
settlement of the disputes was tied to the Supreme Leader’s intervention. However, 
given the new Supreme Leader did not enjoy the same charisma and authority of 
Khomeini, the justification of these interventions became a catalysing element in the 
popularisation of factional politics. 
Khomeini took several actions to resolve the legislative gridlock between the 
Majlis and the GC. In 1981, in the disputes between the Majlis and the GC over the 
bill of land reform, Khomeini gave the overriding right to the Majlis with reference to 
issues of the secondary ordinance, if the Majlis could reach a two-thirds majority.71 
Khomeini’s decree strengthened the Majlis’ position in relation to the GC.  
However, given the GC’s power to influence the political affiliation of 
candidates through pre-election vetting, in practice, Majlis remained in a weaker 
position compared to the GC and other revolutionary institutions. Khomeini’s 
intervention also confirmed the reliance of the Majlis on Khomeini’s unique position 
in its disputes with the GC. During this time, the Majlis had not yet evolved into an 
independent source of power rooted in its popular mandate. Rather, it remained mostly 
an assembly of the regime’s elites, which gained its legitimacy from MPs’ adherence 
to Khomeini and to the rhetorical revolutionary stance.  
Khomeini’s decree did not end the disputes between the GC and the Majlis. 
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These disputes were largely rooted in the different ideological views between the 
majority of the Majlis at the time and the GC. The Majlis was dominated by the 
Leftists, who believed in a strong central state nationalising many industries and 
economic sectors, as well as in the state’s role in establishing social justice. However, 
the GC’s conservative faqihs found the expansion of the role of the state, in particular, 
taxation and nationalisation, to be against the sanctity of private property in Islam. As 
a result, in February 1988, Khomeini ordered the establishment of a committee to settle 
the disputes between the GC and the Majlis. 
Khomeini’s order was accompanied by another controversial decree in which 
he prioritised ‘state interest’ (maslahat) over religious ordinances mentioned earlier. 
Thusly, in the revision of the Constitution in 1989, this committee was integrated as a 
new institution in charge of settling disputes between the GC and the Majlis and also 
consulting the Supreme Leader of the IRI’s general policies.72  
Following the prioritisation of ‘state interest’ by Khomeini’s decree, and the 
establishment of Expediency Council, the state interest became institutionalised. 
Identifying the ‘state interest,' in addition to two pre-existing sources of the law: the 
Constitution and sharia law weakened, in theory, the GC’s power. Nonetheless, 
although the Expediency Council is an upper body which can contain the power of the 
GC and support Majlis decisions, the structure of the Expediency Council guarantees 
the higher hand of the clerical revolutionary — guardian — elements of the IRI over 
its republican pillars. More than 28 members out of 32 or so permanent members of 
the Council are appointed by the Supreme Leader. 
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Executive Power 
Another republican aspect of Khomeinism is the Executive Branch. According to the 
Constitution, “after the leadership, the President of the Republic is the highest official 
of the country. He is responsible for executing the Constitution and heading the 
executive power."73 The Presidents elected in direct elections to a term of four years. 
He is limited to two consecutive terms. The GC is responsible for supervising the 
election and vetting candidates. GC’s vetting is one way revolutionary institutions 
practice control over the republican institutions and influence the procedure and the 
future outcome of the head of the republican institution.  
 Based on the revised Constitution, the President still enjoys a good degree of 
authority. He has the responsibility of forming the cabinet, implementing legislation 
and appointing “directors of the Plan and Budget Organisation," “the National Bank,” 
and the “National Iranian Oil Company.”74 He has the 'authority to sign treaties, 
protocols, contracts, and agreements.” He is a member of the Expediency Council, and 
the Chair of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), which is responsible for 
national security, defence, intelligence and foreign policy.  
 Once a candidate passes the vetting process of the GC and becomes the 
President by popular vote, he will have a power base separate from revolutionary 
institutions. However, this does not mean his popular legitimacy and/or his 
Constitutional authority can protect him and his political space from the influence of 
the revolutionary institutions.  
This brief introduction to the institutions of the Islamic Republic shows the 
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unique institutionalised hybrid nature of the IRI state. This hybridity not only leaves 
open the issue of the form and extent of republicanism and Islamism with the regime, 
it also produces intense factional politics and blends the two forms of factional politics 
described in the Introduction. 
Political Groups and Factions 
To understand the evolution of factional politics in the contemporary period, it is 
necessary to outline the dynamics of factional groups during the Khomeini period. 
This includes their main members and the major issues over which they fought. It is 
necessary to examine how Khomeini, as the father of the revolution and the IRI, 
struggled to manage their factional disputes. 
By 1983, Khomeini had purged the political arena of all groups opposing his 
idea of an Islamic Republic in which revolutionary institutions, and, in particular, the 
position of the Supreme Leader of the Revolution, dominated the country’s political 
life. Despite broad agreement amongst the various factions over the basis of these 
revolutionary institutions, from the beginning, they divided into two major factional 
groups: Conservative/Right, and Radical/Left. Throughout this thesis, the term 
‘Conservative's refers to a faction which includes various conservative political 
groups. This is also applicable to all other factions, namely the Leftists, the Reformists, 
the Modern Right and the neo-Conservatives.    
Conservatives 
The main clerical figures in this group at this time were Ahmad Azari Qomi, Ahmad 
Jannati, Mohammad Reza Mahdavi-Kani, Lotfollah Safi, Abolghasem Khazali, Ali 
Akbar Nateq Nuri, Mohammad Imami Kashani, and the present leader, Ali Khamenei. 
The Conservative's social base consists of traditional groups, such as merchants, 
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landowners, traders and the peasant population.  
 The alliance of merchants, traders and conservative clerics has a long history 
in Iranian politics. It was this alliance that opposed both the Qajar and the Pahlavi 
states and their moves in regard to state building, state taxation and ultimately 
economic modernisation. As the next chapter shows, this issue played a vital role in 
the split within the Conservative group during the mid-1990s, into ‘Old Right’ and 
‘Modern Right.’ 
The Conservative group has institutionalised its political power through the 
creation of political organisations through which they lobby the state and participate 
in electoral politics as allowed by the IRI Constitution. Their main organisations are:  
(1) The Society of Militant Clergy (JRM), (2) The Allied Islamic Society (hereafter 
Mo’talefeh), (3) Hamsu, (4) The Islamic Society of Engineers, (5) Zeynab Society, (6) 
The Islamic Society of Labourers, (7) The Islamic Association of Trades and Guilds, 
(8) The Islamic Society of Universities, (9) The Islamic Society of Students, (10) The 
Islamic Society of Teachers, (11) The Society of Tehran Preachers, (12) The Society 
of Qom Seminary Teachers (JMHEQ)  
JRM, Mo’talefeh and JMHEQ are the most important and politically active. 
Furthermore, their political positions have not evolved fundamentally since the 
Khomeini period. Their main propaganda outlets include the following newspapers: 
Kayhan, Resalat, Abrar, Jomhourieslami,75 Qods, Parto Sokhan, Feyziyyeh, Harim, 
and Siasat-e Ruz.76 
The JRM was established in 1974. Ayatollah Beheshti and Ayatollah 
Motahhari used it to establish a network capable of coordinating and spreading 
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Khomeini’s speeches and writings. During the revolution, it played an important role 
in mass mobilisation, and after the revolution, in the consolidation of Khomeini’s 
power.  
Members of this organisation who played– and, in most cases, still play-an 
important role in factional politics are Ali Khamenei, Mohammad Javad Bahonar, Ali 
Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Mohammad Mofatteh, Mahdavi Kani, and Hadi Ghaffari. 
With the evolution of popularisation of factional politics, some of these members 
including Rafsanjani became the influential figures in newly emerged factions.   
Radicals 
The Radicals or the Leftists were influenced by Western ideas of social revolution but 
within an Islamic context. Morteza Mardiha, one thinker in Iran, summed up their 
belief system: “political authoritarianism, anti-Westernism, a search for an Islamic 
utopian modernity, use of violence to achieve goals and great sensitivity to morals and 
especially sex… and the absolute defense of clergy as a historical duty.”77 They regard 
imperialism, moral corruption and capitalism to be their main targets. At the beginning 
of the revolution, they enthusiastically supported the idea of creating a homo Islamicus 
and the cultural revolution's methods and goals were similar to cultural revolutions in 
Stalinist USSR and Mao’s China. 
The leading members of this group, many of whom still play important roles in 
the IRI, are Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mohammad Mousavi Khoeiniha, Ali Akbar 
Mohtashamipur, Behzad Nabavi, Mir Karim Mousavi Ardabili, Mehdi Karroubi, 
Saeed Hajjarian, and Mohammad Hossein Beheshti and Hossein Ali Montazeri. Their 
main social support base were the lower and lower-middle-classes, and the young 
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generation of clerics who “were heavily drawn from humbler, rural and small-town 
backgrounds. For them, the Islamic Revolution would create avenues of rapid upward 
social mobility.”78 
Besides constituting an important faction in the Islamic Republic Party before 
its dissolution due to factional fighting, they institutionalised their political presence 
within the following organisations: (1) The Crusaders of the Islamic Revolution 
(Mojaheddin-e Enqelab-e Islami MII), which was an armed organisation at the 
beginning of the revolution; (2) The Office of Strengthening of Unity (Daftar-e 
Tahkim-e Vahdat OSU); and (3) The Committee of the Islamic Revolution.  
In 1988, a new powerful organisation was added, the Association of Combatant 
Clerics (Majma’ Rohaniyyat-e Mobarez, MRM). By the mid-1980s, personality and 
ideological differences in the JRM had paralysed it, which convinced its Leftist clerical 
members to split from it and create MRM. This moment was of particular importance 
because even Khomeini proved unable to maintain personal and ideological unity in 
the most important clerical political organisation. The major clerics establishing it 
were Karroubi, Mousavi Khuiniha, Doaei, Mohammad Tavassoli, Mohammad 
Khatami, Mohammad Jamarani, Hassan Sane’i and Sadeq Khalkhali. The split in the 
JRM mirrored that of 1987 in the IRP, due to increasing personal and political tensions 
between the two factions. 
Besides the personality clashes which played an important role in the evolution 
of factional politics, several major ideological issues divided them, namely economic 
policy, foreign policy, social policy and ultimately the source of Islamic jurisprudence 
and therefore Islamic governance. The role of personality clashes is examined in the 
following chapters. The goal here is to outline the ideological and political sources of 
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conflict to contextualise factional politics in the post-Khomeini period. 
Despite Khomeini’s emphasis on the necessity of establishing and perpetuating 
Islamic characteristics in all areas of policy, he provided little theoretical or practical 
advice regarding specific policies. The first major,  ongoing clash touches on economic 
policy. The Leftists/Radicals, who believed the establishment of social justice was a 
primary goal of the Islamic Revolution, supported state intervention in the economy 
and in the redistribution of wealth.  
This followed Khomeini’s emphasis that the revolution should serve the 
material and social interests of the downtrodden. For this group, Islam meant social 
justice. The Conservatives opposed this role for the state. They believed, as did their 
social base, class differences were divinely ordained. They also believed the state had 
no real role in wealth redistribution, including land reform, owning parts of the 
economy, and tax collection. Mohammad Reza Bahonar, the prominent Conservative, 
an MP for eight terms, and First Deputy Speaker of the ninth Majlis (2011–2012), 
considers economic differences to be the main issue that gave momentum to factional 
politics in this period. At this time he was an active member of the political elite:  
The formation of the Left and Right… was based on economic 
issues which then evolved to include other areas like politics and 
finally led to [the formation of the] Reformists and neo-
Conservatives (of today)… The issue was that some believed that 
the People’s Labour should belong to the people themselves. 
While others believed that the state should have the right to use 
its power and position in something larger, called the national 
interest (in other words the achievement of social justice). We 
who believed in the former have been called the Right and those 
who supported the latter were called the Left... We believed in 
the private sector and they believed in the state’s (central) 
position in the economy.79 
 
The battle between these groups started soon after the victory of the revolution. 
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In 1981, Radical/Leftist members of the Majlis suggested a land reform bill to 
distribute “land to landless peasants” similar to the one the Shah introduced as part of 
his White Revolution.80 It was controversial since Khomeini had opposed the Shah’s 
land reforms, calling them contradictory to Islam.81 The bill was rejected by the GC.  
Rafsanjani, then Speaker of the Majlis, sent a letter to Khomeini asking him to 
mediate between the two legislative bodies. Khomeini replied: “The enactment or 
execution of those laws, which will be necessary for the endurance of the Islamic 
Republic regime, are permissible on a temporary basis and so long as there is an 
overriding rule.”82 With this decree, Khomeini not only greatly boosted the political 
fortunes and strength of Mousavi and the Leftists, he also forced a public retreat by 
the Conservative-dominated GC. The Rightists were outraged, but they were limited 
in what they could do against Khomeini. In the end, Ayatollah Safi Golpaygani, in a 
letter implicitly criticised Khomeini’s action.83 
Despite his first decree, tensions remained between the two groups, and in 
particular between the Majlis and the GC. The Majlis, frustrated with Conservative 
obstructionism, once again asked Khomeini for direct intervention. In a message on 
13 March 1983, after praising the performance of both these institutions, Khomeini 
stated, the Majlis has priority in legislative matters and it “is situated on top of all other 
institutions."84  
It was at this time, Khomeini gave the Majlis the GC ‘veto-busting’ right 
mentioned in the previous section. Although Khomeini’s message and move seemed 
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to temper the tension between the two bodies, factional battles soon reappeared. This 
time, the struggle was over labour law, Tazirat (discretionary punishment) and the 
nationalisation of foreign trade, issues which touched on the role of the state and 
threatened the interests of groups supporting the Right.85  During the First Majlis 
(1980–1984), the GC sent back 102 out of 370 bills; during the Second Majlis, 118 out 
of 316; and during the Third, 96 out of 245. The majority of the rejected bills dealt 
with some aspect of economic policy. 
The factional struggles over economic policy also involved a battle between 
Khamenei, the president, and Mousavi, the Prime Minister. They are cousins who even 
before this confrontation had a history of personal confrontations in a familial context. 
Regarding economic issues, Khamenei was a Rightist while Mousavi was a Leftist. In 
1985, in the aftermath of his re-election to the Presidency, Khamenei moved against 
the Leftists and refused to re-appoint Mousavi as prime minister despite Khomeini’s 
open support for Mousavi.  
Khamenei, however, could not stand up to Khomeini, especially after his 
publication of a letter in which Khomeini stated: “I consider Mr. Mousavi a religious 
and responsible person. Despite the country’s complex situation, his government has 
been successful. I do not believe that the change in government is in the best interest 
of the country, given the current situation…”86 Mousavi remained despite Khomeini’s 
support not only of Mousavi, but also the Leftists’ approach to economic policy.  
The Conservatives in the Majlis, especially in the GC, continued to assail him 
and the Leftists over economic issues.87 As detailed later, this public humiliation of 
Khamenei at the hands of Khomeini, and to the benefit of Mousavi, not only greatly 
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86 Khomeini, Sahifeh, vol. 19, 213.  
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exacerbated existing personal and ideological hostility between these two men, it also 
played no small role in Khamenei’s opposition to Mousavi in the 2009 Presidential 
elections. 
Khomeini’s frustration with the ongoing factional politics over economic 
policy and the Rightists’ continued attempts to undermine leftist economic policies 
reached another peak in 1987. In December of that year, the Leftist Minister of Labour, 
Abolqasem Sarhadizadeh, with the support of Mousavi and out of frustration with the 
GC, sent a letter to Khomeini asking him whether the government could provide 
services such as water, telephone and electricity for the private sector, and in exchange 
have the private sector operate within rules and regulations established by the Ministry.  
In his response, Khomeini said, “The government can impose such necessary 
conditions.” Khomeini once again acted publicly in support of the Leftists, including 
Rafsanjani, against the Rightists. Sarhadizadeh then announced, “given Khomeini’s 
decree, the state can regulate prices as well as exercise control over medical and 
socioeconomic services.”88 
The Rightists, not happy with this repeated public support of the Leftists, sent 
a letter asking Khomeini to provide more detail on this latest decree. The letter asked 
whether it was true that the state was now empowered to replace traditional Islamic 
laws and socioeconomic systems as a result of this decree. Khomeini repeated his 
decree and stressed the right of the state to regulate medical and socioeconomic 
services.  
A few weeks later, at Friday prayer in Tehran, Khamenei provided his 
interpretation of Khomeini’s decree. The President stated, although the state enjoyed 
great power, its field of action was limited by the parameters of ‘holy Islamic 
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injunctions.’ A few days later, Khomeini once again publicly humiliated Khamenei by 
saying, “Clearly he did not understand my ruling.”89 
Although Khomeini could not put an end to the factional and personal struggles 
associated with the making of economic policy, he stepped in at key moments to back 
the Leftists against the Rightists. Yet he still did not state a clear position with regard 
to the elements of an Islamic economic policy. Given this ambiguity, Khomeini 
ensured the factional and personal struggles over this issue would play a large role in 
the IRI’s political arena after his passing. 
The second issue dividing the Left and Right, towards the end of the Khomeini 
period, was the type and the extent of social restrictions imposed from above in pursuit 
of the construction of homo Islamicus. The Rightists considered social and moral 
restrictions to be at the heart of the Islamic Revolution. By 1987, the Leftists, although 
still wary of Western cultural and moral influences, lobbied for a lessening of such 
restrictions. Some 30 percent of Majlis bills rejected by the GC in the period 1985–
1987 reflected attempts to lessen these restrictions. Khomeini was finally pulled into 
this struggle. He issued a decree lessening some social restrictions.  
The Rightists protested. Khomeini humiliated his rightist critics: “I must 
express my regret at your interpretation of holy decrees. Based on your views, modern 
civilisation must be annihilated and we must all go and live forever in caves and the 
desert. I advise you to take God into account and not be influenced by ‘pseudo-
religious’ and ‘uneducated clerics’ (akhunds).”90 
Similar to economic policy, despite his support for Leftist attempts to be more 
flexible on social issues, Khomeini did not provide theoretical and practical principles 
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with regard to the extent of this flexibility. This lapse ensured social issues would 
become a major dividing line between the groups. By publicly humiliating the 
Rightists, he ensured they would seek some form of revenge on the Leftists once the 
father of the revolution had passed away. 
The third issue is foreign policy. The Conservatives, although anti-imperialistic 
and wary of signs of Western, and especially the US, political influence over the 
country, did not believe in a perpetual struggle between the Islamic Republic and the 
US. Moreover, they were not great supporters of the export of the revolution. The 
Leftists had a more radical approach to foreign policy. They believed in the export of 
revolution, regarding it as necessary for its survival, and condemned any form of 
relations with the US.  
The Leftists were the ones who took over the US embassy in November 1979, 
to the surprise of Khomeini and the Rightists. Only after seeing the great popular 
support for taking the embassy staff hostage and the great public animosity towards 
the US, did Khomeini and other Rightists begin to adopt a more radical approach. 
Nonetheless, during the Khomeini period, they remained more pragmatic towards the 
West and the US in particular. At the same time, the rhetorical popularisation of 
foreign policy became a tool for the regime to mobilise the masses around the regime. 
Although Khomeini was attracted to the Leftist approach to foreign policy, he 
nonetheless remained a political realist. At the height of the Iran–Iraq War, Tehran 
needed arms and military spare parts from the US. In 1985, a secret deal was made 
between Washington and Tehran according to which the US would indirectly provide 
Iran with these. In exchange, Tehran would use its influence in Lebanon to obtain the 
release of US hostages held by Hezbollah. Khomeini’s and Reagan’s names were kept 
out of these negotiations and eventual agreement. 
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A group of Leftists were outraged over this move by Rightists particularly 
Rafsanjani. Thus, in 1986, Mehdi Hashemi, a Leftist cleric who was the brother of 
Ayatollah Montazeri’s son-in-law, leaked the news of this double-dealing with the US 
to a newspaper, which started the scandal known as Irangate or Iran–Contra. The IRI 
political establishment, fearful of public reaction, was shaken to its core. While calling 
on people to chant ‘Down with America’ after Friday prayers, the elite was making 
secret deals with ‘the Great Satan.' Khomeini denied any knowledge of the deal. He 
did, however, have Mehdi Hashemi brought to trial on another charge. One year after 
the leaking of the deal, Mehdi Hashemi was found guilty of being ‘a sower of 
corruption on earth’ and was executed. 
In sum, before his death, Khomeini left ambiguity over how to approach the 
US. His actions indicated, if it was in the interests of the state, the IRI could deal with 
the US. However, in rhetorical terms, he remained a firm opponent of the US, an 
enmity which remained a bedrock of IRI ideology. This left ample room for factional 
struggles over the re-establishment of relations with the US, which were exacerbated 
by the importance of this issue as the rhetorical popularisation of foreign policy 
gradually evolved into electoral popularisation from the end of the 1990s, as 
subsequent chapters show. 
The principal issue from which these issues and the consequent divisions arise 
revolves around Islamic jurisprudence and thus Islamic governance. The debate was, 
and remains, framed around the concepts of traditional (sonnati) and dynamic (puya) 
religious jurisprudence (feqh). The difference between these two concepts is in their 
response to the question of how feqh and ejtehad should respond to modern-day issues. 
Traditional feqh rejected any major changes in the basic tenets of IRI ideology and 
claimed, to construct the ideal society in this world. Additionally, it claimed the IRI 
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must advance towards a political and social system that existed during the time of the 
Prophet Mohammad. All the necessities for governing society, in order to reach the 
ideal Islamic society, exist in the main sources of Shi’ia Islam: Quran and Sunnah. The 
Rightists support this traditional feqh.  
Dynamic feqh, supported by the Leftists, acknowledge Islamic doctrines can 
offer a comprehensive base for the IRI. Broadly speaking, they believe jurisprudence 
is similar to other disciplines of knowledge. Thus, it is influenced by new findings and 
the accumulation of knowledge in other areas. They argue, similar to other social 
sciences, the epistemological conception of feqh should be changed over time and the 
modern philosophical tools of thinking, such as logical reasoning, should be applied 
in feqh. As a result, they believe Quran and Sonnah can provide enough theoretical 
and ideological material in governing society, provided new sources of ejtehad, like 
time and human experience, are taken into account.91  
Consequently, followers of fiqh-e puya argue, in order to fulfil the 
socioeconomic and political ideals of revolution, republican and/or revolutionary 
aspects of the IRI should be adapted to modern forms by the use of secondary 
ordinance. This is in contrast to followers of feqh-e sonnati belief “that it is revolution, 
the society, and the governing principles of the Islamic Republic that must adapt to the 
orthodox historical Shi’i jurisprudence.”92 
Khomeini, who left contradictory statements relating to this issue, seemed to 
be more concerned with the extent to which this debate was fueling factional struggles 
and exacerbating the personality clashes between the groups. “When those faithful to 
the revolution fight over the issues of traditional and dynamic feqh, they must 
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understand that this division is a symbol of enemy infiltration.”93 Despite his warnings, 
the factional groups continued to struggle over this issue, for its resolution would 
influence the politics of the IRI in all socioeconomic and political spheres.  
At times, Khomeini supported dynamic feqh:  
I am in favour of the traditional jurisprudence and Jawahiri 
ejtehad and do not allow for infringement of them. Ejtehad is the 
same correct method but it does not mean that the jurisprudence 
of Islam is not dynamic. Time and space are the two determining 
elements of ejtehad. An issue having a ruling in the past is 
apparently the same is94sue that a new ruling can possibly be 
found on the dominant relations of politics, society and 
economics of a system… The mujtahid should be knowledgeable 
of the issues of his own time.95  
 
On another occasion, by connecting ejtehad to sociopolitical insight, Khomeini 
underlined that the conventional ejtehad is not enough:  
In the Islamic government, the gate of ejtehad must always be 
open and the nature of the revolution and the system always 
requires deductive-juristic views in various areas… Yet, what is 
important is the correct understanding of the government and 
society on the basis of which the Islamic system could set a 
program for the benefit of the Muslims wherein the unity of the 
policy and action is necessary, and on account of this that the 
conventional ejtehad in the religious seminaries is not enough. In 
fact, if one person is the most learned in the specified sciences in 
the religious seminaries, but could not identify the interest of the 
society or could not distinguish the righteous and important 
persons from the unrighteous ones and, in general, lacks the 
correct insight and power of decision-making on social and 
political aspects, that person is not mujtahid on social and 
governmental issues and cannot administer the affairs of 
society.96 
 
Yet, he also expressed his strong support of feqh-e Sonnati:  
 
                                                 
93 Khomeini, Sahifeh, vol. 21, 145. 
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The academic matter should be such that the traditional 
jurisprudence is not forgotten. That which has preserved Islam 
up to now has been the same traditional jurisprudence. All efforts 
must be exerted to preserve jurisprudence as it is. It is possible 
for some individuals to say that a new jurisprudence should be 
conceived, and that is the beginning of destruction of the 
theological seminaries. One must be vigilant about it.97  
 
In his will, he stressed,  
I humbly and earnestly advise the Muslim community to follow 
the infallible Imams and the political, social, economic and 
military teachings and culture of these great guides to humanity 
with devotion, sincerity and sacrifice. I would like to enjoin all 
of you to safeguard and observe the feqh-e sonnati (traditional 
jurisprudence) or religious canons. These set forth the schools of 
Prophetic mission and Imamate and guarantee the growth and 
development of the nations through their primary and secondary 
decrees.98 
 
 In sum, Khomeini’s approach to this issue provided factions with the ability to 
advocate contradictory versions of this issue while claiming to be representatives of 
true Khomeinism.  
Conclusion 
In sum, the first section of this chapter introduced the components of Khomeinism and 
the contradictions emerging as a result of Khomeini’s reaction to changing 
circumstances and events. This sets the framework for understanding the ideological 
causes of factional struggles. The second section outlined the institutional hybrid 
structure of the IRI, which is divided between republican and revolutionary Islamic 
institutions, both of which symbolise the dual promises of republicanism and Islamism 
at the heart of the revolutionary and post-revolutionary ideology.  
 This hybrid structure, in turn, produces intense factional struggles and provides 
the conditions for the emergence of two forms of factional struggles, one in the 
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electoral arena, the other within the institutional context of the Leader, simultaneously 
conducted by the groups. The last section provided an outline of the two major factions 
during the Khomeini period and the ideological causes for their struggles. Collectively, 
these three sections have provided the institutional, historical and ideological 
background of the IRI. They also provide insight into the factional politics necessary 
for an examination of this thesis’ main research questions. It deals primarily with the 
evolution and dynamics of factional politics from the end of the Rafsanjani period, as 
well as with the influence of personal links and relationships on this evolution. 
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Chapter Two 
Politics Factional of Emergence The Two: Chapter 
This chapter details how the socioeconomic and geopolitical challenges facing the IRI 
after the death of Khomeini and the end of the Iran-Iraq War, in the context of its 
Constitutional contradictions, ideological dynamics, and rivalries among political 
elites,  specifically, between Rafsanjani, the President, and Khamenei, the Supreme 
Leader, led to the expansion and popularisation of factional politics. In this process, 
the Rafsanjani Presidency (1989–1997) played a vital role. 
  During this Presidency the political landscape was, to a significant degree, 
demarcated by four interacting elements: 1) social, economic and geopolitical 
challenges facing the IRI; 2) ideological ideas and paradigms inherited from 
Khomeini; 3) the institutional structure which engenders factional politics; and 4) 
human agency, with particular emphasis on the relationship between Rafsanjani and 
Khamenei.  
 This chapter first explores the relationship between Rafsanjani and Khamenei, 
their personalities and shared experiences until the time of Khomeini’s death. The 
second part examines how social and economic challenges in the IRI institutional 
structure, shaped and influenced ideological challenges. Particularly, how the IRI, 
similar to other revolutionary and/or ideological states, faced the challenge of 
reconciling ideology with the reality of governing an increasingly complex society. 
The third part examines how the interaction of human agency, factional struggles and 
hybrid characteristics of the IRI formed a dynamic that resulted in an increasingly 
influential role of popular politics in the political life of the IRI. 
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Rafsanjani – Khamenei 
The post-Khomeini Era has been overshadowed by the presence and actions of two 
main political figures: Ali Khamenei and Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. In the wake of 
Khomeini’s death, these two men formed a political union that aimed for dealing with 
the myriad of challenges mentioned above, implementing corresponding but limited 
changes in the IRI’s political and ideological agendas, and restricting the power of the 
Left which had benefited from Khomeini’s protection. Despite an old friendship that 
dated back to the early days of the struggle against the Pahlavi regime, both men hold 
different ideological and political views that are reflections of their individual life 
experiences. Thus, these differences, and the consequent power struggle between 
figures and institutions supporting them have influenced their relationship in the time 
covered here.  
Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (b.1934-2017) born to a well-off family of 
pistachio grove traders and owners. Rafsanjani became a student of Khomeini in 1956 
in the Qom Seminary. After the exile of Khomeini in 1964, Rafsanjani took charge of 
the finances of Khomeini’s Movement until the success of the revolution in 1979. This 
responsibility strengthened his relationship with members of the Bazar. Additionally, 
he held some responsibility for establishing contact between Khomeini’s Movement 
and other opposition groups.  
Consequently, he endured several prison sentences under the Pahlavi regime. 
During the 1978-79 uprising against the Shah, Rafsanjani was an active member of the 
Revolutionary Council, a position that led to a growing closeness between him and 
Khomeini. After the unexpected collapse of the Pahlavi state in January 1979, he 
played a major role in the consolidation of the new Islamic state. He was specifically  
involved in the purging of Bani Sadr (the first President of the IRI impeached in 1981); 
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the taming and containment of Tudeh, the main Communist party; and struggling 
against one of the leading threats to Khomeini, the ‘Sazman-e Mojahedin-e Khalgh-e 
Iran’ (hereafter MEK).1 Khomeini had great trust and confidence in Rafsanjani, a fact 
which added greatly to his formal and informal power.  
Although he was the Speaker of Majlis, his real formal and informal power was 
greater than the power which came with this position. For example, during the war, he 
assumed charge of the armed forces to manage the ongoing differences between their 
myriad branches. Given his special relationship with Khomeini, he became his 
representative in the armed forces. He was involved in the Iran-Contra affair and 
played an influential role in persuading Khomeini to end the Iran-Iraq War.2 
Seyyed Ali Khamenei (b.1939) almost five years younger than Rafsanjani, was 
born in a religious family. In contrast to Rafsanjani, he was raised in a poor family. 
His father was a seminary teacher.  He and two of his brothers followed their father’s 
path and became clerics. He joined Khomeini’s Movement in 1962 when he was a 
student of Khomeini in the Qom seminary (1959-1964). It was during this time he met 
Rafsanjani.  
After Khomeini’s exile, Khamenei, given his strong ‘oratorical skills,' became 
active in spreading Khomeini’s Movement, which led to his imprisonment and torture 
by SAVAK, the intelligence agency of the Pahlavi regime, and his subsequent exile to 
Sistan and Baluchestan in 1977. Although Khamenei was not in the initial core of the 
‘Revolutionary Council,' he joined the council soon after the revolution. After a short 
                                                 
1 MEK is an Islamic Leftist group which helped Khomeini in the overthrowing of the Pahlavi regime, 
but later came in conflict with the Khomeinist regime. As the conflict escalated, open war was 
announced on the IRI regime. 
2 Akbar Rafsanjani, Payan-e Defa Aghaz-e Baz Sazi [End of Resistance Begining of Reconstruction ] 
(Tehran, Iran: Nashr-i Ma'arif-i Imam, 2011).  
For Iran-Contra see: Daniel K Inouye and Lee H Hamilton, Report of the Congressional Committees 
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period as Minister of Defence in 1980, and following his survival of an assassination 
attempt, which left his right hand paralysed, he became President for two consecutive 
terms (1981-1989), enjoying Khomeini’s support. Importantly, at this time, the 
President’s office was less prominent than the Prime Minister’s office. With Khomeini 
as the leader, Rafsanjani as the Speaker of the Majlis, and Mousavi as the Prime 
Minister, Khamenei’s Presidential position was more ceremonial than executive.3  
Khamenei and Rafsanjani have had a long history together. For example, during 
the Pahlavi period, Rafsanjani helped Khamenei to hide from SAVAK. They shared 
the expenses of a house during the 1960s.4 Additionally, as admitted by Khamenei in 
his 1965 will, Rafsanjani supported Khamenei financially.5 After the revolution, with 
Rafsanjani’s recommendation, Khamenei attained membership in the ‘Revolutionary 
Council.' With Rafsanjani’s support, Khamenei obtained the Presidency a year later 
and finally became the Supreme Leader after Khomeini’s death.  
Despite their occasional political disagreements, they maintained a good 
relationship until at least 2009. They have had at least one unrecorded meeting every 
two weeks. They also publicly emphasised their good relationship; even in 2009, when 
their political relations were deteriorating, Rafsanjani called it a ‘lover’s relationship’ 
and underlined that “no one has been closer than me and Mr. Khamenei over the last 
50 years.”6  
In contrast to Rafsanjani, who had first-hand experience of the West, due to his 
many trips to various countries including the US, Khamenei’s views about the West, 
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especially the US, were primarily shaped by the enormous skepticism inherent in the 
post-1953 coup intellectual atmosphere in Iran, dominated by the discourses of Third 
Worldism and colonialism.7 During the 1960s and 1970s, the dominant intellectual 
view in Iran was: “anti-Western nostalgia symbolised through the concept of 
Gharbzadegi (Westoxication) [strong opposition to the idea of assimilation to the West 
without considering any cultural and identity premises which were advertised by some 
intellectuals in the early twentieth century].”8  
While Rafsanjani was more involved in the financial affairs of the revolution 
and public relations with various political groups, Khamenei was in touch with 
different circles of secular intellectuals. He was interested in music, literature and 
poetry. When comparing these two men, Rafsanjani displayed a strong sense of self-
esteem and, consequently, effective managerial skills. Khamenei arguably suffered 
from lower self-esteem.9  
The romanticisation of Iranian-Islamic nostalgia shaping the intellectual 
discourse of the pre-revolutionary period had made the re-reading of different 
historical political figures an intellectual trend. While Khamenei found intellectual 
comfort in Seyyed Qutb’s views, Rafsanjani became fascinated with modernisers, 
specifically Amir Kabir, who in the mid nineteenth century initiated economic and 
cultural reforms aimed at modernising Iran.10  
Amir Kabir’s tragic death made him a national hero. After finishing courses in 
Qom Seminary and following his first book about Palestine, Rafsanjani published 
                                                 
7 Khamenei only traveled to the US for attendance to the 1987 UN General Assembly.    
8 A. Mirsepassi, Intellectual Discourse and the Politics of Modernization: Negotiating Modernity in 
Iran (Cambridge University Press, 2000): 65-95, 77. 
9 Morteza Mirdar, Khatarate Akbare Nateq Nouri [Memoir of Nateq Nouri] (2005).  
For example, Nouri noted that during Khamenei’s trip to China and North Korea, he was easily offended 
by perceived breaks in protocol.  
10 Amir Kabir (1807–1852) was an Iranian Prime Minister in the mid-19th century. 
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Amir Kabir: The Hero of the Struggle against Colonialism. Rafsanjani’s views about 
the role of Islam and clergy in the modern world and his ideas about development are 
portrayed in this book:11 
I wrote “Amir Kabir” so people could understand that, along with 
promoting piety and afterlife, the clergy also cares about the 
prosperity and earthly needs of people. I wrote it so Muslims can 
realise that if there is nothing but promoting piety and afterlife’s 
concerns in a society… this society would become more 
backward.12  
 
At the same time, Khamenei admired Seyyed Qutb, who was an Egyptian 
intellectual and activist theorising the need for an Islamic state. Qutb was executed by 
the regime of Gamal Abdol Naser in 1966. Khamenei translated three of Qutb’s books 
into Persian. Arguably, Qutb’s ideas had a strong effect on Khamenei’s already 
emerging anti-West world views.  
In the translated preface of Islam and the Problems of Civilisation, Khamenei 
argues: “alienation in the face of the ‘monstrous’ Western civilisation” has been the 
main threat to the Islamic nations. This ‘monster’ is “an expanding reality against the 
school of monotheism and humanity and… its incompatibility with human nature, has 
made Western civilisation unsustainable.” He argues, instead of helping mankind to 
achieve perfection and salvation, Western civilisation transformed people into slaves. 
Moreover, now that this civilisation is showing its “flaws and has to face its 
contradictions and its deep emptiness,” its followers are realising that,  
At the expense of technology and rapid modernisation, they had 
lost their humanity and human traditions… According to his 
(Seyyed Qutb’s) and our opinion, Islam is the only way out… 
And all other paths have no future other than that of confusion 
for mankind, given that they are the products of mankind. Only 
Islam… can lead mankind to attain knowledge, power and 
                                                 
11 Rafsanjani 12/2/1386 (2/May/2007), http://rafsanjani.ir/view.php?id=12090 code: 13095.  
12 Quoted in Abbas Shadlu, Ahzab Va Jenah-ha ye Siasi-e Iran-e Emruz [Political Parties in 
Contemporary Iran] (Vuzara, 2000): 115. 
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wisdom.13 
 
In sum, Rafsanjani supported more interaction with the West, in order to use its 
technological achievements to achieve modernisation. Meanwhile, Khamenei was 
worried about Western technologies and modernisation, as well as the effect they 
would have on the society. Thus he adhered to Third-Worldism and strong skepticism 
of interaction with the West. Eventually, these two seemingly contradictory 
approaches towards the world found their way into the power dynamic and factional 
struggles of the IRI and played a significant role in the views of factions and 
popularisation of factional politics. Nonetheless, until Khomeini’s death, Rafsanjani 
and Khamenei enjoyed a strong political and personal relationship. 
It is important to underline that once he became the Supreme Leader, Khamenei 
enjoyed great institutional power, but Rafsanjani had greater informal authority.14 
Khamenei lacked Khomeini’s charisma, religious authority and background as the 
father of the revolution. Additionally, a good number of the Leftists and Moderates, 
who had enjoyed the protection of Khomeini, worried that Khamenei may not support 
them as Khomeini had.  
This worry emerged as a result of the disagreement between Khamenei and 
Khomeini over the re-appointment of Mousavi. Rafsanjani, however, enjoyed strong 
public support from Khomeini. He had a popular reputation as a pragmatic manager 
with a deep knowledge of executive and administrative affairs.15 Rafsanjani had also 
maintained a good relationship with other political factions. He obtained the 
Presidency, a powerful institution, under the 1989 revised Constitution. 
                                                 
13 Seyyed Qutb, Eddeanam’ei 'alayh-e Tamaddon-e Gharb [Indictment against the Western 
Civilisation], trans. Ali Khamenei (Mashahad: Tous, 1970): 6-7. 
14 Mohsen M Milani, "The Evolution of the Iranian Presidency: From Bani Sadr to Rafsanjani," 
British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 20, no. 1 (1993): 95-6. 
15 Khomeini, Sahifeh, vol. 7, 435. 
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After Khomeini, the transition of power carried little factional tension. With the 
lobbying of Rafsanjani, along with the tacit, compromised agreement of different 
factions, Khamenei became the new Supreme Leader. The Right and the Left accepted 
this for different reasons. Given his economic views, Khamenei was assumed to be 
affiliated with the Conservatives. On the other hand, the Left considered Khamenei as 
a compromise candidate because, relative to other possible candidates, he was 
regarded as a Moderate.  
Moreover, the fact that Khamenei was not a Grand Ayatollah made him more 
vulnerable in factional disputes.16 These varied perceptions of Khamenei’s future role 
and the potential scale of his power, held by different factions, made his election 
unanimous. Two months later, along with the referendum for new amendments to the 
Constitution, Rafsanjani, Speaker of the Majlis for nine years, became president. 
Rafsanjani gained a majority vote of 96.1 per cent with a 53 percent participation 
rate.17  
During this period, the Conservatives and Rafsanjani’s cadres dominated the 
political arena. Khamenei and Rafsanjani were both members of the JRM. Armed with 
new Constitutional powers, almost all the IRI institutions were staffed by those who 
did not belong to the Left. With such a power dynamic, a new Era in the IRI began. 
Rafsanjani, with the initial support of Khamenei, undertook the economic 
developmental policies he deemed necessary in the face of the destruction brought by 
the long Iran-Iraq War. The details of these policies reflected his vision for the future 
of the IRI. However, their implementation required a considerable shift from the 
policies of the first decade of the IRI’s existence and from the ideological 
understanding of the base and goals of the revolution. This political-ideological 
                                                 
16  Khamenei, the Hojjatol Islam, a middle-ranked cleric, was not a Mojtahed or Marja.'  
17 Jomhurieslami 9/5/1368 (31/July/1989).  
84 
 
challenge had to be met before coherent implementation of the development plans 
could take place.  
The vacuum that emerged after the demise of Khomeini created conditions for 
the intensification of factional struggles as ideological production became 
decentralised and factional groups claimed to represent the true interpretation of 
Khomeinism. The serious economic, social and geopolitical challenges that faced the 
IRI gave great momentum to the factionalisation of politics, as political and policy 
responses to these challenges were sought by different groups.  
The search for these responses was complicated by the incomplete legacy of 
Khomeinism. Despite his establishment of a relatively organised political theory of an 
Islamic Republic, Khomeini could not and did not provide comprehensive outlines 
within Khomeinism in all other areas. Although the ‘velayat-e faqih’ thesis was 
institutionalised after the Constitution’s revision, by the time of his death, Khomeini 
left a contradictory set of opinions touching on different aspects of public and private 
life. This legacy made it possible for factions, to change their views completely. They 
were able to claim that they remained within the boundaries of Khomeinism, or to 
attack other faction’s views with the accusation of betraying Khomeini’s true path. 
According to Lefort, any ideological system that promises a utopia has a figure 
with ‘external’ objective knowledge of the truth and absolute power over ideological 
discourses. This ‘master’ has the ability to smooth over contradictions within the 
‘ideological discourse’ as it encounters the practicalities of governance. Consequently, 
within this ‘master,' ideology and legitimacy merge. Criticising the ‘grand master’ can 
be seen as delegitimising the ideology. With the death of the ‘grand master,' his role is 
divided amongst institutions and successor political elites.  
At the same time, successors and subsequent elites must link themselves to the 
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heritage of the ‘grand master’ and claim that their respective ideas and policies, as well 
as practices, are in fact true elements of the ‘grand master’s’ ideology and intuitions. 
In this respect, Iranian politics was no exception, and power struggles over different 
economic, social and cultural issues had to be framed within, and justified by 
Khomeinism.18  
Current literature agrees, broadly speaking, there are three main factions in the 
Rafsanjani era: the Conservatives (also known as the Right, the Traditional Right), the 
Traditional Left (also called the Left, Leftists and Radicals) and the Modern Right (the 
Technocrats, the Moderates and the Pragmatists). Moslem (2002) and Asr-e Ma 
introduced a fourth faction, named the ‘neo-Fundamentalists’ or the ‘New Left.’ 
However, in this study, this group is considered a pressure group of a particular faction, 
rather than an independent faction in itself. Given its characteristics, this issue will be 
discussed in the last section of this chapter.  
Challenges and Responses 
After the end of the war with Iraq and the death of Khomeini, the IRI faced potentially 
serious political and ideological problems resulting from geopolitical isolation, 
economic discontent, and growing social frustration.  Economically, the challenges 
were complex and difficult.19 Due to the exigencies of the war and the ideological 
beliefs of the Leftists, a statist economic system had emerged that engendered serious 
economic problems, such as stagflation, poor productivity, low real economic growth 
and consistently high unemployment rates.20   
 The low and lower-middle socioeconomic classes, who had supported 
                                                 
18 Shakibi, Khatami, 136.  
19 Farhang Rajaee, The Iran-Iraq War: The Politics of Aggression (University Press of Florida, 1993). 
20 Jahangir. Amuzegar, Iran's Economy under the Islamic Republic (I. B. Tauris, 1997). 
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Khomeini’s revolution and lost many lives in the war with Iraq felt that the 
revolutionary promises of social justice and welfare remained unfulfilled.21 After all, 
it was the slogan of social justice that had motivated these classes to back the 
revolution and then to become the backbone of the regime.  In this context, the memory 
of the strong economic growth of the Pahlavi Era was still alive. 
Economic discontent was not limited just to these classes. On the one hand, the 
professional and mercantile middle-class had endured a drop in their living standards, 
while remembering, as did other classes, the strong economic growth of the late 
Pahlavi era.  These groups were already culturally and politically hostile to the regime, 
resenting the state’s interference in their private lives. The Bazar, which had financed 
Khomeini’s revolution, found the government’s economic politics detrimental to their 
interests.22  
For example, the IRI introduced economic policies directly infringing on the 
Bazar’s interests, such as new taxation, land reform, new customs’ tariffs and 
nationalisation of foreign trade. Aggressive revolutionary foreign policies surrounding 
the thesis of the export of the revolution had made international trade more difficult.  
Lastly, by the end of the war, many urban areas were in ruins. The regime had to take 
care of an estimated one million veterans, more than half a million disabled veterans 
and more than 40,000 prisoners of war.23 
In sum, by the late 1980s, almost all economic indices signalled economic 
deterioration. In a Friday sermon, followed by an interview a week later, Rafsanjani 
summarised the economic obstacles of this time in 23 elements. The main points were: 
                                                 
21 Abrahamian, History, 177-189. 
22 Arang Keshavarzian, Bazaar and State in Iran: The Politics of the Tehran Marketplace (Cambridge 
University Press, 2007).  
23 Mehr News (22-September-2012). 
Statistics could be found at the Centre for Strategic Studies of Presidential Institution 
http://nahad.govir.ir/portal/Home/ShowPage.aspx?Object=News&Category.  
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the consequences of the war, domestic and international debt, the decrease in real 
income, extreme bureaucratic centralisation, unnecessary subsidies, a large income 
gap between rich and poor, the rising expectations of the people after the war, the flight 
of capital, inadequate tax income, and international isolation.24 All socioeconomic 
classes were in discontent and had specific expectations that the regime needed to 
address to avoid a political crisis.  
Khomeinism was an attempt to build a utopian modernity based on the premises 
of Islam, at the core of which was the creation of homo Islamicus. The efforts to meet 
this goal created serious problems that added to the regime’s worries on the economic 
front.  This created social discontent as the regime imposed restrictions on personal 
behaviour in public sphere and attempted to interfere in the people’s private sphere. 
Also, during this period a large post-revolutionary generation was born, eventually 
called the ‘60s’ generation (Because they were born in the 1360s of the solar Persian 
calendar (1980s)). They had no memories of the Pahlavi regime or the revolution. They 
resented both the social restrictions they faced and the declining economic 
opportunities.  
As a whole, people who were under the influence of some liberal norms, 
obtained two faces: one public, reflecting the Islamic values propagated by the state, 
and a private one, reflecting their personal lifestyle choices. During the periods of less 
sociocultural pressure that allowed limited public discussion, some of the components 
of this culture, such as ‘political secularism,' ‘private sexual life’ or ‘forbidden loves,' 
sparked public debates. 25   Khomeinism implemented the ‘Islamic Culture’ from 
above, but the liberal sociocultural norms with the nationalistic themes of Pahlavi 
                                                 
24 Rafsanjani 2/6/1370 (24/August/1991), http://rafsanjani.ir/view.php?id=12987; Rafsanjani 
18/5/1370 (9/August/1991), http://rafsanjani.ir/view.php?id=8508.  
25 Pardis Mahdavi, Passionate Uprisings: Iran's Sexual Revolution (Stanford University Press, 2009). 
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period continued to influence a large chunk of public opinion, despite the state’s 
suppression.  
Furthermore, the Islamicisation of social policy led to serious social problems. 
The most important of which for this work was the abolishment of the Pahlavi 
programme of birth control. This created a population boom, which was the regime’s 
goal. From 1976-1986, the population rose by 46 percent.26 The statist economy could 
not absorb the increase in those entering the job market. This dramatic increase in the 
population, especially in provincial and rural areas combined with the conditions of 
the war to create a massive migration to major cities as people sought work and 
security. These cities, such as Tehran, could not deal with these high rates of 
urbanization. The result was rising economic and social discontent. This further 
resulted in the spread of shantytowns at this period.  
During the war the regime was able to blame foreign enemies, namely the West 
and Iraq, for the problems facing the country. Yet, with the end of the war, this 
approach was no longer effective. A shift in policies was necessary. 
Responses  
To institutionalise and strengthen the legitimacy of Khomeinism after the demise of 
Khomeini, socioeconomic development came to occupy the main place in the agenda 
of the IRI. The Rafsanjani administration adopted the slogan ‘Development’ (hereafter 
Tose’eh) to describe its overall goal. In order to justify placing Tose’eh at the centre 
of the IRI’s political-ideological agenda, Rafsanjani brought forward Khomeini’s 
decree of ‘the Codification of General Policies of the IRI During the Reconstruction 
Period’ to claim he was continuing Khomeini’s work. This was his answer to critics 
                                                 
26 Iran’s population rose from 33 million in 1976 to 60 million in 1996.  
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who claimed that he was trying to divert the revolution away from its true path.  
 In light of this approach, Rafsanjani’s supporters bestowed on him the title of 
‘Marshal of Construction.' Rafsanjani believed the rhetoric, surrounding Tose’eh, that 
aimed to bureaucratise the revolution needed to contain these elements: 1) economic 
development based on a market-driven economy and privatisation; 2) modernising the 
state through reform of the bureaucratic system; 3) normalising the IRI’s relations with 
other countries to facilitate economic growth; 4) professionalisation of bureaucracy, 
based on professional competence rather than revolutionary commitment; and 5) 
creation and strengthening the ‘mercantile bourgeoisie.'27 
Rafsanjani’s plan for socioeconomic and cultural change, and the above-
mentioned shift in the IRI’s approach to socioeconomic development are reflected in 
the composition of his first cabinet. Rafsanjani’s moderate sociocultural tendencies 
can be seen in his appointment of tolerated Leftists, such as Mohammad Khatami as 
Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance, and Mostafa Moein as Education Minister. 
His appointment of technocrats reflected the shift in prioritising the role of competence 
in ideological commitment.  
The appointment of US-educated Mohsen Nurbaksh as the Minister of 
Economic and Financial Affairs, who had a reputation of supporting pro market 
economic policies, was a clear shift in the economic direction. Ali Akbar Velayati, 
another US graduate, remained as Foreign Minister. Velayati has a close relationship 
with Khamenei that dates back to the mid-1980s, when Khamenei, elected to a second 
term as President, wanted to replace Mir Hossein Mousavi with him as Prime Minister. 
Khomeini stepped in, publicly humiliated Khamenei, and Mousavi remained as Prime 
                                                 
27 Mercantile Bourgeoisie is a term used by Ali Ansari see:  
A.M. Ansari, Iran, Islam and Democracy: The Politics of Managing Change (Chatham House, 2006). 
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Minister. This made Velayati an interesting actor in the subsequent political drama, 
when disputes formed during the 2009 election and political players had to declare 
their position regarding Khamenei, Rafsanjani and Mousavi-Karroubi. In sum, 
Rafsanjani’s goal was to form a technocratic government not involved in politicking 
and factional politics.  
 However, rationalisation, bureaucratisation and routinisation of the IRI as 
requirements of development required both a change in the official ideological 
discourse and an institutional reshuffle. These above-mentioned elements of Tose’eh 
stood in contrast to the revolutionary mottos of the export of the revolution, 
denunciation of capitalism and creation of homo Islamicus. In sum, popular transitory 
opinion believed Rafsanjani’s plans symbolised the return to the socioeconomic 
policies of the disgraced Pahlavi regime. 
To justify this ideological shift, Khamenei and Rafsanjani initially worked 
together. They promoted economic development as a mandate of the revolution and  
an Islamic value applicable to worldly affairs. Islam now dealt with this life and the 
afterlife. In their speeches, Rafsanjani and Khamenei assumed a new tone. In a series 
of Friday sermons, Rafsanjani emphasised these changes. 28 “It was the prophets’ path 
to encourage people to be concerned about their financial affairs along with giving 
attention to their afterlife."29   
Meanwhile, Khamenei promoted Imam Ali as a “palm plantation” owner. This 
was a transformation of Imam Ali’s position, from being a symbol of disinherited 
people to a plantation owner. 30  In the first meeting with Rafsanjani’s cabinet, 
Khamenei blamed the enemies of the IRI for overlooking the importance of material 
                                                 
28 Rafsanjani 26/8/1368 (17/November/1989), http://rafsanjani.ir/view.php?id=7361.  
29 Ibid.; Rafsanajni 10/6/1368 (1/September/1989), http://rafsanjani.ir/view.php?id=7359.  
30 Abrahamian, A History, 183.; Bayan 1/10/1369 (22/December/1990).  
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affairs in Islam:  
 
It is the propaganda of our enemies (foreigners) that if the state 
wants to solve people’s problems, to increase production, and to 
expand mines and industries… It would mean forgetting… 
revolution’s goals and diluting spiritual values… This world and 
the afterlife, materialistic welfare and spirituals, are completing 
each other and they could only succeed alongside each other…31  
 
To deflect criticism that development plans resembled those of the Pahlavis, 
Rafsanjani underlined the political and economic autonomy of the IRI and claimed the 
IRI’s approach to Tose’eh was independent of foreign interests.32 Vitally, Rafsanjani 
argued that no tension existed between commitment to the revolution and being a 
technocrat. 33  
The Rafsanjani government emphasis on economic development and less 
attention to the creating homo Islamicus influenced the socioeconomic relationship 
between the state and different segments of society. Rafsanjani believed that in light 
of the socioeconomic challenges the regime faced, it was necessary to create an 
economic elite capable of advancing the causes of economic development. He 
understood that this elite might disagree with the regime on sociocultural issues, but 
would support it given its economic interests.34  
Ansari described this move towards “a ‘mercantile bourgeois republic,' founded 
upon an alliance with the traditional merchants and administered through a large 
bureaucracy dominated, in true patrimonial style, by himself [Rafsanjani].”35 Whether 
Rafsanjani intended to create this class or not is not the focus here, what is important 
is the consequences of this class’ emergence.   
                                                 
31 Khamenei, 8/6/1368 (30/August/1989). 
32 Rafsanjani 10/6/1368 (1/September/1989). 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ansari, Iran, Islam, 41-62. 
35 Ibid., 52. 
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The IRI managed the transition after Khomeini’s death by projecting the image 
of a united decision-making centre and of stability by having one faction, to a large 
extent, staffing all the state’s institutions. The attempts by Rafsanjani and Khamenei 
to shift the socioeconomic direction of the IRI had two consequences vital to this study, 
namely, it opened the door for the return of other factions and it institutionalised 
differing interpretations of Khomeinism, or Khomeini’s legacy, as an alternative 
method for justifying factional political views. Strictly speaking, Rafsanjani’s policies 
became a catalyst to expand factional politics.  
Tose’eh’s economic objectives faced a social, factional and political backlash 
given a) the power structure of the IRI and its constitution; b) the populist aspects of 
Khomeinism; and c) international constraints. Faced with political and popular 
discontent, Rafsanjani in the middle of his second-term as President, changed his 
economic approach in favour of a more statist approach, introducing a new rhetoric of 
‘stabilisation policies’.  
Rafsanjani's power position was linked to different and sometimes 
contradictory premises. For example, implementation of economic policies favouring 
the Bazar was regarded as a promotion of his interests — as he was a merchant and a 
building contractor — and resultantly, these policies cost him popularity. 
Incontrovertibly, as his popularity became a subject of factional and personal rivalry, 
his economic policies — chiefly in his second term — came into conflict with the 
traditional Bazar’s interest. 
Consequences  
Privatisation of government-owned companies, one of the main objectives of Tose’eh, 
aimed to boost efficiency, productivity and to achieve economic growth. However, the 
privatisation was implemented poorly due to myriad factors, including the lack of 
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transparency, the history of a statist economy, a rent-seeking culture, corruption, and 
ideological and security conditions.36   
 Companies with a poor economic portfolio could not attract buyers and 
remained under state control. Profitable companies, through no bid auctions, were 
transferred either to close relatives of the regime’s elites or to different state 
institutions, namely ‘Bonyads’ or IRGC affiliated firms. Poor privatisation changed 
the structure of the economy by damaging the private sector, creating semi-
governmental corporations and expanding the network of patronage. Moreover, during 
this period, bribery and bureaucratic corruption increased and even Rafsanjani 
recognised this bureaucratic corruption.37   
As mentioned in Chapter One, Bonyads are responsible to the SLO. While they 
receive a large budget from the state, they have little accountability towards the state’s 
electoral institutions. Thus, this economic empowerment transformed Bonyads into 
giant financial powers. Their involvement in the post-revolution economy expanded 
into all its sectors creating a vast network of patronage which made them important 
factional players.38  
Ultimately, Tose’eh’s privatisation programs, similar to the experience of 
privatisation in some other countries, led to: 1) the formation of a new economic elite 
with a patron-client relationship with the regime that consisted of predominantly close 
relatives of religiopolitical elites. Considering the factional and political arrangements 
at this time, most of the patronage systems formed within institutions under the control 
of Khamenei, the Conservatives, or Technocrats surrounding Rafsanjani; 2) an 
                                                 
36 There were fears that foreigners could gain control of vital economic interests.  
37 Gheissari and Nasr. Democracy in Iran, 126. 
38 Activities of Mohsen Rafiq Dust, as the Head of the Mostazafan Bonyad, provide a good example of 
this interaction.  
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increase in economic inequality and its social consequences;  and 3) the spread of 
corruption which became a main issue in political and factional debates, subordinating 
other issues in political discourses. Moreover, Rafsanjani and his family became 
symbols of corruption, which made him the target of much harsh political criticism in 
the following years.39  
To keep war veterans and military institutions out of politics, Rafsanjani 
encouraged the IRGC and Basij to participate in Tose’eh. Yet, Rafsanjani tried to bring 
them under the control of the state by integrating the IRGC into the regular army 
establishment, under the control of the ‘Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces 
Logistics.' He failed to achieve this. Nonetheless, Rafsanjani’s strategy turned militia 
institutions into economic giants. For example, the IRGC’s Engineering Branch, 
‘Khatamol Anbiaʾ,' became one of the main contractors of big developmental 
infrastructure projects.40  
Paradoxically, Rafsanjani’s attempts fostered the growing involvement of the 
IRGC in politics by strengthening them financially. The early sign of IRGC 
involvement in politics — after the war — was in the fifth Majlis election when 
Mohsen Rezaee, the IRGC Commander-in-Chief, emphasised the need for IRGC 
involvement in the sociopolitical sphere and implicitly supported the Conservative 
faction in election campaigns. 41  Above all, these military organisations have an 
unclear organisational structure and almost no accountability, nor responsibility to 
civic courts, or to any public supervision. Thus, their involvement in politics and the 
economy imposes a serious challenge to popular politics.  
                                                 
39 See the next chapter on Rafsanjani-Reformist relationship. 
40 F.M. Wehrey, United States. Dept. of Defense. Office of the Secretary of Defense, and National 
Defense Research Institute, The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic 
Revolutionary Guards Corps (RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2009): 60-63. 
41 Iran 25/1/1375 (13-April-1996). 
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Khamenei obtained political benefit from a strong IRGC and Basij. Rafsanjani 
strengthened them, while remaining suspicious, given his attempts to restrict their 
political autonomy. Khamenei strengthened his institutional power by protecting these 
groups. Eventually, Khamenei, his office, and these military organisations became 
more dependent on each other, given official and unofficial links between them.  
Tose’eh’ also influenced the country’s socioeconomic class structure during its 
implementation and as its consequence. Although the growth of the ‘petty bourgeoisie’ 
and bureaucrats experienced slow growth, during 1986-1996, the middle-class, the 
employees of private sectors and the number of capitalists, including modern 
capitalists and the traditional sector grew.42  
Three elements gave momentum to the expansion and characteristics of the 
middle-class in this period: 1) demand for more skilled workers and educated 
professionals and managers; 2) expanded opportunities for higher education; and 3) 
the emergence of a consumption-based economy which resulted in the empowerment 
of a mercantile middle-class. 
Rafsanjani improved the educational system as a necessary requirement of 
development. During this period, the number of students increased due both to the 
population boom and the expansion of education facilities. In higher education, the 
total number of students tripled, reaching 1.2 million. The demographic, geographic 
and gender distribution of the education system also improved. 43  To meet the 
increasing demands for education facilities, semi-private and private educational 
institutions, with partial autonomy from the state, were introduced.  
                                                 
42 Sohrab Behdad and Farhad Nomani, "What a Revolution! Thirty Years of Social Class Reshuffling 
in Iran," Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 29, no. 1 (2009). 
Mahnaz Zahirinejad, "The State and the Rise of the Middle-class in Iran," Hemispheres 29, no. 1 
(2014): 63-7. 
43 Sima-ye Sazandegi, [Review of Construction Era], (Iran, 1997). 
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The ‘Free Islamic University’ (hereafter Azad University), was one of these 
institutions that rapidly expanded its branches in different parts of the country, 
including small cities and rural areas. Thereupon, economic and sociocultural relations 
of these areas were influenced, given it was mostly middle-class and upper middle-
class families who could afford Azad University. Moreover, Azad University 
significantly increased the number of students and empowered student bodies.  
In an atmosphere of relative freedom, new intellectual discourses emerged in 
universities, criticising different conservative interpretations of Khomeinism. The 
formation of critical intellectual discourses imposed another challenge to the regime 
at an ideological and institutional level. The revival of student unions with a bigger 
student body formed a new mobilisation network competitive to the state-led 
mobilisation organisations, such as mosques and Basij. Thus they played an important 
role in the popularisation of politics. 
Overall, socioeconomic challenges forced the IRI to abandon its revolutionary 
phase and adopt a new socioeconomic and ideological direction. Implementation of 
new policies, the socioeconomic consequences of Tose’eh, and, ultimately certain 
geopolitical changes (such as the collapse of the USSR and the Persian Gulf War)44 
not only affected the relationship between state and society but also provided new 
political opportunities to rival factions. During the Rafsanjani period, a new power 
dynamic emerged. While factionalisation of politics at the top increased, the 
popularisation of politics at the bottom gained momentum.   
Politics 
This section examines how struggles over policy initiatives and power influenced the 
                                                 
44 The geopolitical context of this period will be reviewed in Chapter Six.  
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relationship between Rafsanjani and Khamenei and, the factionalisation and 
popularisation of politics. The goal is not to examine the root causes behind these 
struggles which have already been covered by existing literature.45 Rather, the focus 
is on the political consequences of these struggles and how these consequences 
impacted the emergence and evolution of factions and the popularisation of factional 
politics. 
During Khomeini’s time, the political or ideological success of various factions 
depended mostly on the opinion of Khomeini. After his death, this dynamic changed. 
To strengthen their positions, factions needed to gain control of state institutions or 
increase the power of institutions already held and the support of different figures 
within the elite. 46  This new dynamic became a catalyst for the popularisation of 
factional politics since electoral victory enabled the capture of certain institutions.  
Since political parties in the IRI were not institutionalised, personalities played 
a leading role in electoral victories. Electoral victory in the conditions of the IRI is 
very dependent on the popularity of leading elite figures (such as Rafsanjani, Mousavi, 
Khatami and Karroubi). Thus, to an extent, factions themselves ended up becoming 
little circles based around leading political figures. Since the dynamics of personal 
relations and institutional and factional power struggles are entangled with each other, 
a chronological narrative is used to examine the dynamics of politics in this period 
especially in the light of the emergence of new factional groupings examined below.  
The Rafsanjani-Khamenei Alliance 
The elite decided that one way to compensate for the absence of Khomeini’s 
charismatic position was to restructure the state’s institutions so that the jurisdictional 
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lines between them became clearer. Khomeini’s increasing emphasis on the 
‘secondary ordinance’  during the last few years before his death and his decree for 
revising the Constitution two months before his death could be signs he had realised 
the importance of institutions. 
This restructuring aimed to clarify institutional boundaries and minimise 
possible future factional tensions. Yet, the debates in the ‘Assembly for the Revision 
of the Constitution’ were factional in nature. In the revision process, each faction 
speculated on possible future political scenarios and tried to maximise the power of 
institutions they already held or expected to hold. In a political move, both factions — 
the Traditional Right and the Traditional Left – changed their political views.  
The Conservatives (the Traditional Right), considering the probability of 
having Rafsanjani as the next President and a Conservative cleric as the future leader, 
aimed for a strong central executive body in addition to advocating an individual faqih 
as a leader with a great authority. It is worth noting that, up to this point, the 
Conservatives had been opposed to a strong central government. Fearing for their 
power position in the absence of Khomeini’s support, Leftists pushed for a strong 
parliament (the Majlis) and prime ministership, since these were their power bases.  
The Left opposed elimination of the prime minister’s office by claiming 
concentration of power in the Executive Branchwould open the way for dictatorship. 
By supporting a ‘collective leadership’ view, the Left altered their views about the 
strong individual faqih, arguing that such a strong position was only suited for 
Khomeini and no one else.47 The hybrid characteristics of the regime made these shifts 
possible. Eventually, the Traditional Right gained the upper hand and the new 
Constitution established a strong Presidency and leadership office. Despite this new 
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power structure, the hybrid character of the Constitution and consequent institutional 
conflict remained.  
Rafsanjani’s factional position and his alliance with the Conservatives were 
based on shared common views about the economy and foreign policy, but his 
sociocultural views tended to be more in line with the Left. However, the relationship 
with the Left was tainted by the scandals towards the end of the Iran-Iraq War, namely 
Rafsanjani’s role in the ending of the war and his hand in the McFarlane/Iran-contra 
affairs.  
 By the time of the election for the fourth Majlis (1992-1996), Rafsanjani and 
his technocrats and Khamenei and the traditional Right shared a common cause of 
elimination of the Left. The GC and the ‘Supervisory Committee’ — the supervisory 
body within the Ministry of Internal Affairs – banned many Leftists, including 
prominent seated candidates such as Karroubi (the Speaker of the third Majlis),  
Khoeiniha (leader of MRM, former general prosecutor) and Mohtashamipour (former 
Interior Minister), from running in the election.48  
During the election debates, in which criticism was thrown at ‘vali-ye faqih,' 
Rafsanjani supported Khamenei. When the Left expressed concerns about deviation 
from ‘Khomeini’s true path,' Rafsanjani condemned the Left harshly, calling their 
argument the conspiracy of “world arrogance."49 In sum, Khamenei was against the 
Left, given their economic and cultural policies, whilst Rafsanjani hoped that a united 
Majlis, dominated by the Right, would facilitate the implementation of the policies of 
Tose’eh. The Left suffered from a lack of popular support due to their radical foreign 
                                                 
48 The fourth Majlis had 110 Conservative seats, only 40 Radical seats, and 100 Independent seats, 
which were mostly affiliated with the Right faction. The Election’s Executive Committee, which was 
under the control of the Interior Ministry, disapproved 90 Radical seats before the GC vetting process 
began. 
49 Rafsanjani. 3/2/1372 (23/April/1993), http://rafsanjani.ir/view.php?id=8687  
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policy views and the unpleasant memories of the war-economy, which were linked to 
their administration. 
Despite his role in the elimination of the Left from many of the political 
institutions, Rafsanjani maintained, to an extent, his relationship with leading figures 
of this faction. For example, in 1989 he assigned a well-known Leftist and critic of his 
policies, Khoeiniha, editor of the Left’s newspaper Salam, as the head of the recently 
established ‘Center for Strategic Research.' This centre soon became a think tank for 
the Left (later Reformists) and provided them with the opportunity for their 
reorganisation. This move helped create the conditions for the subsequent alliance of 
the Left and the Modern Right by 1997.50 
Soon after the elections to the fourth Majlis, the Traditional Right with a solid 
majority, and in light of the destruction of the Left, now moved to contain the power 
of the Technocrats. Despite the Right’s slogan of “support for Hashemi [Rafsanjani]” 
in the parliamentary campaign, their alliance was short-lived. Ali Akbar Nateq Nuri, a 
well-known traditional Conservative, became the Speaker of the fourth Majlis, 
defeating Hassan Rouhani (later President), who enjoyed the support of Technocrats. 
In another case, the Conservatives impeached the Minister of Transport only six 
months before the end of Rafsanjani’s first term. During Rafsanjani’s second term, the 
composition of his cabinet and sociocultural issues gave great momentum to the 
escalation of these factional disputes. 
The Gradual Split  
By the end of Rafsanjani’s first term, the power balance between Rafsanjani and 
Khamenei had changed. Rafsanjani’s popularity was declining due to high inflation 
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and unemployment rates. Khamenei, then emerged from the shadow of Rafsanjani and 
established his political position by reinforcing his religiopolitical power as the 
‘Supreme Leader.' The first signs of the gradual split came when Khamenei joined the 
Conservatives in criticising Rafsanjani’s development plan in 1992.51  
 Khamenei’s shift was linked, to a certain degree, to the IRI power structure 
that embodied hybrid characteristics. Rafsanjani’s attempts at bureaucratisation of the 
state and his development plans meant more power to the electoral state institutions 
and less power for the revolutionary institutions, which were an important source of 
Khamenei’s institutional power. Eventually, these institutional conflicts influenced the 
personal relationship of these two men.  
Khamenei, seeking to enhance his position, sought a powerful political alliance 
and was after the expansion of the power of the SLO. The alliance of Khamenei and 
the Conservatives was almost inevitable given their shared views and in light of the 
old disputes between Khamenei and the Left. To strengthen Khamenei’s authority, the 
Conservatives propagated the institution of ‘velayat-e motlaqeh-ye faqih’ (absolute 
mandate of faqih) and called him, Imam Khamenei.  
On the other hand, Khamenei, using the Constitutional power of the SLO, 
established new institutions, in order to implement the Conservative's sociocultural 
views and strengthen his and their institutional power. For example, ‘the 
representatives of faqih headquarters’ in universities and ‘Friday prayers office’ were 
established in 1990 and 1993 respectively. These institutions were parallel to the 
existing institutions and — as will be discussed in the next section — soon began to 
play a major role in factional politics.  
While the ties between Khamenei and the Conservatives were strengthening, 
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Rafsanjani’s ties with the Conservatives were weakening. They considered 
Rafsanjani’s attempts to expand the state bureaucracy, support for an industrial export-
based economy, and adherence to relatively moderate sociocultural views, to be threats 
to their power and economic interests. This deterioration of relations, to an extent, 
influenced Rafsanjani’s personal relationship with Khamenei. Given Khamenei’s 
increasing ties with the Conservatives. This dynamic was an underlining theme in most 
of the factional disputes of this period.  
Sociocultural Issues 
The above-mentioned domestic and geopolitical situation, resulting from the end of 
the Cold War and the death of Khomeini, presented the IRI with an ideological 
challenge. In order to strengthen its Islamic/revolutionary institutions, Khomeinism 
needed, therefore, to be reformulated. Thus, Khamenei introduced the hegemonic 
discourse of ‘cultural onslaught.' For Khamenei this initiative enabled him to reinforce 
his position as Supreme Leader and to prove his standing as a regime intellectual. 
Vitally, it gave him the opportunity to establish a new school of thought within 
Khomeinism.  
 Nonetheless, in this discourse, which was largely rooted in Khomeinism and a 
great reflection of Khamenei’s political thought on the West, ‘Islamic culture’ was 
introduced as a ‘moral’ culture superior to the Western ‘liberal’ and ‘immoral culture,’ 
promising happiness in this world and the other world based on propagating ‘real’ 
virtues. The ‘cultural onslaught’ was contextualised in response to the continuation of 
the West’s enmity with Islamic Iran, specifically the US and Israel. The IRI was 
positioned as the leader of resistance to the West’s ‘imperialist colonial hegemonic 
plots.' Similar to other ideologies, ‘cultural onslaught’ was an attempt to construct an 
emotional context for mobilising people and justifying the IRI’s revolutionary power 
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structure. As Khamenei stated: 
At the current time, and especially after the complete defeat of 
Marxism, the West’s arrogance uses cultural means and methods 
in order to dominate and expand its political and atheist 
hegemony over revolutionary nations… Not reacting to such 
‘cultural onslaught,' which sometimes ensues itself through the 
writings of sacked elements (anasor-e khod forukhteh)… will 
have damaging and destructive [consequences].52 
 
The Conservatives backed the discourse of ‘cultural onslaught’ and used it to 
justify their sociocultural views in society at this period. The Conservatives believed 
that, in the public sphere, the people had to adhere to certain Islamic cultural norms. 
For example, wearing Hejab and/or the separation of genders in schools. They placed 
renewed emphasis on making homo Islamicus and considered it as a duty of the Islamic 
state. Accordingly, the state’s intervention in the private sphere, and specifically the 
state’s supervision of public behavior, were justified under a traditional interpretation 
of Islamic discourse of Propagation of Virtue and Prohibition of Vice [hereafter 
PVPV].53  
Backed by Khamenei, the Conservatives moved to implement their cultural 
views. The evolving battle over the sociocultural direction of the IRI increased in 
intensity when Khatami, Minister of Culture and Guidance, resigned in 1991 over 
growing Conservative criticisms of his sociocultural policies. Ali Larijani, a well-
known Conservative and a member of the Conservative political organisation, 
Mo’talefeh, replaced Khatami. Upon his appointment, he announced that his main 
mission was “to confront the cultural onslaught of the West” with the culture based on 
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the teaching of Islam.54  
In 1993, Ahmad Jannati, a Reactionary Conservative, was selected by 
Khamenei to form the Organisation of Vivification of PVPV to enforce ‘true Islamic 
culture.' Furthermore, in 1994, Ali Larijani replaced the head of National Radio and 
TV, Mohammad Rafsanjani, Rafsanjani’s brother, who had the reputation of holding 
moderate sociocultural views. In his decree appointing Ali Larijani, Khamenei 
underlined: “The general theme of all programmes should be resistance to the ‘cultural 
onslaught’ and propaganda campaign of ‘world arrogance.'”55  
a) Mostafa Mir Salim, another Mo’talefeh member, replaced Ali Larijani as 
the new Minister of Culture and Guidance. He gave greater momentum to the 
Conservative's position on culture and announced that his mission was: a) to 
propagate the culture of Basiji; b) to cleanse the media of ‘liberal’ thoughts; and c) 
to support and protect the media’s duty to propagate proper religious and 
revolutionary virtues.56  
As part of the Conservative's campaign, many newspapers were closed on the 
pretext of propagating ‘liberal norms’ or challenging the Conservative's view on Islam. 
Intellectuals charged with the accusation of entertaining ‘liberal’ tendencies faced 
increased social and political restrictions. Some of these intellectuals were fired or 
forced to take early retirement, while a large number of books were banned. In addition 
to this reactive campaign, the IRI reinvigorated its propaganda offensive on the 
cultural front. For example, a series of editorials in Kayhan newspaper and a TV 
program under the name of ‘Hoviyyat’ (Identity) were dedicated to propagating the 
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idea of a pure Islamic identity or making homo Islamicus. In these programs so-called 
‘liberal’ intellectuals and political figures were accused of having links to foreign 
intelligence services and of attempts to undermine the regime.   
A major element central to the creation of homo Islamicus was universities. 
One issue was the degree of autonomy for universities and the type of courses to be 
taught in higher education. At the same time, the political significance of gender 
separation increased. The gender separation exists at primary and secondary education 
levels. Thus, universities offer the first opportunity for the young to interact in a public 
place with members of the opposite sex.  
The Conservatives generally considered the mixed gender environment to be 
against Islamic orders. Moreover, traditional clerics and lay Conservative figures 
considered universities modern institutions that propagated modern social sciences 
whose principles could eventually limit and undermine clerical authority, which, it is 
claimed, is given to them by God. As Khamenei argued: “Religion should be revived 
in the universities. Our universities are born irreligious; this is a clear [fact]… [This 
is] similar to the intellectualism in our country that has also been born irreligious.”57  
The issue of autonomy for universities was a source of concern for the 
Conservatives because liberal socioeconomic and cultural views were gaining 
popularity in universities. The Conservatives reacted by putting together university 
programs to deal with this issue. In 1992, ‘faqih headquarters’ were established in 
universities. One of its goals was to “promote Islamic and revolutionary values in all 
scientific and administrative levels."58  
Khamenei declared the need for the Islamisation of universities and asked for 
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more active involvement of Hezbollahis and university Basij in university activities 
and student affairs.59 University Basij had been formed with Khomeini’s decree in 
1988. By this time it was expanded in almost every big university.60 To a large extent, 
the culture of Basij became the regime’s ideal model of ‘Islamic culture.'61  
Occasionally, Hezbollahis, mostly affiliated to the university Basij, were called 
upon to march in the universities to threaten so-called ‘liberal’ students, and to harass 
professors, political activists and others deviating from true ‘Islamic culture.' By the 
end of Rafsanjani’s second term, the role of students became more noticeable in the 
political scene, given the expansion of the universities, the number of students and 
student political organisations.62  
Despite occasional criticism of conservative cultural policies, Rafsanjani 
refrained from pressuring the Conservatives on sociocultural issues. From the time of 
Khatami’s resignation in 1992 until the seventh Presidential election in 1997, the 
Conservatives dominated sociocultural institutions and the cultural agenda. The 
reasons behind Rafsanjani’s passive position remain unclear but could be linked to: a) 
as a pragmatic, he compromised on sociocultural affairs in order to have more freedom 
in executing his economic plans; b) the ‘cultural onslaught’ was an ideological 
initiative formed in reaction to ideological challenges, and Rafsanjani may, therefore, 
have considered it a necessary step in the continuation of the regime; and c) a low 
popular mandate in the sixth Presidential election’s results (1993) and the unpopularity 
of his economic plans had weakened his position of power.  
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Sixth Presidential Election 
During the sixth Presidential election in 1993, there were few factional disputes. It was 
a significant event in the initial stages of the popularisation of factional politics. In the 
absence of the Left’s candidates, Rafsanjani was the main candidate enjoying the 
support of various groups, including the JRM.  
 However, part of the traditional Right supported Ahmad Tavakkoli. In his 
campaign, Tavakkoli criticized Tose’eh over its unclear long-term consequences for 
social justice and lack of attention to Islamic and revolutionary principles. Although 
Rafsanjani won the election with 62 percent of the vote, there was approximately a 24 
percent decline in the participation rate, which made this election the second in a row, 
after the 1991 election to the AofE, which had a low turnout.  
Faced with a decline in his popularity due to growing socioeconomic discontent 
and pressure from the Right, Rafsanjani began to take steps to generate popular support 
for himself and his policies. In December 1992, ‘Hamshahri,' the first Iranian color 
newspaper, was established by Qolam Hossein Karbaschi, Tehran’s Mayor and a close 
friend of Rafsanjani. ‘Hamshahri’ implemented a new journalistic approach. Instead 
of getting directly involved in politics, it focused on the issues of urban life in Tehran 
and emphasised sociocultural issues— particularly of the middle-class.  
‘Hamshahri’ also underlined the role of Rafsanjani and propagated a 
technocratic view on various socioeconomic issues. ‘Hamshahri’ was an attempt to 
fill the gap between Rafsanjani and the support base he was hoping to expand in 
response to Conservative's criticism. ‘Hamshahri’ rapidly grew and its circulation 
jumped from tens of thousands to a hundred thousand in less than six months. In 1994 
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its circulation reached three hundred thousand. 63  Two years after the successful 
experience of ‘Hamshahri,' ‘Iran,' the second color newspaper, was established as the 
Executive Branch’s newspaper. ‘Iran’ followed the strategy of ‘Hamshahri’ but on a 
countrywide scale. These two, with the short-lived Bahman weekly, were the three 
main media outlets of Technocrats during Rafsanjani’s Presidency. 
The decline in Rafsanjani’s vote influenced the factional power balance and, in 
turn, shaped the policy initiatives in the second mandate. The Left argued that this 
decline was a sign of the people’s dissatisfaction with Rafsanjani.64 The Conservatives 
took advantage of this decline and escalated their efforts to gain access to more 
institutions. While before the election (1993) the Conservatives targeted mostly 
cultural programs, after the election, economic programs were also criticised. To 
alleviate the decline in his popularity, Rafsanjani reshuffled his cabinet and shifted 
ministers in charge of economic policies.65  
Economic Issues 
Although both Technocrats and the Conservatives believed in a non-state market 
economy, their visions for the structure of Iranian economy differed. Rafsanjani 
believed that Iran should have an industrialised, export-oriented economy. The 
Conservatives believed that an industrialised economy did not correspond with Iran’s 
traditional economic interests and the IRI economy should continue to focus on trade.  
 The ‘First Five Year Plan’ contained policies designed to create the conditions 
for the emergence of an industrial export-oriented economy. Therefore, Rafsanjani’s 
plans to industrialise the economy hurt the interests of the major socioeconomic source 
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of support for the clerical class — the trading Bazar. The climax of disputes over the 
direction of the economy was portrayed in the Majlis’ debates over the ‘Second Five-
Year Plan,’ when the bill was approved only after several amendments and changes to 
the original bill. With a one-year delay, the final product was a shift from a 
technocratic industrialised economy towards a bazar focused economy. 
Rafsanjani faced an additional crisis when poor fiscal policies and payment of 
foreign debts hit the currency market. As a result, the inflation rate increased to more 
than 40 percent by 1995-1996. As the economic situation worsened and the fifth Majlis 
election was approaching, the Conservatives focused their criticism on economic 
management, corruption and the lack of commitment to revolutionary/Islamic values 
amongst Rafsanjani’s cadres. Once again the issue of social justice emerged.66  
Khamenei also joined these debates and, in a speech to the officials of Planning 
and Budget Organisation, highlighted the need for social justice and commitment to 
the revolution’s values.67 In response to the Conservative’s criticism with regards to 
the technocrats’ lack of Revolutionary/Islamic commitment, Rafsanjani argued: “a 
detachment between the revolutionary [characteristics] and the competence of officials 
does not exist since these two are not separable.”68 He defended his Tose’eh as a 
necessary step towards a better socioeconomic support of the downtrodden69  and 
underlined the long-term benefits of Tose’eh plans: “Instead of spending the budget 
on construction of dams and infrastructure we could have spent it on [importing] 
cooking oil, rice, sugar, cubic sugar and wheat and people would have felt a price drop 
immediately. But, we would have realised that we were acting irrationally only in the 
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future, when we lost all our capital.”70 
Nonetheless, Rafsanjani, facing criticism, changed programs within Tose’eh’ 
and lowered the pace of the liberalisation of economy and initiated ‘adjustment’ 
policies. At the same time, Rafsanjani blamed the Bazar and the hard currency black 
market for the rising inflation. He took a series of actions against the Bazar, which 
endangered the Bazar’s interests and consequently affected Rafsanjani’s relationship 
with the Conservatives.71  
In 1994, a new institution of ‘Committee for Adjustment of the Bazar’ was 
established to control prices and regulate Bazar activities. In 1995, to reform the 
distribution network, ‘Refah’ chain department stores were launched as competitors to 
the Bazar. These stores hoped to cut out the middlemen by creating a direct link 
between the suppliers and the consumers which meant a serious blow to the traditional 
distribution network. Additionally, Rafsanjani demanded heavy punishment for black 
market brokers.72  
As the Conservatives put Rafsanjani and his cadres under pressure, Rafsanjani, 
realising the important political capital to be gained from addressing discontent over 
sociocultural issues, abandoned his compromise with the Conservatives and criticised 
the closed intellectual space. In other words he made a step in direction of 
popularisation of factional politics.  
At the Tehran Book Exhibition in 1995, he argued: “We should resist dogmatic 
views; writers, researchers, and, scholars should feel safe and secure so that they can 
write… It is impossible that all [scholars] can satisfy our taste. A book that is written 
just to satisfy our taste is better not to be written in the first place.”73  On another 
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occasion soon after his re-election, Rafsanjani underlined the issue of freedom, 
democracy, and the individual and social rights of the people as his second list of 
priorities after guarding Islam.74 In sum, Rafsanjani opened up another front against 
the Conservatives by propagating and supporting popular sociocultural expectations 
and demands.  
Eventually, groups of officials surrounding Rafsanjani recognised the political 
capital to be gained by distancing themselves from the Conservatives. As mentioned 
above, the disputes between the Majlis, dominated by the Traditional Right, and the 
Technocrats in the executive bodies were escalating, due to their different 
sociocultural and economic views. At the same time, new sociopolitical demands from 
below were gaining momentum in society. These elements provided a political 
opportunity for the Technocrats to distance themselves further from the Conservatives 
and to establish themselves, with some pragmatic Leftists, as an independent political 
front. They initiated a process which led to the establishment of the Kargozaran Party 
and the emergence of the ‘Modern Right’ faction prior to the fifth Majlis election. This 
was important step in popularisation of factional politics.   
 The dynamics of the election to the fifth Majlis following the sixth Presidential 
election shows an important aspect of the elites’ perceptions with regard to the IRI 
hybrid structure. In general, the political elites were well aware of the challenges that 
the whole system could face if the electoral/republican pillar became emasculated. The 
Conservatives prefer some sort of hierarchical, patriarchal system, but also 
acknowledge that functioning electoral/republican institutions play a significant role 
in sustaining the regime’s legitimacy. In a sense, the Conservatives see the 
electoral/republican pillar as an imposed necessity or burden. The dynamics of this 
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election show how rival groups were aware of the potential threat of low participation 
rates to the very legitimacy of the IRI and correspondingly reacted. 
Economic hardship, US sanctions and social discontent forced the regime to 
look at limited political openness as an acceptable tool to raise the participation rate. 
A year before the election, Rafsanjani signaled to the opposition groups that the next 
election would be more open to competition:  
We have faith in the people’s vote, and we believe that people’s 
votes are the source of the revolution’s prosperity and the best 
reference… I, as the President, do not consider anything more 
important than to hold a free and healthy election…75 
 
Even the Conservatives and JRM members supported the idea of giving more 
room to the opposition. Mahdavi Kani, the leader of JRM, claimed: 
I sent a message to Mr Hashemi Rafsanjani and told him you 
should announce that people who are in this country, in the 
opposition groups and even different-minded groups, should 
attend the competition… I told the GC not to reject the candidates 
if they did not have a really bad reputation.76  
 
 Mohammad Yazdi, Chief of Judiciary, a prominent Conservative and another 
JRM member, announced: “The political field is open… And all people and groups 
and parties have the right to announce candidates for the next election.”77  
Political groups reacted differently to these promises. The Left, as the main 
opposition faction, doubtful of the sincerity of these moves, reluctantly joined the 
electoral debates. 78  MII, as one of the Leftist organisations, concluded in its 
announcement: “We will publish a list of candidates despite the fact that we are sure, 
with a very high probability, that there will be a great amount of obstacles in our 
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way.”79 MRM, as the major Leftist organisation, showed its hesitation, and despite 
encouraging people to participate in the election, decided not to publish a list of 
candidates.  
In explaining this decision, Abdol Vahhab Mousavi Lari, a prominent MRM 
member, expressed his pessimism about the result of the vetting process of GC or the 
Supervisory Committee, arguing: “It is obvious that all the electoral tools and 
supervisory institutions, including the election’s Executive Committee, Supervisory 
Committee and even the Interior Ministry organisations, are dominated by the Right 
faction.”  
He was correct. Once again, most Leftists were not allowed to run either by the 
Supervisory Committee or GC. 34 seated MPs were found to be unfit by the 
Supervisory Committee.80 The elimination of the Leftists was so intense that they 
could not even publish a list of 30 candidates for the Tehran election.81 Technocrats 
took advantage of the regime’s call for participation in the election, established the 
Kargozaran and managed to become a significant player in this election.  
The establishment of the Kargozaran was an important development in the 
evolution of the IRI’s popularisation of factional politics. It was, to some extent, an 
attempt to implement ‘party politics’ as a new form of politics. In this new form, 
organised political parties were not inclusive, one party or supra-factional, but 
represented the interests of a particular political and/or socioeconomic group. It was 
in contrast to the ideological utopian view practiced hitherto, which ignored, or at least 
did not recognise, the diversity of interests and views in society and propagated the 
higher non-factional values of the Islamic utopia. As we will see, the establishment of 
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Kargozaran had a strong influence on the formation of civil society and future election 
debates. 
 The establishment of Kargozaran with an organised political plan was a 
serious challenge to the Conservatives. Therefore, a number of Conservatives who 
were aware of their weak popular support, and had already recognised the importance 
of implementing the party politics, attempted to change the structure of Conservative 
organisations.  
In the run-up to the fifth Majlis election, therefore, the political structure of 
JRM, as the main organisation of the Right faction, became the source of disputes 
between the JRM and its umbrella organisation: Hamsu.82At this time, prominent 
Mo’talefeh members, such as Asgar Owladi, with the support of clerics such as Nateq 
Nuri (the Speaker of the Majlis at the time), proposed two issues. First, the JRM should 
change its political structure and develop a modern party structure in order to better 
deal with political challenges.  
Second, non-clerical and Hamsu members should be more involved in the 
decision-making process. The proposal faced the opposition of conservative members 
of JRM, mainly Mahdavi Kani, JRM’s speaker. Mahdavi Kani’s opposition was based 
on three premises. By implementing a party system the clergy would inevitably be 
forced to align with some people over others, which is contradictory to its goal of being 
neutral.83 By accepting the party system, the clergy would eventually fall under the 
control of a reactive public and popular elective government, which he believed 
                                                 
82 Following the dissolution of the IRP (Islamic Republic Party) in the late 1980s, some of its 
subdivisions responsible for different unions, such as teachers, engineers, students, physicians etc., 
came under the protection of the JRM with the name of Hamsu (affiliated).  
Shadlu, Ahzab, 37-8.  
83 Akhabr 29/4/1374 (20/July/1995). 
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contradicted the clergy’s duty of guarding the interests of Muslims.84 Finally, since 
JRM and MRM are clerical institutions, they should only be held accountable to the 
Supreme Leader.85 As the disputes escalated, Mahdavi Kani resigned as the Speaker 
of the JRM.86 However, in the end, the attempts to change the structure of the JRM 
not succeed. He returned but these tensions remained.  
The debates within the JRM underlined the presence of two different divisions 
within the Traditional Right. On the one hand, there are those who believed in the use 
of party systems, the state’s authority, less hierarchical structure of the JRM and more 
involvement in everyday politics using modern political means.87 On the other hand, 
there are those who support the traditional position of clerics, the hierarchical structure 
of the JRM, the main authority of clergy, and the autonomy of clerical institutions. 
They denounced the party system as a Western idea. Eventually, hidden tensions 
within these two trends surfaced in future political events.88 
Emergence of the Modern Right and Kargozaran 
Unlike the unsuccessful attempt of restructuring the JRM, the Kargozaran managed 
to emerge as a political organisation. Although Rafsanjani has never been a member 
of Kargozaran, it has been regarded as his party. The main goal of this party was to 
institutionalise Rafsanjani’s position and the power of his cadres. 89 In a declaration 
signed by some of the deputies and ministers of the Rafsanjani administration, they 
initiated a process towards the establishment of Kargozaran.90   
                                                 
84 Hamshahri 29/4/1374 (20/July/1994). 
85 JRM News Bulletin no. 26: 22; Salam 13/12/1374 (3/March/1996). 
86 Ettela’at 17/4/1374 (8/July/1995). 
87 Sobh 29/1/1374 (18/April/1995); Asr-e Ma 9/7/1374 (1/November/1995). 
88 These events included the sixth Majlis election. During the Khatami Presidency, over Ahmadinejad’s 
candidacy and finally in the 11th Presidential election.  
89 Iran 2/11/1374 (22/January/1996). 
90 Iran 20/10/1374 (10/January/1996). 
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 Sensing the rise of a powerful rival, the Conservatives reacted negatively to the 
announcement of Kargozaran. Asadollah Badamchian, a prominent Mo’talefeh 
member and the editor of ‘Resalat,' one of the main newspapers of the Conservatives, 
condemned the ‘announcement’ as interference of the Executive Branch in the 
Legislative Branch.91 In a letter, 150 Conservative MPs condemned Kargozaran’s 
statement as being disrespectful to the Majlis.92 
 Eventually, Khamenei’s intervention paved the way for Kargozaran’s 
establishment.93 After its unsuccessful attempt to stop Kargozaran’s establishment, 
the traditional Right and its pressure group, Ansar-e Hezbollah, were hopeful that the 
GC would block its members. Ansar-e Hezbollah officially entered the electoral 
campaign debates. It was yet another step in the popularisation of factional politics. 
For the first time they were taking a public stand. They announced: “[We] ask the GC 
to prevent all those penetrating hands of ‘world arrogance,' liberals, technocrats and 
intellectuals… from entering the Majlis and to confront them with no tolerance,” 94 
However, in a sermon, Khamenei signaled to the GC:  
It is not acceptable that personal tastes and views intervene with 
the process of accepting or vetting… GC should do its heavy duty 
with complete perception and utmost justice and fairness… One 
cannot be charged with being against the velayat-e faqih based 
on false accusations… due to the irrelevant over-investigations 
and grudges.95 
  
It was a factional and political signal, because while almost all of the Kargozaran 
managed to pass the GC, most of the Leftists could not participate in the election.96  
                                                 
91 Iran 4/11/1374 (24/January/1996). 
92 Iran 8/11/1374 (28/January/1996). 
93 Khamenei 8/11/1374 (28/January/1996), http://farsi.khamenei.ir/news-content?id=19693; Iran 
14/11/1374 (3/February/1996). 
94 Iran 14/11/1374 (3/February/1996). 
95 Iran 15/11/1374 (4/February/1996). 
96 Asr-e Ma 9/12/1374 (28/February/1996).  
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However, the Left acknowledged and encouraged the emergence of 
Kargozaran. In an article in their bulletin, Asr-e Ma, MII (a Leftist organisation) listed 
six different reasons for their support of the establishment of Kargozaran:  
1) it would promote the political institutions; 2) it would make the views of 
different factions clearer; 3) it would facilitate moves towards more institutionalised 
politics; 4) it would encourage political pluralism and block the monopolising 
measures of the Traditional Right in the fifth Majlis; 5) it would make society more 
political; and 6) it would help to increase the political accountability of different 
political groups.97 
In the election, the Kargozaran, the Modern Right, was faced with declining 
popular support given its links to increasingly unpopular economic policies of the 
Rafsanjani administration. In turn, the Traditional Right was seen as responsible for 
restricted sociocultural policies and civic liberties.98 After the election, both factions 
claimed to have gained a majority. After the cancellation of some ballots in different 
cities,99  and considering the second round’s results, the Traditional Right faction 
gained around 105 to 140 seats.100 The Kargozaran and the Imam’s Path coalition 
gained around 110 seats and the remaining seats belonged to Independents.101  
Another important event of this election was that Faezeh Hashemi Rafsanjani, 
daughter of Rafsanjani, obtained the second highest number of votes in Tehran. In her 
campaign she raised the issue of greater involvement of women in society, which stood 
                                                 
The vetting process was so strict, the Leftists that decided to participate in the election could not 
publish a list of 30 candidates for the Tehran election.  
Iran (21/February/1996). 
97 Asr-e Ma 18/11/1374 (7/February/1996). 
98 Ibid.  
99 Isfahan was one of the cities where disputes led to public tension between Isfahan’s Governor and 
the GC. 
100 The range of 105 to 140 is due to: 
a) the unclear political position of some independent candidates; and  
b) some candidates were on a list of both factions in different cities. 
101 Official Webpage of the Majlis, http://www.parliran.ir/index.aspx?siteid=1&pageid=3952.  
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in contrast with the views of the Conservatives on the role of women in society. The 
Conservatives labelled her as a ‘liberal,' promoting a Western role for women. 
Nonetheless, Faezeh managed to mobilise not only women but those who wanted to 
show their discontent with restrictive sociocultural policies. This was the beginning of 
the emergence of the influence of gender issues on factional politics.  
In sum, Rafsanjani became more dependent on the support of the professional 
middle and upper-middle-classes and those who were looking for a decrease in 
sociocultural restrictions, in light of the gradual change in the factional power balance 
and the evolution of social class structure. In his acceptance speech of his second term 
Presidency, Rafsanjani promoted the “issues of freedom, democracy, and the 
individual and social rights of the people and social justice.”102  
Therefore, an alliance between him and ‘the Left undergoing reform’ became 
more plausible. In return, Khamenei, in order to consolidate his support base and to 
maintain his authority over the revolutionary and Islamic institutions, had to come up 
with ideological answers to the changing conditions and to expand patronage in these 
institutions. Consequently, Khamenei became more dependent on Basij, Militia, 
IRGC, Hezbollahis and other religious fundamentalists. Khamenei’s increasing 
dependence on Islamic/revolutionary institutions played a significant role in the 
evolution of factional politics and influenced the personal relationship between him 
and Rafsanjani. Moreover, the Conservative’s traditional support base seemed to 
contract due to many factors, including distancing of part of the society from the 
revolutionary state, spread of satellite TVs, the presence of alternative political 
factional views and changes in the Bazar structure. 
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Factions in the Rafsanjani Era 
As a result, by the end of Rafsanjani’s Presidency, power struggles over reconciling 
ideology with the socioeconomic and ideological challenges faced by the IRI, in 
addition to the rivalry in the political elites, changed the factional landscape. The 
dynamic of factional politics in this period has already been discussed. This section, 
therefore, provides an overview of different factions by the end of Rafsanjani’s 
Presidency. 
The Conservatives (The Traditional Right) 
For the Traditional Right, religiosity and the Islamic dimension of the IRI has 
precedence over its republican and populist dimension. The main politico-religious 
views of this faction are portrayed in the velayat-e motlaqeh-ye faqih and the ‘Islamic 
government’ thesis. Traditional feqh is at the heart of their ideology and despite having 
rationality — reasoning — (aql) and ejtehad as acceptable tools for feqh, application 
of these two is limited to certain domains.103  
 For this faction, ‘Islamic government’ is a divine phenomenon that would 
expand its authority through a hierarchical system. People are considered secondary 
players and imitators (muqalled). Since clerics are the experts in feqh and sources of 
imitation (marja’ taqlid), the government should be run by them. Vitally, they believe 
that most of the republican institutions only become legitimate after the verification of 
religious super bodies.104 
Since the traditional Right places Islam and the traditional feqh at the center of 
its discourse, its views regarding the economy, foreign policy and socioculture are 
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influenced heavily by feqh. After Khomeini’s death, the Conservatives continued to 
maintain their initial views about the ‘Islamic economy.' Based on the traditional feqh, 
in an ‘Islamic economy,' new concepts, such as cooperative economy, taxation, 
insurance, banking and customs need to be structurally modified. In general, less 
regulation, a market-driven economy and the removal of trade tariffs underline the 
main aspects of Conservative views.  
Considering the alliance of the Bazar and the Conservatives before and after 
the revolution, this faction promotes trade and commerce and less investment in 
industries and agriculture. 105  Following its reading of Islam, in Islamic society, 
different social classes should exist and the issue of socioeconomic justice would be 
addressed through the charity of the wealthy via religious taxation, such as ‘Khoms’ 
and ‘Zakat.’  
The main characteristics of foreign policy of this faction during this period 
were: emphasis on sovereignty, and favouring normalisation of relations with other 
countries, with the exception of Israel and to a lesser degree the US.106 In contrast to 
the Left, the export of the revolution was not a top priority for this faction. The 
historical alliance between this faction and the Bazar, to some extent, has influenced 
the formation of this pragmatic foreign policy that could facilitate conditions for 
international trade, which would benefit Bazar economy.  
Traditional feqh also influenced this faction’s sociocultural views. Based on 
traditional feqh, ‘Islamic ethics’ and ‘Islamic culture’ find their normative premises 
from orders and ordinances preserved in the Quran and the ‘tradition’ (sonnat). The 
                                                 
105 It should be noted, after the revolution, the structure of the Bazar changed. As a result of the 
creation of a patronage system within the state, thus, the homogeneity of the Bazar was broken and its 
indigenous mobilisation power weakened.  
Ibid. Keshavarzian. 
106 On two occasions, Ali Larijani gave the green light to the US on rebuilding diplomatic relations.  
Moslem Factional Politics, 111-113. 
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clergy is responsible for discovering and explaining these norms. In this discourse, the 
‘Islamic government’ is responsible for preservation, practice and exercise of ‘Islamic 
culture’ and ‘values.'  
In other words, Islamic government should guard the spiritual dimension of the 
IRI and coercive force is a legitimate tool, while pluralism is not an acceptable 
concept.107 After the introduction of ‘cultural onslaught,' ‘Islamic culture’ gained more 
ideological weight, having an effect on this faction’s pragmatic foreign policy. While 
the Traditional Right benefits from economic interaction with the West, they were 
quite fearful of the influence of Western culture on society.  
The Modern Right  
Due to its pragmatic tendencies, the Modern Right’s relationship with feqh and 
velayat-e faqih has been based on changing political circumstances. Velayat-e faqih is 
acknowledged as a key element in the survival of the IRI but one whose power should 
have particular limits. For this group, an ideal position of the leader is spiritual 
leadership of the ‘Ummat’ (Islamic nation). Moreover, this faction primarily believes 
in elements of modernism, collective rationality and Western modern political 
philosophy as useful methodological tools for creating an Islamic state. Therefore, they 
emphasise ‘dynamic feqh’ (feqh-e puya) discourse.108  
Tose’eh was the pillar of Modern Right ideology. They believe that the IRI’s 
success depended on an industrialised economy and modern, well-developed political 
institutions. The Modern Right’s view of Tose’eh is based on a market-driven 
economy, development through integration in the global economy and on industrial 
                                                 
107 Mesabh Yazdi argues four different approaches towards pluralism.  
Reza Sanati, Gofteman-e Mesbah [Mesbah's Discourse] (Markaz-e Asnad-e Inqelab-e Islami, 2008): 
501-528. 
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and export-oriented economy. The state should have an active role in the economy 
through regulating the market and investing in infrastructure to provide export 
competitiveness and a less oil-dependent economy. The state should also reform tax 
laws and develop transparency in financial records. This faction supports membership 
in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and implementing the IMF and World Bank’s 
development guidelines. For this faction, banks and financial sectors should play an 
important role in channeling investment and capital into different sectors.  
While the Modern Right, similar to the Left, considered the state responsible 
for social justice, it argued that redistribution should be emphasised only after 
‘development’ succeeded. So the rhetorical support for social justice did not really 
translate into policy.109  
 For the Modern Right, sustained economic development rests on political 
stability and normalised foreign relations. Despite recognising the political and 
ideological complexities of Iran-US relations, this faction believes that better relations 
even with the US are in the IRI’s national interest.  
Similar to the Left, the Modern Right believes in tolerance and moderation in 
the sociocultural sphere. Dismissing use of coercive force, the Modern Right argues 
that sociocultural issues should be left in the hands of specialists and within the 
Tose’eh discourse, scientific and technological progress would revive the Islamic/ 
Iranian culture. 110  The Modern Right is less concerned with the slogan ‘cultural 
onslaught.' In fact, at times they did not see a threat in cooperation with the West. 111 
Due to the importance of Rafsanjani to the Modern Right, the main political 
figures of this faction were Rafsanjani’s ministers and deputies. Gholam Hossein 
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Karbaschi, Ataollah Mohajerani, Abdollahe Nuri, Hassan Rouhani, Mohsen 
Nourbakhsh, Mohammadreza Ne’matzadeh, Bizhan Namdar Zanganeh, Mohammad 
Ali Najafi, Eisa Kalantari and Eshaq Jahangiri are amongst the prominent members of 
this faction. Iran, Hamshahri and the short-lived biweekly Bahman were the main 
journals of this faction.  
The Left  
In this period, the Left’s views on economy, foreign policy and intellectual discourse 
were modified as a way to return to the political scene. The possibility of various 
interpretations of Islam and an emphasis on ‘dynamic feqh’ became cornerstones of 
the Left’s ideology and the catalyst for reconsidering their initial views. Moreover, the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War was a blow for leftist 
ideologies worldwide. The Left’s statist egalitarian economic model — at least in its 
revolutionary form — was less appealing to the public. Therefore, an effort went into 
forming intellectual discours on the concepts of ‘rule of law,' ‘civil society,' 
‘republicanism,' the relation between Islam and modernity and ‘pluralism.' 
 Despite the collapse of the USSR, the Left’s economic views remained focused 
on self-sufficiency and ‘independence.' Emphasis on egalitarian redistributive 
socioeconomic justice remained while there was a new emphasis on development and 
economic growth.112 The Left believed that economic growth is only possible through 
the state’s intervention and control over strategic economic sectors.  
Consequently, more investment in industries and more control over the 
commerce and trade sectors were encouraged. They believed that expansion of 
socioeconomic justice should be considered as one of the main goals of the IRI. 
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Furthermore, skeptical of IMF’s development plans, the Left was cautious about the 
Tose’eh and its effects on socioeconomic justice and ‘independence.' 
Despite the less aggressive tones in this period, the Left’s foreign policy 
remained focused on anti-imperialist rhetoric against the US as the sole remaining 
superpower. However, considering the Left’s moderate tone in foreign policy in the 
Reformist era (1997-2005), as we will see, one can conclude that the Left’s criticisms 
were mainly the result of domestic factional politics. 
The Left, compared to the Right, had moderate sociocultural views in the 
Khomeini era. On various occasions during the period from 1979-1989, the Left also 
exhibited a hard-line position towards Western culture and the presence of un-Islamic 
symbols in society. However, during Rafsanjani’s Presidency, the Left changed its 
tone and showed more tolerant sociocultural views and became the main critic of 
sociocultural restrictions.  
The main journals of this faction during this period were: ‘Salam,' ‘Asr-e Ma,' 
‘Bayan,’ ‘Kiyan,’ and ‘Gardun.' This faction was focusing on shifting their ideological 
and intellectual discourse to form a public discourse. To revive or continue its political 
life, political thinkers and journalists were in the front-line of this faction during 
Rafsanjani’s period. Main active figures were Mousavi Khoeiniha, Saeed Hajjarian, 
Abbas Abdi, Behzad Nabavi, Mohsen Mirdamadi, Mohsen Armin, Hamid Reza Jalaei 
Pour, and, most importantly, Abdolkarim Souroush. 
As mentioned earlier, this period witnessed organised activities of another 
group, called the ‘neo-Fundamentalists’ or the ‘New Left.' Although some scholars 
consider them a faction, I am going to argue here, briefly, why they should not be 
considered as such. The views of this group were a mixture of traditional jurisprudence 
and some modern readings of Islam and Sharia. Their views reflected a combination 
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of the ideas of Ali Shariati (ideologue of revolutionary Shi’ism), Morteza Motahhari 
(Chairman of the Revolutionary Council) and Navab Safavi (founder of Devotees of 
Islam ‘fadaeyan-e Islam’). They cherry-picked from these discourses and thought in 
line with changing political battles and conditions. 113  In other words, they were 
dogmatic.  
The group’s ideological fundamentalism and its belief in the ‘permanent 
revolution’ led to its lack of respect for the authority of the state and the law. They 
believed that people should adhere to certain Islamic norms in the public sphere and it 
is this group’s Islamic duty to make sure that society follows those norms. They 
performed, therefore, many vigilante actions, targeting, mostly, the public 
manifestation of secular views, such as improper veiling for women ‘bad hejabi,' 
Western style of dress. Accordingly, they strongly harassed secular intellectuals. The 
private sphere was not safe from their intrusions due to the debates that put the making 
of homo Islamicus as the main duty of the IRI. Populist egalitarian social justice and 
self-sufficiency have been used as excuses to legitimise their hostility against 
opposition groups.  
Within this line, they attacked those who were showing off their wealth. The 
main figures of this group were Mehdi Nasiri, Masoud Dehnamaki and Hossein Allah 
Karam, with the journals Yalasarat, Shalamche, Jebheh and Sobh as their main 
tribunes. They have a dress code of a black shirt, buttoned up to the neck, khaki or 
grey straight trousers, and black shoes, with a bearded face, and they ride in pairs on a 
particular model of motorbike: the Honda 125. They are thus referred to as the 
‘plainclothes militia.' 
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There is a common perception that this group lacked any official institutional 
power or any concrete political ideology.114 Some have argued that this group is made 
of hardliners or semi-militia forces with a military hierarchical organisational structure 
and no accountability to any civic institutions. Moreover, they have access to classified 
information and public financial resources through their strong links to parallel 
revolutionary and religious institutions.  
This group is a circle of supporters or an informal pressure group that is called 
upon on particular occasions to execute the dirty work of the state, or, more precisely, 
a particular faction or patron. Its activities in this period consisted of protests close to 
the fourth Majlis election and over ‘cultural onslaught,' the protest in front of the IRNA 
news agency, and the harassment of people in the cinema Qods.115  Their actions 
became the subject of public political debates in the future. Therefore, consideration 
of this group as a vigilante group, affiliated to a certain faction as a means of informal 
pressure on other factions or social groups, is a better description. 
Conclusion 
This chapter examined the extent to which the socioeconomic and ideological 
challenges that faced the IRI after the death of Khomeini influenced the expansion of 
factional politics and pushed towards its popularisation in the context of the hybrid 
characteristics of the IRI and the rivalry in political elites. Although in response to the 
social and economic discontent after the war Tose’eh dominated the political agenda, 
its requirements were found to be in conflict with the ideological and revolutionary 
institutions. Due to the contradictions of Khomeinism at both an ideological and 
institutional level, Rafsanjani’s efforts to provide a cohesive stratum to integrate the 
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modern state elements with Khomeinism achieved limited results. Eight years of 
Tose’eh’s policies failed to fulfil the goal of containing the socioeconomic 
challenges116 — though it changed the society, state and state-society relations.117  
Since in this period the political sphere was dominated by the presence of 
Rafsanjani and Khamenei, their personal relationship and their power position had a 
symbiotic relationship with the institutional and factional power dynamics. As the 
ideological/revolutionary context of the IRI started to dissolve, the power struggle 
between Rafsanjani and Khamenei strengthened and gave more rein to their 
ideological differences as both men sought political ideological means to win the 
power struggle. Factional struggle had two goals. Firstly, factions sought to strengthen 
institutions they held. Secondly, and naturally, they sought to increase the number of 
institutions they control.  
Consequently, institutional struggles emerged between those institutions 
controlled by supporters of Rafsanjani and those institutions staffed by supporters of 
Khamenei. Furthermore, pluralisation of Khomeinism – following the removal of the 
‘Grand Master’ — intensified struggles over policy initiatives. Resultantly,  
confrontation over different policy initiatives, specifically over the socioeconomic 
plans, antagonised the pragmatic cadres of Rafsanjani and led to the split in the 
‘Traditional Right’ that resulted in the emergence of ‘the Modern Right’ as a new 
faction, with the Kargozaran as its front representing part of the popular demands.  
As the society distanced itself from revolutionary ‘activism’ and began to give 
more attention to worldly affairs, the social support base of Khamenei weakened and 
Rafsanjani’s support base gradually shifted. Exercising his power through 
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117 Gheissari and Nasr, Democracy in Iran, 127. 
128 
 
Islamic/revolutionary institutions, Khamenei, in order to maintain his support base, 
had no choice but to first come up with ideological answers to changing conditions 
and, second, to expand patronage within his support circle and related institutions. Due 
to the shrinking of the Conservative’s traditional support base, Khamenei became 
more dependent on Basij, Militia, IRGC, Hezbollahis and similar religious 
fundamentalists.  
For his part, Rafsanjani had to seek support from those social classes which his 
policies had helped to flourish in the first place. In other words, he and Kargozaran 
paved the way for the empowerment of the republican dimension of the IRI or 
popularisation of factional politics. Meanwhile, the Left was reconstructing its 
ideological discourse surrounding the republican dimension of the IRI as a potential 
legitimate means to return to power. Consequently, the republican pillar or 
popularisation of politics became a common ground for alliance between Rafsanjani, 
the Modern Right and the Reformists, in order to contain the institutional dominance 
of the Traditional Right.  
In the next chapter, as the debates on the republican aspect of the IRI become 
the main political agenda, the extent to which these debates have influenced the future 
power dynamics and the rivalry in the political elites in the context of factional politics 
will be discussed. 
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Chapter Three 
Politics Factional of Popularisation Three: Chapter 
 
The election of Mohammad Khatami as President in 1997 marked a new phase in the 
popularisation of politics in the IRI. Despite strong support from the Conservatives 
and Khamenei for his rival, Nateq Nouri, Khatami’s majority of more than 20 million 
votes was a clear signal of demand for change in society. Khatami mobilised those 
who had never voted before and unified different social groups with slogans such as 
the ‘Rule of Law,' ‘Civil Society’ and ‘Democracy’ Khatami’s election paved the way 
for the return of the old Leftists with a new form of political mandate, and the 
designation of ‘Reformist's.  
 These elements made up the Reformists platform of ‘political development.' 
Their goal was to become the unifying representative of all pro-reform forces. 
Although Khatami and the Reformists had this overwhelming mandate, there was no 
clear concept of the extent and the breadth of what reform meant. The extent of 
changes expected by various electoral constituencies was unclear. So while Khatami’s 
victory was an important step in the popularisation of politics, it also created additional 
tensions in IRI factional politics. The victory of Khatami’s slogans, and the 
Reformist’s, was again a repetition of basic divisions in society about the main goals 
of the revolution; Islamic/revolutionary aspirations or republicanism. This division 
goes back to 1979–1980. At the heart of this division was the very question of ‘the 
role of people’ in the IRI.  
The question of the role of people in the IRI has always been an underlining 
theme of IRI politics, as Alireza Alavai Tabar, Khatami’s advisor and prominent 
Reformist, underlines: “The faith in the IRI is determined by struggles between those 
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supporting republican interpretations of the Islamic Republic and those who support 
other interpretations of the Islamic Republic — [which he has previously categorised 
as totalitarian, traditional oligarchical and bureaucratic authoritarian].”1  
Nevertheless, during this period, the IRI elites proposed varied responses to this 
question within the framework of Khomeinism. These debates exercised a strong 
influence on factional politics, social expectations, social awareness and perspectives 
of political elites. To an extent, the concept of the ‘role of people’ had become an 
‘empty signifier,' borrowing Laclau’s argument that different factions and social actors 
implemented to craft their vision, to justify their actions and to empower their position 
within the IRI.2 
The IRI’s hybrid characteristic also played an important role in how these 
different responses translated into politics. A popular President combined with a 
popular Majlis not only can strengthen the Executive Branch, together they can 
exercise a strong influence on the balance of power between the republican and Islamic 
institutions. Given the power balance of this period, strengthening the electoral 
institutions, along with Khatami’s attempts to integrate pro-republicanism aspirations 
into the fabric of the IRI, threatened the patriarchal model of government supported 
by the Conservatives and the Supreme Leader, and also the political and/or economic 
interests of these groups, which was deeply entangled in the power of parallel 
Islamic/revolutionary institutions at this time.  
While Khatami was hoping to introduce and to strengthen republicanism in the 
state institutions by reinforcing ‘civil society,’ as well as the ‘rule of law,' Khamenei, 
alongside the Conservatives, were expanding their authoritarian interpretation of 
                                                 
1 Mohsen Armin Hashem Aghajari and Mohammadreza Tajik, Eslahat va Porsesh-ha-ye Asasi 
[Reform and fundamental questions] (Nashr-e Tahqiqat-e Zekr, 2000/2001): 190. 
2 S. Critchley and O. Marchart, Laclau: A Critical Reader (Routledge, 2004). 
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Khomeinism. As a result, these two divergent, and sometimes conflicting 
interpretations of Khomeinism influenced the dynamics of the power struggle on an 
institutional level and the trajectory of societal change.3  
The Khatami Era and factional politics of this era were mentioned in numerous 
studies, but they have not been substantially studied in themselves.4 Given that the 
main goal of this chapter is to construct an analytical comparative case within the 
larger comparative framework of this thesis, this chapter does not offer a substantial 
study of factional politics of this period. Nevertheless, this chapter aims to place the 
emergence of the pro-Reform Movement, its evolution and the factional politics of this 
period in a better context by taking into account two aspects. For example, theoretical 
and intellectual debates of the opposing factions, both the Reformists and the 
Conservatives, and conversely, the ideological and intellectual battles, as well as 
political struggles of this period. 
This chapter examines the main philosophical and political trends that struggle 
with each other over the meaning of the ‘role of the people’ within the IRI system. 
Vitally, it also examines the extent to which these different definitions have influenced 
the dynamics of power within IRI politics and of society. It aims to explore the 
structural and human agency factors affecting the trajectory of the popularisation of 
factional politics in this period by looking at the attempts to determine the ‘role of 
people’ in the IRI. It shows how concepts become a significant factor in factional 
fights, either as justification for action, the promotion of given institutions or use of 
violence. It aims to show that the Conservative's position is not only cynical power 
politics or mindless reaction; rather rooted in an Islamic philosophical approach and 
intellectual doctrine.  
                                                 
3 Gheissari and Nasr, Democracy in Iran, 128.  
4 See Introduction chapter for details of these studies.  
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This chapter starts by exploring the importance of Khatami’s election and why 
it has been a turning point in IRI history. This is followed by an overview of Khatami’s 
political thought and his personality, with a focus on exploring the theoretical premises 
of the ‘role of people’ in Khatami’s discourse.5 The subsequent section reviews the 
main intellectual debates in this period, including those opposing Khatami’s 
interpretation of the ‘role of people’ in the IRI. The following section shows how these 
different responses have influenced the institutional battles in the IRI. The final section 
investigates the reaction of society and popular movements in these debates.  
Khatami’s election marked the beginning of a new Era in the IRI. It is referred 
to as ‘The Epic of 23 May.' In this election, new players with agendas greatly differing 
from the previous administration attained political power through the platform of 
election. This election revived, to an extent, certain elements of electoral procedure. 
In contrast to previous elections: a) the ‘ballot box’ became the battleground for 
different ideas and views; b) ‘voting’ developed into the means of choosing different 
policy directions, besides its symbolic meaning of affirming the revolution; c) 
‘electoral competition’ was restored, at least to a limited degree; d) the demand of 
people for change was channelled through a non-violent political participation that 
divided them into a ‘majority’ and ‘minority,' and e) the defeated faction accepted the 
results. While previous elections were mostly confirmations of pre-selected winning 
candidates, who usually enjoyed the tacit consensus of the political elites, this election 
was a competition with an unpredictable result. Overall, perhaps this election was the 
first step in the transformation of ‘Ummat’ or ‘always mobilised nation’ to citizens.6  
The different political factions reacted differently to Khatami’s victory. The 
                                                 
5 Even though it is called ‘Khatami’s Discourse,' it is an accumulation of a myriad of intellectual 
efforts of various thinkers and public debates.  
6 Mehrnameh v. 22 (June 2012). 
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Conservatives propagated it as confirmation of the revolution and the Supreme Leader, 
given the high electoral participation. 7  The Left, however, promoted Khatami’s 
victory as the opposition of the people to the policies of the Conservatives. Hajjarian, 
a prominent Reformist, argued that the ‘The Epic of 23 May’ was the natural 
consequence of the unsatisfied expectations of the people.8 Abdolkarim Soroush, a 
well-known religious, intellectual, declared: “The election result was a ‘No’ to all that 
has been going on in our society, specifically with regard to (sociopolitical) 
freedoms.”9  
Khatami’s victory showed that there were several sources of tension in society. 
First, the restrictive sociocultural policies of the Conservatives had resulted in social 
discontent amongst various social groups. Second, people and the lower and middle-
class in particular had serious concerns about the deteriorating socioeconomic 
situation along with the country’s international isolation at this period. The divide in 
the Conservative’s camp, portrayed in the emergence of Kargozaran, had created new 
‘political opportunities’ for ‘new political players,' and also a chance for social groups, 
mainly young people and women, to demand a certain degree of change.  
It was within this context that Khatami became the symbol of this change, and 
his rival, Nateq Nuri, became the symbol of the regime’s pre-elected candidate.10 A 
‘collective solidarity’ emerged amongst different social groups around the support for 
Khatami. This was, to a certain extent, a form of contention with the established 
political setting. This collective solidarity, coupled with the agreement amongst the 
                                                 
7 Resalat 5/3/76 (26/May/1997); 4/3/76 (25/May/1997). 
8 Salam 27/5/76 (18/August/1997). 
9 Resalat 8/3/76 (29/May/1997). 
10 Nateq Nouri, in his memoir states, he became the symbol of the establishment while Khatami 
became the candidate of change. He even blamed those groups who attached themselves to him and 
whose ideas he did not support, for his defeat.  
Mirdar, Khaterat-e Akbar, 100-121. 
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Leftists and Modern Right political elite over Khatami, created an opportunity for this 
change.  
Khatami’s victory was not solely due to systematic mobilisation of the 
supporters of these two factions — the Reformists and the Modern Right. The election 
results showed that Khatami gained the votes of the urban population, the rural areas, 
the support of the secular middle and upper-middle-classes, as well as the conservative 
segments of society, as demonstrated by his victory in Qom, a Conservative bastion. 
Different aspects of Khatami’s personality also appealed to different constituencies.  
For instance, Khatami’s religious standing and being a ‘Seyyed’ (being a 
descendant of the Prophet Mohammad) helped him to gain the support of conservative 
families. In addition, his slogans, chic attire, charismatic personality and moderate 
cultural views attracted many who hoped for change. Therefore, while Khatami 
broadened the appeal of these two factions, at the same time part of his votes belonged 
to different constituencies. This incoherence amongst Khatami’s supporters 
influenced, to an extent, the future of the Reform Movement.  
Khatami’s personality and political views played an important role not only in 
his electoral victories and his popularity, but also in the wider scope of the IRI’s 
politics.11 Seyyed Mohammad Khatami (b. 1943) was raised in a middle-class family. 
His father was the Friday prayer Imam of Yazd.  
In contrast to both Khamenei and Rafsanjani, Khatami was never a direct 
student of Khomeini. He moved to Qom in 1961 at the age of 19. After Khomeini’s 
exile in 1964, he left the Seminary and chose a different educational path. He studied 
Western philosophy at the University of Isfahan and then earned a Master’s degree in 
                                                 
11 For study of Khatami’s personality and political views see: Ghoncheh Tazmini, Khatami's Iran: The 
Islamic Republic and the Turbulent Path to Reform (I.B.Tauris, 2009). Shakibi, Khatami,143-186.  
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Education from Tehran University. He then returned to Qom to finish his seminary 
studies. During this time, Khomeini’s thesis on political Islam and his authority as a 
Marja became well established. Khomeini’s students were now seminary teachers 
propagating his reading of political Islam and engaging in new debates regarding its 
different aspects. Khatami was a student of Morteza Motahhari and Hossein Ali 
Montazeri, two of Khomeini’s main pupils of this period. Thus, Khatami was heavily 
involved in these new debates.  
Khatami’s marriage to Zohreh Sadeqi, who was from a prominent religious 
family, deepened his ties with the clerical establishment, especially with Khomeini’s 
family. She was the niece of Mousa Sadr (the Lebanese Shi’a leader) and the aunt of 
the wife of Ahmad Khomeini (Khomeini’s son). Contrary to Khamenei and 
Rafsanjani, who married in their early twenties, Khatami was 31 at the time of his 
marriage.  
Khatami was never imprisoned or exiled, in contrast to both Khamenei and 
Rafsanjani. He was not even in Iran during the revolution.12 After his return to Iran 
from Germany in 1980, Khatami gained Khomeini’s support, becoming an MP in the 
first Majlis and soon after becoming in charge of cultural affairs. After showing his 
ability as the editor of Kayhan newspaper, he became the Minister of Culture and 
Islamic Guidance, a post he held for ten years (1982–1992). Eventually, over the 
growing criticism of his moderate sociocultural views, Khatami resigned, after only 
two years in the Rafsanjani cabinet. At the time, Khatami’s resignation was seen as a 
sign of his weakness in politicking.13  
Khatami’s many years in higher education, during which he studied philosophy 
                                                 
12 He was in Germany, where he had replaced Mohammad Beheshti as Head of the Hamburg Islamic 
Cultural Centre. 
13 Shakibi, Khatami, 150. 
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and the humanities, strengthened his deliberative disposition of uncertainty and self-
reflection. He was an intellectual, and concerned with the ‘truth’ more than ‘Maslahat’ 
(expediency) and practicalities, an attitude that Karbaschi, secretary general of 
Kargozaran, described as “[Khatami’s] lack of interest in administrative work and 
planning.”14 These personal characteristics may help us to understand better certain 
decisions that Khatami made — or did not make — in times of crisis. When Khatami 
became President, his ideas were confronted with the exigencies of political 
leadership. This adds to the importance of investigating Khatami’s political thoughts. 
The relation between Islam and modernity, or the Western concept of 
modernity, has been at the core of Khatami’s philosophical concerns. Khatami’s 
attention to these issues are seen in the books he published after his resignation as 
Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance. Importantly, Khatami has a fairly realistic 
image about the West, given his life experience and his studies in the philosophical 
grounds of Western modernisation. In his book, Fear of the Wave, published in 1992, 
Khatami underlines two factors in addressing the question of “Where is our place [as 
Iranian Muslims] in today’s world?." These factors are “understanding time” and 
“religious concerns." Therefore, he finds “religious intellectualism” a necessary 
requirement for Iranian society. This “religious intellectual” should have certain 
characteristics, including familiarity with “modern issues” and respecting reason and 
freedom.15  
Khatami seeks to introduce a new ‘discourse of modern subjectivity’ by 
integrating elements of modern Western thought into an interpretation of Islamic 
                                                 
14 Mehrnameh v 22 Tir/1391 (June/2012): 94.  
15 Mohammad Khatami, "Bim-e Moj,” (Tarh-e No, 1996/1997): 202–205. 
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thought. 16  In this framework, freedom possesses an essential place in Khatami’s 
discourse. He argues that “the people’s ideal has always been and will always be 
freedom.”17 Khatami underlines that “the history of mankind is the history of [the 
quest for] freedom.”18  
However, he believes in the compatibility of freedom and religion: “Placing 
religion against freedom would be one of the major catastrophes of the history of 
mankind because in that case, both freedom and religion will suffer, in addition to 
mankind, who deserves to be both religious and free.”19 He also criticises liberalism 
because, by starting from individualism, freedom transcends to hedonism. 
“Utilitarianism was derived from the bosom of individuality, and material interests 
became the foundation of social and inter-state relations.”20  
Most of Khatami’s efforts are dedicated to conclusively responding to the 
question of the role of the people in the IRI. He hopes to define this role in a way that 
recognises the modern rights of individuals while remaining in the purview of Islam 
and Khomeinism. He tries to integrate Islam and republicanism in state institutions. 
This effort is portrayed in his thesis of “religious democracy” (mardomsalari-ye dini). 
Khatami argues that integration of the main components of ‘Western democracy’ with 
Islamic values can offer a better form of democracy.  
In his view, “there is no contradiction between the right to rule of the people 
and the divine right to rule, because these two are at two different levels (dar tul-e ham 
                                                 
16 “Post-Revolutionary Islamic Discourses on Modernity in Iran: Expansion and Contraction of 
Human Subjectivity," International Journal of Middle East Studies 35, no. 04 (2003); Farzin Vahdat, 
"Religious Modernity in Iran: Dilemmas of Islamic Democracy in the Discourse of Mohammad 
Khatami," Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 25, no. 3 (2005). 
17 Ettela’at 3/3/1377 (24/May/1998).   
18 Mohammad Hussein Haqdar, Gofteman-e Farhangi Siasi-ye Khatami [Cultural and Political 
Discourse of Khatami] (Shafi'i, 1999), 76. 
19 Ettela’at 3/3/1377 (24/May/1998).   
20 Mohammad Khatami, Mardomsalary [Democracy] (Tarh-e No, 2002): 28.  
138 
 
hastand).”21 For Khatami, God is the absolute source of legitimacy. However, God 
assigned this right to people because God also equipped mankind with tools such as 
will, choice, responsibility and reason that would enable him to figure out the best 
ways to manage societies. People, directly or indirectly, are, therefore, the real 
sovereign and people’s will that legitimises all other state authorities.  
Khatami believes that this ‘religious democracy’ needs an ‘Islamic civil 
society’ to succeed. He illustrates the characteristics of this civil society:  
In a civil society, the dynamics of society are based on 
participation, cooperation, sympathy and elections. People with 
different preferences, interests and tendencies should have the 
opportunity to come together and define their demands and… 
discuss their rights and find procedures that need to be taken in 
order to secure them these rights [and demands]. These 
mechanisms would keep society dynamic, coherent and 
progressive.  
 
Perhaps to prove that this civil society is in the purview of Khomeinism, 
Khatami distinguishes Islamic civil society from Western civil society.  
While Western civil society, historically, as well as theoretically, 
is derived from the Greek city-state and the later Roman political 
system. The civil society that we have in mind has its origin in 
the historical and theoretical ground of Madinat ol-Nabi (city of 
the Prophet, literally, pointing to the first Islamic state 
established and governed by the Prophet Mohammad in 
Madina).22  
 
Khatami underlines the need for ‘freedom’ and ‘rule of law’ as important 
instruments to protect this society. He points out the interrelation of the two concepts: 
“freedom without law is chaos and law without freedom is dictatorship.”23 In his first 
press conference five days after his election, Khatami announced:  
                                                 
21 Jomhourieslami 8/8/1376 (30/October/1997). 
22 Mohammad Khatami, "Islam Dialogue and Civil Society, Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies, the 
Middle East & Central Asia," (Canberra: The Australian National University, 2000):16. 
 Madinat ul-Nabi (or Madinat al Nabi) means the ‘City of the Prophet.' 
23 Ettela’at 3/3/1377 (24/May/1998); Jomhourieslami 22/3/1378 (12/June/1999); Ettela’at 2/3/1378 
(23/May/1999).   
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Our main goal is to institutionalise the ‘rule of law’ and to 
implement fully the Constitution.”24   However, as it will be 
shown the Constitutional conflicts between the 
revolutionary/Islamic and republican institutions became 
obstacles to the success of Khatami’s political platform. Khatami 
defines political freedom as freedom of opponents and minorities 
and one of the main pillars of political development.25 Khatami 
advocates ‘dialogue’ as the only way of negotiating the 
differences, because “dialogue is a value in itself, as it is based 
on freedom and autonomy/choice (ekhtiyar). 26 
 
Khatami introduces the universality of the rights of people by implementing a 
new interpretation of Khomeinism. This view is portrayed in his slogan of “Iran for all 
Iranians.” By arguing that an important aspect of Khomeini’s discourse was the revival 
of the rights of humans to determine their fate and to participate in different aspects of 
life. Khatami concluded that all segments of society should have certain rights.27  
On another occasion, he underlined “We are proud that we have interpreted our 
Islamic regime in a way that every Iranian who is a citizen, either Muslim or non-
Muslim should have citizenship rights.”28 Khatami underlines the accountability of the 
government to its citizens and argues that a ruler is accountable to God and the people. 
His definition of this accountability is summarised in his slogan: ‘Freedom in the realm 
of thought; rationality in the realm of dialogue; and law in the realm of action.'29 
The ‘security paradigm’ of Khatami is closely linked to sociopolitical 
pluralism, tolerance, citizens’ rights, social participation, respect for minorities, 
                                                 
24 Salam 7/3/1376 (28/May/1997).  
He also argued, “A good government is the one that does not exclude even one of its opponents and 
can persuade its opponents to play by its rules." Khatami continues, “One of the main aspects of 
political development is freedom for minorities." 
25 Ettela’at 17/7/1382 (8/October/2003). 
26 Khatami Speech in Florence University Quoted in: Reza Soleimani, Siasat Khareji-ye Dolat-e 
Khatami, Siasat-e Tanesh Zoda'i va Goftegu-ye Tamaddon-ha [Foreign Policy of Khatami, 
Normalisation and Dialogue of Civilisation] (Kavir, 2002): 23.   
27 Ettela’at 26/1/1378 (15/April/1999). 
28 Jomhourieslami 22/9/78.  
29 Mentioned in Golnar Mehran, "Khatami, Political Reform and Education in Iran," Comparative 
Education 39, no. 3 (2003). 
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freedom of speech and security for opponents, and the coexistence of different views 
and ideas. “The real security is that the people could participate in different areas and 
feel this participation [is real].”30  
For Khatami, the combination and coexistence of religion and freedom are the 
recipe for salvation:  
Unification of religion and freedom is our message to today’s 
world. Our religion, as well as our freedom both, have enemies. 
Enemies of religion hide behind the idea of ‘Western freedom,' 
whilst enemies of freedom hide behind religion, I believe our 
journey of Islamic salvation and development of society, is in its 
transient period that is the experience of [finding a way] to merge 
religion and freedom.31  
 
In this line, in a response to the debates of ‘clash of civilisations,' he put forward 
the idea of ‘dialogue of civilisations.' 
In sum, ‘rule of law,' ‘freedom’ (political freedom), an ‘accountable 
government,' ‘the rights of citizens’ and ‘civil society’ are the main aspects of 
Khatami’s political ideology. During his Presidency, Khatami introduced new terms 
or new definitions for old terms and new concepts to the political culture of the IRI. 
Although these concepts were unprecedented topics since the establishment of 
Khomeinism,32 it was the ambiguity in Khomeinism that allowed the possibilities of 
representation and redefinition of these new topics.  
By doing this, Khatami greatly influenced the popularisation of factional 
politics. He redefined the role of the government, its obligations and its accountability 
to its citizens, and, while recognising that people have certain rights, aimed to 
institutionalise them through the rule of law. To fulfil his promises, Khatami aimed to 
strengthen the IRI republican institutions. His efforts translated into a new power 
                                                 
30 Jomhourieslami 1/5/1377 (23/July/1998).  
31 Khatami, Mardomsalari, 29. 
32 Armin and Aghajari and Tajik, Eslahat, 252–5. 
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balance for the republican dimension and shaped new political dynamics at a factional 
and institutional level.  
The debates about the rule of law and people’s right to rule over their fate were, 
to a great degree, the reflection of unresolved issues of the source of legitimacy of the 
IRI or the discourse of velayat-e faqih. The velayat-e faqih thesis was Khomeini’s 
response to the philosophical question of the relationship between Islam and 
modernity. Therefore, intellectual debates, once again, centred on the source of the 
legitimacy of the IRI. However, these debates differed from the debates both before 
the revolution and soon after it, during the process of ratification of IRI’s Constitution. 
This time, a generation of intellectuals who were part of the IRI elite tried to respond 
to these debates. Not only did they have the experience of the revolution and the Iran–
Iraq War but also they had gained 20 years worth of experience in the political arena.  
Intellectual Debates 
To a degree, the intellectual battles over different definitions of ‘people’ and their 
‘role’ in politics were a facet of the power struggle in this period amongst the main IRI 
political players. On the one side are those who believe people can achieve prosperity 
and salvation in life by using the tools with which God provided them; namely, reason, 
modern knowledge and human achievement.  
 For this group, Islam is a rich collection of guidelines that help humans to find 
better solutions for governing. The Islamic faith is an important yet personal endeavour 
for this group. They consider the people as bearers of rights. On the other side are those 
who consider people to be creatures that need continuous supervision and guidance. 
For this group, people cannot be trusted as they are doomed to follow their negative 
desires. They believe God has provided people with a complete set of rules and 
regulations that will guide them to salvation and prosperity and these orders are clear 
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and normative. They argue that the Islamic government should be established to 
implement Islamic ordinances in society and should be actively involved in the life of 
the people to ensure their commitment to Islam.33  
 These two different conceptions of the people lead to two different political 
orders. They each define a different role for the state and its institutions and different 
borders for public and private spheres. Furthermore, the IRI Constitution, with its 
hybrid characteristics, embodied institutional opportunities for each of these two 
approaches. On the other hand, the ambiguities in Khomeinism provide enough 
ideological manoeuvrability for each of these two sides to claim to be the true promoter 
of Khomeini’s ideas. As a result, these intellectual battles over the role of the people 
provided grounds for the political cohesion of different political groups, while also 
largely influencing the factional power struggle within the grounds of ‘Constitutional 
politics.'34  
 ‘Absolute mandate of jurist’ (velayat-e motlaqeh-ye faqih), the hegemonic 
discourse of the IRI, argues that during the time of occultation since there is no access 
to infallible imams, the foqaha have guardianship over people, inclusive of all 
responsibilities of the Prophet Mohammad. Once a man qualifies as a jurist, he then 
becomes the source of authority over the people. In this interpretation, jurisprudence 
and the Islamic pillar of the IRI take precedence over the IRI’s republican dimension. 
Although Khomeini’s thesis was a response to the challenges of modernity to Islam, 
Khatami’s victory proved to some that Khomeini’s thesis was not responding to other 
challenges being posed by modernity.  
Therefore, new intellectual efforts emerged to address these questions. 
                                                 
33 These two are different to liberal/ideological or liberal/theocracy dichotomies. 
34 Arjomand, After Khomeini, 99-140. 
143 
 
Khatami, while emphasising the rule of law and the Constitution, rarely addresses the 
institution of velayat-e faqih. However, as mentioned earlier, he was encouraging 
intellectual debates in this area. Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, Mohsen Kadivar, 
Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari, Abdolkarim Soroush and Mostafa Malekian were 
the main religious figures and ‘religious intellectuals’ dealing with this issue of finding 
new responses to the challenges imposed by modernisation. Besides these religious 
intellectuals, the political theories and scholarly works of Homayoun Katouzian and 
Hossein Bashiriyeh have influenced the platform and paradigms of the Reformists and 
Khatami.35 
Ayattollah Montazeri’s views are important because he was one of the main 
advocates of the integration of the principle of velayat-e faqih in the IRI Constitution 
during the establishment of the IRI. After almost 20 years of his first-hand experience 
of IRI politics, he became a critic of velayat-e motlaqeh-ye faqih. He publicly criticised 
Khamenei’s authority and questioned his credentials. Eventually, his opposition led to 
house arrest in 2002. Based on Montazeri’s political model, people should choose their 
leader amongst a group of jurists (foqaha), given that jurists are experts in 
understanding what is ‘good’ and ‘bad.'  
However, this leader should be accountable to and responsible for the people 
and it is the people who should decide the terms of his leadership, including his tenure 
and his jurisdiction. Theoretically, Montazeri’s ideas are in the purview of Khomeini’s 
political Islam and from the classic school of the Islamic methodology. However, 
Montazeri’s students, particularly Mohsen Kadivar, took the initiative and broadened 
                                                 
35 A. Mirsepassi, Democracy in Modern Iran: Islam, Culture, and Political Change (NYU Press, 
2010): 132, 143. 
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this subject.3637 
Mohsen Kadivar is a mojtahed with a Doctorate in Philosophy and a degree in 
electrical engineering. He introduced new readings of political Islam and eventually 
his provocative ideas led to his imprisonment and defrocking in 1999. Kadivar tried to 
integrate modernity with his conception of Islamic-Iranian identity.  
By criticising the traditional narrative of ejtehad, he questioned the originality 
and authenticity of velayat-e faqih and claimed it has been just a minority in the Shia 
tradition that followed this narrative. In his book ‘Political Thoughts in Iran,' he 
underlines the contradictions between velayat-e faqih and the principles of 
republicanism. In this book, after explaining different possible forms of government 
in Shia tradition, he discusses the difference between two main forms of ‘absolute and 
appointed guardianship of jurist’ (velayat-e entesabi-ye motlaqeh-ye faqih) and 
‘selected and consultative guardianship of jurist (velayat-e entekhabi-ye moqayyedeh-
ye faqih). In the former, the source of legitimacy is top down, while in the latter, the 
state mostly gains its legitimacy from the people.  
However, to integrate Islam with modernity, Kadivar introduced a new 
approach: “If a majority of a society is Muslim then this society can have a democratic 
government and at the same time [this society] can practice [Islamic] faith, [Islamic] 
ethics and Islamic values, because Islam as a religion, can integrate with democracy 
as a modern political tool.”38 For Kadivar, the IRI should be a religious democracy, by 
which he means the form of government is a democracy whilst the majority of the 
people are Muslims. Kadivar soon became a public intellectual and an active 
                                                 
36 Hossein Ali Montazeri, Nezam ol Hekam fel Islam: Kholaseh Ketab Derasat fi Velayat Faqih, 
[Collection of Teachings about Velayat-e Faqīh] ( Nashr-e Saraei, 2001). 
37 Hamid Dabashi’s Interview with Kadivar, 12/10/1388 (2/January/2010), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9YC51vB3CI0.  
38 Mohsen Kadivar, Shariat va Siasat: Din Dar Howzeh-ye Omumi (1387/2007): 237, 
http://kadivar.com/?p=8448#_Toc298183485.  
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‘Reformist.' He published many articles and made many speeches on ‘civil society,' 
‘freedom,' ‘pluralism’ and ‘rule of law,' mainly to discuss how these concepts could 
be linked to Islam. 
Kadivar’s philosophy looks at different traditions of feqh using mainly the 
classical methods of theology. Shabestari implements modern philosophical 
paradigms, namely hermeneutic and existential theologies, to respond to the 
contradictions between revolutionary Islam and modern forces. Shabestari argues that 
it is not possible to have a single true interpretation and/or reading of any text and/or 
religion, therefore no one should claim to possess the true reading of a religion. 
Shabestari rejects that Islam suggests a certain form of polity and argues that the Quran 
and Islam are concerned with certain end goals and not particular forms of 
government.39  
Contradictory to the official ideology, in his discourse, state and political 
institutions have a ‘civil’ nature where religious measures could apply to them. 
Freedom plays a crucial role in Shabestari’s discourse. He argues that 
institutionalisation of religion would lead to the negation of subjectivity, which is 
against freedom.40 Shabestari argues that the main concerns of the people of faith 
regarding political theories should be in which form of government faith can flourish 
the most. Faith cannot be achieved without freedom of thought and autonomy.41 A 
desirable government should, therefore, have guardian institutions for freedom and 
                                                 
39 Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari, Iman Va Azadi [Faith and Freedom] (Tarh-e No, 2000): 60. 
40 Shabestari’s discourse lies within the paradigm of ‘meditated subjectivity,’ as Farzin Vahdat 
suggests.  
Farzin Vahdat, "Post‐Revolutionary Discourses of Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari and Mohsen 
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‘citizen rights of participation’ as its main requirements.  
Since the best form of government that can deliver these two promises is the 
parliamentary system with an independent judiciary system, then this form of 
government is desirable.42 For Shabestari, “The necessity of a democratic government 
cannot be derived from the meaning of faith or the religious texts. However, since 
social realities demand such a form of government, people of faith must forge a 
relationship with this reality, reconcile themselves with its requirements and follow a 
faithful life along its riverbed.”43 
Abdolkarim Soroush was another influential religious intellectual of this period 
who was once a radical member of the ‘Cultural Revolution Council’ in 1980. Soroush 
gradually distanced himself from his revolutionary stance and increasingly criticised 
the role of the clergy in the IRI. Soroush made several contributions to the debates on 
the relationship between modernity and Islam, most of which faced serious reactions 
from the traditional clergy.  
In his book The Theoretical Contraction and Expansion of the Sharia, Soroush 
distinguishes between religion and religious knowledge and argues that, in contrast to 
‘religion,' ‘religious knowledge’ is subjective, changing, time-bounded and influenced 
by other realms of knowledge, including science and the humanities, therefore 
claiming to have true and absolute understanding of a religion is impossible.44 He 
implicitly questions the privilege of Ulama over religion. In another series of his 
works, he discusses the relationship between religion and ideology.  
Contrary to the views of many Muslim modernist thinkers, including 
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Khomeini, Soroush rejects claims religions are ideologies and underlines the need to 
reverse those efforts that aim to ideologise religions. Soroush argues that ideologies 
are developed to fulfil certain sociopolitical purposes in a particular set of 
sociohistorical frames. Thus, ideologisation of a religion will harm religion in two 
ways: Firstly, by fitting religion into certain boundaries, it will not allow different 
meanings and interpretations that a religion can offer to surface. Second, it will 
transform a religion into a collection of certainly fixed answers to certain questions 
raised mostly in competition with rival ideologies.  
For instance, considering Islam as an ideology leads to the empowerment of the 
Sharia dimension at the cost of ignoring mystic interpretations of Islam.45 Soroush 
opposes the “ideologisation” of society because it will leave little room for reasoning, 
critical thinking and efforts to question the official ideology. In a society where 
religion is practiced as an ideology, questioning the official religion will be restricted, 
which is contradictory to an ideal religious society, which acknowledges subjective 
understandings of religion.  
Importantly, reasoning and critical thinking are significant elements in 
Soroush’s philosophy, given the large influence of Western philosophers, particularly 
Carl Popper.46 In sum, for Soroush, the political form of government is outside the 
purview of jurisprudence and within the other realm of knowledge. For Soroush, like 
Shabestary, faith is the essence of religion and gives precedence to religious practices. 
He concludes that secularism as government is compatible with Islam, and, by the 
same token, a plural and democratic form of government is an essential element in the 
flourishing of religious faith.  
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 A major aspect of these intellectual attempts was the justification of a new role 
for people in politics. With the victory of Khatami and the Reformists, these 
intellectual concepts became the subjects of politics and public debates that challenged 
the old establishment on theoretical and institutional levels. Soon after Khatami’s 
victory in 1997, the Reformists published several newspapers and journals propagating 
the discourse of political development.  
The Conservatives soon reacted.  They used state-backed newspapers, such as 
Kayhan and Resalat, the tribunes of Friday prayer and national TV as their main media 
outlets. Mesbah Yazdi (hereafter Mesbah), Ahmad Jannati and Mohammad Yazdi 
stood at the forefront of the Conservative camp’s attempts to respond to these 
challenges. However, many people, to an extent, regarded Mesbah as the key theorist 
of the conservative camp, because he engaged in these debates on a theoretical and 
philosophical level. 
Mesbah was born in Yazd in 1932. After studying for a few years at Yazd 
seminary, he went to the Qom seminary in 1953, where he attended Khomeini’s 
courses. Despite his active involvement in Khomeini’s Movement in the early 1960s, 
many Reformists and revolutionaries, including Rafsanjani, have questioned his 
support and loyalty to Khomeini’s Movement during his exile.47  
There are also allegations about his support of Hojjatieh, a discourse that 
believes the Islamic government should only be established by the Hidden Imam. After 
Khomeini’s exile, Mesbah became a member of the board of the Haqani School. 
Beheshti established this school as an alternative to the traditional Madreseh education 
system in 1964. After a few years, Mesbah resigned over the escalating disapproval 
surrounding his serious opposition to the ideas of Ali Shariati (who propagated 
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revolutionary Islam as a modern interpretation of Islam). Mesbah rejected these views 
because “the religion that implements non-feqahati methodology can be dangerous.”48  
After his resignation, tensions continued in the Haqani School amongst the 
students and eventually 18 students who supported Mesbah were expelled. Soon after 
his resignation, Mesbah established a section in another school called the ‘Madreseh-
ye Rah-e Haq’ and enrolled the expelled students from Haqani School. These students 
became the core ring of Mesbah’s supporters and leading figures in the Ahmadinejad 
period.  
After the revolution and during the first decade of the IRI, Mesbah mostly held 
different positions dealing with cultural and educational affairs. He founded the Baqer 
al Olum Foundation as a continuation of Rah-e Haq School, and later on, in 1995, he 
established ‘the Research and Education Institution of the Imam Khomeini,' which 
allowed him to exchange students from other universities and to offer postgraduate 
courses.  
These educational institutions helped him to expand his influence 
institutionally and to educate new cadres — followers — with specific views that 
would eventually deepen his informal power over different state institutions. Mesbah 
has been a member of the AofE and a member of JMHEQ. In 1996, he organised an 
educational course for Basij forces to strengthen the ideological education of these 
forces, called the ‘Guardianship Scheme’ (Tarh-e Velayat). This programme 
strengthened the scale of influence of Mesbah and his circle on these mobilisation 
networks, given that students and teachers of the Imam Khomeini institutions taught 
this course.  
Mesbah’s relationship with Rafsanjani and Khamenei dates back to their time 
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in the Qom Seminary in the 1950s. The difference in the worldviews of Rafsanjani and 
Mesbah could be traced back to this time in Qom. While Rafsanjani was mostly 
concerned with the practical aspects of resistance to the Pahlavi state, Mesbah was 
mostly engaged in its theoretical and ideological aspects.  
These different views were portrayed in the bulletins that each published.49 
During Khomeini’s exile, Rafsanjani proved to be a pragmatic, while Mesbah 
remained a fundamentalist. These different approaches led to their disagreement 
regarding cooperation with Leftist Islamist groups, such as the MEK. When Rafsanjani 
was helping MEK, Mesbah opposed him, arguing that alliance with those who are 
against the Islamic nature of the movement will compromise the principles of the 
Islamic Movement. Despite their different ideological standings, after the revolution, 
they have cooperated frequently. However, eventually, these two different worldviews 
fueled their disputes. These disputes reached their peak during the ninth Presidential 
election in 2005.50  
For Mesbah, the goal of the revolution was the establishment of an Islamic 
government where the main source of legitimacy is a divine right. He argues,  
Shia jurisprudence — with the exception of few contemporary 
faqihs — believes that in the time of ‘occultation,' faqih has the 
right to rule and this right is assigned to foqaha from God through 
infallible Imams. In the time of ‘occultation,' a government 
should only be legitimised through God, and people have no role 
in legitimising a government and [the people’s] role is only to 
objectify this government.51  
 
For Mesbah, any other role for the people is unacceptable. He denounces the 
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arguments of dual legitimacy and/or conditional legitimacy. Dual legitimacy argues 
that velayat-e faqih enjoys both divine legitimacy and popular legitimacy. However, 
conditional legitimacy argues that the main source of legitimacy of vali-ye faqih is 
divine, but conditioned to the people’s acceptance and votes. 52  For Mesbah, the 
republican aspect of the IRI has no intrinsic value, and it refers to the IRI’s frame of 
government. He argues,  
The goal is establishing an Islamic system through a government 
and the name of this government would be a republic only 
because monarchy (Saltanat) is not an acceptable form of 
government. This does not mean we have another goal called 
republicanism next to Islam. This is infidelity (sherk)… 
Republicanism is just a shell for reaching Islamic government 
otherwise it (republicanism) has no essential value.53  
 
He reaffirms this point: “There is no doubt that the main theme of the IRI’s 
Constitution is the sovereignty of God and Islam.”54  
For Mesbah, a majority cannot be trusted because, in general, people are weak 
and mostly under the influence of their earthly desires. Therefore, “It is the duty of the 
‘vali’ to rule as long as there are only enough people who support vali-ye faqih to 
maintain the Islamic government, and it is not the question of the number of his 
supporters.”55  For Mesbah, Islamic orders surpass all other human achievements, 
particularly in the humanities, given that Islamic orders are rooted in the ultimate truth. 
According to Mesbah’s discourse, there is only one reading of Islam and it is 
obtained through traditional feqh, and only Ulama have the authority and expertise to 
conclude this reading. Ulama are in agreement on the main issues of Islamic rules, and 
in those few areas of disputes, feqh and ejtehad offer sufficient tools to find the 
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answers.  
Mesbah harshly condemns debates about pluralism and the possibility of 
different readings of Islam: “Extension and generalisation of pluralism and political 
'pluralism in religion is not acceptable.”56 He even criminalises such interpretation: 
“Whoever said I have a new reading of Islam should be punished and punched in the 
mouth.”57 He responds to his critics by saying that “Islam has one reading and that is 
the reading of the Prophet and Imams. Those people who argue that no one has the 
right to impose his preference [on others], (implying the Reformists and Khatami) 
[should know that] our religion is not a matter of preference (saliqeh) for us, [which 
based on that] we can not impose it!”58  
For Mesbah, freedom is legitimate only if both Sharia and the law embrace it.59 
In another word, there are legitimate or illegitimate freedoms rather than just legal or 
illegal freedoms. The duty of the Islamic government is to prohibit any ‘illegitimate’ 
acts, in addition to protecting ‘legitimate and legal’ freedoms. He reduces the demand 
for ‘freedom,' propagated by the Reformists, to a Western ‘morally corrupted’ 
lifestyle.  
Mesbah rejects Khatami’s view on freedom: “Those remarks that consider 
freedom as the source of human dignity and consequently reject [social or political] 
restrictions and or boundaries, propagate a deceitful slogan of freedom of the West.”60 
He argues that there is no freedom without boundaries; so, the question is who should 
define these boundaries? “The response of a Muslim is: no one is more competent than 
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God for defining the restrictions of freedom in the world because it is God who creates 
all the beings and knows the best of its creatures and knows their desires and wants 
nothing but their perfection… but the response of a liberal is: these restrictions should 
be defined by people.”61  
For Mesbah, freedom and democracy are not inherently Islamic values; even 
interpretations of them are in contrast to Islam. Therefore, he blames those intellectuals 
who claim Islam propagates these values.62 In a sermon in a Friday prayer in 1998, 
Mesbah summarised his views: 
 
Those who propagate freedom and at the same time are mourning 
that there is no freedom in Iran, what are they implying?! The 
fact is, they have seen, heard or watched a certain behaviour in 
Western countries or in their movies and now they crave for that 
lifestyle, but this [Western lifestyle (referring to social and 
individual liberties)] is not permitted in Iran. Who does not 
permit it? Islamic government. Where does the Islamic 
government get this right from? From Islam; where does Islam 
get this right from? From vali-ye faqih, from God, and from the 
Prophet. These people, in fact, do not want to accept God’s 
orders…63 
 
For Mesbah, all types of freedom are constrained to the boundaries set in 
Sharia. Therefore, he rejects the freedom of belief because Islam only accepts the 
‘true’ and ‘right’ beliefs. By the same token, freedom of expression is valuable as long 
as it is not used against Islam or sacred religious values. 
In Mesbah’s paradigm, Muslim identity prioritises citizenship. 64  Mesbah 
questions the universality of the right of citizens and argues: “Equality of humans in 
humanity does not necessarily mean that they are equal in citizenship rights.” 65 
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Mesbah criticises Khatami’s slogan of ‘Iran for all Iranians,’ “Propagating nationalism 
is a sign of the deterioration of religious culture [in Iran], because these ideas and 
values [nationalist values] would [only] spread when religious culture deteriorates in 
a society and in order to substitute this culture.”66  
Khatami underlines ‘tolerance,’ in society as a major element in the political 
development platform. Conversely, Mesbah is suspicious of these attempts, 
considering them a weakening of Islamic values and a Western conspiracy: “They took 
our religious pride by propagating ‘tolerance.' Be careful not to lose our spirit of 
martyrdom easily, and not to be fooled by the people propagating ‘tolerance.'” 67 To 
show the contradiction between ‘tolerance’ and Islam, Mesbah underscores areas in 
which Islam explicitly legitimises violence. “Representing violence as a negative value 
is part of cultural onslaught.”68 ‘ 
“The West says that we should have tolerance when someone offends our 
religious beliefs… but Islam says such beliefs are sacred and are [even] more 
important than our life and one should defend these values even by sacrificing one’s 
life.”69 For Mesbah, the use of violence is part of Islamic ordinances. “If one accepts 
the Quran, consequently one should accept [the use of] violence.”70 He argues that the 
enemies of Islam should feel the terror of Islam and “for protecting Islamic regime, 
violence is a must and the most necessary obligation of Muslims.”71 He believes there 
are clear circumstances in which Islam allows people to use violence even without the 
approval of the state.  
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For instance, if “the people feel that the principles of Islam are in danger”72 
and/or if religious beliefs of Muslims are insulted.73 In one of his most controversial 
comments, Mesbah argued that “if someone insults the ‘sacred values’  [of Muslims] 
he/she should be killed and there is no need for a court order.”74 Given his comments, 
he was called the ‘Theoriser of Violence’ by the Reformists and Khatami. Khatami 
responded to his remarks on many occasions: 
 
Violence is condemned in all forms, even under sacred or popular 
slogans, or in the name of revolutionary figures […] however, 
those who are trying to theorise [and to legitimise] this use of 
violence should be blamed the most.75  
 
On another occasion Khatami underlined the possible dangers of these remarks: 
 
We made the revolution in order to build a proud revolutionary 
society. And people also declared that they accepted [that 
interpretation of] Islam, which its orders were reflected [in the 
Constitution]. Now, how is it that some people dare to disturb 
this order in the name of Islam? To claim what they believe in is 
the true interpretation of Islam, even if it is against the 
Constitution, even if it is against the accepted norms. How do 
they dare to encourage people and their religious followers to use 
violence and terror with the excuses such as your religion is in 
danger … those who are against science and knowledge and 
every modern achievement, disguise [hide] their illusions and 
delusions in philosophical themes and ‘ayeh’ (Quranic verses) 
and ‘hadis’ in order to propagate their reactionary beliefs. [They] 
present these [delusions and illusions] as holy concepts and take 
advantage of religious emotions [of the people]… The only thing 
that they are concerned about is their dark narrow mindset. These 
people do not believe in Khomeini, Islamic revolution and the 
Constitution.76 
 
These intellectual battles became largely politicised. These two different 
conceptions of the role of people in politics remained an underlining theme in factional 
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politics, the effects of which shaped, to a certain extent, different aspects of factional 
politics at an institutional level. 
Factional Politics at the Institutional Level 
Before elaborating the dynamics of factional politics, a few points need to be recalled. 
The triumph of Khatami took both him and the Reformists by surprise.77 They had no 
long-term comprehensive strategy. They realised that the extensive social support of 
Khatami was their main political asset. Given the large diversity of this support base, 
satisfying all sections of this support base was difficult. Khatami and the Reformists 
made political development their main agenda and their initial strategy was a 
negotiation at the top, backed up with pressure from below.  
 To execute this strategy successfully, one can argue that Khatami needed 
effective negotiation amongst political elites at the top and unification of both his 
social support base and the Reformists. Satisfying the expectations of his supporters 
meant executing policies that would endanger the interests of the Conservatives. At 
the same time, prolonged negotiations at the top could lower the social momentum 
behind the change and weaken his negotiating position. The task was, therefore, 
complicated, demanding the skills of a politician instead of a philosopher.  
In return, the Conservatives focused on dividing the Reformist camp and 
weakening its ties to its social support base. They blocked and delayed the 
implementation of Reformist policies and discredited the Reformist elites. They used 
coercive force both against the Reformists and civil society— They were successful. 
On the one hand, the question of how to respond to the Conservative's actions led to a 
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divide in the Reformist camp. On the other hand, some people and political elites 
questioned even the possibility of the initial claims of the Reformist Movement about 
achieving Islamic democracy by following the Constitution. 78  
 In this context, power struggles formed around policy initiatives concerning 
social, economic, cultural and foreign policy. These struggles took place on an 
institutional level between the judiciary and other guardian institutions versus civil 
society and electoral institutions versus guardian institutions.79 To stay in the purview 
of this thesis, only those events with direct relevance to factional politics and 
institutional battles are covered. This section does not claim to provide a political 
history of this period.  
Before the dynamics of this power struggle are elaborated, it should be noted 
that the relationship between Khatami and different segments of the Reformists 
changed. For instance, at political junctures, some of the Reformists who used to 
consider Khatami the ‘Father of Reforms’ changed their views on his role in the 
Reformist Movement. The radical part of the Reformists even proposed in 2000, the 
thesis of ‘bypassing Khatami,' by which they meant that if Khatami is not ready to 
adapt to the pace of the Reformist Movement, the Reformists should look for 
alternatives to Khatami and stick with the movement.80 Thus, referring to Khatami and 
the Reformists as a single political unit in this thesis does not mean they were always 
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united. 
Soon after the seventh Presidential election, Khatami and the Reformists 
strengthened their attempts to open the political and sociocultural space under the 
rubric of ‘political development’ and empowerment of civil society institutions. In 
response, the Conservatives, having realised the serious challenge that Khatami’s 
paradigm would impose on their power base, unified their forces. They exerted their 
control over judiciary institutions and also mobilised their pressure groups, the IRGC 
and Basij. As a result, a power struggle emerged between these two groups.  
The appointment of Ataollah Mohajerani and Abdollah Nouri, as Ministers of 
Culture and Islamic Guidance and the Interior respectively, was a clear signal of 
change in sociocultural and political agendas, due to their moderate views. In this new 
direction, new journals and newspapers were published, mostly propagating Reformist 
agendas. In October 1997, the first union of journalists was established by personal 
order of Khatami. In the music industry, bans were lifted on new genres of music, 
which were previously considered anti-Islamic.  
Many books, which were banned by prior administrations, were published 
and/or republished. New films and plays were produced, challenging the official image 
of society by showing different aspects of ‘secular culture’ within Iranian families.  
Controversial issues, such as the role of war veterans in post-war politics, social 
freedom, social poverty, extramarital romantic affairs and the social position of clerics, 
increasingly became the subject of books, music and films. In fact, these new cultural 
activities were in clear opposition to the claims of the state in its success in creating 
homo Islamicus. The popularity of these new debates was confirmation of the growing 
number of different social groups with a desire for change.  
Whilst the policies of Mohajerani marginally opened the cultural space, 
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Khatami and his Interior Minister tried to open the political space. Taking a step 
towards modern politics and the encouragement of party politics, new parties were 
established. During the period of 1997–1998, eight new parties were established, 
including the ‘Iranian Participation Front’ (Hezb-e Moasharekat-e Iran hereafter 
Mosharekat), which was headed by Khatami’s brother, Mohammad Reza Khatami. 
Mosharekat was the Reformist’s attempt to institutionalise their popular support base. 
Even though Mosharekat portrayed itself as Khatami’s main political party, Khatami 
was not a member, and at times their political strategies and tactics were in conflict.81  
To strengthen civil society, over the eight years of Khatami’s Presidency, an 
estimated ten thousand NGOs were established, in contrast with Ahmadinejad’s two 
terms as President, where the number of NGOs dropped to around two thousand.82 
Women’s rights activists and unions activists (mainly teachers and labourers) also 
mobilised their forces during this time. However, their efforts faced harsh and 
sometimes violent reactions from the regime.  
Universities also benefitted from this relaxed political space. Student activities 
revived and eventually gave birth to the first round of serious Student Movements in 
1999. Various meetings, ceremonies and anniversaries with a political nature received 
permits from the Minister of the Interior to form. For instance, in 1997 a permit for a 
memorial for Bazargan became the subject of factional politics and eventually became 
the main excuse for the impeachment of Nouri in 1998 by the Conservative Majlis. 
Bazargan was one of the founders of the LMI and the first IRI Prime Minister.  
However, due to his criticism of revolutionary policies, particularly during and 
after the hostage crisis (1979–1981), he became the symbol of so-called ‘liberals,’ a 
pejorative term in IRI political lexicon which refers to those who compromise the 
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revolutionary ideals. In response to the Reformist’s attempts to open the cultural and 
political spheres, the Conservatives soon joined forces with the judiciary institutions. 
 In this period, the judiciary institutions — including the Special Clerical Court 
(SCC) — imprisoned influential intellectuals, activists and political Reformists and 
restricted the Reformist media and NGO activities. The first victim was Gholam 
Hossein Karbaschi, who was arrested on charges of corruption in 1998.83 Arguably, 
his arrest was the Conservative’s factional revenge for Kargozaran and the Modern 
Right and their role in Khatami’s victory.84 The attack on the Modern Right continued 
with the banning of Faezeh Hashemi’s newspaper ‘Zan’ (woman) in April 1999. Less 
than a year into the Khatami’s Presidency, in April 1998, comments by Rahim Safavi, 
the Commander-in-Chief of IRGC, were circulated. 
  
I told Khamenei that a new form of hypocrisy is forming in the 
name of clergy. There are people wearing clerical attire but they 
are hypocrites. They are pretending to obey the rules but [in fact] 
they are breaking the rules. We need to cut someone’s head 
and/or cut out someone’s tongue (implying hard punishment); 
[because] these days, tongues have become swords [of our 
enemies], the newspapers that are publishing [these days] are 
threatening our national security. We are destroying and will 
destroy the roots of these anti-revolutionaries wherever they 
are.85 
 
Following these remarks, two months later, in February of 1999, Mohsen 
Kadiver was arrested and convicted in the SCC. His conviction ignited a series of 
debates about the legitimacy of such courts. In 1999, Abdollah Nouri, who, after his 
impeachment as the Minister of Interior, engaged in publishing newspapers. Nouri was 
arrested and sentenced to six years in prison, despite alleged attempts by Rafsanjani to 
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get a lesser sentence. Khamenei defended the clerical courts and criticised Reformist 
clerics.86  
In 2000, several Reformist intellectuals and politicians were arrested and tried 
following their attendance at a conference in Berlin. The Heinrich Boll Foundation (an 
organisation affiliated to the German Green party) held this conference to discuss IRI 
politics after the sixth Majlis election.  
However, the attendance of opposition groups outside of Iran, including MEK, 
in addition to the weak performance of the Reformist attendees in responding to the 
harsh criticisms pointed at the IRI regime, gave enough excuse to the judiciary for 
action. On another occasion, following a signal given by Khamenei in a speech at Amir 
Kabir University, in March 2001 the ‘Islamic Revolutionary Court’ issued an arrest 
warrant for numerous members of two political groups, the National Front, Melli 
Mazhabi and the LMI, over charges of involvement in a project called ‘over throwers 
of the regime.' The IRGC imprisoned a large number of these members during a trip 
by Khatami to Moscow.87  
NGOs were not safe from the political actions of the judiciary. For instance, in 
September 2002, the ‘Ayandeh’ Foundation, with its link to Gallup and Zigby, was 
convicted because it undertook a survey which showed that 74.4 percent of Iranians 
supported direct negotiations with the US.88 After IRNA published this report, many 
Reformists involved in the institute, including Abbas Abdi and Alireza Alavi Tabar, 
were accused of espionage.89   
                                                 
86 During a Friday prayer, Khamenei said, “The enemy manipulates people to get its goal and 
sometimes it is the clergy which is manipulated and ignorant."  
Khamenei Friday prayer (17/December/1999), http://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=2984.  
87 Jomhourieslami 22/12/1379 (12/March/2001); Jomhourieslami 22/1/1380 (11/April/2001); Noroz 
20/1/1380 (9/April/2001). 
88 Hayat-e No 1/7/1380 (23/September/2001); Etemad 1/71380 (23/September/2001).  
89 http://www.bbc.com/persian/iran/030203_a-iran-poll.shtml   (2 March 2016). 
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Another controversial action of the judiciary against Reformist intellectuals 
was the sentencing to death of Hashem Agha Jari in November 2002, because of his 
harsh criticism of the concept of taqlid (emulation) during a speech.90  His death 
sentence ignited another series of university protests in this period. His sentence was 
eventually reduced to 15 years in prison.  
The Conservatives used the judicial institutions for political purposes against 
the Reformist media. In July 1998, Mohammad Yazdi, the head of the judiciary, 
argued in a Friday prayer that political development is not the main priority of the 
IRI. 91  His sermon was followed by an editorial in Resalat by Morteza Nabavi 
elaborating that continuation of political development would lead to chaos and a 
political explosion in Iran.92 Soon after his sermon, the judiciary shut down ‘Jame‘eh’ 
newspaper, which was the first independent newspaper established a few months after 
Khatami’s Presidential victory. It had become popular, perhaps because it had 
unconventional stories and headlines, ran political cartoons and satire, and was not 
afraid of questioning certain social and political taboos.  
In reaction to its closure, Ahmad Borghani, the Press Deputy of the Culture and 
Islamic Guidance Minister, resigned and Jame‘eh was replaced with ‘Tous’ newspaper 
two days later. Soon, this procedure of issuing a new newspaper under a new name 
with the same cadres became the main tactic of the Reformists in the face of restricting 
Judiciary actions against the media. These newspapers gained the title of chain 
newspapers.  
Gradually, the Reformist media radicalised in reaction to increasing pressure 
                                                 
90 Following this speech, JMHEQ announced MII – the organisation to which Agha Jari was affiliated 
with, against the Sharia and asked Muslims not to cooperate with MII.  
Siasat-e Ruz 19/4/1381 (10/July/2002).  
91 Asr-e Ma 7/5/1381 (29/July/1998). 
92 Ibid. 
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by the Conservatives and entered sensitive political areas, such as the legitimacy of 
the ‘Supreme Leader.' Eventually, Khamenei entered the debates and harshly criticised 
the Reformist newspapers, calling them the “base for the enemies.”93 After this signal 
from Khamenei, and despite attempts by Mohajerani to contain the situation, 
eventually, in April 2000, several newspapers were shut down overnight by the order 
of Judge Saeed Mortazavi through the institution of the press court.  
Saeed Mortazavi soon became the forefront of the Judiciary actions against the 
pro-Reform camp. The escalated restrictions on the Reformist media continued to 
where national TV almost completely boycotted Khatami during the final years of his 
Presidency. The Conservatives also used their formal and informal links to hard-line 
pressure groups in the factional battles and in times of signs of social unrest. 
 The pressure groups, including Ansar-e Hezbollah, played an important part in 
the judiciary’s systematic actions against the Reformists. By and large Judicial actions 
against the Reformists usually began with the mobilisation of these pressure groups 
following a signal from the conservative camp. This signal could be a comment by a 
prominent Conservative or Khamenei in a Friday sermon or other tribunes in which 
certain sociocultural activities of pro-change forces and/or policies of the Reformists 
were criticised.  
In their protests, these groups accused Khatami’s government and the 
Reformists of intentionally weakening ‘true’ Islamic/revolutionary values and 
demanded a harsh reaction of the judiciary and/or other guardian institutions. As 
mentioned earlier, since these groups were not accountable to any civic or military 
courts, they were also the main instrument of illegal suppression of the opposition by 
the regime.  
                                                 
93 Khamenei 1/2/1379 (20/April/2000), http://farsi.khamenei.ir/news-content?id=896. 
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However, as the Conservatives limited the Reformist's actions and in damping 
the pace of their sociocultural and political programs, these hard-line pressure groups 
became less present in the public sphere. Over the period of 1997 to 2000, Ansar-e 
Hezbollah and plain clothes militia were involved in vigilante actions on more than 30 
occasions. They harassed intellectuals, disturbed political meetings and even beat up 
high-ranking officials of the Khatami cabinet (including the beating of Abdollah Nouri 
and Ataollah Mohajerani, in a Friday prayer in September 1998). They protested 
against Mohsen Kadivar and Abdollah Nouri before and during their trials and asked 
for the serious punishment of the attendees at the Berlin conference in 2000. They also 
played an important role in vigilante actions against students during university unrests 
on different occasions. Some members of these groups were also involved in the 
assassination of Saeed Hajjarian in 2000.  
The assassination attempt on Hajjarian by Saeed Asgar, a young, active Basij 
member, was a turning point in Khatami’s politics of change. The assassination took 
place soon after the landslide victory of the Reformists in the sixth Majlis. The bullet 
went through his head but he survived. He has, however, been paralysed ever since. 
Hajjarian was one of the key theorists and strategists of the Reformists.  
His assassination shocked society, Khatami and the Reformists. Serious 
suspicions emerged about the involvement of the security forces in the assassination 
and whether the assassins had a direct religious decree, fatva, for their action. It was 
seen as a clear threat to the Reformists and showed the scale of violent measures that 
the anti-Reform Movement was ready to take to hinder the Reformist Movement. The 
assassination considerably raised the cost of reform for Khatami and the Reformists 
and it raised the risk of activism.  
The message was clear: if the anti-Reform Movement cannot tolerate activities 
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of Hajjarian, a war veteran, an active revolutionary and one of the founders of the 
intelligence services after the revolution, what reaction should other segments of the 
society who have been outsiders to the revolution expect. The Hajjarian assassination 
was a case in a series of violent actions against the pro-change forces. What made it 
so exceptional, was the fact that he was part of the establishment. 
The incident known as the ‘Chain Murders’ case was the climax of systematic 
use of violence by the guardian institutions for hindering Reformist ‘liberal’ 
intellectual debates and civil society institutions. In November 1998, several public 
intellectuals, Dariush Forouhar and his wife, Parvaneh Eskandari Mohammad 
Mokhtari, Mohammad Jafar Pouyandeh and Majid Sharif, were brutally murdered. 
Reformist journals covered their deaths and also connected them to the killings of 
intellectuals in the previous years.  
In December 1998, a group called “Pure Mohammadian Islam Devotees of 
Mostafa Navvab” took credit for at least some of these killings. On 5 January 1999, 
the public relations office of the Ministry of Intelligence unexpectedly issued a short 
press release admitting that “staff within” its Ministry “committed these criminal 
activities [...] under the influence of undercover rogue agents."94 Eventually, the case 
was closed by the resignation of Khatami’s Intelligence Minister and the suicide of 
Saeed Emami in prison, as the key officials responsible for the murders. 
The domination of the ‘Chain Murders’ in the public sphere significantly 
influenced both factional politics and the public debates of the time. As mentioned in 
the previous section, part of the intellectual and public debates in this period 
surrounded ‘coercion’ and ‘violence.' These debates were formed within this context. 
The resolution of the case with the resignation of the Minister of Intelligence was 
                                                 
94 Jomhourieslami 16/10/1377 (6/January/1999). 
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perceived by most people as a success for Khatami and Reformists and a blow to the 
Conservative’s camp and Khamenei himself, given that the Minister of Intelligence is 
only appointed after the approval of the ‘Supreme Leader,' and it was seen as giving 
the upper hand to Khatami and the Reformists. 
 Crucially, the ‘Chain Murders’ became a turning point in the relationship 
between Rafsanjani and the Reformists. The Reformists, who had reinforced their 
political power following a landslide electoral victory in the first City Council election, 
considered the ‘chain murders’ a unique opportunity to settle their old disputes with 
Rafsanjani.  
In a political manoeuvre, they targeted Rafsanjani and accused him of knowing 
about these political assassinations during his Presidential terms. Some went even 
further and implicitly portrayed him as the man behind the killings.95 Abbas Abdi, who 
was imprisoned during the Rafsanjani administration, and Akbar Ganji were at the 
forefront of these attacks. They succeeded. Rafsanjani’s popularity declined 
considerably, to the point that in the election to the sixth Majlis, he received the lowest 
number of the votes amongst Tehran’s elected MPs and was eventually forced to resign 
before the sixth Majlis began.  
As a result, the monopolising ambitions of the Reformists cost them Rafsanjani, 
a major political ally who exercised considerable influence on the political elite. After 
their successive electoral victories in 1997, 1999 and 2000, the Reformists seemingly 
thought that the Conservatives popular and institutional power had been significantly 
weakened. Therefore, they thought it was now a good time to contain the power of 
Rafsanjani as a possible rival.  
                                                 
95 Akbare Ganji published a book and accused Rafsanjani of being the puppet master. 
Akbar Ganji, Alijenab-e Sorkhpush Aliljenab-i Khakestaripush, Asib Shenasi-ye Gozar Be Jame’eh-ye  
Democratic [The Boss in Red and the Boss in Grey ] (Tarh-e No, 2000).   
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Nonetheless, the attack on Rafsanjani seemed a political gamble, because, at 
this period, they needed Rafsanjani’s politicking skills more than ever, given that their 
main strategy was a negotiation at the top. Thus, this was a strategic mistake which 
the Reformists realised only too late when they lost the ninth Presidential election to 
Ahmadinejad. The Reformists, or at least some part of them, overestimated their 
popular and institutional power while underestimating the power of the Conservatives. 
The Rafsanjani–Reformist relationship will be discussed in more detail in the next 
section where factional politics between the electoral institutions and guardian 
institutions are examined. 
Electoral versus Guardian Institutions  
Struggles over the control of electoral/republican institutions have always been a major 
area of factional politics in the IRI. However, since the republican institutions were 
the only main state institutions that the Reformists could find a chance to control, 
elections were especially important during this period. During the eight years of 
Khatami’s Presidency, six elections were held, including two Presidential elections, 
two elections to the Majlis and two elections to the City Councils. To raise popular 
participation in politics, and also to show his popular support, Khatami established the 
institution of City Councils soon after his victory.96  
 In February of 1999, in the first City Council election, Reformists successfully 
mobilised pro-change social groups and enjoyed a strong victory. Although the 
institutional jurisdictions of City Councils were limited, this election was an important 
battleground for different factions to show their popular support, given it was the first 
                                                 
96 As in this election, the Interior Minister was in charge of the vetting process, instead of the GC. 
Many Reformists entered the election.  
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election since Khatami’s election.  
 However, this institution became a victim of factional politics. For example, 
the first City Council of Tehran became a near dysfunctional institution by mid-term.97 
The major electoral victory of Reformists happened a year later when they won 170 
out of the 290 seats in the sixth Majlis elections in February of 2000. With this victory, 
the Reformists gained control of almost all electoral institutions, marking this period 
as the height of the struggle between the GC and the sixth Majlis.  
 This period (2000–2004) was dominated by factional disputes between the 
Reformists and the Conservatives and escalated debates about the role of the people in 
politics. In June 2001, the eighth Presidential election was held, in which Khatami 
succeeded over his opponent with more than 50 percent of the vote; he won more than 
21 million votes.98 This was, however, the last electoral victory of the Reformists 
during this period.  
 The first signs of a decline in their popularity can be seen in the second City 
Council election in February 2003 where part of the Conservatives took advantage of 
the electoral apathy of the supporters of the Reformism and won the election. In 
February 2004, in the election to the seventh Majlis, the GC banned a large number of 
the Reformists, thus the Reformists suffered another electoral defeat. The domination 
of the Conservatives in the seventh Majlis during the last two years of Khatami’s 
second term made him a lame duck President. The struggle between the electoral and 
guardian bodies was a significant aspect of factional politics in this period. To 
emphasise different aspects of these struggles, a historical narrative is used here. 
 Khatami and the Reformists were engaged in a factional struggle with the fifth 
                                                 
97 More than half of the Tehran City Council members resigned and it was closed for some time. 
98 Seventy-seven percent of the total vote, with 67.7 percent participation.  
Entekhab 21/3/1380 (11/June/2001).  
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Majlis dominated by the Conservatives in the first two years of Khatami’s Presidency. 
During this time, the fifth Majlis used most of its instruments to hinder Khatami’s 
plans to shift the direction of sociocultural and political developments.  
For example, almost a year into the Khatami Presidency, the fifth Majlis 
successfully impeached Khatami’s Interior Minister, Abdollah Nouri, over his 
moderate political policies in a tense impeachment session.99 Less than a year later, in 
1999 the Majlis impeached Mohajerani, the Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance, 
who was the key member of Khatami’s cabinet supporting moderate cultural policies. 
Mohajerani, with his ‘dazzling’ oratory skills, convinced the hardliner Majlis. 
Eventually, he resigned in 2000 due to the harsh criticisms of the Conservatives, 
importantly, the direct and public criticism of Khamenei, in addition to his 
disappointment in controlling the radical approach in part of the Reformist 
newspapers.100 
The Conservatives in the fifth Majlis used their legislative power to contain 
pro-Reform policies. To limit the freedom of the press, they proposed legislation 
leading to a tougher press law. It was during this time that the Salam newspaper 
published an allegedly secret letter from Saeed Emami to the Intelligence Minister 
Fallahian. Emami was the key suspect in the chain murders and in his letter, expressed 
his worries regarding the cultural state of society and the need for action. The article 
that included this letter led to Salam’s closure, which was followed by student unrest 
in reaction. Eventually, in the final few days of the fifth Majlis, the new legislation 
passed. However, the press law continued to be a major issue in the factional politics 
in the sixth Majlis.  
                                                 
99 In this session, a Conservative MP attacked Nouri and slapped another cleric who was stopping 
him. 
100 Interview with Ataollah Mohajerani, conducted in 2014.  
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The Sixth Majlis 
The Reformist dominated sixth Majlis gave birth to a new dynamic of factional 
politics. During the last two years of the fifth Majlis, a large part of factional politics 
was between two electoral institutions of Conservative dominated Majlis and 
Presidency. Different from this dynamic, in the sixth Majlis, the factional politics 
emerged mostly within the institutional context of Reformist sixth Majlis and the GC. 
The first conflict between the sixth Majlis and the GC happened before the start 
of the sixth Majlis. The GC refused to approve the election results of Tehran, where 
almost all the winning candidates were Reformists. After bombarding the GC with 
numerous nominees, many Reformists who had eventually passed the GC vetting 
procedure entered the election competition. 
 After the sweeping victory of the Reformists, the GC questioned the legitimacy 
of the election and tried to cancel the election of Tehran and that of some other cities. 
Eventually, the GC only confirmed the election results after the direct intervention of 
Khamenei through Leadership Decree.101 The Mosharekat party gained a majority in 
the sixth Majlis. Mosharekat’s success was due to its popular support because of its 
portrayal as being pro-change and anti-establishment. However, its attempts to show 
itself as anti-establishment cost the party its alliance with Rafsanjani and Kargozaran.  
The election to the sixth Majlis significantly influenced the relationship 
between the Reformists and other factions and internal disputes amongst their 
members. The Reformists were overwhelmed by the extent of their victory and thus 
suffered from a degree of hubris and overconfidence. They underestimated the extent 
of the political power the Conservatives could impose. They overestimated their ability 
                                                 
101 Khamenei 29/2/1379 (18/May/2000) http://farsi.khamenei.ir/message-content?id=11508 
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to implement quickly a Reformist political agenda.  
A growing split emerged between Khatami and some leading Reformists. As 
mentioned earlier, soon after Khatami’s victory, the ‘23 May’ Movement Coalition 
was formed. Since it included a wide political spectrum of political players, it was an 
incoherent political organisation. The emergence of Mosharekat was an attempt to 
shape this spectrum under a new political organisation.  
However, Mosharekat lacked both a solid political identity and a coherent 
political strategy even amongst its members, let alone with the other pro-change 
groups. The leading members of the Mosharekat, in accordance with majority 
members of the MII, supported radical approaches in implementing political 
development. They believed it was time to reform the power structure, which could 
also guarantee their chance of remaining in power. They propagated radical 
sociopolitical reforms affecting almost all the revolutionary and Islamic institutions. 
Their approach soon came into conflict with moderate pro-Reform groups, namely 
MRM and Kargozaran, in this period. These moderate Reformists argued that these 
radical measures would only radicalise the Conservatives and consequently would 
harm the Reform Movement.  
This approach of the radical part of the Reformists was depicted in their 
relationship with Rafsanjani. A radical part of the Reformists raised a war against 
Rafsanjani. This campaign, which had followed the ‘Chain Murders’ case, escalated 
during the election to the sixth Majlis.  
At least three points could explain these Reformist's hostilities against 
Rafsanjani. First, they feared that, if Rafsanjani became the Speaker of the sixth Majlis, 
his pragmatic views could be an obstacle to the Reformist’s main objectives of 
substantial political and cultural reforms. Second, they argued that the time of 
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Rafsanjani’s behind-door politicking was over and his method would harm ‘political 
development.' Third, most of the Reformists had not forgotten nor forgiven 
Rafsanjani’s role in their political elimination in the elections to the fourth and the fifth 
Majlis.  
Therefore, when Rafsanjani announced his candidacy for election to the sixth 
Majlis, he became the target of severe criticisms and accusations from the Mosharekat 
and their newspapers. Mosharekat even refused to include Rafsanjani in its list of 
candidates. When Rafsanjani was announced as the last elected candidate in Tehran, 
Mosharekat continued its intimidation and accused the GC and Rafsanjani of electoral 
fraud. Finally, Rafsanjani resigned his seat in parliament, even though after the recount 
of disputed ballot boxes his position improved by ten steps. The Mosharekat and the 
radical Reformists portrayed Rafsanjani’s resignation as a victory, but they lost an 
important ally who could have played a significant role in the coming factional 
disputes.  
The Reformists used the legislative power of the Majlis as the main institutional 
instrument to empower their position and to pursue political reform. These efforts 
fueled factional politics and largely influenced the Reformist’s relationships with the 
main political figures, namely Khamenei. The Reformists put forward a bill designed 
to reform press law in their first attempt. Two weeks after the election, Mohammad 
Reza Khatami, the first candidate of Tehran in the sixth Majlis, underlined: “Now, the 
lifting of severe limitations on the press, which is one of our [the Reformists] most 
important political promises, can be resolved easily. We aim to resolve the semi-legal, 
legal and illegal obstacles on press in our first step.”102  
Just a few weeks into the sixth Majlis, the Reformists pushed for a new press 
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law bill, despite Khamenei’s back-door messages to postpone such action because the 
previous Majlis had just passed the new law. Eventually, Khamenei intervened 
officially and issued a Leadership Decree. Karroubi, who was initially against the 
ratification of the bill, giving Khamenei’s several messages, dropped the bill from the 
agenda as the Majlis’ speaker. Mosharekat reacted and, after unsuccessful attempts to 
nullify Khamenei’s decree by obstruction, questioned the grounds of the Leadership 
Decree (hokm-e hokumati). Mosharekat’s reaction was a clear questioning of the 
authority of Khamenei. It was seen as a sign of confrontation between the Supreme 
Leader and the Reformists. Importantly, these threats to Khamenei resulted in a 
renewed relationship between Khamenei and Rafsanjani, given that both men faced 
challenges from the Reformists. 
Disputes between the Majlis and the GC escalated when the Reformist Majlis 
focused on strengthening republican institutions of the IRI by introducing reforms 
limiting the power of parallel revolutionary/Islamic institutions of the IRI. Mostafa 
Moein, Khatami’s Minister of Higher Education, proposed the ‘Structural Reform of 
Higher Education Bill,' which aimed to limit the jurisdiction of the SCCR, a parallel 
institution, by bringing it under the control of the Ministry of Higher Education.  
The Conservatives reacted strongly, and the bill was rejected by the GC as 
being against the Sharia and the Constitutions on 34 counts. The Mosharekat MPs 
ratified the bill with a few corrections and insisted on their initial position after 
underlining that the initial purpose of the Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution was 
not legislative.103 Once again, Khamenei entered the debates, given his sensitivity 
towards cultural programmes. In a meeting with university professors, he strongly 
supported the Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution and responded to the Reformist 
                                                 
103 Mardomsalari 20/9/1381 (11/December/2002). 
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arguments: “No, in fact, it is not a legislative centre, it is a policymaking centre and 
policy making is superior to legislation.”104 As the disputes escalated, Mostafa Moein 
resigned. His resignation letter shows the scale of institutional deadlock in the IRI and 
of pressure on intellectuals and youths:  
 
In fact, on the one hand, the myriads of decision making centres 
and especially the jurisdictional conflicts with Supreme Council 
of Cultural Revolution, in addition to the suspicions, 
interferences and intrusions of institutions and councils that are 
unaccountable and irresponsible [to any state institutions], have 
taken considerable time and effort of me and has made any 
successful, efficient and effective efforts almost impossible. And 
on the other hand, the sacred privacy of the universities, the 
dignity, privacy and the intellectual and social security of 
students, professors and staffs and in general the youth, 
intellectuals and ‘farhikhtegan’ (thinkers) have been violated, 
harassed, and not tolerated.105  
 
The Twin Bills 
The climax of the disputes between the electoral and guardian institutions was over 
the ‘Twin Bills’ (lavayeh-e dowganeh). In an interview almost a year into the second 
term of his Presidency, Khatami, announced the introduction of legislation designed 
to equip the President with the minimum instruments that would enable him to perform 
his Constitutional duty of implementing the Constitution. Subsequently, the Khatami 
government submitted two pieces of legislation: the ‘reform of the election law’ and 
the ‘explanation of rights, duties and jurisdiction of the President’s bills. Lavayeh were 
if passed intended to a) restrict the jurisdiction of the GC, and b) empower the 
institutional position of the Presidency in relation to other parallel institutions, by 
providing it with additional legal instruments.  
 Lavayeh were designed to strengthen the electoral institutions, at the expense 
                                                 
104 Khamenei 22/8/1381 (13/November/2002), http://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=3153. 
105 BBC Persian (23/August/2008), http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/030823_mf-moinletter.shtml.
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of the guardian institutions. Ratification of lavayeh became the main priority of 
Khatami and the Reformists, given that institutional deadlocks had paralysed their 
policies. Their future political life was at stake. The Reformists expected that, with the 
GC in charge of the vetting process, they would have little chance of entering the 
electoral campaign in the coming 2003 parliamentary election. The Conservatives 
reacted harshly. As shown in the following paragraphs, the debates surrounding the 
lavayeh showed the institutional obstacles facing reform because of the contradictions 
embedded in the IRI Constitution, and the importance of the factor of human agency 
in IRI politics. 
The main objective of the first bill, the ‘reform of the election law,' was to 
constrain GC authority by clarifying its jurisdiction over electoral institutions. Based 
on Article 3 of, the ‘Majlis election law,' passed by the fifth Majlis, “Supervision of 
Majlis elections is within the purview of the GC and the nature of this supervision is 
‘mandatory’ (estesvabi), comprehensive, and inclusive of all the steps and procedures 
related to the election.”  
In the proposed bill, the adjective ‘mandatory,’ was dropped and the new article 
was rephrased as: “According to Article 99 of the Constitution, supervision of the 
Majlis elections is the duty of the GC.”106 By linking the GC jurisdiction to a specific 
article in the Constitution, the Reformists hoped to hinder GC attempts to block it on 
the grounds of being against the Constitution. To limit the GC excuses to vet the 
candidates, the general condition of being Muslim and expressing the commitment to 
the Constitution replaced the existing condition of ‘commitment’ (eltezam) to Islam 
and velayat-e faqih as requirements for candidacy.107  
                                                 
106 Bahman Esmaeili, Entekhabat-e Majlis-e Haftom [Seventh Majlis Election] (Asnad-e Inqelab-e 
Islami, 2005). vol. 1: 142–3.  
107 Ibid, vol.1, 120–80. 
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The Conservatives reacted to these amendments. In an AofE’s opening 
ceremony, Ayatollah Meshkini, a well-known conservative, criticised these 
Reformist's efforts: “The AofE expresses its serious regret over the bitter actions of 
the lawmaking officials, namely the elimination of the ‘estesvabi’ supervision, [and] 
the elimination of the requirement of the practical commitment to the velayat-e faqih 
and Islam in the election laws.”108  
 The second bill reinforced the jurisdictional leverage of the President in the 
conflicts with parallel institutions by giving him more legal power. Based on the first 
article, the President would establish a new institution, a ‘committee of supervision 
and prosecution of the execution of the Constitution.' ‘All of the state institutions’ must 
grant access to “all of the information and documents” requested by this committee 
and certain penalties are foreseen for those who defy to submit.109  
The generality of the term, ‘all of the state institutions,’ would give this 
committee the legal authority to supervise and to intervene in the institutions that were 
already out of reach of the supervision of the Executive Branch, namely, and most 
importantly, the SLO, the  EC, the GC and the Majlis. The second article of this bill 
was designed to strengthen the president’s position by expanding his jurisdiction over 
guardian institutions: “The President should act upon his duty of executing the 
Constitution… and stop the decisions and/or actions made against the Constitution."110  
By placing the President in charge of determining when Constitutional laws are 
broken and by whom, the President would have more authority in disputes with the 
judiciary, and, most importantly, with the GC, whose main Constitutional duty is to 
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assure that legislation complies with the Constitution. The GC and the Conservatives, 
sensing the threat that these bills could impose on their institutional power, escalated 
their efforts to stop their passage.111  In addition to the ongoing legislative battles 
between the Majlis and the GC, lavayeh became the main subject of factional politics 
in the public domain and one of the turning points in the Reform Movement.  
The main strategy of the Reformists and Khatami was to convince the GC that 
the rejection of lavayeh would leave the regime facing a serious legitimacy 
challenge.112 The Reformists threatened that if the lavayeh did not pass, they would 
exit IRI politics and/or they would go directly to the people and use a referendum to 
defy the GC.113  
In November, Saeed Hajjarian, underlined that Khatami, had red lines and “if 
his red lines are violated he will not continue and if lavayeh do not pass, Khatami will 
resign.” 114  Hamid Reza Jalaeipour, Mosharekat’s central committee member, 
summarised the debates: “If the lavayeh does not pass, the Reformist Movement will 
have two strategies: the referendum and/or eventual collective resignation.”115 The GC 
rejected both bills with more than 50 amendments.116 
The GC verdict fueled factional battles. Tajzadeh, Khatami’s advisor and 
political deputy of the Interior Minister in the first two years of his Presidency, 
announced: “If these two bills do not pass, ultimately, part of the Reformists will 
decide to resign in order to show their objection to current conditions in which the 
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right to free election and the ‘citizenship right,' are not secured… I assume by going 
in this direction it is possible that part of the Reformists will decide to prepare clear 
proposals for amending changes in the Constitution,” (implying reconsideration of the 
position of the Supreme Leader of the Constitution).117  As the factional disputes 
escalated, in June 2002, the Reformists directly targeted Khamenei and sent a harsh 
letter to him demanding him to comply with the Reformist's demands: 
 
With the current turn of events, there are just two possible 
outcomes: either dictatorship or despotism, which in the most 
optimistic scenario would lead to more political and economic 
dependency and ultimate collapse of the regime; or, return to the 
principles of the Constitution and honest acceptance of 
democratic rules… Such a humble and rational reaction would 
face, with no reservation, with the same award that Imam Rahel 
[Khomeini] received from the people [after ending the war].118  
 
This letter targeted Khamenei directly and considered him the main 
Constitutional obstacle. It also underlined the overconfidence of the radical section of 
the Reformists. As the election to the seventh Majlis approached, the debates about 
lavayeh were overshadowed by the GC’s actions in eliminating the Reformists. The 
GC initially rejected a large number of the Reformists, including 80 seated MPs. 
Mohsen Mirdamadi called the GC’s action “a coup d’état without an army and a 
regime change without a military involvement.”119 In January 2003, Mosharekat MPs, 
in reaction to the GC actions, started a protest and sit-ins in the Majlis, which were 
followed by a hunger strike almost a week later, and a call for collective resignation. 
On the first of February 2003, and in reaction to the final confirmation of the 
vetting of the GC, more than 90 MPs resigned collectively. This was followed by the 
collective resignation of governors, the threat of resignation from cabinet ministers, 
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and, allegedly after getting the green light from Khatami, the collective resignation of 
deputy ministries.  
In the deputies’ resignation letter, the GC actions were considered: “Violation 
of the most obvious and most essential principle of a democratic regime, in other 
words, it is the violation of ‘freedom of choice of the people’ and ‘right of candidacy’ 
for candidates.”120 After reminding the challenges that this action of GC may impose 
on the very legitimacy of the regime, they asked the President to implement all the 
means at his disposal not to let it happen.121 However, Khatami pulled the rug from 
under the Reformists and rejected their resignations, declaring that the election would 
be held.122 Khatami, who had initially threatened the GC that if many candidates were 
banned, he might not carry out the election, harshly criticised those in the Ministry of 
the Interior who were supporting this idea.  
Eventually, the sit-ins ended with no major popular resonance. The seventh 
Majlis election was held despite the disqualification of a thousand of the Reformist 
candidates. The electoral participation rate dropped from 67 percent in the sixth Majlis 
to 51 percent, allowing the Conservatives and the neo-Conservatives to gain a majority 
in the seventh Majlis.   
Soon after the defeat of the Reformists in the seventh Majlis, Khatami retracted 
his lavayeh. In his press conference, he revealed some structural obstacles to change: 
namely the conflict between the parallel institutions, the lack of authority of the 
Presidential office and the domination of security doctrine in the state institutions.  
Khatami criticised the GC for acting politically: “I take the lavayeh back 
because our lavayeh faced strong reaction from the GC. The GC ignored the initial 
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verdict which had underlined that it was the President’s duty to ensure complete 
implementation of the Constitution.”  
In response to another question, he confessed to the lack of institutional 
authority of the Presidential office and its limited power: “In the current situation the 
President is in a position of tadarokchi (tea boy) for other organisations.” He also noted 
escalating activities of parallel security institutions as obstacles of pro-democracy 
forces: “We will face a myriad of problems if supervision is replaced with 
guardianship, ‘qeimumiyyat,' (mandate) or if those who are in charge of supervision 
establish parallel intelligence organisations to spy on people; this is problematic.” He 
finally rejected the possibility of his resignation. 123  
To sum up, three points need to be stressed in the wider framework of the 
subject of this thesis: First, political disagreements had polarised factions regarding 
the ‘role of people’ in politics and electoral institutions. The Reformists increasingly 
propagated the importance of the people’s vote, electoral institutions and demanded 
restrictions on the guardian institutions.  
In return, the Conservatives increasingly emphasised their conception of the 
role of the people in politics, which demanded the stronger presence of guardian 
institutions in the sociopolitical domain. The Conservatives, therefore, strengthened 
their links to guardian institutions with security and military nature. For the 
Conservatives, security considerations became vital and resulted in the growing 
involvement of the IRGC and other semi-militia organisations, such as Basij, in 
politics, the economy and the public sphere, to the point of public confrontation of the 
IRGC with the government on some occasions. For instance, at the opening ceremony 
of the Imam Khomeini International Airport, the IRGC intervened in the middle of the 
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ceremony and closed the airport, because of their disputes with the government about 
the contracts for the airport security.124 
Importantly, the Conservatives also realised that power was now increasingly 
dependent on popular politics. They restructured their organisations and electoral 
strategies, which was a turning point in the evolution of the popularisation of factional 
politics. During this period, the Conservatives also sharpened their organisational and 
rhetorical methods for increasing the political activism of their supporters. This 
included learning how to run more attractive and flashy campaigns (including posters, 
banners, meetings, party organisational cells and other forms of propaganda).  
The Reformists faced disagreements on how to respond to the attacks of the 
Conservatives. Some of the Conservatives aligned with the IRGC and other semi-
militia organisations took advantage of this political opportunity. They entered 
electoral politics and occupied electoral institutions one-by-one. (The emergence of 
the neo-Conservatives will be examined in the next chapter.) 
Second, personal decisions and/or mistakes played a significant role in the 
factional disputes in this period, which underlines the importance of human agency, 
particularly in the absence of established institutions. For example, Khatami’s 
reluctance to proceed with his resignation and/or to ask people to boycott the election 
of the seventh Majlis produced an image of an indecisive leader which arguably 
became a significant factor in the disappointment of a large part of the pro-change 
segment of the society with his ability to provide sustainable change or to be a leader 
of pro-change forces.   
It also emboldened his opponents, who realised that he would not stick to his 
threats and would back down in the end. His opponents could, therefore, act with an 
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increasingly free hand.  The actions of the Reformists, and particularly Mosharekat, in 
breaking their political ties with certain influential political figures, namely Khamenei 
and Rafsanjani, suggest that they underestimated the importance of political figures in 
IRI politics. In fact, their public confrontations with these political figures limited their 
political manoeuvrability. For instance, Rafsanjani’s position in the Expediency 
Council as the ultimate arbitrator between the GC and the Majlis could have been an 
option for passing at least a compromised version of lavayeh. Alternatively, they could 
have used Khamenei’s supra-institutional authority position to pass the bills partially. 
 Third, the Reformists had mistaken the number of their votes with active, 
mobilised popular support. They had a misperception of how far their social support 
would take them. They were therefore surprised when, during the last days of the sixth 
Majlis, their actions did not resonate in society.  
However, this social indifference was rooted because on several occasions the 
Reformists had left these groups alone in their confrontation with the conservative part 
of the regime (namely, the Student Movement, the imprisonment of intellectuals and 
the continuous harassments of social groups such as unions by semi-militia 
organisations). The Reformist’s call for popular support was seen as insincere, as it 
only came when they were facing electoral defeat and loss of power.  
In sum, despite experiencing several electoral defeats one after the other, 
including the seventh Majlis election, lavayeh and election to the second City Council, 
they remained delusional about their social support, and eventually their 
underestimation of the chance of the rival groups in the ninth Presidential election cost 
them the last institution they held.  
Conservative Responses  
In the shadows of escalating factional politics and Reformist internal disputes, part of 
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the Conservatives restructured their political thought. The first sign of this factional 
reshuffle was the election to the second City Council in 2003 in which the new faces 
in the Conservative faction secured a landslide victory countrywide. However, this 
change in the Conservatives reflected older divisions in this faction, the first signs of 
which had surfaced during the election to the fifth Majlis (1994).  
As previously mentioned, there were two different trends in the Conservatives 
in the early 1990s. One trend believed in more involvement in everyday politics using 
modern political means, party systems, the state’s authority and the less hierarchical 
structure of the JRM, which consisted of the younger generation, non-clerical members 
of the JRM and Hamsu, and political players such as Ali Larijani.125 The second trend 
believed in the traditional position of clerics, the hierarchical structure of the JRM, the 
autonomy of clerical institutions and denouncing the party system as a Western idea.126  
Clerics close to Mahdavi Kani in the JRM and many JMHEQ members 
belonged to this trend. The first trend was not a coherent political body. On the one 
side of its spectrum were those who had familial links to the prominent revolutionaries, 
had close relations to the Mo’talefeh and were part of the establishment since the 
revolution. On the opposite side were those with a more radical approach to the Islamic 
state, young active enthusiasts in the IRGC and Basij, whose involvement in state 
affairs was mostly grown after Khomeini’s death.  
Electoral politics played a significant role in changes in the balance of power 
between these various segments of the Conservative spectrum. Consecutive 
Conservative electoral defeats in Khatami’s first Presidency, and the election to the 
first City Council, gradually weakened the traditional segment of the Conservatives to 
a point that their defeat in the sixth Majlis election almost completely marginalised 
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this segment of the Conservatives in electoral politics.  
This final defeat gave momentum to the restructuring process of the 
Conservatives. The coalition of ‘Supporters of Imam and the Supreme Leader Front,' 
under which the Conservatives had entered the sixth Majlis electoral campaign, 
changed its name to the Council for Coordinating the Revolutionary Forces. This 
council was, in fact, a coalition of 28 political groups and organisations joining forces 
to put an end to the Conservative's electoral defeats.  
Eventually, Mahmood Ahmadinejad and Hossein Fadaei were selected and 
became in charge of the Conservative's campaign for the election to the second City 
Council, in which they entered under the new title of ‘Abadgaran-e Iran-e Islami’ 
(Developers of an Islamic Iran, hereafter ‘Abadgaran’).127 Their name resembled the 
Rafsanjani’s Kargozaran. They won this election. In Tehran, 14 out of 15 City Council 
members belonged to Abadgaran. Ahmadinejad’s reward was the mayorship of 
Tehran. This victory strengthened the young generation of the Conservatives at the 
expense of the Traditional Conservatives.  
The Conservatives successful electoral campaign for the second City Council 
also became a platform for their campaign to the seventh Majlis election, in which they 
secured another victory, due to the absence of any prominent Reformists in the election 
and a low voter participation. As part of their campaign strategy, they introduced 
completely new faces, all of whom carried the titles of engineer and doctor because 
they realised that the prominent Conservatives had lost their appeal to a large portion 
of the society.  
For instance, in Tehran, with the exception of Gholam Ali Haddad Adel and 
Ahmad Tavakkoli, all other 28 Abadgaran nominees were almost unknown. Even their 
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attire had no resemblance with the Traditional Conservatives. In their campaign, they 
aimed to construct an image of technocrats who could save the country, depicted in 
their title, Abadgaran and its resemblance with Kargozaran. Abadgaran also kept their 
distance from the Traditional Conservatives. The JRM declared that Abadgaran had 
no connection to this group.  
However, most of these candidates were active members of the IRGC and 
Basij. Thus, they considerably increased their chance of winning by taking advantage 
of their patronage network through the guardian institutions. On the one hand, the GC 
eliminated almost all the prominent Reformist candidates. On the other, these 
candidates used the facilities of the IRGC and Basij in addition to these institution’s 
organisational votes in their favour. As the election to the ninth Presidency 
approached, the tensions between different divisions within the Conservatives 
escalated and eventually, a new faction emerged within the Conservatives. 
The main slogans of Abadgaran focused on the delivery of social justice, 
economic growth and fighting corruption. They portrayed themselves as the party who 
could deliver the true promises of the revolution; namely achievement of social justice 
and successful struggle against corruption. Being a new player in IRI politics gave 
Abadgaran the easy opportunity to blame the previous IRI governments and the 
establishment for the current economic situation without being considered even partly 
responsible for the situation. They amplified Khatami’s image of lack of attention to 
the economy whilst propagating their own image of being the party who could build 
the economy. 
The neo-Conservatives despite Khatami’s relative success in economic policy, 
attacked him for not achieving any form of social justice. Khatami could not properly 
establish the link between different components of his political development platform, 
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namely republicanism, rule of law, and the civil society and wider economic goals. 
Most importantly, he could not present a comprehensive link between social justice 
and political development.  
Even though Khatami considered the economic achievements of his 
administration comparatively successful to his political reforms,128 society perceived 
him and the Reformists as concerned with political development more than the 
economic development. Khatami and the Reformists could not convince different 
segments of society that their plan was to provide both political change and social 
justice by increasing the role of people in politics.  
Different elements played a role in the construction of this image of Khatami 
and the Reformists. First, it was the context in which the political development 
paradigm emerged. This paradigm formed in the final years of Rafsanjani when 
economic development had become the main agenda of the IRI. The Reformists main 
argument was that political development is the requirement of successful economic 
development.  
However, their emphasis on political development was perceived by society as 
neglecting social justice. Second, a sharp decline in oil revenue was a serious challenge 
to the Khatami administration, given Iran’s budget depends largely on oil revenues. 
Although economic indicators showed that Khatami’s economic achievements, 
particularly in his second term, were defendable compared to other administrations. 
His image was of one who could not deliver on the revolution’s economic promises.129  
Importantly, the issue of social conservatism was another aspect of the factional 
politics of this period. The Reform Movement was seen as a Progressive Movement, 
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questioning not only existing political order but also social and cultural norms. This 
worried conservative segments regarding the extent of future sociocultural changes. 
The rhetoric of social conservatism gained appeal.  
The Conservatives cultivated this social conservatism, accusing the pro-change 
movement of not believing in IRI traditional values, of a lack of respect for the memory 
of martyrs, and for the sacrifices of war veterans and the revolutionaries. The 
Conservatives propagated that the pro-Reform Movement sought to substitute 
Islamic/revolutionary values with liberal Western norms, which in their rhetoric meant 
a morally corrupted society with no respect for sacred family values or Islamic 
traditional values.  
Nonetheless, some aspects of social conservatism resonated in traditional 
families, particularly amongst the older generation. Strong anti-West sentiment in a 
large part of this generation, to an extent, was due to the legacy of anti-Pahlavi 
Movements, such as both leftists and Islamists. To an extent, social conservatism was 
a flip side of demands for social and cultural pluralism demanded by other segments 
of society, particularly the younger generation. The neo-Conservatives did not 
capitalise on social conservatism in their political campaigns, given the increasing 
popularity of secular culture. However, to an extent, this conservative sentiment 
engendered conservative parts of society’s mistrust of the Reformists. 
Social Activism 
Khatami’s discourse of political development, particularly his slogan of empowerment 
of civil society, entailed an increasing ‘role of the people’ in politics. Social groups 
considered this call a signal for more active participation. Thus, collective organised 
actions from different groups seeking recognition of their rights by the regime 
increased.  
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 This call resonated mostly with young people and women, given the particular 
characteristics of Iranian society: a large youth population, tensions between official 
and underground culture, the generational gap and a patriarchal society. However, in 
the absence of coherence, autonomy and flexibility in society’s political institutions, 
this active participation soon became a new challenge to the regime. While Khatami 
and Reformists asked for more popular participation, they could not strengthen the 
society’s political institutions. Nor could they provide  sustainable protection to 
existing institutions, given the parallel institutional structure of the IRI, besides other 
Constitutional, historical and cultural obstacles to the formation of these institutions. 
In a sense ’reform’ had become a holy concept, partly because it projected 
dreams of different groups in this period and provided a discourse with which different 
social groups could all identify. Thus, being a Reformist became a component of 
identity for this generation. This romanticised conception of the ‘reform’ had certain 
social and political consequences. By intensifying the emotional component of the 
Reform Movement it consequently facilitated, to a certain extent, the formation of 
collective solidarity at times of social contention. It also intensified the impact of the 
defeat of the Reform Movement, for this defeat was perceived as crushing the dreams 
of a generation who had emotionally invested in it, instead of transferring political 
power from one faction to another.  
Since different groups projected their own ideals on ‘reform,' satisfying 
different groups with a particular political programme was almost impossible. At the 
same time, the ambiguities in the concept of ‘reform’ made it possible for different 
political players with contradictory views to claim to be the representatives of the 
Reform Movement in the next decade. Romanticised perceptions of the ‘reform’ 
placed Khatami as the hero of this movement. This heroism had its roots in historical 
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memory and the sociology of the Iranians.130 Even though Khatami criticised this 
view,131 this heroic conception of Khatami played an important role in future political 
events and influenced the social influence of Khatami.  
The dynamics of social activism at this period resemble the dynamics of the 
larger political landscape of the IRI. The very activism of various social groups soon 
became the subject of factional politics, mostly because their sociopolitical demands 
were in tension with the IRI’s ideological claims. In general, the Conservatives 
accused these activist groups of conspiracies to replace the IRI’s values with ‘liberal,' 
‘Western’ norms and/or to corrupt the homo Islamicus to emasculate the IRI society 
from within.  
The Conservatives argued that these activist groups would impose a serious 
challenge to the IRI and therefore should be suppressed and/or repressed before it 
became too late. On the other hand, the Reformists supported most of these group’s 
demands as part of promoting their political development paradigm, and perhaps also 
to improve their position in factional politics by underlining the dissatisfaction of these 
groups as a clear sign of the failure of the conservative sociocultural policies.  
However, the Reformist's support seemed only half-hearted, because when 
these groups confronted the guardian institutions, the Reformists left them alone on 
various occasions. For instance, artists, intellectuals and activists were harrased and 
imprisoned by the guardian institutions, during this period. This included the 
imprisonment of a large number of student activists following the 1999 and 2003 
student protests. The response of the Reformists to said actions reinforced the 
perception that the Reformists were unable to protect these groups, either due to lack 
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of political will or authority.  
The Reformist’s and Khatami’s reluctance to support these groups at these 
critical moments, in addition to the escalated repressive actions of the guardian 
institutions, resulted in various degrees of disappointment in these groups at the 
possibility of sustainable reform within the current IRI Constitution. This 
disappointment resulted in electoral apathy, which became a significant factor in the 
success of the neo-Conservatives and Ahmadinejad in the next Presidential election. 
After their experience in this period, social groups rethought and reevaluated their 
relations with the IRI and looked for new strategies to attain their rights.  
 Different activist groups of this period (student’s, women’s rights and workers’ 
rights) have distinctive links to the regime. The nature of these links, in addition to the 
state of development of existing institutions representing these forms of activism, 
played significant roles in the trajectories of these involvements.  
For instance, given the history of student activities and historical/organic links 
of student organisations with political groups in the IRI, and the presence of a 
mobilising structure within student organisations, Student Movements became the 
main visible area of activism during this period.132 Student Movements successfully 
mobilised different forces, mostly pro-democratic, on different occasions in this 
period.133 Importantly, in addition to pursuing student demands, Student Movements, 
in fact, became a channel for both women’s rights campaigns and union rights activists 
to raise their issues.134 
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Placing different forms of activism in this period in a wider framework, one 
can argue that Khatami’s election created an opportunity that enabled suppressed 
and/or denied sociocultural and political inspirations to surface and to ask for their 
recognition by the state. In other words, the underlining theme of these activist causes 
was the confrontation of the two divergent trends mentioned in the previous chapter, 
between those who were supporting official ideological norms and those who sought 
to lessen social restrictions. This confrontation was reflected in the arrangement of 
student groups active in universities.  
A turning point of the post-revolutionary student activism was an incident 
known as ‘18 Tir’ (9th of July), which refers to a series of demonstrations that took 
place between 8 and 13 July 1999. 135  ‘18 Tir’ took place at the height of the 
Reformist’s early efforts to institutionalise different aspects of their political 
development paradigm. As will be elaborated, this incident, to a large extent, changed 
Khatami’s relationship with the Student Movement. 
 On 8 July 1999, a demonstration was held in the Tehran University dormitory 
in reaction to the closure of the newspaper, Salam, and to support freedom of the press. 
Continuation of this demonstration was heavily crushed later that day by, semi-militia 
groups with the alleged cooperation and involvement of ‘police.' At least one person 
was killed, many students were injured, and many rooms were destroyed.  
Over the next week, a series of protests emerged on different university 
campuses and cities in support of the students, condemning the invasion and 
demanding justice. These protests soon radicalised and created an ‘opportunity’ for 
students and society to express their general demands. The OCU that was trying to 
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claim being the representative of the Student Movement lost its control over the 
situation.136 A ‘shift in the scale’ was evident both in the size and the demands of the 
protests. This shift is portrayed well in the slogans of the protestors.  
On 8 July, the first day, the slogans mainly touched on the importance of a free 
press, freedom of speech and condemnation of the closing of Salam. On the next day, 
slogans targeted mostly the lebas shakhsis and their links to the Conservatives and 
police. For example, one slogan was: “Niru-ye Entezami (police) shame on you.”  On 
10 July, slogans further radicalised and targeted Khamenei himself and his position: 
“Ansar [referring to Ansar-e Hezbollah, the pressure group] commits crimes and the 
Supreme Leader supports them," or “Freedom of thought could not be possible as long 
as the Supreme Leader is on top."  
When dissension escalated, it was quickly perceived as a serious security threat 
to the state. With the signal of Khamenei and the green light of Khatami, Basij, other 
militias and police forces intervened and controlled the situation on 13 July. On 14 
July, a rally was organised by the ‘Islamic Propaganda Organisation’ (Sazman-e 
Tablighat-e Islami) to show solidarity with the Khamenei supporters.  
No posters of Khatami were allowed. During the protests and in the following 
weeks, many students — around 1,500 – were imprisoned, amongst whom 17 
remained in prison for more than two years.  
The ‘18 Tir’ unfolded in the context of factional politics. The incident started 
as a confrontation of Reformists and guardian institutions and became a battleground 
for a factional power struggle. It ended with the defeat of the Reformists and caused 
the disappointment of many social forces behind the Reform Movement.  
The day after the incidents (9 and 10 July) many prominent Reformists attended 
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the student demonstrations, demanding containment of the power of parallel security 
institutions. Almost all the Reformist newspapers targeted the lebas shakhsis and 
demanded serious action to make them accountable to the government. To show their 
solidarity, Mostafa Moein, the Minister of Higher Education, with the head of a few 
other universities, resigned. Khatami did not accept their resignations, but  condemned 
the incident and asked for patience. Khatami also assigned a committee within the 
SNSC in charge of investigating the “18 Tir.” Hassan Rouhani (later President) was 
the head of the SNSC at the time. This committee published four statements over the 
course of the week.  
An important part of these statements was their official recognition, for the first 
time, of the existence of pressure groups. Farhad Nazari, the commander of the Tehran 
police, was suspended. Khamenei also condemned the invasion on 12 July and stated 
“This incident broke my heart.” In another part of his speech, he asked of his 
supporters: “Even if my picture was set on fire or torn, you should not lose your 
patience.”137  
On 13 July, Khatami promised to find whoever was responsible.138 When the 
demonstrations radicalised, Reformists sensed the possible political danger and backed 
down, denouncing any activities and slogans opposing the Supreme Leader and the 
IRI. Their half-hearted position showed their inability to control these forces and also 
contradicted their claim of being their representative. The climax of this confrontation 
with guardian institutions is reflected in the confidential letter that 24 commanders of 
the IRGC wrote directly to Khatami, threatening and condemning his actions in 
controlling the situation:  
 
Mr. President, if you do not make the revolutionary decision and 
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do not fulfil your national and Islamic duty, tomorrow will be 
unimaginably too late and irrecoverable. At the end, with all due 
respect, we declare that our patience is running out and we cannot 
bear any more inattention.139  
 
Despite Khatami’s promise to prosecute responsible officials, the trial showed 
the weakness of the Reformist’s influence on the judiciary. No high-ranking officials 
were found guilty of causing the incident, and not a single member of the pressure 
groups was prosecuted. In the final verdict, only two officers were found guilty for 
charges such as breaking a student’s hair clipper, while many students were still in 
prison.  
As Hashem Aqajari describes, “Anti-democratic forces wanted to suppress the 
movement, to put the Student Movement into a coma and to cause depression and 
disappointment in the Reformist government in order to paralyse this government… 
they temporarily succeeded.”140 The Student Movement revived once more in 2003 in 
reaction to the verdict of execution for Hashem Aqajari because of his comments about 
emulation (taqlid) in Islam. However, this time the unrest was soon contained by the 
regime. 
The ‘18 Tir’ incident, and the way it was suppressed influenced IRI politics on 
different levels. First, it set a precedence according to which the regime reacted to 
different popular mobilisations in the future. Most forms of mobilisation were 
perceived as potential security threats by the regime and a rapid containment of them 
by coercion gave precedence to any negotiations.  
Importantly, this security doctrine was reinforced by geopolitical 
developments. After 2001, the doctrine of war against terror dominated US foreign 
policy, which led to the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. It was followed in 2002 
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by the inclusion of Iran in the Axis of Evil, despite Iran’s extensive help to the US in 
the war in Afghanistan.  Finally, the beginning of the Iraq invasion in 2003 gave more 
excuses for this security doctrine of the IRI.  
Khamenei and the Conservatives strengthened their ties with vigilante groups 
and semi-militia organisations because of their declining popularity, a possibility of 
external threat and domination of this security paradigm. This alliance translated into 
lesser restrictions on these vigilante groups and their empowerment in different 
spheres of economy and politics.  
Khamenei had to face the reality of the scale of his popularity amongst certain 
parts of the society in comparison with Khatami’s. This point played a role in their 
personal relationship. In a sense, Khamenei realised that he may never be accepted as 
an intellectual by part of society and their intellectual communities. Last, it showed 
that the Reformists lacked a strong structural network and/or ideological grasp on the 
pro-Reform social forces, which made their claim of representing these groups 
questionable. The Conservatives became less afraid of the Reformist’s threat of the 
mobilisation of these groups in factional politics.  
Another example of the popularisation of factional politics is women’s 
activism. The dynamic of women’s activism in this period shows the extent to which 
the IRI’s hybrid characteristics and its factional nature interrelated with this aspect of 
the popularisation of politics.141 Despite the large participation of women in the 1979 
revolution, in the new regime, women were marginalised and a male-oriented polity 
emerged.  
However, at the same time, IRI’s social policies, for instance, the expansion of 
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education, led to the empowerment of women, which strengthened the basis of female 
activism. Scholars agreed on the unique character of Iranian female activism. It is 
neither a centralised, organised movement with specific leaders nor is it fitted to grand 
theories of Women’s Movements. Iranian women’s activism seems to pass through 
different boundaries — ideological, ethnicity, socioeconomic class — and has been 
formed around major concerns of everyday issues of women.142 It is not “collective 
protests but collective presence” that makes its repression almost impossible and its 
evolution unique. 143  This fluidity has seemingly helped it to merge easily into 
forms of social activism, whether it is Student Movements, union rights or electoral 
campaigns.  
The factional contexts of the IRI politics and its hybrid characteristics have both 
influenced female activism. Ambiguities in the rules, regulations and in Khomeinism 
itself, allowed the new reinterpretation of these regulations possible. As explored in 
this chapter, the electoral pillar of the IRI gave the Reformists a chance to return to 
power by giving attention to the various constituencies and electoral politics, which 
consequently meant that the elected government had to address certain demands of 
these constituents, even if these demands might not be in accordance with the views 
of the IRI’s guardian pillar.  
Since women’s votes were a significant factor in Khatami’s Presidential 
victory, addressing issues of women became a part of Khatami’s administration. As 
electoral politics continued to influence increasingly the factional politics after 
Khatami, women’s issues continued to play a major part in electoral debates, despite 
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differences in the ideological standings of various candidates. Many of the attempts to 
reform the unequal rights in this period became the victim of factionalism. For 
instance, the GC rejected changing certain articles of civil law with the goal of more 
gender equality and also rejected the ratification of Convention of Elimination of all 
kinds of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).144  
Nonetheless, female participation in government and female activism expanded 
in the Khatami period. However, this active presence could not achieve tangible results 
in improving the legal status of women.145 Khatami’s administration witnessed more 
women in higher administrative positions compared to all previous post-revolution 
administrations.  
He assigned Masoumeh Ebtekar, a prominent Leftist/Reformist, who was the 
speaker for the students in the US embassy hostage crisis, as his Vice President and 
the Head of Environmental Protection Organisation. He established the ‘Center for 
Women’s Participation’ (Markaz-e Mosharekat-e Zanan) with the main goal of 
“increasing women’s participation in different areas by preparing and proposing new 
policies and new legislation to corresponding bodies.”146  
He appointed Zahara Shojaei, who was also his Women’s Affairs Advisor, with 
a seat in cabinet meetings, as its director. Zahra Rahnavard, the wife of Mir Hossein 
Mousavi, the former Prime Minister, was appointed as his senior advisor on cultural 
affairs. Participation of women in electoral institutions also increased. In the first and 
the second City Council elections, 1375 and 2336 female councillors, respectively, 
were elected countrywide.147  
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Women also challenged male domination in different state institutions, both 
religious and civil. For example, women tried to run for the Expediency Council 
elections and Presidential elections even though they could not pass GC vetting.148 To 
increase women’s integration into the police force, Khatami established the first 
women’s police academy, which ironically soon became a major force of the guardian 
institutions in constraining women’s activities. In this period, the number of journals 
dealing with women’s affairs increased, including the publication of Hoquq-e Zanan 
(Women’s Rights) as the first journal dealing with women’s rights professionally.  
Finally, the blossoming of NGOs helped female activism. Importantly, this 
presence of women in the social and political scene was allowed only within certain 
rigid boundaries of explicit Islamic/ideological laws. Khatami’s tenure witnessed the 
improvement of women’s consciousness and their awareness of their rights. Gender 
analysis and women’s rights language and discourse gained momentum and found 
themselves in most of the political debates. 
 Eventually, the gradual defeat of the Reformists divided female activists, 
similar to the student activists, over the possibility of the reform within purview of the 
IRI Constitution. In this period, the main approach of female activism was a 
collaboration with pro-Reform forces, hoping to attain certain rights from within and 
through the Reform Movement. The consensus amongst different groups of women 
activists, both Islamic and secular, about certain aspects of gender inequalities, 
including social, family and employment discrimination, unified these different 
groups.  
However, a division emerged in this alliance when the repressive actions of the 
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guardian institutions escalated and Khatami and the Reformists seemed unable to 
protect them or to conclude the main claims of the Reform Movement. (For instance, 
the guardian institutions blocked various attempts for legislative reform, NGOs closed 
or undertook heavy pressure from the state security apparatus, women’s rights activists 
were imprisoned, and even the seated MP candidates — the Islamic spectrum of 
women activists — were not tolerated by the Conservatives and were stopped from 
running in the seventh Majlis.) Similar to the Student Movement, disappointment in 
Khatami and the Reformists, and division within their movement, led to passiveness 
of these groups in the next election, which helped pave the way for the neo-
Conservative’s rise to power.  
Conclusion 
The reinforcement of the different conceptions of the role of people in the IRI remained 
a major driving force in factional disputes and shaped the strategies and tactics of both 
the Reformists and the Conservatives, which also developed in an institutional context. 
During this period, factions polarised between the republican and/or 
revolutionary/Islamic pillars of the IRI.  
 Therefore, the Reformists and Khatami focused on: a) occupying more existing 
electoral institutions-the Majlis, and  President office; b) empowering and/or re-
activating electoral institutions — City Councils; c) containing the power of parallel 
institutions by questioning their legitimacy and their protection against the supervisory 
bodies — lavayeh; and d) empowering civil society as a tool to maintain their popular 
mandate.  
 In return, the Conservatives reacted by: a) limiting the jurisdiction and 
activities of the electoral institutions by using the parallel guardian institutions – GC 
actions against the sixth Majlis; b) closing sociopolitical and sociocultural spheres to 
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disappoint pro-Reform support base — actions of Judiciary and pressure groups 
against intellectuals and activists; and c) expanding activities of their loyal supporters 
and parallel guardian institutions, such as Basij and the IRGC. 
Even though the attempts of Khatami and the Reformists to integrate the 
republican interpretation of Khomeinism into the fabric of the IRI failed, their efforts 
had a significant effect on society and politics. How the Reformists attempted to 
increase the political activism of their supporters also influenced the Conservatives. 
They too implemented new organisational and rhetorical tools to strengthen their 
electoral appeal.  
The Conservatives understood the changes in political activism unleashed by 
Khatami and worked to adapt themselves to this new environment. Electoral 
institutions then became very important for factional politics. The two different 
factions with different concepts of the role of the people realised that they needed 
electoral institutions. The result was an increase in the popularisation of politics by 
both main blocs of the political divide in the IRI. 
The new faces in the Conservative camp with strong ties with security 
institutions entered electoral politics and occupied different electoral institutions, one 
by one by taking advantage of the political opportunity that was created following: a) 
the disappointment and consequent apathy of pro-Reform forces in the Reformists; b) 
the internal split within the Reformists; and c) the sharp decline in popularity of 
prominent Conservatives.  
Furthermore, Khatami’s inability to link political development with economic 
development and social justice created an opportunity for neo-Conservatives to 
construct an image of themselves, which according to them, only they could, deliver 
on the main promises of the revolution, namely: social justice and anti-corruption. 
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Subsequently, once again the issue of social justice returned to the centre of IRI 
politics. The emergence of this faction and their occupation of the remaining electoral 
institutions initiated a new phase in the popularisation of factional politics in the IRI.  
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Chapter Four 
9)200–(2005 Conservatives-Neo the and Populism :urFo Chapter 
This chapter focuses on the emergence of the neo-Conservatives as a new faction in 
the process of the popularisation of factional politics. The chapter has five sections; 
the first section explores the emergence of the neo-Conservatives as a faction in the 
IRI and the evolution of other factions. The election of the ninth President was an 
important event in this regard, his Presidential terms are discussed in the second and 
third sections.  
 During this election, various divisions within the Conservatives surfaced, and, 
to a lesser degree, within the Reformists. The electoral debates, slogans and campaign 
strategies of different candidates during the first and second rounds of the 2005 
election offer a historical and analytical framework to better understand the 
relationship between different factions and their views regarding the role of people in 
politics. The fourth section includes discussions on the election and the emergence of 
Ahmadinejad populism. Ahmadinejad and his circle of close friends played a 
significant role in the politics of this period, which warrants a discussion of his 
personality and ideology, thus tracing the formation and evolution of this circle. The 
final section explores the dynamics of factional politics in IRI politics.  
The neo-Conservatives and the Ninth Presidential Election  
Khatami’s attempts to institutionalise his vision of the dynamic between the republican 
and revolutionary institutions were ultimately not successful. His tenure in power 
transformed the dynamics of electoral politics, the popularisation of factional politics 
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and discussions concerning the role of the people in the IRI political sphere.  
 One major result of these dynamics that had for a period placed the 
Conservatives on the political back foot, was the emergence of the neo-Conservatives 
followed by their successive electoral victories in the elections to City Councils (2003) 
and the seventh Majlis (2004) under the label of Abadgaran. These victories changed 
the power balance amongst the conservative groups. The Presidential election of 2005 
is a good example of this development during which the Conservatives fielded several 
candidates with different views. The ultimate result of this was the election of 
Ahmadinejad as President. 
Ahmadinejad’s Presidential victory surprised almost everyone: voters, analysts 
and political figures. Ahmadinejad was a middle-ranking civil servant whose highest 
administrative position was a short but controversial tenure as Mayor of Tehran. 
Although his previous electoral attempt as a candidate of the Conservatives in the 
election to the sixth Majlis (2000) was unsuccessful, he passed the first round of the 
2005 Presidential election, defeating not only the Reformist candidates, including 
Mehdi Karroubi, the Speaker of the Majlis and Mostafa Moein, the main candidate of 
Mosharekat, but also prominent Conservatives, such as Ali Larijani, the head of 
National TV, and Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, the Commander of the National Police 
(1999–2005).  
Ahmadinejad’s victory in the first round was marginal. Karroubi contested the 
results, accusing Khamenei’s son of systematically changing the election result with 
the help of the Basij and the IRGC.1 However, in the second round Ahmadinejad beat 
Rafsanjani, with 63 percent of the votes. Thus, for the first time since the revolution, 
a non-cleric, second-rank political figure and second generation revolutionary 
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occupied the Presidency. Ahmadinejad’s factional affiliation to the neo-Conservatives 
expanded this faction’s influence and marked a new Era in IRI history.  
In IRI politics, elections determine the position of different factions while also 
creating opportunities for internal disputes to surface. In the ninth Presidential election, 
three additional issues touched on the subject of this study.  
First, demands for social justice and anti-corruption efforts overshadowed those 
for political development. Second, this shift was justified under the paradigm of 
Khomeinism. Third, factional politics and their popularisation influenced the 
popularity and power of particular political elites, as shown by the investigation of 
Rafsanjani’s vote following his defeat.  
In this election, both the Reformists and the Conservatives suffered from 
internal divisions and could not agree on a single candidate. This was a reflection of 
deeper disagreements about the tactics, strategies and, to a lesser degree, the goals of 
each factional bloc given the evolution towards popularisation of factional politics. 
Initially, most of the Reformists were united behind bringing Mir Hossein Mousavi, 
who had previously served as Khomeini’s Prime Minister. However, once Mousavi 
decided not to run, the unity over the choice of a single candidate fell apart. Thus the 
Reformists fielded several candidates. 
At least four different approaches could be recognised amongst the pro-Reform 
forces. First, there were pro-Reform forces who supported the strategy of not 
participating in the election. They mainly argued that since popular participation is an 
important element in legitimising the IRI, lack of participation in the election would 
be an instrument by which they could show their dissatisfaction with the general 
direction of the country and push the regime to accept a series of sociopolitical 
changes. They were mostly disappointed in the possibility of sustainable change within 
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the Constitutional framework of the IRI and/or incremental reform proposed by 
Khatami. 
 The other three approaches amongst the pro-Reform forces supported different 
Reformist candidates in this election. The second approach belonged to those who 
supported Mostafa Moein who had served as Khatami’s Minister of Higher Education 
(2000–2003). His supporters were mainly affiliated with the Mosharekat front. They 
had previously experienced the consequences of sanctioning elections in the election 
prior to the seventh Majlis and found it damaging to their plans of reform, given it 
resulted in a Majlis dominated by neo-Conservatives.  
Moein entered the competition under the coalition of a ‘pro-democratic front’ 
consisting of Reformists close to Mosharekat and members of ‘LMI,' with slogans, 
such as, “Homeland (‘vatan’), We will build you [again]” and “Iran for all Iranians.”2 
To a certain extent, Moein was the candidate of the so-called ‘radical approach’ to 
reform emphasising the supreme role of republican institutions. He stressed his main 
reasons as “defending the right of the silent and critical population” and “representing 
their voice… ending the extra-legal activities… ending the Era of law-breaking, [and] 
establishing a pro-democratic and human right front.”3  
The third approach amongst the pro-Reform forces belonged to those moderate 
Reformists who supported Mehdi Karroubi, the Majlis Speaker, known as the ‘Sheikh 
of Reform.' These supporters found Moein and his supporters’ approach to reform too 
radical. Although they shared to a certain degree with them mutual ideals, they 
disagreed with their tactics.  
While Karroubi entered the election with a clear plan and an electoral campaign 
strategy, Moein seemed to enter the race with an indecisive one. Karroubi focused on 
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social justice and the rights of ethnic groups while Moein focused on mostly 
advocating political development. Karroubi also had economic views different to those 
of Moein. His views were reflected in his slogan of “social welfare and the 
continuation of reform."4 The socioeconomic and political views of this segment of 
the Reformists were succinctly depicted in the Karroubi political manifesto announced 
a few weeks before the election:  
I believe the roots of our problems lie in the following of 
dogmatic interpretations of Islam, ignoring the republicanism of 
the IRI and forgetting ‘justice’ in economic and social 
development… I also believe that the concept of reform is 
embedded in the fabric of the IRI and the continuation of reform 
not only is possible, but also is the only way of solving the 
existing obstacles and problems facing the IRI, and thus ensuring 
the IRI’s survival…  
 
He then made 12 promises which showed Karroubi’s and this group’s attention 
to the issue and demands of social justice including: a subsidy of 500,000 IRR (equal 
to USD 60) per month to all Iranian adults as part of his economic policy; 
implementation of a national health care system and reform of the education system.5 
The fourth approach in the pro-Reform forces belonged to some new faces in 
the IRI political arena who supported Mohsen Mehralizadeh. Mehralizadeh was 
Khatami’s deputy and the Head of the Department of Sports. His main campaign 
slogan was “Welfare State.” He justified his slogan by criticising previous 
administrations for lacking a clear sociopolitical programme. He claimed his 
government would construct a welfare state similar to that of Scandinavian countries.6 
He counted on the votes of ethnic groups, given his Azeri background,7 and the votes 
of the less political younger generation, along with various sports fans. However, 
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Mehralizadeh could not get the endorsement of any prominent Reformists or main 
Reformist organisations and political groups. None of the aforementioned different 
Reformist segments could capitalise on Khatami’s popularity and were unable to 
capture the bulk of his social base. 
The Conservative forces also faced internal divisions. The divisions within the 
Conservative camp were reflected in the various candidates of this group, their 
electoral strategies and support base. In this election, the traditional segment of the 
Conservatives decided against appointing a well-known candidate, who belonged to 
the first generation revolutionary and/or old establishment. They supported Ali 
Larijani, one of the younger figures of the establishment.  
The “Central Committee for the Harmonisation of Conservatives” announced 
Ali Larijani as its candidate. The Committee was initially established to unify different 
streams of the Conservatives to stop the Reformist's electoral victories by the time of 
the second City Council election in 2003. In this election, its efforts to unify different 
Conservative groups behind a single candidate failed. None of the candidates who had 
initially agreed to accept the decision of the Committee – namely, Mohammad Baqer 
Qalibaf, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Mohsen Rezaee and Ali Akbar Velayati – accepted 
its final verdict and they entered the election independently, although Mohsen Rezaee 
withdrew only a few days before the election, and Ali Akbar Velayati left the 
competition when Rafsanjani entered the electoral campaign.  
Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf enjoyed the support of Jameyyat-e Isargaran 
(hereafter Isargarn) and older veterans in the neo-Conservatives. Isargaran was a 
political organisation established in 1999 and had close links to the security 
institutions. Despite having Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as a founding member, Isargaran 
supported Qalibaf in the first round, influencing, to a degree, the future relationship of 
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Ahmadinejad and this segment of the Conservatives. Isargaran was one of the 
organisational pillars of the neo-Conservatives whose members were mostly second 
generation political figures.  
The pillar of their claim to political power was loyalty to the Supreme Leader 
and the concept of ‘velayat-e motlaqeh-ye faqih’ and their sacrifice during the Iran-
Iraq War. They did not have established organic links to prominent Leftists or the 
Traditional Right. However, their ideological views were, to an extent, a combination 
of different views of both the pre-Reformist Left and the Traditional Right. They 
believed in the revolutionary nature of the IRI, in domestic and foreign policies. They 
supported a welfare state with a production-oriented economy. At the center of their 
socioeconomic views was the widening gap between the poor and rich, in other words, 
social justice.8  
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad enjoyed the support of the younger generation of 
Isargaran, the Conservatives, Ansar-e Hezbollah and the support of Mesbah and his 
circle of trustees. This internal division was reflected in the way that each candidate 
defined his relationship to the title of Abadgaran. Following the successful electoral 
victories of the Abadgaran coalition in the second City Council and the seventh Majlis 
elections, these candidates capitalised on the brand of ‘Abadgaran’ and took credit for 
its success.  
Initially, Qalibaf, Larijani and Ahmadinejad all campaigned as the 
Abadgaran’s nominee. However, as the election got closer, Qalibaf changed his tactic 
and campaigned under the new title of ‘Progressive Principlists’ (Osulgarayan-e 
Tahavvol Khah). Both Ahmadinejad and Larijani spoke under the name of Abadgaran 
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until the election. Eventually, almost six months after Ahmadinejad’s victory in the 
election, Mehdi Chamran and Hassan Bayadi, close allies of Ahmadinejad established 
‘Abadgaran-e Javan-e Iran-e Islami’ to differentiate themselves from Abadgaran. 
These internal divisions also shaped different campaign strategies of 
conservative candidates. Ali Larijani had the support of traditional Conservatives, the 
bazaris or merchants and some clergy, particularly before Rafsnajani’s entrance into 
the electoral race. To appeal to the secular middle-class, Larijani’s campaign slogans 
included, “Government of Hope” and “Fresh Air.”9 Qalibaf’s campaign strategy can 
be compared to Tony Blair’s, which resulted in the return of the UK’s Labour party to 
power for three consecutive terms after several years of Conservative rule.10  
Similar to Blair’s ‘third way’ campaign, Qalibaf tried to demonstrate that he 
and his team could be trusted in all areas of governance just as much as the 
Reformists.11 Feeling assured about having the conservative vote, Qalibaf focused on 
connecting with undecided voters more aligned with the Reformist sociocultural 
policies and demanding better economic prosperity. Qalibaf’s campaign constructed 
an image of him as a pragmatic leader capable of solving all of Iran’s problems with 
no dogmatic sociocultural views.  
Thus, Qalibaf’s slogans, such as “each Iranian deserves a decent life," or “I will 
not be, if there is no Iran,”12 rarely touched on his sociocultural policies and carried 
nationalistic themes. He launched the most expensive campaign, which in turn pushed 
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away his initial support base of Basijis who disapproved of his flashy campaign 
strategies. Qalibaf found a new support base within the Reformist social groups and 
Rafsanjani supporters.13  
While both Larijani and Qalibaf targeted social groups that originally had more 
appeal to the Reformists, Ahmadinejad followed a different strategy. He portrayed 
himself as a true Khomeinist who grew up ‘impoverished,' and thus understood the 
problems of ordinary people firsthand. He projected an image of a capable leader who 
could solve the people’s problems. His main strategy was to run an anti-establishment 
platform. The main pillars of his slogans called for the return to the true Khomeinism 
values of social justice and anti-corruption, which he proclaimed to be the true value 
of Khomeinism.  
Rafsanjani announced his candidacy only a few weeks before the election. 
Rafsanjani’s candidacy was arguably due to the dynamics of the popularisation of 
factional politics. As mentioned above, the popularisation of factional politics led to 
the fragmentation of factional politics in both conservative and Reformist camps while 
none of them seemed to activate their grassroots support.  
Thus, sensing this fragmentation and a challenge it could impose on the regime 
Rafsanjani entered the election. He underlined the process of, and the reasons behind 
his candidacy in a speech few weeks before the election. In it, he described his 
meetings with Khamenei, and their initial attempts to persuade the Conservative 
groups to unify behind one candidate. “When it was clear that they (Conservatives) 
could not unify behind one candidate… Khamenei asked me to intervene. I told him 
that these people would not listen to me, and, most of them even considered me as 
their rival. [Nonetheless] I did my best unite them.” In his meeting with Khamenei, 
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Rafsanjani underlined three concerns that would oblige him to enter the election:  
 
First, a candidate should enter the election that would be capable 
of continuing the [Right–Left] dichotomy so the country could 
rest on two pillars. Second, ‘political nobodies’ must not win the 
election and cause embarrassment by suddenly decreasing the 
regime’s prestige. Third, if a candidate amongst the acceptable 
candidates became President with a very low number of votes 
some would interpreted it as a serious gap between the regime 
and the people. 14 
 
 Rafsanjani argued that this factional fragmentation itself might represent itself 
as a challenge to the regime. Thus, he needed to enter the election. However, 
Rafsanjani also saw a political opportunity in this fragmentation that he interpreted as 
a path to his victory in the election.  
Rafsanjani announced his candidacy a few hours before the deadline. He also 
explained his rationale for announcing his candidacy without telling Khamenei first:  
I thought [that if I met Khamenei and talked to him about the 
election and my candidacy] there would be three possible 
scenarios, either he would tell me not to participate in the election 
and then I would not. Or he would tell me that I should attend, 
which would be against the principle of non-interference in the 
election, or he would say nothing which would not be good for 
our relationship.15 
 
Importantly, Rafsanjani’s tone and his description of his meetings with 
Khamenei showed, to an extent, that Rafsanjani perceived his position with regarding 
Khamenei as equals. He was trying to construct an image of their relationship as those 
deciding and planning the important political events together. However, as time 
showed, the power relationship was already shifting against him. Rafsanjani’s speech 
also underlined that the main IRI political elites believed that large voter participation 
was an important legitimising element of the IRI. It also implicitly confirmed 
                                                 
14 Rafsanjani 18/3/1384 (8/June/2005), http://rafsanjani.ir/view.php?id=11610. 
15 Ibid. 
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Khamenei’s affiliation to the Conservative camp.  
 Rafsanjani entered the electoral campaign with an attitude that, since he had 
been President, he could easily win. Capitalising on his image as a pragmatic leader, 
his main slogan was: “For the glory of Iran, we all work together.”  Placing Iran on 
the path from underdevelopment to development, he presented himself as the best 
leader for this journey.  
This was reflected in a political manifesto he published a few weeks after his 
candidacy describing his views and plans: “From a historical point of view the reform 
Era is linked to the construction era.” He continued, “I hereby introduce a roadmap to 
guide the Iranian nation into a transitory Era leading to democratic and sustainable 
development.” He included 14 points in this political manifesto as his major policy 
goals, including improvement and expansion of health care and education, expansion 
and improvement of social welfare services, efficient policy making, and addressing 
issues important to women and the younger generation.  
Under the political development section, he declared popular participation and 
the institutionalisation of political participation as main goals of his administration.16 
Most of the prominent political figures, particularly those affiliated to the traditional 
bazar and clerics, endorsed his candidacy. Velayati and Ahmad Tavakkoli withdrew 
from the campaign following his candidacy, followed by endorsements by several 
seated and previous MPs and ministers.17 JRM endorsed Rafsanjani a few days before 
the election, and although JMHEQ could not reach a conclusive decision, a large 
number of its members declared their support in an announcement.18  
Rafsanjani’s entrance into the electoral arena exercised a strong influence on 
                                                 
16 Hambastegi 11/3/1384 (1/June/2005). 
17 Shargh 17/3/1384 (7/June/2005). 
18 Shargh 19/3/1384 (9/June/2005). 
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the dynamics of this election. Rafsanjani enjoyed organic links to the IRI’s political 
elites and both blocs of the Conservatives and the Reformists. He also enjoyed a 
diverse support base, especially the very mercantile bourgeoisie class he had helped 
create during his Presidential terms.  
Rafsanjani was a strong rival. However, his candidacy ignited a series of 
debates about his political authority, his reputation and his patronage, which all 
underlined the change within IRI politics. Open debates and criticism of Rafsanjani 
further highlighted the extent to which members of elite, in this case Rafsanjani and 
his family, could become victims of factional politics. This is important, because in 
most dictatorial regimes, the political elites usually enjoy a certain extent of immunity 
against public scrutiny. This also touches on the wider purview of this thesis and the 
extent to which the factor of human agency could play a role in IRI history. 
 The content and scale of attacks on Rafsanjani underlined a deeper change 
within IRI politics. Rafsanjani, who was perceived as one of the closest living 
comrades of Khomeini next to Khamenei, and gained his legitimacy and authority 
form comradeship to Khomeini, his efforts in the revolution, role in consolidation of 
the IRI and efforts in the Iran-Iraq War, now became the subject of some of the 
harshest attacks. He was accused of betraying Khomeini and the revolution’s ideals. 
During the sixth Majlis elections it had been mostly the radical spectrum of the 
Reformists who had criticised Rafsanjani.  
Now Rafsanjani’s biggest critics come from the conservative camp and the neo-
Conservatives. Ironically, Rafsanjani, about whom Khomeini once said, “[Rafsanjani] 
is alive because the movement is alive,”19  was now faced with the accusation of 
betraying the revolution by those too young to have played a role in the revolution or 
                                                 
19 Khomeini, Sahifeh-ye Imam.vol. 7, 495. 
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have seen Khomeini alive.  
In the Conservative camp, both Qalibaf and Ahmadinejad considered 
Rafsanjani their main rival. Therefore, they both attacked the record of his former 
ministers charging them with being supporters of liberal capitalism. However, attacks 
on Rafsanjani by those affiliated to these segments of the Conservatives started months 
before his election announcement.  
As rumours emerged almost a year before the election that Rafsanjani would 
run for the Presidency, the University Basij, an institution close to the neo-
Conservatives, in an open letter, called for new faces in politics, which was seen as 
their attempt to dissuade Rafsanjani from entering the election.20 In the Reformist 
camp, the main criticisms came from Karroubi, who, to a certain extent, shared a large 
support base with Rafsanjani, given their revolutionary history, reputation and 
religious standings. He criticised Rafsanjani for claiming none of the existing 
candidates could solve the IRI’s problems. He took this as personal insult.21  
 Ahmadinejad and Qalibaf’s supporters accused Rafsanjani of economic 
mismanagement, being a “palace dweller” and liberal who had turned his back on the 
revolution’s ideals. The Reformists, however, criticised his sociocultural policies and 
accused him of involvement in the killing of intellectuals and disregarding political 
freedoms. Arguably, Rafsanjani did not foresee this volume of attacks and thus his 
campaign was not prepared for them.  
Ali Larijani lost much of his supporters to Rafsanjani and was left only with 
the support of the Mo’talefeh and a few other Conservative organisations. Therefore, 
both Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad approached Larijani to persuade him to withdraw 
in their favour. Larijani’s nightly meetings with Chamran and Ahmadinejad did not 
                                                 
20 SharifNews, 30/7/1383 (21/October/2004). 
21 ISNA 28/2/1384 (18/May/2005). 
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agree. When Nateq Nouri persuaded him to withdraw in favour of Rafsanjani, his 
brothers persuaded him to stay in the election.22 This reflected a deeper disagreement 
between Larijani’s brothers and Rafsanjani and also their sensing of a shift of the 
power balance away from Rafsanjani and towards Khamenei. Having sensed this shift, 
Larijani played a political game that preserved for him an important role in the future 
of factional politics, particularly after the events of 2009. 
Rafsanjani’s candidacy significantly influenced society’s perception of the 
political power of various candidates. It also underlined another characteristic of IRI 
politics namely that in the absence of organised parties, candidates could change their 
position frequently and freely. Because of Qalibaf’s fancy campaign suspicions were 
raised amongst his followers about the real reasons for his desire to become President. 
Therefore, to many his main goal for running to get to office was to serve his personal 
economic interests. This provided a unique opportunity for Ahmadinejad, who 
remained the anti-establishment candidate.  
Rafsanjani appeared as a villain with regard to Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric of 
fighting for the ‘downtrodden people.' As election day approached, criticisms of 
Rafsanjani, his family and different aspects of his political life gave Ahmadinejad the 
opportunity to strengthen his position as the anti-establishment candidate. This was 
reflected in the contents of promotional videos that each candidate produced to be aired 
on national television.  
Ahmadinejad’s video underscored his simple lifestyle with his small house in 
a lower middle-class neighbourhood of east Tehran. Rafsanjani’s video showed him 
arriving in his Mercedes Benz to have a meeting with the young in his big house in 
upscale northern Tehran. Moreover, Ahmadinejad had not been a political player 
                                                 
22 Shahrvand-e Emruz, Azar/1386 (December/2006) 
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during the previous Presidential administrations, provided him protection from overall 
criticism of current socioeconomic condition.  
The support of the SLO and Khamenei have always played a significant role in 
the dynamics of factional politics. For Conservative candidates, support from the SLO 
translates into a large and systematic vote for that candidate, a vote rooted in the 
patronage network linked to the SLO. It was speculated that during this election, the 
initial candidate of Khamenei and SLO was Qalibaf, but a few days before the election, 
the SLO switched his support in favour of Ahmadinejad.  
Qalibaf had aligned himself closer to the Reformists and thus appeared to be 
distancing himself from Khamenei’s values, despite his relatively strong ties to the 
IRGC. Khamenei has never explicitly supported a candidate before an election, though 
his sermons during electoral campaigns always provided hints about the candidate he 
prefers. During the seventh Presidential election, Ali Akbar Nateq Nouri was 
perceived as Khamenei’s choice, and this time it was Ahmadinejad. A day before the 
election, Khamenei argued in a speech, “The next government should be the one who 
would solve the people’s problems and it should find its colleagues amongst faithful 
Muslims… Corruption should be eliminated, and special attention should be given to 
the ‘downtrodden people.'”23  
This was perceived as support for Ahmadinejad, given the strong position of 
‘downtrodden’ in Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric. Or, when a few weeks before the election, 
Khamenei said the new President should have “youthful vivacity”24 it was perceived 
as a hint that Rafsanjani was not his favourite candidate. Qalibaf explicitly elaborated 
                                                 
23 Khamenei 25/3/1384 (15/June/2005); the Headline of Siasate Rouz 26/3/1384 (16/June/2005).  
Khamenei, on 10/3/1384 (1/June/2005), explicitly announced, “No one knows my vote.” 
http://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=3294. 
24 Khamenei 5/3/1384 (26/May/2005), http://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=3292.  
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on this, stating that “Aqa [Khamenei] was against Rafsanjani.” 25  
Nevertheless, Khamenei’s support of Ahmadinejad could also be explained 
within the context of the political power balance. One could argue that Khamenei 
preferred the loyal candidate who was not a strong factional leader or linked to strong 
factions in contrast to Rafsanjani and Khatami. Khamenei believed the continuous 
factional disputes of the Khatami Era had threatened his authority and even 
institutional power.  
The escalation of the security paradigm due to international and geopolitical 
concerns, especially given the US war on terror, provided a strong justification for his 
preference of having more control over the Executive Branch. Therefore, every 
Reformist candidate, particularly Moein, was considered a possible disruptive force. 
Rafsanjani and Larijani were both affiliated to the traditional Conservatives, and as 
such, their Presidency would mean another President with strong factional links. 
Though Traditional Conservatives were Khamenei’s close allies, they had gained their 
authority and legitimacy prior to Khamenei’s supreme leadership. Khamenei was seen 
as part of this faction and not its father figure.  
Therefore, both Qalibaf and Ahmadinejad appeared as the best option for 
Khamenei. However, Qalibaf’s flashy electoral strategies made Ahmadinejad a more 
desirable candidate. These three different streams of conservatism depicted in the 
candidacies of Ali Larijani, Ahmadinejad and Qalibaf, soon became political rivals. 
Their disputes escalated and led to the formation of new groups, namely: Paydari and 
Jaryan-e enherafi (to be discussed in the next chapter).  
In the first round of elections, Rafsanjani obtained 21 percent of the votes and 
thus entered the second round, along with Ahmadinejad who obtained 19.5 percent of 
                                                 
25 Aftab News (17/3/1384) (7/June/2005), http://aftabnews.ir/vdcj.xeifuqemtsfzu.html. 
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the votes. Mehdi Karroubi was ranked third with only a few hundred thousands vote 
less than Ahmadinejad, followed by Qalibaf, Moein, Larijani and Mehralizadeh. The 
analysis of the votes demonstrated, to some extent, the social support base of each 
candidate. These election results showed that, contrary to common belief, 
Ahmadinejad’s main supporters were concentrated in urban areas, rather than rural 
areas. Karroubi and Rafsanjani were relatively successful in rural areas, which could 
be interpreted as the popularity of Karroubi’s promise to direct distribution of 
subsidies or Rafsanjani’s religious and revolutionary status in rural areas. 26 
Importantly if the Reformists had been united behind one candidate, Ahmadinejad 
would not have gone to the second round.  
In sum, an analysis of the first round of the election showed: First, a shift from 
attention to political development to issues of social justice, economic prosperity and 
anti-corruption. Primarily all candidates focused on these issues except for Moein. 
Second, almost all candidates acknowledged the importance of electoral institutions, 
at least in rhetorical forms.  
They all used fancy slogans and refurbished them to reflect popular opinion. 
Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric of the return to the true values of the revolution and 
Khomeinism was no exception. This is investigated in more detail in the next section. 
Third, Rafsanjani’s presence changed the dynamics of the election considerably, 
which also highlighted the factor of human agency in the IRI’s factional politics in a 
                                                 
26 In small cities, Karroubi ranked first, followed by Rafsanjani, Moein, Ahmadinejad and Qalibaf. 
However, Karroubi and Moein gained significantly more votes in rural areas with moderate size 
populations, while Ahmadinejad’s major votes came from populated urban areas. In medium-sized 
cities, Karroubi ranked first, followed by Rafsanjani, Ahmadinejad, Moein and Qalibaf. Though 
Rafsanjani, Moein and Qalibaf’s votes were comparatively greater in the rural populated areas 
compared to urban areas, Ahmadinejad had more votes in urban areas. In big cities, Ahmadinejad ranked 
first, followed by Rafsanjani, Qalibaf, Karroubi and Moein. Similar to small cities, Karroubi’s main 
vote came from rural areas, while Ahmadinejad, similar to small and medium cities, enjoyed the highest 
vote in urban populated areas.  
Farda News 29/2/1388 (19/May/2009), http://www.fardanews.com/fa/news/83120/. 
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wider frame. How Rafsanjani’s attitude raised harsh criticism of Karroubi is a good 
example of this effect of human agency. Fourth, a split emerged between the neo-
Conservatives and the old Conservative establishment. Some of the neo-Conservatives 
criticised these groups for their incompetence and forgetting the true values of the 
revolution. Fifth, the role of the security institutions in politics increased. All 
conservative candidates were IRGC members, and various security and military 
institutions explicitly engaged in political campaigning. For instance, security forces, 
close to law enforcement, bugged one of Rafsanjani’s campaign committees, an 
incident that received the title of the “Iranian Watergate.”27  
In addition, Basij forces were mobilised to support Ahmadinejad and intervene 
in the supervision of the election.28 Mousavi Lari, the Interior Minister, warned about 
the IRGC and the Basij’s involvement before the election, following comments by the 
GC speaker urging supervision of ballot boxes by the Basij.29  Finally, while the first 
round witnessed the dispersion of factions and the emergence of different segments, 
the second round witnessed the unification of factions. 
In the second round, once again, the definition and candidate’s perceived 
conceptions of the role of the people became the centre of factional/electoral political 
competition. The political sphere became polarised. Rafsanjani’s supporters portrayed 
the election as a choice between two different approaches to ‘the role of people’ in IRI 
politics, namely: Islamic republic or Islamic government. All the different segments 
of the Reformists unified behind Rafsanjani in this round, including MII, Mosharekat 
and ‘LMI.'  
Their main argument was that, if Ahmadinejad became President, the IRI 
                                                 
27 Hambastegi 18/3/1384 (8/June/2005). 
28 Shargh 22/3/1384 (12/June/2005). 
29 Aftab Yazd 10/3/1384 (31/May/2005). 
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republicanism would be eliminated. They claimed Ahmadinejad aimed to establish an 
Islamic government promoted by Mesbah. In its announcement supporting Rafsanjani, 
MII underlined that “the iron fist of authoritarianism that is hidden in the silk glove of 
popular democracy is about to crash… The only hope is the political understanding of 
the great Iranian people… To change the result of the second term in favour of 
themselves and against despotism and authoritarianism.”30  
In an announcement endorsing Rafsanjani, the Association of Researchers and 
Teachers of Qom, a Reformist religious organisation, argued, “The Iranian nation 
stands at a juncture: one way carries the danger of collapse and elimination of the 
regime’s republicanism and hinders the Reform Movement, itself leading to the 
emergence of a branch of Talibanism under the name of Islam and Shia. The other way 
[voting for Rafsanjani] will save the regime and the revolution.”31  
This theme was also reflected in Moein’s endorsement letter, “[By voting for 
Rafsanjani] I will say “no” to the threats of dogmatism, death of the Reform 
[Movement] and Fascism.”32 Mehdi Karroubi, explicitly, and Mohammad Khatami33 
and Mir Hossein Mousavi, implicitly, supported Rafsanjani. In their announcements, 
they underlined the “threat of dogmatism and authoritarianism” and the “elimination 
of republicanism.”34 Ironically, during the election to the Sixth Majlis (2001), some of 
these Reformists who were now supporting Rafsanjani, were harsh critics of 
Rafsanjani. Rafsanjani’s support included many non-Reformists, such as some of 
Qalibaf’s supporters. Some prominent Conservative groups under the banner of the 
“harmonising committee [of the Conservatives]” called both candidates Reformist 
                                                 
30 Aftab News 29/4/1384 (20/July/2005). 
31 Shargh 1/4/1384 (22/June/2005). 
32 Shargh 31/4/1384 (22/July/2005). 
33 Shargh 31/1/84 (20/April/2005).  
34 Ebtekar 1/4/84 (22/June/2005); Shargh 1/4/1384 (22/June/2005). 
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principlists (Osulgarayei Eslahtalab) and did not pick sides. Also, Mo’talefeh did not 
endorse Ahmadinejad or Rafsanjani.  
However, as attempts escalated to portray Ahmadinejad as a politician who 
wanted to emasculate the republican institutions, Ahmadinejad reinforced his rhetoric 
as a simple Basiji whose only aim was to serve the people, deliver social justice and 
cut the hands of those who had become rich at the cost to people. Therefore, the more 
the Rafsanjani front unified, the stronger Ahmadinejad’s claim of “entering the 
forbidden zone of the government”35 became.  
This ‘victimisation’ was an important theme both in Ahmadinejad’s campaign 
and his political career as President. Ahmadinejad’s political doctrine rested on 
rhetoric of “us against them," in which “us” were the people and “them” were part of 
the establishment, who had manipulated the IRI, and betrayed Khomeini’s values for 
their own material benefit. Furthermore, since Ahmadinejad had never held a major 
leadership position, he was immune to popular criticisms and discontent emerging 
from existing socioeconomic conditions.  
These themes were reflected in Ahmadinejad’s long interview with Fars News 
a few days before the second round of the election. By stressing his anti-establishment 
credentials, Ahmadinejad accused IRI politicians for being responsible for the current 
economic and social problems. “I think the institution of government has detached 
itself from the people, thus cannot properly recognise the problems facing the people 
and has fallen into political and power games.” He criticised Khatami’s and 
Rafsanjani’s programmes, stating:  
I am saying that for the last 15 or 16 years you [Khatami and 
Rafsanjani] have done economic and political development. Now 
I am asking you, do our farmers, workers, clerks, businessmen 
and bazaris have security, peace of mind or stability? No! 
                                                 
35 Fars News 2/4/1384 (23/June/2005). 
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Economic growth benefitted the pocket of a few special people 
and not the dinner tables of the people.  
 
Portraying himself as a victim he argued that the attacks on him were the result 
of the understanding of the elites that his election would threaten their political and 
economic interests: “Some in the establishment think that if I become President, their 
rents will cease… Those factions that control our economy and politics, as well as the 
administrative decision-making centres, fear that if the door opens to popular forces, 
they [popular forces] would prove that they can manage everything better.”  To give 
more credibility to his claims and popular platform he once again and explicitly played 
the anti-establishment candidate, saying: 
  
I am not part of any faction or party. I am independent and no 
one supported me. I introduced myself to the people, and they 
welcomed me… My problem is that I do not accept factional and 
party politics. I am saying it proudly that I only want to serve the 
people, [because] there is no reason that I would sacrifice 
people’s interests for the sake of groups, factions, and parties.36  
 
He connected his lack of clear economic policy to the issue of corruption, 
stating:  
I do not accept the current financial system of the country, 
because this system has only benefited a few, and not the 
majority of people… This means the socioeconomic gap is 
widening in favour of a few special people… They say that I am 
against investment. I believe in investment, but I am saying your 
financial system is shifting the IRI economy to a broker 
economy.  
 
To appear attractive to urban youth and middle-class voters he rejected the 
accusation that he supported restrictive sociocultural policies. He also turned the table 
and called those who initially called him a radical, the real radicals:  
Those who say Ahmadinejad is a radical, I know them; they had 
the control of the Interior Ministry in the years from 1985 to 
1993. We [Ahmadinejad and his team] confronted them at the 
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time as we were against them sending their cyclists to the streets 
to cut the hair, shoes and dresses of those they deemed as 
inappropriately dressed. They were the ones who put buses and 
soldiers on the streets to control and check women’s make-up.  
We were against these actions then and considered it against 
sharia. [We believed] you (they) had no right to confront our 
people in this way, because they were our people.  
 
He declared, “I strongly support freedom of the press. We (Ahmadinejad and 
his team) even thanked the press who criticised us [during my mayorship] and gave 
them awards.” He endorsed freedom: “Freedom is the soul of the revolution and it is 
the greatest gift and a blessing from God." Subsequently, by connecting freedom to 
economic policies, he criticised the establishment: “The government whose industry 
is 80 percent state-owned has restricted popular freedoms. This means that all the 
economy is in the hands of a few while the rest of the people have nothing.”37  
During two televised Presidential debates, representatives of Rafsanjani and 
Ahmadinejad discussed their candidate’s respective economic and sociocultural 
policies. They only popularised Ahmadinejad’s support. In these debates, it was the 
attitude of Rafsanjani’s representatives rather than the content of their debates that hurt 
Rafsanjani. Their self-righteous attitude reinforced the audience’s negative views on 
Rafsanjani and his team and served Ahmadinejad’s narrative that some within the 
establishment behave as if they owned the country.38  
Rafsanjani’s defeat in the second round, with about seven million votes less 
than Ahmadinejad, showed, to an extent, that the Reformists and Khatami’s appeal to 
people to vote for Rafsanjani did not resonate amongst their supporters. In the second 
round, despite large support from Reformists, especially Khatami, Rafsanjani only 
secured 5 million votes of the total 10 million Reformist votes of the first round (the 
total number of votes of Karroubi, Moein and Mehralizadeh). This was largely due to 
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the Reformist's inability to justify properly their sudden decision to support Rafsanjani 
and to persuade their support base to vote for him.  
The Reformists had earlier, and during the first round, accused Rafsanjani of 
authoritarianism and totalitarianism. They had called him “The Master in the Red 
Suit,” for his alleged involvement in the “case of chain murders,” but now they stood 
behind Rafsanjani. They referred to him as a fighter and a survivor for freedom, 
republicanism and the Reform Movement. The shift was too much for many.  
Large numbers of pro-democratic forces and intellectuals found their ideals and 
their perception of Iranian society crushed by Ahmadinejad’s victory. They mostly 
blamed the deprived social class for Ahmadinejad’s rise to power and considered this 
class the new majority. This point was depicted in the lower participation rate in the 
second round. The total number of more than 2 million votes were cast less than the 
previous round (participation rate dropped from 63 percent in the first round to 59 
percent in the second round).  
However, the votes in the second round showed that a large part of 
Ahmadinejad’s vote came from the middle-class. Ahmadinejad obtained the majority 
of votes in big cities, such as Tehran, Shiraz, Mashhad and Tabriz. Mohammad 
Ghouchani, the Chief Editor of Shargh, a Reformist newspaper, said the votes came 
not from “the deprived (mahrum) socioeconomic class, [but] the fat, irresponsible and 
demanding middle-class we ourselves developed.”39 In a historical context, some of 
Ahmadinejad’s votes were cast by those who were looking for quick fixes to their 
problems and found Ahmadinejad’s promises appealing. This theme of rapid reform 
was also a significant component of Khatami and Rafsanjani’s promises. They both 
promised rapid economic and/or political change but rarely discussed the time frame 
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or details and consequences of these changes.  
As explored in previous chapters, Rafsanjani’s economic development and 
Khatami’s political development strengthened IRI middle-class to routinise the 
revolution and motivate the middle-class to act as the main social force behind 
development. However, their efforts and promises only raised society’s expectations, 
which they were unable to meet given the IRI’s hybrid characteristics, its factional 
politics and deep structural economic and social problems. This resulted in unsatisfied 
economic and political expectations in large parts of the society over the last 16 years.  
Ahmadinejad’s victory was also a reflection of resentment concerning the 
establishment. Once again, a candidate who was perceived as an outsider and against 
part of the establishment gained the vote of the majority. Mohammad Ali Abtahi, 
Khatami’s Vice-President, analysed Rafsanjani’s defeat in his weblog a few days after 
the results were announced. He said,  
Hashemi Rafsanjani, in the public opinion, was largely the 
representative of power, wealth and the regime, whether true or 
not! Mr. Ahmadinejad took advantage of the divide between the 
government and the people, as well as the gap between poor and 
rich. In the eyes of lay members of society, [Ahmadinejad] 
became a symbol of confrontation with the regime, the symbol 
of the fight against poverty and the symbol of change for 
different layers of society. 40 
 
As mentioned earlier, the IRGC, and the Basij played an extensive role in this 
election. They used their mobilising network and vast resources in favour of 
Ahmadinejad, as later claimed by both Karroubi and Rafsanjani. Regardless of the 
nature of this involvement, it underlined the increased role of the IRGC and parallel 
security institutions in the state affairs. Ironically, it was Rafsanjani who had allowed 
these groups to expand their economic activities as means to keep them out of politics. 
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Now Rafsanjani himself became a victim of these groups’ political ambitions.  
In his statement about the results of the election, Rafsanjani denounced their 
interference, stating,  
With regard to those who in unprecedented action took advantage 
of billions of tomans (Iranian unofficial monetary unit) of ‘public 
money’ and brutally offended me and my family. And those who 
used the facilities of the regime in systematic ways and interfered 
illegitimately in the election, I believe their misfortune in this 
world and the afterlife would be the price of this brutality to me, 
the people, and the country. 41  
 
To a large extent, Ahmadinejad’s rise can be explained using the theoretical 
populism framework, specifically the new works on ‘neo-populism,’ or ‘electoral 
populism.' Neo-populism is different compared to the classic populism on certain 
characteristics. It is “less mobilisational, transformatory, and redemptive as compared 
to classical populism. Its inclusionary character is more symbolic than effective.” 
However, “it adopts a more anti-organisational stance, reaches followers in the private 
sphere, and depends on the confidential responses of individual citizens, [and] not on 
collective manifestations by the people in the public sphere.”  
Therefore, it is “more representative than classical populism,” 42  and more 
compatible with democratic systems. 43  Some argue that “Populist Movements or 
parties are a by-product of the democratic malaise which they exacerbate when the 
political elites and their democratic institutions are unable to address the challenge 
with vigour or efficiency.” 44  Even though the IRI is far from a Western-style 
                                                 
41 Jomhurieslami 6/4/1384 (27/June/2005). 
42 Kurt Weyland, "Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American 
Politics," Comparative Politics (2001), 15-17. 
43 Kenneth M Roberts, "Populism, Political Conflict, and Grass-Roots Organization in Latin 
America," Comparative Politics (2006) 127-48.  
For a study of populism in Iran, see:  
Manochehr Dorraj, From Zarathustra to Khomeini: Populism and Dissent in Iran (Lynne Rienner 
Publishers London, 1990); "Iranian Populism: Its Vicissitudes and Political Impact,” The Many Faces 
of Populism: Current Perspectives; Alamdari, “The Power Structure." 
44 Yves Meny and Yves Surel, Democracies and the Populist Challenge,  (Palgrave Macmilan, 2002), 
11-12. 
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democracy, Khatami’s political development, following Rafsanjani’s economic 
development strengthened, to a certain extent, the electoral institutions, while raising 
sociopolitical and economic expectations in society. These expectations were not met 
due to a variety of reasons; the unsatisfied expectations within the hybrid structure of 
the IRI created an opportunity for the emergence of populism.  
An examination of Ahmadinejad’s populism enables us to understand his 
approach to it in different debates on this issue. Ahmadinejad’s conception of the ‘role 
of the people’ was to a large extent a mixture of different paradigms, including both 
Khatami’s and Mesbah’s. Khatami’s conception of the people and their role in politics 
was rooted in the individual and the modern concept of ‘a citizen.' His efforts, to an 
extent, were transforming the concept of an ‘always mobilised nation’ (‘mellat-e 
hamisheh dar sahneh’) to citizens with rights whose will legitimised the IRI.  
Ahmadinejad followed majoritarianism and under a vague concept of the 
people, which justified his political aspirations. Though he seemed to “thrive on 
people’s acclamations,” he did not in fact believe in the “people’s vote”,45  or he 
probably saw their votes as a means to his goal of reaching power. Ahmadinejad 
reduced popular demands to social justice and improved the economy, perhaps due to 
his own personal experiences with poverty, while neglecting the Reformist approach 
to republicanism. He considered all other demands secondary and unjustified. He also 
shared Mesbah’s concept of the role of people, stating: “In the heart of Europe 
Marxism is defeated, and so is liberalism. It is only pure Islam that can respond to 
modern-day challenges.”46  
Ahmadinejad was concerned about building the IRI as a representative of a true 
Islamic society. However, unlike the Khatami era, most public debates during 
                                                 
45 Ali M Ansari, Iran Under Ahmadinejad: The Politics of Confrontation (Routledge, 2007): 45. 
46 Official website of the President of the IRI, 30 /9/1386 (21/December/2007). 
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Ahamdinejad’s Presidency were about economic or foreign policy issues. Fewer 
debates took place about the theoretical power balance between republican versus 
Islamic-revolutionary institutions.  
Ahmadinejad rarely discussed issues such as tolerance, freedom of speech and 
pluralism except in blaming Western countries for their so-called hypocrisy. He 
mainly used the Islamic government as rhetoric in the wider international stage, saying 
“Liberalism, Marxism, and Nationalism could not save the mankind. Now all the 
nations realise that there is only one way for salvation and that’s the way that the 
Iranian nation took with the help of the clergy and ulama.”47  
Ahmadinejad tried to construct a doctrine to justify his claims about the 
significant role of the IRI in building a new global civilisation order. He emphasised 
the role of the Iranian revolution as an example and alternative to the devastation 
brought on the world’s nations by liberalism and Marxism. His claims became more 
relevant in negotiations with the West on the Iran’s nuclear programme. 48 
Ahmadinejad’s two terms and his role as a leader marked a new Era in IRI history.  
The following section focuses on Ahmadinejad’s personality and traces the 
formation of his circle of friends, exploring different social, economic and managerial 
aspects of his policies and views.   
Ahmadinejad and the Uremia Circle 
During the time when the aristocracy (ashrafiyat) was considered noble and living in 
cities was considered civilised, “I was born in a poor family in a rural village near 
Garmsar [a city located in the southeast of Tehran].” 49  Mahmoud Ahmadinejad 
                                                 
47 Official website of  thePresidentof  the IRI, 25 /3/ 1386 (15/June/2007). 
48 Official website of thePresidentof the IRI, 28 /1/ 1386 (17/April/2007). 
49 http://www.ahmadinejad.ir 21 /5/1385 (12/August/2006).  
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(b.1956) opened his official biography with this sentence, showing the importance of 
social class conflicts and his resentment towards symbols of aristocracy in his psyche, 
a characteristic rooted in his personal life experience. His family moved to Tehran in 
1959 when Ahmadinejad was just one-year-old. 50  Growing up, Ahmadinejad 
supported his family by working in a small shop. Later, he successfully entered the 
Iran University of Science and Technology (IUST), where he studied Civil 
Engineering. He obtained his PhD after the revolution in 1997, whilst at the same time 
serving as the Governor of the Ardabil province in northwest Iran.  
 Ahmadinejad, given his background and his belief that Pahlavi modernisation 
disrupted rustic life and his own family life he was more than a willing adherent of 
Khomeini’s slogans touching on socioeconomic indifferences and achieving social 
justice and ultimately suspicion of urban elite. 51  Ahmadinejad later, and in his 
electoral campaign for Presidency in 2005, capitalised on a similar class antagonism 
discourse which was an important component of Khomeinism as discussed in Chapter 
One. 
  Before the revolution, Ahmadinejad was not a prominent revolutionary and 
after the revolution he gradually built his political career through student networks and 
his services in the war. He was never imprisoned or exiled and had no close links to 
the IRI’s prominent revolutionaries. Ahmadinejad did not have any familial ties to the 
IRI establishment. After the revolution he was one of the founding members of the 
‘Islamic Student Union’ and consequently a member of the Central Committee of the 
                                                 
50 In his autobiography, he blamed Pahlavi’s modernisation efforts and land reform plans for the 
family’s financial struggles that forced them into migration, saying: “The villagers were lured into the 
glamour and seductive appearance of the urban life. They migrated to the cities in hopes of finding a 
morsel of bread, but instead found themselves marginalised in the slums.”  
Ibid.  
51 Abrahamian, A History, 27-8. 
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OSU, where he worked with prominent Leftist students. 52  
However, in the 1990s, when some of the students of the first circle of OSU 
emerged as Reformists, he stayed close to the Conservative camp. Soon after the 
revolution he was appointed as the Deputy Governor of Khoy and Mako, small cities 
in Iran’s Azerbaijan province in north-west Iran. He worked his way up and by the 
time of Khatami he became the mayor of Tehran (2003-2005). During the war, he 
joined the IRGC.53 Before becoming Tehran’s Mayor, Ahmadinejad unsuccessfully 
participated in the election to the sixth Majlis. He ran as a candidate from the 
Conservative camp and Mo‘talefeh. Ironically, Rafsanjani was a prominent figure in 
their list.  
Ahmadinejad’s Presidential victory also led to the entrance of his circle of 
friends to power. This circle’s members gained each other’s trust over the years. 
Ahmadinejad considered them off limits regarding political factional attacks. This 
group was known as ‘the Urmia circle’ in IRI political lexicon, given they worked 
together closely dealing with political and intelligence issues in these areas ( Urmia is 
a city in north-west Iran).  
Their friendship was forged in their common experiences and goals soon after 
the revolution and in their service to the War. The main members of this circle were 
Sadeq Mahsouli, the Interior Minister, his Advisor, Mojtaba Samareh Hashemi, his 
Senior Advisor and Deputy Interior Minister for Political Affairs, and Esfandiar Rahim 
Mashaei (hereafter Mashaei), the Chief of Staff and Vice-President. 54  Mashaei 
                                                 
52 He was opposed to the invasion of the US Embassy and argued that if an embassy were to be 
occupied, it should be the Soviet one.  
Fararu 12/11/1388, http://fararu.com/fa/news/34410/.  
Bultan News 19/10/1392 (9/January/2014), http://www.bultannews.com/fa/news/185424/. 
53 Fars News 12/5/1384 (3/August/2005). 
54 The formation of this circle could be traced back to the early days of the revolution. Mahsouli was 
appointed Governor of Urmia and the IRGC Commander of Division Five, in charge of the 
northwestern part of Iran. At this time, Samareh Hashemi was appointed the Deputy Governor of the 
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became an important pillar of the Ahmadinejad administration during his Presidency.   
Mashaei, who is believed to be Ahmadinejad’s mentor, has built his career in 
intelligence and cultural affairs. Similar to Ahmadinejad, he was young at the time of 
the revolution.55 In the early 1980s, he served as the IRGC Intelligence Office Deputy 
in charge of controlling Kurdistan’s Komaleh (a Leftist Kurdish group). In 1984, when 
the Ministry of Intelligence was established, he took charge as the codification of the 
IRI’s strategy toward Iranian Kurds.  
During Khatami’s Presidency, Mashaei became the Head of the newly 
established radio station, Payam Radio. Payam attracted new audiences by playing 
Iranian pop and jazz songs for the first time on the radio. This led to harsh criticism 
from some religious figures, who blamed the Reformist government and Khatami for 
allowing these types of music to be played. At the time of Ahmadinejad’s mayorship, 
Mashaei moved to the municipality office where he was in charge of cultural and art 
affairs.56 His controversial comments and his attitude were in contrast to his behaviour 
while working in Payam Radio.  
For instance, he harshly criticised cultural houses and the genre of pop music, 
saying “cultural houses have turned into ‘houses of corruption.' I will Islamicise them. 
Khatami should be held accountable [for them]. I won’t allow vulgar pop songs to be 
                                                 
Azarbaijan Province, while Ahmadinejad served as the Governor of Khoy. As Mahsouli became the 
Commander of the IRGC Fifth Division, Ahmadinejad also joined him as Commander of the 
‘Armoured Division’ (Tim-e Zerehi). Others, such as Parviz Fattah, the Minister of Energy in 
Ahmadinejad’s first Cabinet, and Alireza Sheikh Attar, Iranian diplomat and an ambassador, formed 
an alliance during this period. When Ahmadinejad was Governor of Khoy, he met Mashaei in the 
meetings of the “Committee of Maintaining the Security of Province.” (Showra-ye Tamin-e Ostan). 
Shargh 3/4/1394 (24/June/2015), http://www.sharghdaily.ir/News/6656l, 
http://aftabnews.ir/vdceno8zvjh8wwi.b9bj.html. 
55 An excellent public speaker, he gave speeches in praise of Khomeini, in small cities, at the age of 
15.  
Nameh News 21/9/1391 (11/December/2012), http://namehnews.ir/fa/news/12369.  
Khabar Online 3/2/1392 (23/April/2013), http://www.khabaronline.ir/detail/288697/Politics/parties. 
56 Nameh News 21/9/1391 (11/December/2012), http://namehnews.ir/fa/news/12369. 
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distributed in cultural houses. Un-Islamic theatres should be banned.”57 He portrayed 
himself as a strong supporter of Imam Mahdi, which gave momentum to the rumours 
about his involvement with the Hojjatieh. Mashaei faced accusations of misuse of 
public money for electoral purposes.58 
While Mashaei increasingly engaged in security and cultural affairs, Mahsouli 
increased his financial activities and became one of the financial sources of this 
circle.59 When Ahmadinejad proposed him as his initial candidate as Oil Minister in 
2005, his wealth and the controversies surrounding how he became rich became a topic 
of debate in the Majlis and a factor in his rejection by it.60  
The Ahmadinejad Doctrine 
Ahmadinejad and his circle belonged to a generation of Khomeinism that gained its 
political identity and legitimacy from its efforts in the war. They did not participate in 
the revolution but called themselves true revolutionaries claiming they understood the 
revolution’s true ideals. They believed the IRI did not deliver on these ideals. This 
point is well depicted in Nateq Nouri’s account of his meeting with Ahmadinejad in 
the “Central Committee for the Harmonization of Conservatives," prior to the ninth 
Presidential election, when Ahmadinejad presented his plans as a possible candidate. 
Nateq Nouri said:  
After Ahmadinejad proposed his plans, Asgar Owladi said, ‘This 
brother of ours thinks that he is the only one who understands 
Islam. This brother of ours thinks he is the only one who 
understands the revolution. This brother of ours thinks he is the 
only one who knows the Imam.’ I said then, ‘Mr. Ahmadinejad, 
I listened to your presentation carefully, but I should admit that I 
did not understand any of it, either your knowledge is beyond my 
understanding or your comments are by someone who lives in 
                                                 
57 Etemad 16/6/1388 (7/September/2009).  
58 Etamaad 16/6/1388 (7/September/2009). 
59 Nameh News 12/12/1391 (2/March/2013), http://namehnews.ir/fa/news/26917/. 
60 Shargh 21/8/1384 (12/November/2005) Fararu, http://fararu.com/fa/news/17146/. 
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the clouds. After this meeting, Ahmadinejad got angry, and later 
in a letter said that he did not wish to work with us.61  
 
Ahmadinejad considered Mousavi’s war economy, Rafsanjani’s economic 
development and Khatami’s political development misleading and deviations from 
true Khomeinism. In a speech almost a year before his election, he underlined these 
points:  
During the war, the country’s macro-management was 
centralised due to the war situation. This gave birth to patronage. 
The second phase was the construction Era in which the 
administration followed different agendas, but could not deliver 
social justice. In the third phase the sociopolitical direction 
changed and many revolutionary principles were transformed, 
though once again social justice could not be accomplished… In 
the second phase, justice became a part of the [economic] 
development paradigm and the goal of overcoming social 
deprivation became the secondary target. In the third phase, the 
principles of religious governance and independence of the 
country were questioned.62  
 
Ahmadinejad promoted the increasing role of the people in the IRI. However, 
his understanding of the people differed from Khatami and the Reformists. While the 
political conception of the people in Khatami’s doctrine referred to modern civil 
identity and the people as the collection of citizens/individuals, Ahmadinejad 
considered the people as a collective identity of a single entity. This entity then shared 
the same aspirations for social justice while fulfilling their Islamic revolutionary duties 
expressed in Khomeinism.  
The Islamic regime could not be achieved without the direct 
participation and involvement of the people. Thus it is the only 
popular regime in the world… Those who think that the Majlis 
and government are the only ways to realise the ideals are wrong. 
People should demand social justice… If people are in charge of 
the government, then the Islamic regime can be achieved. The 
reason that the income gap is widening is due to the fact that the 
people feel that their responsibilities are only establishing these 
pillars of the government (arkan-e hokumat) and defending its 
                                                 
61 ISNA 31/4/1393 (22/July/2014), http://isna.ir/fa/news/93043118195/.  
62 Fars News 4/5/1383 (25/July/2004). 
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independence.  
 
He also emphasised,  
If we want to realise justice, we should change the administration 
model of the government and open the way for the people to 
manage the country. The popular government is in the context of 
Islamic government, and the role of the people in the 
administration of the country is essential… Without the 
involvement of the people, reform of the economy and the 
emergence of social justice is impossible.63  
 
To a certain extent, under the influence of Mesbah’s theory of the role of the 
people in the IRI, Ahmadinejad constructed his theoretical vision, which gave meaning 
to his mission. He called for a ‘third revolution’ to establish divine government. He 
highlighted different aspects of this mission in his Presidential election speech in 
Rasht, a city in northern Iran.  
He placed his mission in a religious-historical context: “The Islamic revolution 
was the continuation of the Prophet’s Movement and its goals were the prophet’s 
goals.” He placed the role of the people within a religious context of an apocalyptic 
mission, stating, “The Iranian nation has a duty of preparing the grounds for the 
Islamic government which would be the precursor for the establishment of the 
government of the occumulant [hidden] Imam.”  
Therefore, he argued, “We need to establish a progressive powerful and unique 
Islamic society in Iran as fast as possible, [a society] that can set an example for [other 
countries] and consequently, be the first step in the global movement toward the 
Islamic government.” He then placed this thesis in the historical context of the IRI, 
arguing that the establishment of the Islamic government would be the third revolution, 
following the first one, meaning the 1979 Revolution, and the second one, meaning 
the establishment of IRI political stability. He also defined the Islamic government as 
                                                 
63 Ibid. 
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“… a government where practices, regulations and agendas are extracted from Islam.”  
He also distinguished this government from the previous governments of the 
IRI arguing, “The programmes of these administrations were based on their own 
thinking or the implementation and copy of other programmes,” and not based on 
Islam. For instance, during “the construction era, the goal of economic development 
had become economic growth and wealth accumulation.” While “…during the Islamic 
government economic development is based on justice,” which he defined as “fair 
countrywide distribution of the country’s resources.”64  
The relationship between Ahmadinejad and Mesbah dates from the time he 
attended Mesbah’s classes held for University Basij professors.65 After his Presidency, 
Ahmadinejad also praised Mesbah and Imam Khomeini’s institutions on different 
occasions.66 Ahmadinejad’s idea of building the ‘ideal Islamic society’ was influenced 
by Mesbah’s teachings.67 However, after he became President, Ahmadinejad tried to 
avoid direct involvement in philosophical debates about the role of the people as taught 
by Mesbah. For instance, in response to the question of a journalist on Mesbah’s 
comment which said, “The people’s vote is the base of popularity, and not legitimacy," 
Ahmadinejad said, “These are scientific debates. Let’s not hinder the expression of 
ideas and scientific debate by politicising them.” 68 
In sum, social justice, return to Khomeinism and anti-elitism (‘ashrafigari’) 
were the three elements of Ahmadinejad’s doctrine. Ahmadinejad believed these three 
                                                 
64 Hamidreza. Esmaeili, Shuresh-e Ashrafiyyat Bar Jomhuriyyat [Confrontation of Aristocracy and 
Democracy] (Markaz-e Asnad-e Enqelab-e Islami, 2011): 75-78.  
65Interview with Mohsen Qaravian, Nasim Bidari Journal; Partially republished at ISNA23/3/1392 
(13/June/2013), http://www.isna.ir/fa/news/92032313728/. 
66 Official website of thePresidentof the IRI 25/3/1386 (15/June/2007). 
67 Official website of thePresidentof the IRI 24/10/1384 (14/Jan/2006). 
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elements, also known as ‘compassionate government,' were true values of the Islamic 
revolution and that any distancing from them, including adoption of foreign, 
specifically Western models, would only weaken them and thus the revolution.69 He 
therefore summarised: “The next government will be just, and faithful to the ideals 
and goals of the Islamic revolution. The government will go back to the hands of the 
people again.”70  
These themes were highlighted in his ‘comprehensive strategic plan of 
Presidency,' which was published a few weeks after his first Presidential victory. The 
global aspect of Ahmadinejad’s mission was highlighted by emphasising the 
significant historical role of Iran in creating a new civilisation. “Khomeini was another 
leader who placed Iran on the track of civilisation building… The Islamic revolution 
was a new beginning for the Iranian Islamic civilisation… The Islamic Iran is now 
gradually emerging to spread the lights of justice and spirituality by refuting the 
hegemonic world order.” His ideal was to “prepare the grounds for the ‘world’s just 
government’ through the vivification of the Islamic civilisation.”71 
To understand some of the policy decisions Ahmadinejad made, it is necessary 
to summarise some of his announced policy goals. His main strategic approach was 
“to spread justice and multi-faceted and endogenous development based on pure 
Mohammedian Islam.” His main cultural strategy was “to improve public culture, 
human dignity, legitimate freedoms…” His social and economic strategy was to create 
a welfare state based on “self-reliance in production, activating economic capacities 
and export-oriented production, just wealth distribution, job creation, overcoming 
                                                 
69 Shuresh, 55-85; Fars News 20/11/1383 (8/February/2005), 
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deprivation, elimination of discrimination, and improvement of people’s purchase 
power and their welfare.”  
In this document republican institutions were considered a part of his security 
strategy: “The security strategy includes popular mobilisation at decisive moments, 
the empowerment of the regime’s republican aspects by spreading justice and serving 
the people, job creation, the strengthening of scientific and economic bases, and 
improving defense capabilities.”72 
Ahmadinejad’s personality and ideological views strongly influenced his 
different policies and programmes, and thus IRI politics, society and economy. For 
instance, due to his personal financial background and his image as the defender of the 
poor, Ahmadinejad considered money the answer to all problems and “perceived 
economics as a handbook for distributing assets and income rather than primarily a 
source of income and wealth creation."73  
He initiated expansive monetary policies. Contrary to common economic 
knowledge, he considered inflation as a result of production cost rather than monetary 
policies. His economic plans were a mixture of several inconsistent policies, which he 
justified under different Islamic economic doctrines, such as anti-corruption or social 
justice. He propagated reducing the role of the government in the economy and took 
liberalising measures. For instance, he lifted subsidies on petrol and other products 
and continued the privatisation of state-owned companies. His record on stabilising 
prices and demolishing financial auditing institutions was, to a large extent, 
unprecedented in the IRI history.  
His economic plans were chaotic. To fulfill his slogan of “bringing the oil 
                                                 
72 Fars News 25/5/1384 (16/August/2005). 
73  Jahangir Amuzegar, "Islamic Social Justice, Iranian Style," Middle East Policy 14, no. 3 (2007): 
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money to the dinner tables of families," he redistributed oil income directly to the 
hands of people without following Majlis regulations and protocols. Given his 
commitment to Jahadi management, he initiated many extensive projects without 
proper prior study and research and in the absence of proper budgeting and financial 
evaluation.  
He initiated the ‘Mehr Housing’ project offering first-time owners affordable 
housing without proper prior research and evaluation.74 He also distributed public 
‘justice shares’ (Saham-e ‘Edalat) by allocating stocks of large state-owned companies 
to low-income people without clarifying its regulatory body. An unprecedented 
increase in the oil income allowed him to sustain these expansive economic policies 
for a few years. However, when oil prices plunged and sanctions tightened, most of 
these policies became huge burdens on the state and the next administration.75  
Ahmadinejad’s Presidential management style was a continuation of his 
municipal management style which had two main pillars. On the one hand, his 
informal populist managerial approaches aimed to construct and strengthen a down-
to-earth, hardworking and humble image of Ahmadinejad. As mentioned by 
Mohammad Jahromi, his Labour and Social Affairs Minister in the first cabinet, his 
‘ego,' lack of managerial knowledge or experience and his increasing ‘narcissism,' led 
to his micro-management.76 
His decisions and performance seemed contradictory to his status as President. 
To reinforce this image of humble servant, he held cabinet meetings in different 
                                                 
74 Ali Karshenasan and Mahsa Beiranvand, "A Review on Weaknesses and Strengths of Delivering 
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9 (2013).   
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provinces, arguing that his cabinet needed to be in touch with reality on the ground. 
He got involved with people’s minor problems and gave orders on the spot during 
these cabinet meetings. He also distributed handout payments in his trips. His trips 
across the country were filled with images of mostly poor people approaching him or 
his car just to give him letters describing their problems and asking for handouts. Over 
the seven years of his Presidency, he received more than 23 million letters during these 
trips.77 He even defined new small projects on the spot by bypassing regular protocols.  
His ego and self-confidence made it almost impossible for his cabinet ministers 
to work with him. He interfered in ministerial affairs and policy details without proper 
research and knowledge. He also frequently interfered in the department process 
within individual ministries, including intra ministerial appointments. For instance, he 
once interfered in the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Sport and Youth and directly asked 
for the dismissal of the national football team’s coach. In another occasion, he made 
the final decision about the selection of a football club director.78 He changed ministers 
and appointed new ones in an unprecedented and unpredicted ways.  
As Qolam Hossein Mohseni Ezhei, Ahmadinejad’s Intelligence Minister, 
emphasised, “We did not know why we were fired.”79 Some of his ministers were 
expelled on the spot just for having small disagreements with him.80  Despite his 
continuous emphasis on the importance of competency in the selection of his cadre, 
the main criteria for his cadre selection were loyalty, obedience and adulation, further 
highlighting his dictatorial style.81  
Consequently, his modus operandi created chaos in policy making and severely 
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weakened the cohesion of the cabinet and of the ministries. This modus operandi also 
brought chaos to other institutions. He dissolved many such as the ‘Money and Credit 
Council’ a body responsible for research and decision making regarding the general 
policies of the Central Bank82 to increase his power over policy making, he decreased 
the role of supervisory bodies such as the ‘Planning and Budget Organisation’ 
(Sazman-e Barnameh va Budjeh).83 
In his valedictory speech after his resignation, Davoud Danesh Jafari, 
Ahamdinejad’s Economics Minister (2005–2008), succinctly summed up the 
characteristics of Ahmadinejad’s economic, and managerial approach:  
“First,[during Ahmadinejad’s administration], there was 
skepticism about the country’s expertise. [Moreover] many 
generally accepted concepts in economics, such as the impact of 
liquidity on inflation, or the preferable division of labour 
between the government and the people were doubted. Second, 
unimportant secondary issues became the government’s 
priority… We also witnessed an active presence of pressure 
groups in administrative processes. In order to change the 
direction of affairs, these groups circulated false information… 
Third, the government continuously entered into disputes with 
other institutions due to a myriad of reasons, which heavily 
affected the activities of the Ministry of Economics and 
Treasury. Many of [these issues] have remained unresolved until 
now. Those disputes with the Majlis, disputes with particular 
people, disputes with the National Television, disputes with 
Ahmadinejad’s previous rivals in the Presidential election and 
disputes with potential candidates of the tenth Presidential 
election.”  
 
Fourth, although the main programme of the government was to face the 
financial sanctions [imposed by the UN], the interference of “people who had no 
expertise or professional experience” hindered these efforts.84  
                                                 
82 Nazar News (9/4/1394) (30/June/2015), http://www.nazarnews.com/39258.  
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Factional Dynamics 
Because of this modus operandi and political, ideological approach, the dynamics of 
factional politics during the Ahmadinejad period differed greatly from those of 
previous administrations. There were three main trends in factional politics.  
 First, given that the Reformists had lost control of almost all the state’s 
institutions, they debated the reasons behind their defeat and planned their comeback, 
while their media remained critical of Ahmadinejad’s policies. Second, in the absence 
of the Reformists from the main state institutions, internal disputes amongst the 
Conservatives greatly escalated. Third, one of the major factional disputes, which 
became personal, was the dispute between Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad that in return 
exercised an increasing influence on the overall dynamics of factional politics and their 
popularisation. Thus the investigation of these inter-elite competitions are necessary 
for better understanding of the popularisation of factional politics of coming years.  
Importantly, it should be underlined that this period was overshadowed by the 
geopolitical concerns about the Iranian nuclear programme and Ahmadinejad’s 
aggressive tone in foreign affairs. Geopolitics were, therefore, important contextual 
elements of factional politics during this period. In this section, some of these 
geopolitical contextual elements are mentioned briefly and a substantial analysis of 
them is presented in Chapter Six.  
During this period Rafsanjani and his family became the target of harsh 
personal and political attacks by Ahmadinejad and the neo-Conservatives. The first 
signs of opposition to Rafsanjani appeared when Rafsanjani’s speech in Qom, on 5 
June 2006, on the anniversary of the beginning of Khomeini’s Movement, was 
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disrupted by clerics affiliated to the Imam Khomeini Institute. 85  Mesbah’s office 
denied any systematic role in this incident.86 The struggles between Ahmadinejad and 
Rafsanjani reached its height during the disputes over the control of the Azad 
University (Free University) and the arrest of Mousavian.  
The importance of Azad University is due to several points. First, Azad 
University is the largest non-governmental educational institution in the IRI. 
Therefore, it has  an important position in the debates about the IRI’s control over the 
educational policy and the making homo Islamicus. Second, given its large student 
body it can be a powerful mobilising force for any group in whose hands it resides. 
Azad University serves 75 percent of the country’s university students.  
Azad University’s students are a large network parallel to other networks, such 
as the Basij, which enjoys the control of the state. Third, with an annual budget of 
around two billion US dollars, it is the source of wealth and patronage.87 As mentioned 
in Chapter Two, Rafsanjani established Azad University as one of the requirements 
for the success of his Tose’eh paradigm. Thus, Rafsanjani’s name was attached to the 
Azad University. Therefore, Ahmadinejad’s success in gaining control over Azad 
University symbolised the weakening of Rafsanjani’s power.  
Ahmadinejad versus Rafsanjani  
Ahmadinejad regarded Rafsanjani as his main political rival. This rivalry was partly 
personal given the dynamics of the 2005 election and partly political. In addition, 
going after Azad University fitted into Ahmadinejad’s ideological rhetoric of targeting 
corrupt establishment. Therefore, important aspects of the disputes over Azad were the 
rivalry between Ahmadinejad and Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad’s attempts to prove 
                                                 
85 Etemade Melli 16/3/1385 (6/June/2006). 
86 Etemade Melli 17/3/1385 (7/June/2006); Fars News 17/3/1385 (7/June/2006). 
87 Serat News 17/12/1393 (8/March/2015), http://www.seratnews.ir/fa/news/231624/.  
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his anti-establishment claims.  
Azad University  
Soon after his election Ahmadinejad targeted Azad University and asked for a 
reduction of its tuition fees. In October 2006, he threatened Azad University, saying 
“If Azad University does not reduce its tuition fees we will take a revolutionary 
decision against the university.”88 It was perceived largely as a political move as Azad 
University was non-governmental and received no fund from the government. If 
Ahmadinejad’s motivation was to reduce the tuition fees, he could have approved 
some governmental loans for which Azad University had applied and/or tried to put a 
cap on public university tuition fees, which sometimes were more than that of Azad 
University.89 
Two weeks later, Ahmadinejad took action against the statute of Azad 
University. As the President and the Head of the SCCR, he appointed five people to 
conduct an inquiry into the statute’s reform and the possibility of a change in the 
composition of its founding board.90 SCCR is an IRI upper body mainly charged with 
delineating the general strategic educational and cultural policies of the IRI. The 
SCCR’s organisational links to Azad University are relatively limited.  
Azad University, similar to all other IRI educational institutions, must comply 
with the legislation of the SCCR. Any changes in the composition of the founding 
board and the appointment of the University Dean need SCCR confirmation. Thus, 
Ahmadinejad’s action was a clear example of how different factions use their control 
over beheld institution for factional political purposes.  
                                                 
88 Iran/8/1385 (November/2006). 
89 Ibid.  
90 Asr Iran 17/8/1385 (8/November/2006), http://www.asriran.com/fa/news/6219/. 
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In response Rafsanjani as the head of founding board of Azad University, 
proposed changes in the composition of the founding board. He hoped that diversifying 
the board would hinder Ahmadinejad’s attempt to control the institution.91 Following 
Khamenei’s behind the door interference, SCCR accepted these changes and for a 
while the issue was dropped. 92  However, the 2009 Presidential election gave 
Ahmadinejad the chance to settle his issues with Rafsanjani and Azad University. 
Ahmadinejad’s use of Azad University in the election campaign was part of his 
attempts to strengthen his anti-establishment image. 
In a live televised electoral debate during the 2009 election, Ahmadinejad 
harshly criticised Rafsanjani and his family. He also accused Azad University of 
systematically using the organisation’s money and resources for political and electoral 
purposes.93 After the election, Ahmadinejad’s surrogates accused Azad University and 
Mehdi Hashemi, Rafsanjani’s son was at the time the office manager of the 
University’s founding board, of interfering in politics.94 
 Fearing monopolising actions by the Ahmadinejad administration, Rafsanjani 
and Azad’s founding board endowed Azad University. In doing so, they ensured that 
the government could not access the institution’s assets even if the board lost control 
of the University.95 Rafsanjani hinted about the personal aspect of these disputes, 
“While worried about the future and aware of the extent of greed and jealousy toward 
the institution, the Founding Board reached the conclusion that the only assured way 
to respond to these attacks was to endow the institution.”96  
                                                 
91 Alef 6/9/1385 (27/November/2006), http://alef.ir/vdch.-nit23nxmftd2.html?txt. 
92 Raja News 21/8/1386 (12/November/2007). 
93 See Aftab News 14/3/1388 (4/June/2009), http://aftabnews.ir/vdcjxveh.uqeymzsffu.html. 
94 Frasnews 27,28/11/1388 (15,16/Februrary/2005). 
95 Tabnak (1/September/2009), http://www.tabnak.ir/fa/mobile/news/62069/. 
96 ILNA 8/9/1388 (29/Novemebr/2009); Tabnak 8/9/1388 (29/Novemebr/2009), http://www.tabnak.ir/ 
8/9/1388. 
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In his second term as President, Ahmadinejad reinitiated the process to reform 
Azad University statute. On 25 April 2010, Ahmadinejad declared Azad University’s 
new statute. In the new statute, Azad University fell largely under the control of the 
government. Eventually, on 27 February 2012 after two years of intense political 
disputes, Farhad Daneshjoo became its new Dean, following a decision made by the 
trustee board and the acceptance of the majority of the founding board members. To 
legalise this decision, Rafsanjani’s signature was needed as the head of the founding 
board. Rafsanjani refused to sign the decree.  
In return, Ahmadinejad assigned Kamran Daneshjoo, Farhad’s brother and the 
Minister of Science and Education, to sign his verdict instead of Rafsanjani.97 This 
move symbolised the weakened power position of Rafsanjani during this period 
following the 2009 events. However, during Rouhani’s Presidency, a shift in factional 
power balance, tipping in favour of Rafsanjani, led to a new power balance in Azad 
University. Daneshjoo was replaced in 2014, after about two years of controversial 
management of the institution. 
Khamenei’s role in these disputes reflects the evolution of the personal 
relationship between Khamenei and Rafsanjani and the extent to which this 
relationship changed following the 2009 election. The next chapter explores different 
aspects of this shift in more detail. Khamenei’s first intervention in these disputes was 
in 2006 when he asked both Ahmadinejad and Rafsanjani to drop the issue after the 
changes in the composition of the founding board occurred. After the 2009 election, 
the deterioration of the relationship between Rafsanjani and Khamenei was reflected 
in Khamenei’s position in disputes over Azad University. Rafsanjani asked Khamenei 
about Azad University and received the green light for his endowment plans.  
                                                 
97 Qanun 24/6/1392 (15/September/2013). 
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However, the SLO later publicly denied this confirmation. When Rafsanjani 
went to see Khamenei, the Supreme Leader responded that it had just been his 
jurisprudential decree in which he agreed to the principle of endowment and 
Rafsanjani still needed to gain the acceptance of jurisdictional institutions, such as  the 
SCCR. Meanwhile, the process to reform Azad University statute, which was 
reinitiated by Ahmadinejad after 2009 continued. When Rafsanjani sent a letter to 
Khamenei pointing out that the intervention was illegal, the SLO, instead of Khamenei 
himself, rejected Rafsanjani’s claims and confirmed its legality in a letter.98  The shift 
in the balance of power and the deterioration of the relationship between Khamenei 
and Rafsanjani was now publicly clear.  
The escalation of these disputes led to the entrance of new institutions into these 
debates.  Two events in late May and early June 2010 changed the dynamics of these 
disputes. First, on 27 May 2010, security forces invaded the office of Azad’s founding 
board. Media close to the government and the IRGC claimed, in the raid many 
confidential documents regarding oil contracts and other important confidential issues 
were discovered.99  
However, Mosharekat claimed the purpose of this raid was to confiscate the 
documents that Azad University had on some of the children of the establishment and 
civil servants, which showed their fraud in their obtaining degrees. Mosharekat also 
claimed amongst the documents confiscated was a confidential report on the Student 
Movement in Mashahd from the January 2010 ashoura event. 100 Second, the Majlis 
entered the Azad University’s dispute in June 2010. Ali Larjani, the Speaker of the 
                                                 
98 BBC Persian (14/June/2010), 
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Majlis, emphasised that there had always been an unofficial agreement between the 
SCCR and the Majlis, set by Khamenei, according to which the Majlis was not allowed 
to interfere in the SCCR’s decision making.101  
The Majlis ignored Larijani’s comment and voted in favour of Azad University 
and the continuation of the older statute. The Majlis referred to a court verdict in 2006 
in which the changes in the statue was considered illegal. This action by the Majlis 
faced harsh criticism from the plain clothes militia, pressure groups and the Basij. They 
condemned the Majlis for acting against Khamenei’s wishes and threatened to close 
the Majlis. The Majlis harshly criticised these actions of these pressure groups, though 
it later cancelled the bill.  
Eventually, as the disputes escalated, Khamenei intervened and in two different 
letters asked both Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad to stop their attempts to reform the 
statute and the endowment process.102 As mentioned above, in less than two years after 
these events in the Majlis, Ahmadinejad implemented the new statute and changed the 
Dean of Azad University. 
The entrance of the eighth Majlis into Azad University debates and consequent 
events was an important event portraying shifts in the dynamics of factional politics 
and the confrontation of republican institutions with the revolutionary pillars. The 
eighth Majlis had a Conservative and neo-Conservative majority.103  
Therefore, the actions of the Majlis against Ahmadinejad in Azad University 
debates were, to a large extent, a reflection of the division within the Conservative 
camp. This was one of the first few occasions where pressure groups were mobilised 
                                                 
101 BBC Persian (29/June/2010), 
http://www.bbc.com/persian/iran/2010/06/100601_l39_azaduniversity_background.shtml.  
102 ANA 14/4/1389 (5/July/2010); Fararu 14/4/1389 (5/July/2010), http://fararu.com/fa/news/51331/.  
103 Given that after large rejection of the Reformist's candidates and electoral apathy of the Reformist 
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to condemn the actions of a Conservative-dominated institution. These groups justified 
their actions with new rhetoric. They claimed they would act upon their understanding 
of the Supreme Leader’s wishes (Niyyat), because sometimes the Leader could not 
announce his wishes publicly due to state’s interests (Maslahat). This new rhetoric 
played an important role in future political events, particularly during the Rouhani 
administration and in negotiations with the US in the nuclear programmes.  
After the 2009 election, Ahmadinejad and Rafsanjani’s lack of attention to 
Khamenei’s continuous public and private interventions to a degree revealed the 
formation of new power dynamics and the weakening of Khamenei’s institutional 
authority as the ultimate arbitrator of disputes. This point will be elaborated further in 
the next chapter. 
In sum, these disputes on Azad University illustrate certain elements regarding 
the subject of this thesis as well as the impact of inter-elite competition on the 
popularisation of factional politics. First, the way these disputes emerged and evolved 
offers an example of the ideological and political dynamics of factional politics. 
Second, these disputes continued in both of Ahmadinejad’s Presidential terms, 
therefore they offer a case study with analytical importance given that these events 
symbolise the extent to which the 2009 Presidential election and subsequent events 
have influenced the dynamics of factional politics and Rafsanjani’s power position and 
popular authority. Third, these disputes symbolised wider power politics of this period 
and how a personal issue for both Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad, evolved and spread 
into the wider political arena leading to the confrontation of different institutions. 
Fourth, they highlight the importance of human agency in the IRI politics. Fifth, these 
disputes represent the evolution of the relationship between Rafsanjani, Khamenei and 
Ahmadinejad. Finally, they showed that Khamenei was unable to control the factional 
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fights.  
Mousavian Arrest 
In this dispute between Ahmadinejad and Rafsanjani, yet another main dispute, 
happened in May 2007 when Hossein Mousavian was arrested on charges of 
espionage. Mousavian was Hassan Rouhani’s Deputy and a high-ranking official in 
the Iran’s negotiating team with regard to its nuclear programme. To date, he maintains 
a close relationship with Rafsanjani. When Rouhani was in charge of Iran’s nuclear 
programme negotiations, Mousavian served as the Speaker of the negotiating team 
(2002–2005). Mousavian was acquitted of espionage charges and keeping 
governmental and confidential documents. However, on charges of propaganda 
against the regime, he was found guilty and sentenced to three years of suspended 
sentence. Ahmadinejad and Mohseni Ezhei, his Intelligence Minister, criticised the 
sentence for being too light.  
Ahmadinejad used Mousavian’s arrest as another example in his wider rhetoric 
about the hidden powerful hands in IRI politics and the extent of Rafsanjani’s power. 
He said, “They [Rafsanjani and his allies] went as far as planting a spy [in the 
negotiating team] in order to systematically collect secret information. Of course, if 
this spy goes to the court, the judge would acquit him. However, they should know 
that the people’s court will not allow it and we will be in continuous fight with the 
‘mafia’ in full force.”104  
Once Mousavian was acquitted of part of the charges. Ahmadinejad seized the 
opportunity and escalated his anti-establishment rhetoric. The IUST Basij-of which 
Ahmadinejad was a member of-arranged a protest against the judiciary.105 He pointed 
                                                 
104 Fararu 10/9/1386 (1/December/2007). 
105 Donya-e Eqtesad 7/9/1386 (28/November/2007). 
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out that if Mousavian was innocent, why his trial was not open to the public, and why 
not publish his private conversations with foreigners, so the people could judge for 
themselves. 106  Mousavian’s indictment was published in early 2010 by Iran 
newspaper, close to Ahmadinejad’s administration at the height of factional politics 
following the 2009 election and just before the ninth Majlis elections. Ahmadinejad 
used this opportunity to portray himself once again as an anti-establishment figure.107  
Mousavian was accused of transmitting information about IRI’s domestic 
issues and conflicts to foreign officials and his indictment was a valuable document 
that showed the dynamics of factional politics and an insider’s perception of 
Ahmadinejad. In the indictment, at least three points regarding the subject of this thesis 
were detailed. First, it confirmed the role of the IRGC and the Basij in the Presidential 
election and their electoral strategy. Mousavian “confirmed the existing disagreements 
amongst the elites (the IRGC’s support for Qalibaf, as well as the Basij’s support for 
Ahmadinejad).”  
Second, it explained the power structure for decision-making in foreign policy 
and the relationship within the negotiating team. “[Mousavian claimed that] there is a 
disagreement between the SNSC and the Foreign Ministry on the negotiators… A 
disagreement between the new head of negotiating team (Ali Larijani) and a previous 
one (Hassan Rouhani.)” He underlined that Ahmadinejad only trusted his inner circle 
and in foreign policy Ahmadinejad’s main confidant was Hashemi Samarah.  
Third, in the indictment the dynamics of factional politics and the conflicting 
relationship between Ahmadinejad and Rafsanjani was confirmed. “Emphasis on the 
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251 
 
point that the result of the AofE and the City Council elections in December 2005 (in 
which Rafsanjani acquired more than 1.5 million votes and was elected as the first 
rank candidate) weakened the government and particularly Ahmadinejad.”108    
As the tenth Presidential election (2009) approached, Rafsanjani escalated his 
criticisms of Ahmadinejad, targeting his socioeconomic policies, such as 
Ahmadinejad’s subsidy reform, known as the ‘targeted subsidy scheme.' This scheme 
aimed to cut the subsidies on fuel and energy and instead distribute the freed resources 
to the people and the production sector. Subsidy reform was the plan of the previous 
governments. However, Ahmadinejad’s attempts to pass the scheme just a year before 
the election was perceived largely as a political move.  
Rafsanjani accused Ahmadinejad of “motivating the lazy” (Gedaparvari), 
stating “social justice cannot be reached through fancy slogans. Social justice is not 
the distribution of impoverishment, but rather it is the proper distribution of facilities 
amongst different social groups.” 109  Ahmadinejad responded by connecting 
Rafsanjani’s criticisms of his efforts for reform in subsidies, sarcastically saying,  
If all of the subsidies devoted to you, whose stomach and pockets 
are full, and to you, whose wealth hits the sky, it would not be 
gedaparvari. But if it was distributed amongst all the nation, it 
would be gedaparvari! You do not know the people (mellat). 
You have distanced yourself from the people. You only consider 
yourself, your families, and your party as the people.110 
 
Ahmadinejad versus the Conservatives 
A major development in the evolution of the popularisation of factional politics was 
the turning of the Conservatives against each other, or in other words the emergence 
of civil war amongst them. As mentioned above, the ninth Presidential election became 
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an event in which internal disputes between the Conservatives surfaced. Even the 
Conservatives were surprised when Ahmadinejad won the election. As only a few 
Conservative groups supported Ahmadinejad, he was mostly dependent on his circle 
of friends. At the beginning, he was considered a weak President whose main element 
of power was his social support base.  
 Gradually, his confidence rose, and he increasingly confronted different 
streams of the Conservatives. As time passed, he was less willing to compromise on 
different political issues. This trend was reflected in Haddad Adel’s (the Speaker of 
the seventh Majlis) interview, where he stated, 
We had high hopes when Ahmadinejad won the election, but 
since the beginning [of his Presidency], our relationship 
changed… We were two different breeds. In other words, Mr. 
Ahmadinejad did not believe in compromise (ahl-e tamkin 
nabud). Therefore, an atmosphere was created where we had a 
difficult time, largely due to the fact that we [the Conservatives] 
insisted on keeping disputes between the Majlis and the 
government out of the public sphere. This was our intentional 
political strategy.  
 
 He claimed this strategy succeeded, and the Conservatives remained united in 
the eighth Majlis election in 2008. When a list of candidates showing both 
Ahmadinejad and other Conservative supporters was published, “People did not ask if 
this was the list of Ahmadinejad or Haddad Adel.” However, “by the ninth Majlis 
election, we could not continue to keep this unity which was no longer a secret.”111   
The first sign of internal disputes after Ahmadinejad’s successful election was 
the Majlis’ vote of confidence for his nominated Ministers. Most of Ahmadinejad’s 
close allies did not obtain a vote of confidence and those ministers who gained the vote 
were mostly affiliated with other streams of Conservatives. The Majlis rejected 
Ahmadinejad’s initial choices for the Ministries of Education, Oil and Gas, 
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Cooperatives, and Labour and Social Welfare.  
Ahmadinejad gradually waged war against most of his former rivals in the 
Presidential election. The first sign of this disagreement was when, in the second City 
Council election, Qalibaf became Tehran’s mayor, despite Ahmadinejad’s 
disagreement and his support for Aliabadi, Ahmadinejad’s Deputy for Development 
at the time of his own mayorship. Qalibaf’s selection was, in fact, a reflection of the 
divide within the City Council and between two streams of Ahmadinejad’s supporters 
and his critics. However, the main issue touched on the budget for transportation 
projects.112 
 The disputes between the municipality and the government reached the point 
that Qalibaf eventually asked the Supreme Leader to intervene and explicitly stated 
that his request was “due to personal disputes between the government and the Mayor 
after a few years of unsuccessful attempts to solve the differences.”113 Ahmadinejad’s 
efforts to hinder Qalilbaf’s work were to a certain extent political. He knew of the 
power of the Tehran municipality in Presidential elections and also sensed the possible 
threat that Qalibaf could impose on his re-election. Ali Larijani was also not safe from 
Ahmadinejad’s attacks during his tenure as the Head of the SNSC (2005–2007). At 
this time he was also the Chief Negotiator in charge of negotiations with regard to 
Iran’s nuclear programme.  
Eventually, their disagreements about negotiation tactics led to Larijani’s 
resignation.114 During the eighth Majlis, in which Larijani was the Speaker of the 
Majlis, their disagreements continued, particularly over issues such as ‘the targeted 
subsidy scheme’ and the annual budget. During Ahmadinejad’s last year of his first 
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term, their row over the ‘targeted subsidy scheme’ bill reached its height and, in public, 
Larijani called Ahmadinejad’s objections “ridiculous.”115  
The eighth Majlis (2008–2012) reflected the wider factional political 
landscape. In this election, the GC rejected large numbers of Reformist candidates 
while there was also a general electoral apathy amongst the Reformists and their 
supporters. There was a low voter turnout of 51 percent across the country and 30 
percent in Tehran.  
This led to a Conservative and the neo-Conservative majority in the Majlis. The 
Reformists only gained around 15 percent of the votes, while with a 220 MP majority, 
the Conservatives and neo-Conservatives established the faction of Principlists 
(Osulgarayan) in the Majlis. This was a coalition of different conservative forces and 
thus was not a coherent faction. It reflected the wider political landscape of the 
Conservative forces.  
The first stream in this faction included 60 out of these 220 MPs, were amongst 
the government’s supporters who entered the election under the label of the ‘nice smell 
of service’ (rayeheh-ye khosh-e khedmat). These MPs had close relationships with 
Ahmadinejad, while also maintaining good relations with Mesbah’s circle. The main 
figures in this segment included Morteza Agha Tehrani, Hamid Rasaei and Ismaeil 
Kowsari.  
The second segment of the Conservative forces, with more than 100 MPs, was 
composed of old establishment Conservatives, who mostly belonged to the Followers 
of the Imam and the Leader Front. They included Ali Larijani, Mohammadreza 
Bahonar and Ala Broujerdi, amongst other members. The third stream was the 
‘Progressive Principlists’ (usūlgarayan-i tahavvol khah), who mostly supported 
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Qalibaf in the election. They included Haddad Adel, Elias Naderan, Ahmad Tavakkoli 
and Alireza Zakani as their main members.  
The eighth Majlis (2008–2012) witnessed a change in the dynamics of the 
relationship between the Majlis and the government which was also a reflection of the 
division within the Conservative forces. The first signal of this change came when the 
Speaker of the Majlis was selected. The Majlis chose Ali Larijani, Ahmadinejad’s rival 
in the ninth Presidential election, instead of Hadad Adel, who was seen as pro-
Ahmadinejad and had a reputation of following an approach of non-confrontation with 
the government.  
This change of dynamics also showed itself in the impeachment of 
Ahmadinejad’s Interior Minister, Ali Kordan, only a few months after the beginning 
of the eighth Majlis and despite Ahmadinejad’s zealous support for him until the end 
in November 2008. The 2009 election and subsequent events significantly influenced 
the relationship between the Majlis and Ahmadinejad during his second term.  
The main disagreements were on economic views, budgeting, and financial 
management. As the tenth Presidential election approached, rumours emerged that the 
Conservatives would enter with a candidate other than Ahmadinejad. 116  These 
disputes happened in an institutional context, to a large extent, given the conflict of 
institutional jurisdictions and ambiguities within the Constitution and Khomeinism. 
During this period, debates around the jurisdictional authority of the President and the 
Majlis once again became the source of dispute.  
For instance, the disputes between Ali Larijani and Ahmadinejad over the 
‘annual budget of 2009–2010’ evolved within this institutional context. Ahmadinejad 
had included the ‘targeted subsidy scheme’ as part of the budget bill to bypass the 
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Majlis in discussing this scheme as an individual bill. This scheme aimed to cut the 
subsidies on fuel and energy and instead distribute the resources to the people and the 
production sector.  
Subsidy reform had been the plan of the previous governments. It had been the 
victim of factional politics given that each factional group did not want another 
factional group to implement it because they would become popular. Thus, 
Ahmadinejad’s attempts to pass the scheme just a few months before the tenth 
Presidential election (2009) were perceived largely as a political move. The Majlis 
therefore rejected the scheme as part of the budget bill. 
 Ahmadinejad claimed the Majlis action was against the Constitution and he as 
the President had a Constitutional right to intervene. Larijani rejected his claims and 
argued that according to the Constitution, the President did not have this right. This 
right (determining if a bill is against the Constitution or not) was only reserved for the 
GC, and the President could not intervene in such matters.117 Eventually, the scheme 
passed and was implemented in December 2010. However, the way that it was 
implemented and its consequences continued to play a significant role in future 
factional politics and their popularisation and split of the Conservatives. 
 As mentioned earlier, Ahmadinejad enjoyed the support of Khamenei. 
Ahmadinejad never seriously confronted Khamenei and his authority during his first-
term of Presidency. Thus, Khamenei did not perceive Ahmadinejad as a threat to his 
position. However, various criticisms to Ahmadinejad’s sociopolitical and economic 
policies and his disputes with different institutions were also reflected in Khamenei’s 
comments about Ahmadinejad. Khamenei’s criticisms were mild and mostly targeted 
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(17/March/2009) Larijani’s response. 
 Also for further details see, Etamad 3/2/1387 (22/April/2008). 
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administrative issues and ways in which Ahmadinejad’s disagreements with other 
institutions should be better managed.  
With the tone of an advisor, Khamenei usually proposed his concerns in his 
annual meetings with the President and his cabinet. For instance, during the above 
mentioned institutional disputes between the Majlis and the President, Khamenei 
emphasised more cooperation between the legislative, executive and judiciary bodies: 
“The next point is the importance of cooperation between state institutions (ta’amol-e 
qova). After all, you (the President), the Majlis and the judiciary are different parts of 
one body (kol) and your cooperation is necessary. It will not be helpful when one body 
blames the other.”118 When there were criticisms about Ahmadinejad’s trips and his 
action as empty promises, Khamenei asked for more attention to following up with 
passed legislation.119  
Khamenei also gave moral advice touching on some criticism of 
Ahmadinejad’s personal attitude: “Be aware not to fall into the pitfall of arrogance.”120 
On another occasion, Khamenei asked for extra attention to ‘expertise and research,' 
which could be seen as a criticism of Ahmadinejad’s actions, such as the dissolution 
of the aforementioned counseling bodies: “Particularly with regard to fundamental 
issues, such as the budget organisations and councils, you should give attention to 
expertise.”121 He also asked not to rush to execute large national projects and to take 
extra time for research about their consequences. The case of the targeted subsidy 
scheme was an example of such projects.122  
Khamenei also commented on Ahmadinejad’s concept of justice and 
                                                 
118 Khamenei 6/6/1385 (28/August/2006), http://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=3349. 
119 Khamenei 2/6/1387 (23/August/2008), http://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=3661.  
120 Khamenei 4/6/1386 (26/August/2007), http://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=3398. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Khamenei 2/6/1387 (23/August/2008), http://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=3661. 
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underlined that the concept of justice was intertwined with “two other concepts of 
rationality and spirituality," stating: “Without rationality (aqlaniyyat), justice is not 
justice, because if we do not use rationality to find an area of implementation, then 
justice may be lost. Rationality is not conservatism… while justice without spirituality 
would lead to fake, deviating and hypocritical lies and manipulations.”123  
Khamenei asked the President to respect the jurisdiction of ministers, which 
reflected his concerns about Ahmadinejad’s increasing interference with ministerial 
affairs: “The supervising role of the President should not be mistaken with his 
interference in the minister’s jurisdiction.”124  The 2009 election and its aftermath 
gradually changed Khamenei’s relationship with Ahmadinejad significantly.  
Conclusion 
The neo-Conservatives emerged to reinvent Khomeinism along the lines of social 
justice and socioeconomic concerns, following a general social disappointment with 
the ‘political development’ paradigm of the Reformists and/or the Reformist’s ability 
to implement sustainable sociopolitical change, in particular. The eight-year 
experience of the Reformists taught the Conservatives the importance of popular 
support and its role in republican institutions. Some Conservatives restructured their 
organisations, and by capitalising on populist aspects of Khomeinism and taking 
advantage of mobilising facilities of security institutions of the IRI, they successfully 
increased their popular support.  
 However, the first round of the ninth Presidential election showed that both the 
Reformist and the Conservative camp suffered from internal divisions. Different 
segments of each faction were claiming to be the main representative of that faction 
                                                 
123 Khamenei 8/6/1384 (30/August/2005), http://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=3304. 
124 Khamenei 2/6/1387 (23/August/2008). 
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and of its popular support. In the second round, electoral dynamics changed and 
different conceptions of the role of the people in IRI politics became the centre of 
electoral debates. The Reformist’ efforts to mobilise their popular support base behind 
Rafsanjani, by portraying Ahmadinejad’s election as the end of republicanism and the 
emergence of the Islamic government, were unsuccessful.  
 Ahmadinejad directly connected with different segments of the society and 
gained their political loyalty by promising them their share of the economy, stopping 
the corruption of political elites and returning the revolution to its true path. 
Ahmadinejad’s promises to return the revolution back to the hands of people and to 
deliver social justice were the main elements of his populism that resonated with 
popular demands and sentiments of different individuals, mainly belonging to the 
urban lower and lower-middle-classes. His triumph became a significant turning point 
in the IRI’s contemporary history.  
Ahmadinejad’s Presidency raised him and a group of his close friends to power 
in an alliance with the neo-Conservatives. However, the relationship between 
Ahmadinejad and the neo-Conservatives is different to the relationship between both 
Khatami and Mosharekat or the Reformists, or Rafsanjani and Kargozaran or the 
Modern Right. Despite having certain enthusiastic supporters and a circle of close 
allies, Ahmadinejad has never been a pillar for wider political groups and/or the neo-
Conservatives. Unlike the political position of Khatami and Rafsanjani after their 
Presidencies, after Ahmadinejad’s two terms of Presidency, most Conservatives and 
neo-Conservatives who had initially supported Ahmadinejad during his Presidency, 
tried to distance themselves from him. Some even went as far as denying their role in 
his economic and social mismanagement. 
Nonetheless, in the context of factional politics of this period, Ahmadinejad 
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had a unique position. Although when he became the President he was seen as one 
who “served the function of a charismatic vanguard, clearing the way of Reformist 
debris,” 125  he soon showed that he was a serious political player. Gradually, 
Ahmadinejad and his circle, increased their power by taking advantage of every 
opportunity. Their lack of organic ties with main factions provided them, to a large 
extent, with some political resilience and political manoeuvrability in factional 
disputes. He also enjoyed the inherent institutional power of the Presidency. 
Ahmadinejad also expanded the power of his circle by appointing them to important 
administrative positions.  
The combination of this institutional power and political position, with certain 
personality traits, such as his narcissism, his opportunism and his mixed 
socioeconomic and religious ideological views, confronted the IRI with serious 
socioeconomic and geopolitical challenges. During his tenure, his aggressive rhetoric 
in foreign policy led to two UN resolutions on the Iranian nuclear programme that 
imposed economic and financial sanctions.  
Meanwhile, his socioeconomic policies with his micro-management, and his 
continuous confrontations with various state institutions, as well as political figures, 
damaged the efficiency and cohesion of different IRI state institutions. It also 
exacerbated structural socioeconomic problems. Importantly, Ahmadinejad and his 
government used international sanctions as legitimate excuses to further ignore 
different laws, regulations and procedures. These elements led to the emergence of 
state-sponsored corruption and deep structural issues. Ahmadinejad was, and probably 
continues to be, a unique phenomenon within IRI politics. 
 The main factional disputes in this period were, on the one hand, between 
                                                 
125 Ali Ansari, "Iran under Ahmadinejad: Populism and Its Malcontents," International Affairs 84, no. 
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Ahmadinejad, the Reformists and Rafsanjani, and between different spectrums of the 
Conservatives. The main themes of the evolution of factional disputes and the 
dynamics of the relationship between Ahmadinejad, Khamenei and Rafsanjani, were 
symbolised in the Azad University dispute.  
In sum, the Azad University debates showed the gradual split between 
Rafsanjani and Khamenei and the role that Ahmadinejad played in it. It also showed 
the power balance of these political players. Ahmadinejad’s Presidency, to a large 
extent, strengthened the political power of Khamenei and his office, given 
Ahmadinejad’s weak factional position, his shared ideological views with Khamenei’s 
and his large popular support, which was gained through his harsh criticisms of 
Rafsanjani. Khamenei’s close relationship with Ahmadinejad also gave Khamenei an 
opportunity to implicitly implement part of his sociopolitical and foreign policy ideas.  
Thus, Khamenei’s authority was raised by the expansion of the network of his 
loyal supporters and their integration into different state institutions and semi-
governmental organisations. The IRGC was involved further in state affairs and the 
economy. The continuous confrontations of Ahmadinejad with Rafsanjani weakened 
Rafsanjani, while Khamenei claimed to be impartial.  
However, the 2009 Presidential election and its aftermath became a turning 
point in this context. It led to public confirmation of the schism between Khamenei 
and Rafsanjani and affirmation of Khamenei’s political affiliation with Ahmadinejad. 
Khamenei became increasingly involved in these disputes as well as in everyday 
political affairs. In other words, the restricting of Rafsanjani’s authority came at the 
price of strengthening Ahmadinejad and his circle, which eventually became yet 
another challenge to Khamenei and IRI politics. This will be discussed in the next 
chapter. In this chapter, I aimed to explore the emergence of the ‘Ahmadinejad 
262 
 
phenomena,’ its ideological standings, its roots in the politics of the IRI and its impact 
on the popularisation of factional politics.
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Chapter Five 
2013)–(2009 Below from Politics opularP Five: Chapter 
This chapter investigates how the rapid evolution of factional politics, the dynamics 
of which changed during the first Ahmadinejad administration, helped to create the 
conditions for the confluence of factional and popular politics in the Presidential 
electoral campaign. This confluence was expressed by a series of demonstrations from 
June 2009 to February 2011, which were crushed by the state. Those engaged in the 
demonstrations called these events the Green Movement, while the state refers to them 
as ‘sedition’ (hereafter Fetneh), an illegal movement that sought to overthrow the IRI. 
The issues of proper role of the people not only remained at the center of political life 
of the country but also came to overshadow other issues. 
To place the emergence of these events in the context of factional politics, this 
chapter begins by investigating the discursive dynamics and the main political figures 
of the 2009 Presidential election. It then explores the consequent institutional and 
legitimacy challenges that these events imposed on the regime, and, subsequently, the 
reactions of the regime and the extent to which they influenced the popularisation of 
politics and led to the emergence of new international and domestic sociopolitical 
consequences. Finally, the embedded institutional contradiction between the electoral 
institutions and the guardian ones during this period are evaluated.  
2009 Presidential Election and its Aftermath 
Iran entered the tenth Presidential election (2009) facing domestic and geopolitical 
challenges that were more intense than in the past. Thus the electoral situation was 
fluid. Beginning in 2006, Iran faced severe international sanctions regarding its nuclear 
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programme. They banned any financial, research and trade activities that might have 
links to the country’s nuclear programme or long-range missile programs. The 
sanctions froze assets of certain entities and individuals related to the IRI’s nuclear 
programme.1 Iran became increasingly isolated internationally.  
 Furthermore, in November 2008, Barack Obama was elected as US President. 
He sought to transform US foreign policy in the Middle East, promising withdrawal 
of US troops from Iraq, a change of policy in Afghanistan and a new approach towards 
Iran’s nuclear programme.2 Obama’s changes promised possibility of a new dynamic 
in Iran-US relations, as well as the possible emergence of a new power dynamic on 
the western and eastern borders of Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan. The Conservatives 
believed the Russo-Georgian War of 2008 was an additional sign of deterioration in 
the relationship between the West and Russia, which had already begun in 2003 and 
thus presenting the IRI with a new opportunity for strategic partnership with Russia.  
 At the same time, Lebanon was coping with the 2005–2008 internal conflict, 
which eventually ended with the empowerment of Hezbullah, Iran’s main ally. This 
caused the escalation of the proxy rivalry between Iran and Arab countries. On the 
global stage, the 2008 financial crisis meant that the world faced one of the worst 
economic crises of the century, leading to worldwide recession, followed by 
sociopolitical consequences.   
Iran was facing various economic, social and political challenges. As a 
consequence of the financial crisis, the price of oil declined rapidly. Ahmadinejad, 
who had once confidently predicted that the price of oil would not fall under $100 per 
                                                 
1 See UN Resolutions S/RES/1696 (2006); S/RES/1737(2006); S/RES/1747 (2007); S/RES/1803 
(2008); S/RES/1835 (2008) and S/RES/1887 (2009), http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-
documents/. 
2 NY Times (23/May/2012), http://elections.nytimes.com/2008/president/issues/iran.htmlz,  
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barrel,3 faced a 70 percent decline in oil prices in just a few months after his comments. 
Iran’s budget was hit, given its dependence on oil income. Annual GDP growth 
dropped from 6.4 percent in 2007 to 0.6 percent in 2008.4 Inflation also rose from 11.9 
percent in 2006 to 25.5 percent in 2008.5 As a result, concerns escalated about further 
deterioration of living standards.  
During Ahmadinejad’s tenure, restrictive sociocultural policies replaced, to an 
extent, the moderate sociocultural policies of Khatami’s era. These were attempts to 
propagate the Islamic Revolutionary culture and escalate the creation of homo 
Islamicus. Many NGOs were banned.6 While, the budget of religious and semi-militia 
institutions increased significantly.7 They were asked to play an increasingly active 
role in the public cultural sphere. These actions led to increased discontent of secular 
Iranians.  
To accelerate attempts to make the homo Islamicus, SCCR passed the 
legislation named “strategies for expansion of culture of chastity," known as the 
‘Veiling and Chastity Scheme.8 Its aim was to make the homo Islamicus. The Morality 
Police and the Social Security Police were established in 2006 to ensure adherence to 
state conceptions of morality in society; to cleanse society from representations of ‘un-
Islamic’ symbols in public.  
Thus, women and their attire became their main target. The Morality Police 
                                                 
3 Hamshahri Online 19/3/1388, http://hamshahrionline.ir/details/83165.  
4 Annual GDP growth (%), World Bank. 
5 Inflation, Consumer Prices (annual %) (FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG) International Monetary Fund, 
International Financial Statistics and data files. 
6 Shargh 29/12/1392 (20/March/2014). 
7 In 2007, the budget of Basij increased by 200 percent.  
Radio Farda 29/4/1387 (19/July/2008), http://www.radiofarda.com/a/f3_basij_budget/457002.html.  
The budget of seminaries increased from 20B (IRR) in 2001 to 1500B (IRR) in 2008. 
 Aftab News 1/10/1388 (22/December/2009), http://aftabnews.ir/vdciwwa3.t1ayp2bcct.html. 
8 "Strategies for Expansion of Culture of Chastity," ed. SCCR (4/5/1384 26/July/2005). 
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even expanded its jurisdiction to private companies, firms and small shops to ensure 
that IRI norms, particularly about hejab, were practiced.9 The Morality Police depicted 
the securitisation of identity with the aim of creating homo Islamicus. These issues and 
challenges raised social and economic discontent within society, particularly amongst 
secular Iranians, the urban educated middle and upper-middle-classes, and those with 
secular social and cultural tendencies. As analysed in the previous chapter, the 
animosity between the Conservatives and the neo-Conservatives at the time of this 
election was at its peak.  
The Reformists leadership recognised this rising social and political discontent 
and the domestic and geopolitical consequences of the country’s international 
isolation. Thus they believed they had a unique political opportunity to return to the 
IRI’s political arena. As a result, Ahmadinejad’s campaign for re-election encountered 
both growing popular discontent and serious political rivals, in contrast, both to 
Khatami’s and Rafsanjani’s second-term elections. Given that incumbency provided 
better access to various state institutions and media, the Reformist leadership knew 
that to win this election, they would need to unify behind one candidate.  
To many Reformists, Khatami or Mir Hossein Mousavi should be the single 
candidate. Mehdi Karroubi, who was planning for this election since his 2005 defeat, 
could not convince different spectrums of the Reformists to support his candidacy. 
Khatami entered the election first, on 8 February 2009, but when Mousavi announced 
his candidacy a few weeks later on 10 March 2009, he withdrew and endorsed 
Mousavi. Some argued Mousavi’s reputation as being Khomeini’s Prime Minister, and 
his so-called leftist socioeconomic views, could appeal to some of Ahmadinejad’s 
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constituents whereas Khatami could not. Thus he might have a better chance at victory 
in the election.10  
The prospect of a Khatami return, worried the Conservatives who began to 
unify. However, the emergence of Mousavi in the election increased Conservatives’ 
worries and prompted them to unify behind a single candidate, Ahmadinejad, despite 
serious disappointment with his policies. The pro-Mousavi attempts to persuade 
Karroubi to withdraw were unsuccessful. Karroubi argued that he and Mousavi had 
different constituencies, thus his attendance would help the Reform Movement to split 
the Ahmadinejad vote.11 Four candidates participated in the election: Mir Hossein 
Mousavi, Mehdi Karroubi, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Mohsen Rezaee. Mohsen 
Rezaee hoped to gain the vote of the moderate Conservatives and the support of some 
part of the IRGC, given his links to the IRGC.  
Electoral Discourses 
Large segments of the IRI establishment feared that the re-election of Ahmadinejad 
would impose serious threats to the revolution, and to the interests and standing of 
factions. We can see these worries in the slogans and manifestos of three main 
candidates for the Presidency: Mousavi, Karroubi and Rezaee. They hoped to mobilise 
those parts of society discontented with Ahmadinejad’s socioeconomic policies. They 
criticised Ahmadinejad’s style of governing, as well as different aspects of his social, 
cultural, economic and foreign policies.  
 In his live televised debate with Ahmadinejad, Karroubi stated: “We have 
criticisms both of Ahmadinejad’s style of governing and his personality.”12 Mohsen 
                                                 
10 Fararu 30/1/1388 (19/April/2009), http://fararu.com/fa/news/22556/. 
11 Etemad 20/03/1388 (9/April/2009). 
12 Hamshahri Online 17/3/1388, http://hamshahrionline.ir/details/83025. 
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Rezaee critically argued: “I believe it is necessary to transform the economy 
fundamentally, to transform the culture and also to initiate certain reforms in foreign 
and domestic policy.”13  
 In his first press conference, Mousavi listed four areas of Ahmadinejad’s 
actions in which he found serious threats to the IRI’s principles: 1)  the tendency to 
violate the law (Qanun Gorizi); 2) “The disbanding of decision-making institutions, 
the main duty of which was assuring the effectiveness and coordination of decisions 
made by the state.” He was referring to Ahmadinejad’s actions in dismantling the 
supervisory and consultancy organisations; 3) the lack of transparency and 
Ahmadinejad’s blatant and self-defeating manipulation of economic statistics. For 
instance, Ahmadinejad changed the legal definition of employment from two days per 
week to two hours per week; and 4) the great inconsistency and zigzagging in foreign 
policy and/or economic policies.  
 He saved special criticism for Ahmadinejad’s populist rhetoric and actions, 
which were part of his claimed policy of solving the issue of social justice: “Social and 
human dignity is the greatest most valuable asset of the revolution and the state, 
therefore distribution of handouts (Sadaqeh) and bags of potatoes only humiliate our 
people (mellat). Such an approach could not maintain our people’s national 
confidence.” 14  
On another occasion, Mousavi accused Ahmadinejad of destabilising behavior, 
making contradictory decisions and causing unnecessary serious international and 
domestic problems. Mousavi attacked Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy, claiming it 
damaged Iran’s international prestige, created unnecessary embarrassment and 
                                                 
13 Jam-e Jam Online 15/3/1388 (5/June/2009), 
http://www1.jamejamonline.ir/newstext2.aspx?newsnum=100908632959. 
14 Jomhourieslami 18/1/1388 (7/April/2009). 
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consequently, seriously damaged domestic economic development. For example, in a 
live televised debate, he criticised Ahmadinejad’s controversial comments about the 
Holocaust. He underlined why, when the official position of the regime had been to 
support the election in Israel and the Palestinian Territories, which was compatible 
with the international legal norms, one should break this procedure.  
Mousavi continued: “The problem emerges when we act based on our personal 
judgement and our maverick and our extremism… [That’s why in foreign policy] 
instead of isolating Israel, we (Ahmadinejad’s actions) facilitated its victimisation in 
the international scene.” 15  Karroubi also criticised Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy 
approach in regard to Arab neighbours, the US, Venezuela and Israel.16 
These candidates criticised Ahmadinejad’s continuous instances of breaking 
the law and regulations, including his repeated ignoring of Majlis legislation. In this 
vein, Mousavi linked the disregard for law with authoritarianism, accusing 
Ahmadinejad of authoritarian aspiration.17 By recalling that the dictatorship of the 
Reza Shah Pahlavi started by ignoring the laws passed by the Majlis, Mousavi argued: 
“I am not saying that you (Ahmadinejad) are a dictator, but the way in which you 
prioritise your ideas and opinions over the collective decisions of the Expediency 
Council or the Majlis will only end in a dictatorship.”  
In strong terms, in a televised debate, Mousavi condemned the overall 
characteristics of Ahmadinejad’s governing style. He characterised it as dangerously 
“adventurous” and “destabilising," full of “theatrics and phoniness," “superficial," 
“based on old superstitions”(which have no place in governing style) and on secrecy 
and extremism. “shallow” and based on secrecy and extremism. His “shallow” modus 
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operandi was rested on two pillars: a disregard for the law and on the cult of 
personality.18 
Importantly, Mousavi and Karroubi made these criticisms of Ahmadinejad’s 
policies and behaviours as a critique within Khomeinism. Ahmadinejad’s responses 
were also largely in the context of Khomeinism and the Khomeini’s doctrine. Thus, in 
this election, the various competing interpretations of Khomeinism were, once again, 
an underlying theme of the election debates. In addition to the general criticisms of 
Ahmadinejad’s foreign and economic policies and his managerial style, ‘the return to 
the true values of Khomeini and the revolution’ dominated the candidate’s electoral 
rhetoric and was a context in which they criticised each other. This discursive theme 
was not new. However, new interpretations radically engendered discursive dynamics 
in this election, given the personalities of the candidates and the myriad domestic and 
international issues that the regime faced at the time. Issues that were more extreme 
than they had been in the past and, unlike in the past, they were being played out in 
the context of greatly heightened factional politics. 
At the centre of Mousavi’s interpretation of Khomeinism, in this election, was 
Khomeini’s argument of the “Islamic Republic without the pretext and suffix.”19 
Mousavi argued: “I will not deviate, even a step, from what Imam [Khomeini] defined 
as the Islamic Republic. Islamic Republic means Islam and republicanism. Weakening 
any of these two will be harmful to us.”20  He considered that “the return to the 
revolution’s values and the resistance against the enemies [of the IRI] are part of our 
identity, which will enable us to revive our [ancient Iranian] civilisational position.”21 
He argued that Ahmadinejad’s policies and personal attitude had threatened the IRI’s 
                                                 
18 Aftab News 14/3/1388 (4/June/2009), http://aftabnews.ir/vdcjxveh.uqeymzsffu.html. 
19 Khomeini, Sahifeh, vol.6, 274. 
20 Jomhourieslami 15/2/1388 (5/May/2009). 
21 Jomhourieslami 5/3/1388 (26/May/2009). 
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foundation and framework. In his first press conference to announce his nomination in 
March 2009, Mousavi explicitly pointed out this issue:  
 
Over the last five presidencies (two terms for Rafsanjani, two 
terms for Khatami, and one term for Ahmadinejad), I never felt 
that the foundations and the very structure of the regime and the 
revolution had been ignored or harassed. Despite witnessing 
some deviations… the directions of Rafsanjani and Khatami 
were in the general direction of the principles of the revolution… 
As time passed (during the Ahmadinejad Presidency), I found 
that the pillars [of the Revolution] were shaking that we were 
witnessing increasing accounts of breaking the framework, rules 
and principles of [the IRI]. Sensing the existence of such a 
serious threat to the future of the regime, I was convinced that I 
needed to enter the election.22 
 
Karroubi’s interpretation of Khomeinism in this election shared Mousavi’s 
emphasis on Islam and the Republicanism of the IRI, adding one extra element of 
nationalism or Iraniyat. It was Karroubi’s attempt to emphasise a civil Iranian identity. 
In his first televised programme, Karroubi underlined the “three issues which Imam 
underlined [as the essence of the IRI], namely republicanism, Islamism and 
‘Iranianness’ (Iraniyat, the Iranian national identity), are now threatened,”23  
He explored these three main premises of Khomeini’s doctrine on different 
occasions during this election’s debates. Similar to Mousavi, Karroubi underlined 
republicanism as being the main aspect of Khomeinism: “Khomeini was against any 
actions that would harm the republicanism of the IRI.”24 Accusing Ahmadinejad of 
ignoring the republicanism of the IRI. He criticised Ahmadinejad for not taking action 
when the GC rejected more than two thousand candidates for the eighth Majlis 
election: “when the IRI’s republicanism faced restrictions [by the actions of GC], why 
didn’t you (Ahmadinejad) defend these many people who were disqualified?”25 
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24 Jomhourieslami 17/3/1388 (7/June/2009). 
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Karroubi elaborated his interpretation of Khomeini’s Islam, which shared the 
main elements of Mousavi’s interpretation of Islam. They emphasised the importance 
of ‘dynamic jurisprudence’ (feqh-e puya), in Khomeinism.  
This interpretation would allow them to integrate certain modern sociolegal 
elements, such as gender equality, which were part of their electoral slogans, into the 
IRI. Karroubi argued: “We are following the Islam of Imam [Khomeini] according to 
which he issued decrees which took into account circumstances at the time. And if you 
pay good attention to Khomeini’s decrees and speeches, you will find that his later 
decrees were different [from his earlier ones].”26 Karroubi was referring to those later 
decrees in which Khomeini prioritised the state’s interests over Islamic ordinance.  
However, he criticised Ahmadinejad’s new Islamic discourse propagated by 
part of Ahmadinejad’s circle under the name of ‘Mahdaviat,' calling it against 
Khomeinism. ‘Mahdaviat’ was a millenarian ideology proclaiming the possibility of a 
direct link to the hidden Imam, the twelfth Imam of Shi’a, who was considered to be 
alive and will be resurrected as Jesus was. It was a competing religious ideology to the 
velayat-e faqih, according to which, due to the lack of access to the hidden Imam 
during his occultation, the vali-ye faqih would be his representative. In other words, 
the Mahdaviat discourse weakened clerical authority by considering clergy’s role an 
anachronism.27  
Karroubi argued that “the Khomeini’s Islam was against superstitions and those 
who claim to pray behind Hidden Imam are dogmatists.”28 This was a direct attack on 
Ahmadinejad. In his televised debate with Ahmadinejad, Karroubi pointed out the 
theoretical and historical differences in the conceptions of political Islam held by 
                                                 
26 Jomhourieslami 5/3/1388 (26/May/2009). 
27 Forozan, Hesam, The Military in Post-revolutionary Iran: The Evolution and Roles of the 
Revolutionary Guards (Routledge, 2015): 130-46 
28 Jomhourieslami 5/3/1388 (26/May/2009). 
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Ahmadinejad and Khomeini: “I frankly say that the faction is giving you 
(Ahmadinejad) directions now, that had problems with Khomeini’s [political views] 
and disagreed with him [before the revolution].”29  
Karroubi’s introduction of Iraniyat as part of his interpretation of Khomeinism 
was the reflection of a wider confluence of national identity and the popularisation of 
factional politics. Khomeini himself was against nationalism; his main political 
doctrine of velayat-e faqih was a transnational ideology based on an ’ummah inclusive 
of all Muslims and downtrodden people. Khomeini explicitly proclaimed this 
position.30  
To counter possible criticism that his use of Iraniyat was in opposition to 
Khomeinism Karroubi argued: “Our Iraniyat is beyond nationalism and is rooted in 
ancient Iran and Islam.”31 Given the attempts at the institutionalisation of the modern 
conception of the civil nation and the nation-building process, which started in 1906, 
the Iranian civil national identity has been a strong source of identity overriding, and 
to an extent, other components of identity amongst Iranians.  
However, over the last century, nationalism and Islamism took opposing paths, 
despite the fact that both remained the main components of “Iranian national identity 
in pre- and post-revolutionary Iran.” 32  The inherent dichotomy between the civil 
Iraniyat, and the Islamic element of identity rooted in their opposite grounds of 
ideological legitimacy, integrated additional potential sources of tensions in the 
popularisation of factional politics.33  
                                                 
29 Hamshahri Online 17/3/1388 (7/June/2009), http://hamshahrionline.ir/details/83025. 
30 Khomeini, Sahifeh, vol. 14, 307–8.  
31 Jomhourieslami 5/3/1388 (26/May/2009). 
32 Alam Saleh, "Iran's National Identity Problematic,” Sfera Politicii 20, no. 4 (2012): 50. 
33 Alam Saleh, "Iran’s National Identity Problem,” Ethnic Identity and the State in Iran (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2013): 45–58; Ali Mozaffari, Forming National Identity in Iran: The Idea of Homeland 
Derived from Ancient Persian and Islamic (IB Tauris, 2014). 
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Since Khomeini’s death, various conceptions of Iranianness (Iraniyat) and 
nationalism increasingly grew in the state discourses as well as electoral debates. 
Along with the popularisation of politics, different elements of nationalism integrated 
into the factional discourse. With the popularisation of politics, factions developed 
discourse and words by which they could mobilise people. Thus, different factions, or 
their electoral candidates, used different conceptions of Iraniyat in their discourses.  
For instance, Ahmadinejad used Iraniyat to increase his popularity and to 
justify his aggressive foreign policy in the face of escalating sanctions. In this vein, 
Mahdaviat, as a millenarian religious worldview merged with nationalistic themes 
from Iran’s pre-Islamic era, was introduced by Mashaei. He promoted it under the 
name of the ‘Iranian school’ (Maktab-e Irani). Khatami made Iranian nationality one 
premise of his political reform to justify the civil identity and his conception of the 
role of people in politics.34 Karroubi’s emphasis on Iraniyat was a continuation of 
Khatami’s perception and an effort to mobilise supporters for electoral purposes. They 
were trying to create an emphasis on civil identity, which reflected the popularisation 
of politics.  
Ahmadinejad’s Defensive Offensive  
In response to these criticisms, Ahmadinejad lumped together all former 
administrations and portrayed them as a regime that had taken the country off the path 
of the revolution. He defended his foreign, economic and sociocultural policies by 
comparing these policies’ results with various sociocultural and economic situations 
of different periods of the IRI to show their success. In responding to charges, 
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Ahmadinejad, like any true populist, picked only half-truths and quarter-truths to 
respond to accusations.  
 For example, responding to criticisms about the restriction of press or 
intellectrual freedom during his administration, he compared the number of press 
closures in his administration with Khatami’s. He emphasized that during his tenure, 
not even one journal was banned and during Khatami’s tenure, many journals were 
closed. While this was true, it was only a half-truth. First of all, Khatami was not 
responsible for closing the periodicals. Second, Ahmadinejad’s administration took 
subsidies away from potentially critical newspapers while banning state companies to 
advertise in them. In response to his restricted cultural policies, he attacked Mousavi’s 
cultural policies in the first period of the IRI, claiming the scale of openness of his 
cultural policies was not comparable to Mousavi’s in that era.35 
Ahmadinejad placed Rafsanjani at the centre of a faction acting as a mafia 
within the IRI, which had taken the revolution away from the people and the goals of 
Khomeini. He and his mafia now were intent on revenge. From that point, he placed 
Mousavi, Karroubi and others as members of the same mafia. Everything before him 
represented the old establishment against which he was fighting as the protector of the 
people.  
In a debate, Ahmadinejad argued: “I am not facing one candidate today, I am 
facing three consecutive administrations… And the younger people should know that 
I am facing a system which has Rafsanjani as its pillar which, in cooperation with 
Khatami and Mousavi, has been attacking me [over the last four years].”36   
He claimed that his attempt to bring the revolution back to the people was the 
                                                 
35 Aftab News 14/3/1388 (4/June/2009), http://aftabnews.ir/vdcjxveh.uqeymzsffu.html. 
36 Ibid.; Mohammad Hossein  Rouzi Talab, Takyigah (Barrisi-Yi Amalkard-I Rafsanjani Dar 
Intikhabat-I Riyasat Jumhouri) [Support, Rafsanjani's Actions in the 9th and 10th Presidential 
Election] (Markaz-i Asnad-i inqilab-i Islami, 2011). 
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reason behind these attacks:  
Over these three periods (the Mousavi, Rafsanjani and Khatami 
eras), a bureaucratic structure and a circle of managers were 
formed that deviated from the revolution path and the 
revolutionary values… Gradually, this group, ‘Jaryan,' emerged 
who considered itself the owner of mellat, the people and the 
revolution and had free access to the treasury (beitolmal) and 
controlled state affairs.37  
 
To respond to his rival’s criticisms, Ahmadinejad referred to the revolutionary 
phase of Khomeini, which meant Khomeini’s views during the revolution and a few 
years afterwards. For instance, he emphasised the revolutionary elements of 
Khomeini’s foreign policy during this phase. He included Khomeini’s thesis of the 
export of the revolution and/or the claims that Khomeinism could be an alternative to 
capitalism and/or Marxism.  
Thus, Ahmadinejad claimed his aggressive foreign policy and the model for 
‘global management’ were based on true Khomeinism. In this vein, when Mousavi 
criticised Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy, having resulted in more international 
isolation, and damaged the Iranian dignity, Ahmadinejad defended his foreign policy. 
He forcefully rejected Mousavi’s criticisms of the international isolation during his 
administration: “If you (Mousavi) think that we need to make a few great powers 
happy, this is against the Imam’s wish, our reason and our independence.” 
He justified his socioeconomic policies by emphasising Khomeini’s rhetoric of 
supporting the lower-class and ‘downtrodden’ people. He then charged Mousavi as 
well as the rest of the old establishment as being active members of ‘the mafia 
dedicated to power and wealth’ (mafiya-ye zar va zur), which, having forgotten the 
important social aspect of Khomeinism, tended only to their own economic and 
political interests. In this vein, Ahmadinejad’s main supporters attacked Mousavi. 
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After the televised debate between Ahmadinejad and Mousavi, Ahmadinejad’s 
surrogates continued the attack on Mousavi and the old establishment.38   
In sum, looking at some criticisms made by Mousavi and Karroubi, one can say 
that they supported the idea of strong state institutions that can create Islamic 
development, and conditions for a better socioeconomic situation. They were worried 
that with Ahmadinejad’s destruction of these institutions, through the chaos and 
corruption that he was injecting into these institutions, the goals of the revolution, 
which should be achieved by these strong institutions, would fail.  
They accused Ahmadinejad of damaging the essence of Khomeinism, which 
they saw in the institutionalisation of both republican and Islamic institutions. In 
response, Ahmadinejad referred to revolutionary Khomeinism. He once again 
presented himself as the anti-establishment candidate. This view found support in 
different segments within society who felt that a reason behind the unfulfilled 
socioeconomic promises of the revolution had been the corruption of the elites. 
The height of the confrontation between these two different approaches and the 
polarisation of factional politics, came in a series of live televised one-on-one debates 
between the candidates for the first time since the revolution. The debates themselves 
were a significant step towards the popularisation of politics since candidates now 
debated with each other to attract popular support. The people’s judgment was 
considered final.  
The three one-on-one debates between Ahmadinejad and the other three 
Presidential candidates were at the center of the electoral campaign. In addition to the 
candidate’s general criticisms of Ahmadinejad’s programmes, personalities, and the 
disputes over who had the true interpretation of Khomeinism – as mentioned above — 
                                                 
38 Iran 17/3/1388 (7/June/2009). 
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these debates had several moments impacted popular opinion and the mobilisation of 
people.  
In the Mousavi-Ahmadinejad debates, in an unprecedented action, 
Ahmadinejad accused some political figures and their families of corruption and 
named them in this live debate, with more than half of the population watching. He 
accused Nateq Nouri, and his children, Rafsanjani’s children and Karbaschi, of 
financial corruption in order to justify his argument: “I denounce rent and clientelism. 
I am against some people getting rich at the expense of the rest of the people. I am 
against these. I am not against the law.”39  
He accused Rafsanjani of “a secret and illegal relation with an Arab neighbour 
country.” He portrayed all former administrations as part of this mafia and members 
of a new aristocracy, ‘Ashraf,' which had taken the country away from the path of the 
revolution. Mousavi reacted and called these accusations one example of 
Ahmadinejad’s disregard for law: “It is below the dignity of the head of the 
government to mention names of people without giving them the chance to defend 
themselves.” 40  While many Reformists and some Conservatives criticised 
Ahmadinejad’s accusations,41 his supporters considered his actions part of his bold, 
daring behaviour to reveal the elite’s corruption. 
Ahmadinejad attacked his opponents on a personal level. Towards the end of 
his debate with Mousavi, and after his attacks against the IRI political elites, 
Ahmadinejad, addressed Mousavi whilst showing him a file. With a threatening tone, 
                                                 
39 Aftab News 14/3/1388 (4/June/2009), http://aftabnews.ir/vdcjxveh.uqeymzsffu.html. 
40 Translation is taken from The Guardian, 4/June/2009, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jun/03/iran-president-election-tv-debate.  
41 Jomhourieslami 16/3/1388 (6/June/2009).  
Hadi Khamenei, Khamenei’s brother, was close to the Reformists. After accusing the Ahmadinejad 
administration of a lack of honesty and disobedience of the law. Khamenei argued, “Mousavi is not 
someone who would be indifferent to the Imam, the revolution and the regime.”  
Jomhourieslami 17/3/1388 (7/June/2009). 
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he said: “Should I say it Mr Mousavi? Should I say it? (begam? begam?)” The file that 
Ahmadinejad was pointing at was a file on Mousavi’s wife with her picture on it. 
Despite such strong theatrics, the issue was only Ahmadinejad’s allegations about the 
educational career of Mousavi’s wife, Zahra Rahnavard. He accused her of obtaining 
her PhD illegally, since she did not attend the PhD entrance exam, and argued that her 
two Masters degrees were obtained in violation of regulations.  
Mousavi defended his wife, and called this blackmailing behaviour of 
Ahmadinejad a sign of his incompetence for the Presidency. He argued that this 
behaviour was against the Khomeini’s path. He summed up: “I entered the election to 
change this behaviour.”42 Anti-Ahmadinejad supporters saw these personal attacks on 
Mousavi’s wife as vulgar, unfair and a sign of his populist deviousness. He had shown 
his true characteristics. It was also seen as hypocritical given that, only a few months 
earlier, when the Conservative-dominated eighth Majlis impeached Ahmadinejad’s 
Interior Minister, Ali Kordan, over his fake degrees, he called the degrees “just 
unnecessary pieces of paper that are not needed for serving the people.”43 Even some 
of Ahmadinejad’s supporters found these attacks on Mousavi’s wife to be breaking 
certain ethical red lines for the sake of power, which stood in contrast to 
Ahmadinejad’s slogans.  
Karroubi in his debate with Ahmadinejad, ended up falling into the populist 
framework that Ahmadinejad had set for him. Their debates ended up not being so 
much about policies, but about Ahmadinejad’s attempt to link Karroubi to the 
establishment mafia. Ahmadinejad tried to humiliate Karroubi over his economic 
knowledge and his information about state affairs, while evading Karroubi’s questions 
about his personal behaviour, his controversial comments, the financial allegations 
                                                 
42 Aftab News 14/3/1388 (4/June/2009), http://aftabnews.ir/vdcjxveh.uqeymzsffu.html. 
43 Tabnak 20/5/1387 (10/August/2008), http://www.tabnak.ir/fa/pages/?cid=15167. 
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concerning his time as Tehran’s Mayor and his domestic and foreign policies. In 
response to Karroubi’s criticisms, Ahmadinejad repeatedly accused Karroubi of 
financial corruption.  
Karroubi eventually lost his temper and played defensively to Ahmadinejad’s 
anti-establishment rhetoric. 44  However, part of this debate reflected the modus 
operandi of Ahmadinejad and his campaign of misinformation, which played a role in 
popular mobilisation that happened after the election. For instance, in response to 
Ahmadinejad’s attempts to defend his economic policy by accusing Karroubi of not 
having economic knowledge of inflation, Karroubi said, “Your central bank has 
announced the inflation rate as 25 percent, but overnight, you decrease it to 14 percent 
using bizarre calculations. Even my mum and grandma understand inflation. Inflation, 
next to its scientific characteristic, is part of the everyday life of the people. It is not 
imaginary and a delusion.”  
On another occasion, Karroubi criticised Ahmadinejad’s claim of producing a 
model for global management which had become famous:  
“You (Ahmadinejad) told us more than 100 countries requested 
to have our model of management so far. First of all, what is this 
model of management?  Tell us what is this model of 
management that you produced and 100 countries fell in love 
with? Just give us the name of 20 of these countries… No just 
[give us the name of] five… No just give us the name of two 
countries?”  
 
However, it was Rezaee who challenged Ahmadinejad’s economic 
aggrandisement, given his education in economics.45  
A few moments in these debates were important in retrospect and in the light 
of the Green Movement emergence. One example was a dialogue between Mousavi 
and Karroubi in their televised debate. There were worries that if Mousavi became 
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President, he would bend under the factional political pressure, given his 20 years of 
absence from the main political scene and thus abandon his political manifesto.  
Karroubi raised this concern in their televised debate. When Karroubi asked: 
“Tell us frankly, how you will overcome the [factional and political] obstacles?” He 
replied: “I entered the election knowing all the obstacles and I will stay till the end 
inshallah.”46 Later on, the Green Movement referred to this part of the debate and 
admired Mousavi’s actions as fulfilling his promise to fight for the people’s rights to 
the end. During the electoral campaign, the supporters of Mousavi and Karroubi 
perceived that the National TV programmes supported Ahmadinejad’s candidacy. This 
perception reinforced feelings that there was a plot to rig the election, which emerged 
after the results.    
These televised debates gave momentum to the popular mobilisation of 
candidates’ supporters. On the nights of these debates people poured into the streets of 
Tehran and big cities. In reaction to what they perceived as outrageous comments by 
Ahmadinejad, Mousavi’s and Karroubi’s supporters rallied in the streets. Yet, not all 
of the mobilised crowds had this kind of political motivation.  
Many people were taking advantage of the less restrictive social space during 
this period to enjoy the rare chance of experiencing the feeling of participating in a 
carnival-like collective environment. This was largely different from the official 
ceremonies and rallies sponsored by the regime. However, this atmosphere increased 
the popularisation of politics. Even if some people were there for fun, it mobilised 
them and they then became part of that entire mobilised image and thus popular 
politics.  
In reaction to the mobilisation of Mousavi’s and Karroubi’s supporters in the 
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street, Ahmadinejad and his political allies realised that they needed to mobilise their 
supporters in the streets, which added to the popularisation of politics. These 
unofficial, unorganised mobilisations were also coupled with some organised electoral 
mobilisations a few days before the election. On 8 June 2009, tens of thousands of 
Ahmadinejad’s supporters gathered in Tehran’s biggest mosque complex, Mosalla. On 
the same day, Mousavi’s supporters launched a human chain of his supporters in 
Tehran and other big cities. On 9 June 2009, Mousavi’s supporters held an electoral 
meeting in one of Tehran’s big stadiums, mobilising tens of thousands of their 
supporters.   
This election witnessed two additional, yet important developments regarding 
the popularisation of factional politics. First, new grassroots networks emerged and 
played an important role in the election, such as the ‘Third Wave Campaign’ (Puyesh-
e Mowj-e Sevvom). Before Khatami’s nomination, this campaign emerged with the 
main goal of persuading Khatami to enter the election.  
After Khatami’s withdrawal, however, this campaign supported Mousavi and 
played a significant role in mobilising his supporters, who numbered almost half a 
million members. This campaign consisted of and targeted young university students 
and the 60s generation with secular cultural tendencies, who had ties with the Student 
Movement of the Khatami era. This campaign utilised new campaigning tactics: it 
organised rallies and electoral meetings in major cities with the participation of public 
celebrities, and used new technologies, such as social media and the internet.  
The ‘Third Wave’ established an internet TV called the ‘Fourth Wave.' They 
institutionalised the colour green as Mousavi’s campaign colour.47 Other candidate 
campaigns followed some of these tactics. For instance, other candidates also assigned 
                                                 
47 Kevan Harris, "The Brokered Exuberance of the Middle-class: An Ethnographic Analysis of Iran's 
2009 Green Movement," Mobilization: An International Quarterly 17, no. 4 (2012): 435-455. 
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a colour to their campaign: Karroubi chose white, while Ahmadinejad, in the final days 
of the election, assigned the three colours of the Iranian flag. The youth branch of 
Karroubi’s Etemade Melli was also active and shared almost the same strata of the 
young generation with the Third Wave campaign. It also moved beyond electoral 
tactics.  
In the previous election, the Conservatives and the neo-Conservatives used 
their organic links to the Basij and the employers of the institutions that were under 
their control on election day. In this election, they mobilised these forces into the street 
to show their support for Ahmadinejad. It was an important aspect of the 
popularisation of politics by almost all different groups.  
Second, the discourse of ‘rights’ increased in the candidate’s slogans. For the 
first time since the revolution, the discourse of human rights was supported and 
promoted by some Presidential candidates in their campaigns, namely Mousavi and 
Karoubi.48 The majority of Karroubi’s principles — four out of six — were about 
rights, including the rights of minorities, the rights of women and the rights of citizens. 
His sixth statute was a ‘manifesto of human rights,' which was, to a certain extent, the 
sum of the previous statutes.49 He issued this manifesto after Mousavi published his 
manifesto of human rights a few weeks earlier, expressing his views regarding human 
rights and his promise of implementing them if he became a President.  
Both candidates promised to establish new state institutions to implement and 
institutionalise these concepts. In part of Mousavi’s manifesto, he promised,  
To recognise that it is the people’s support and their trust which 
gave me legitimacy. And to include all people in the process of 
decision-making, especially the young, women, NGOs, unions, 
syndicates, associations, councils and civil society institutions, to 
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respect the rights of minorities and opposition groups. And to 
prepare the requirements for public rational-critical dialogue 
about national interests.50 
 
The personalities of these candidates influenced the degree and intensity of 
their political social support. Seyyed Mir Hossein Mousavi Khamene, (b, 1942) raised 
in a wealthy family. His father was a tea merchant. He graduated with a Masters degree 
in Architecture from Iran Melli University, during which he met his wife Zohreh 
Kazemi, known as Zahra Rahnavard, in 1969. She was “an Islamic feminist with leftist 
tendencies.”51  
She published ten books before the revolution, mostly about Islam and its views 
on women, some of which were published outside of Iran and in the US. In 2000 she 
was appointed as Khatami’s senior adviser on women’s affairs. She also became the 
first female University President of Alzahra, an all-female university. They were both 
under the influence of Ali Shariati.52 Mousavi also had a close relationship with LMI 
and Beheshti, one of the main architects of the IRI. Mousavi became Prime Minister, 
given the strong support of Khomeini. Khamenei and Mousavi have a familial link: 
their fathers were second cousins. However, they did not enjoy a good relationship, 
politically or personally.  
As mentioned in the first two chapters, Khamenei and Mousavi belonged to 
two different factions of the IRI. Their disagreements escalated over time and surfaced 
during Khamenei’s second term as President, to become a matter of public debate. 
After Khomeini’s death (1989), with the gradual elimination of the Left from the 
political scene, Mousavi also left politics and focused on his artistic and academic 
activities. His disputes with Khamenei added to his popularity during this period 
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51 Jahanbegloo, Iran Between, 178. 
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amongst anti-Ahmadinejad forces.  
While most of the IRI political elites were clerics, engineers or doctors, 
Mousavi and Rahnavard were artists. Even their attire was different. Mousavi wore a 
tie in the first few years after the revolution, while most of the Islamic revolutionaries 
considered ties to be symbols of pro-West tendencies. Rahnavard wore colourful scarfs 
when the official attire of the IRI women’s cadres was a black veil, called a Chador. 
In this election, they campaigned together shoulder to shoulder. It was the first time 
that a candidate’s wife had a public political face. In sum, Mousavi and Rahnavard 
belonged to different segments of the first-generation revolutionaries, compared to 
Karroubi. 
Mehdi Karroubi (b.1937) was raised in a religious family. His father was a 
cleric. He attended seminaries in both Qom and Najaf. He was a direct student of 
Khomeini and Hossein Ali Montazeri. He also held a university degree in theology 
from Tehran University. He was an active revolutionary who was in charge of 
distributing financial support to the families of revolutionaries who were in prison or 
in exile. He was imprisoned several times from 1963–1979.  
These arrests led to his connections with different revolutionaries with a wider 
range of political affiliations, including MEK and Tudeh. After the revolution, 
Karroubi was elected MP in the first, second, third and sixth Majlis, and he was the 
Speaker of the Majlis in the third and sixth Majlis. He was a founding member and 
served as the head of the Imam Khomeini Relief Foundation. He was also the founder 
of the Martyr Foundation.  
After Khomeini’s death, he was part of the Leftists who were eliminated from 
the main scene of IRI politics. With the return of the Leftists under the name of 
Reformists, he played a significant role in Khatami’s election: he helped to persuade 
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Khatami to enter the Presidential election. He lobbied for his candidacy with 
Khamenei. He also confronted his critics in the Conservative camp, including pressure 
groups.53 His speakership of the sixth Majlis was during Khatami’s era. In sum, he 
considered himself to be a true revolutionary who sacrificed a lot for the IRI and who 
had been part of the IRI political elite since its establishment, and on the other hand, 
one that the Reformists are owed to their return to power.  
Besides the debates about the political, social and/or even ideological 
differences amongst different candidates, the issue of ethics, morality and fairness — 
the importance of moral elements in politics and power struggles — became an 
important element in this election. The main components of Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric 
revolved around the immorality of part of the IRI elites — the so-called mafia — in 
taking the Revolution away from its true path and for their personal political and 
economic interests. This moralisation of politics was an element that Mousavi, in 
particular, promoted more frequently than others.  
This was seen in his statement published a day after his televised debate with 
Ahmadinejad:  
I did not break my 20 year silence to be President by any means. 
I felt that the country is facing the danger of [the expansion of] 
immorality, moral and material impoverishment and irrational 
management. I entered the election to save human dignity and to 
ensure that moral values would be implemented in governing. 
And [I also entered the election] to stop the increase of 
superstitions.54  
 
This moralisation of politics had a very strong connection with the historical 
and cultural context of Iranian identity. It was reflected in religious and national 
ceremonies, rituals and symbols. One of these religious ceremonies is the 
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commemoration of the tragic martyrdom of Imam Hossein in the battle of Karbala 
(680), a ten-day national mourning ceremony.  
In this ceremony, Imam Hossein is portrayed as the symbol of rebellion. He 
sacrificed his life along with the life of his other 72 followers and family members for 
freedom and in a fight against injustice, tyranny and oppression. Therefore, on the one 
hand, the strong presence of rhetorical debates about the values, revolution, morality 
in politics, fairness and rights, whatever way they were defined, raised the emotional 
component of the society in this election. The perception of electoral fraud that 
emerged following the election results stimulated this sense of injustice in parts of 
society and resonated with this component of the popular psyche.  
Much symbolism during this mobilisation emerged comparing the Green 
Movement with the Imam Hossein Movement. Given that Mousavi shared the same 
name, he was also a descendant of the Prophet Mohammad, a ‘seyyed,' and had the 
perceived conception of being a victim of injustice. This was also a factor in 
understanding the wide range of Mousavi supporters in the Green Movement.  
Before the election, there were concerns about possible electoral fraud in this 
election.55 Within the Mousavi and Karroubi camp, and in popular opinion was the 
belief that if the voter participation rate reached levels above 65 percent the chances 
of reactionary forces forging the results would collapse.  
Moreover, The Mousavi and Karroubi camps were convinced that such a large 
voter participation rate would ensure a victory for anti-Ahmadinejad forces. They held 
little doubts that the majority of voters, if they came out and cast their vote, were 
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against the current President. This point was reflected in banners in Tehran, which had 
a picture of Rafsanjani and the quotation: “If the majority does not vote, the minority 
will rule.”  
On 12 June 2009, the election was held with an 85 percent participation rate, a 
large turnout, in comparison to those of the previous second-term Presidential 
elections, which were 67 percent for Khatami (2001) and 51 percent for Rafsanjani 
(1993). On election day, the candidates’ communication’s links with their 
representatives at the ballot boxes were cut following the shutdown of all mobile 
networks.56 In the evening, the main building of Mousavi’s campaign was attacked by 
plain-clothes militia.57 Mousavi declared his victory in the election before the official 
announcement of the results.58  
Khatami, and allegedly Nateq Nouri and Ali Larijani, congratulated him on his 
victory. However, the next day, the Interior Minister, Sadeq Mahsouli, declared 
Ahmadinejad as the new President, with 75 percent of the total number of more than 
24 million votes. Mousavi came in second with 13 million votes (33 percent), and 
Karroubi was ranked last with less than 400,000 votes, even less than the number of 
voided ballots. Mousavi and Karroubi rejected the results, calling them fraudulent and 
for a new election.59 Their claims were accompanied by the popular protest of their 
supporters in the streets,60 with the main slogan of ‘Where is our vote?’61  
The continuation of popular mobilisation and political disputes over the 
election results, and the violent reaction of the security forces and the police, all gained 
                                                 
56 Etemade Melli 23/3/1388 (13/June/2009). 
57 Farda 22/3/1388 (12/June/2009). 
58 Kalameh Sabz 23/3/1388 (13/June/2009). 
59 Kalameh Sabz 24/3/1388 (14/June/2009). 
60 Jomhourieslami 24/3/1388 (14/June/2009). 
61 It is not clear when this slogan first emerged, but since Monday 25/3/1388 (15/June/2009), it was 
used on a large scale. 
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the title of the Green Movement by the participants in the protests and/or Fetneh by 
the regime.  
Investigating the causes behind the emergence of this uprising or its dynamics 
or social formaction of this uprising is beyond the scope of this chapter. Although only 
a short time has passed since these events unfolded, a large body of literature has 
emerged that explores the different sociopolitical and cultural aspects of this 
movement, its emergence, the question of its demise and its future both inside and 
outside of Iran.62  
One could argue that certain characteristics made this movement different to a 
large number of recent contentious moments, including the Arab uprisings or, to a 
lesser degree, the coloured revolutions in Eastern-European countries. It was not a 
movement initiated by demands for institutional change or in reaction to certain 
socioeconomic policies, directions or difficulties nor was it a movement of 
party/faction supporters and their claims to political power.  
It was a reaction to the efforts to emasculate the republican institutions, which, 
over the short history of the IRI and the evolution of the popularisation of politics, had 
become a rising hope for a large number of people to have a say in the direction of 
their country. It was the very popularisation of politics that initiated this reaction.  
However, contentious movements have their own life and dynamics after they 
emerge. The demands and scale of the Green Movement also changed and evolved 
over time. It is necessary to investigate the extent to which this movement has 
influenced the popularisation of factional politics and factional politics. In other words, 
this section aims to provide a better understanding of this event within the context of 
the subject of this thesis.    
                                                 
62  See Introduction chapter for details of this literature. 
290 
 
These protests and events were portrayed differently by the protesters, their 
alleged leaders, Mousavi and Karroubi, and the state and its official narrative. Mousavi 
and Karroubi promoted these events as a movement within the framework of 
Khomeinism to protect the main premises of the IRI. They emphasised the civil nature 
of the protests and their non-violent characteristics. This theme is depicted in 
Mousavi’s and Karroubi’s statement published after the election. For instance, in 
Mousavi’s ninth statement, issued on 1 July 2009, when the GC confirmed the election 
results, Mousavi maintained: 
It is our historic responsibility to continue our protest and not to 
stop our efforts to obtain the people’s rights. It is our religious 
responsibility not to allow the regime and the revolution to be 
transformed into something that Islam does not accept. It is our 
revolutionary responsibility not to allow the blood of hundreds of 
thousands of martyrs to be dissipated and reduced into the 
[emergence of] a security state.  
 
He continued: “If the Islamic Republic [as a framework] is implemented based on its 
initial promise and initial contract [with the society], it is a regime (framework) that 
could satisfy all our (the Green Movement) demands.” He then raised his concerns 
about those attempts to break ties with the regime and to become an opposition outside 
of the regime: “How bitter our disputes are; they are [still] a family’s disputes. We will 
regret it if we involve foreigners in these disputes.” He then underlined that it is not a 
personal matter: “I already have sacrificed my right, but I cannot negotiate with regard 
to the people’s rights. At the centre of this [movement] are the issues of Islamism and 
the republicanism of our regime. If we do not stand up for them, there will be no 
guarantee that we won’t experience the same problems again.”63  
 These points were also repeated in the last statute published by both Karroubi 
and Mousavi, the second draft of the manifesto of the Green Movement. In the first 
                                                 
63 Kalamih 10/4/1388 (1/July/2009), http://www.kaleme.com/1388/04/10/klm-8789/. 
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paragraph, explaining the goal of the movement, they expressed: “the Green 
Movement is a critical movement within the framework of the Constitution and the 
popular vote and opinions.”64 In their statement for the memorandum of the 1979 
revolution victory, 11 February, they argued: “[The discourse of the Green Movement] 
is a discourse that sees the salvation of people in Islamism and the Republicanism of 
the regime and democratic sovereignty in all aspects of the country’s affairs.”65  
At the centre of the Mousavi-Karroubi narrative was the role of the people as 
the main legitimising element of the IRI. In his ninth statute after confirmation of the 
election by the GC, Mousavi stated:  
From now on we will have a government that would be in a 
catastrophic position concerning its relation with society, 
[because] a majority of the society, including me, do not accept 
its political legitimacy. An unpopular and immoral government 
where nothing could be expected from it… A state that has been 
dependent on popular trust for 30 years cannot be replaced with 
security forces overnight.66 
 
 In ‘the second draft of manifesto,' he stressed the Green Movement “is a 
popular movement which gave birth to a national movement with the goals of freedom, 
social justice and national sovereignty.” Thus it is a movement along the historical 
movements of the “Constitutional Revolution” (1905–1911) the “Oil Nationalisation 
Movement (1949–1953) and the Islamic Republic Revolution (1979).” It underlined 
that,  
Popular sovereignty and the right to self-determination are 
inviolable principles of the Green Movement. The institution of 
election is important as it is a means to fulfil this principle… The 
people’s vote and demands are the source of legitimacy of 
political power and therefore the Green Movement 
denounces…'mandatory supervision (estesvabi).  
 
                                                 
64 Kalamih 3/12/1389 (22/February/2011), http://www.kaleme.com/1389/12/03/klm-48610/. 
65 Kalamih 19/11/1389 (8/February/2011), http://www.kaleme.com/1389/11/19/klm-46738/. 
66 Kalamih 10/4/1388 (1/July/2009), http://www.kaleme.com/1388/04/10/klm-8789/. 
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It also underlined that “the Green Movement is a civil, non-violent 
movement.”67  
The official narrative portrayed these events as conspiracies of the enemies of 
the revolution who had been planning them for years. One reason that this could have 
been effective is due to the fact that foreign countries had interfered in the country’s 
internal affairs such as 1906 Constitution Revolution the coming to power of Reza 
Shah in 1921,   the coup d’état attempt against Mosaddeq, Western support of 
Mohammad Reza Shah and after the 1979 revolution, several foreign supported coup 
attempts against the IRI.  
Based on this narrative, the protestors and their leaders either unknowingly or 
intentionally fell into this trap of the enemies, whose main aim was the collapse of the 
IRI through processes similar to the coloured revolutions in Eastern-European 
countries. Rafsanjani, Khatami and the radical Reformists were the internal agents of 
these plans. Almost a week after the election, many prominent Reformists, Mousavi’s 
and Karroubi’s high-ranking campaign officials and Rafsanjani’s daughter, Faezeh, 
were arrested. Only a few weeks after their arrests, they were publicly tried on charges 
of attempting to execute a coup d’état. The state media covered this trial.  
This narrative was reflected in the televised confessions of various prominent 
political figures in this trial. Mohammad Alil Abtahi, Khatami’s Vice President and 
Karroubi’s advisor, who was arrested a few days after the election, said in his trial that 
“Mousavi, Rafsanjani and Khatami swore to remain united no matter what happened.” 
He continued: “The accusation of electoral fraud was their code name for creating 
chaos.” He also confessed that “Rafsanjani was trying to take revenge against 
Ahmadinejad and Khamenei.”  
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He argued that Mousavi was delusional, while Khatami clearly understood the 
situation and the power of the Supreme Leader. Khatami knowingly helped Mousavi 
and fueled Mousavi’s delusion. Thus Khatami’s actions constituted treachery. 68 
Khatami and Rafsanjani rejected these accusation and criticised the trial. The role of 
foreign intelligent services from the West, the US and the UK was also expressed in 
the confession of Kian Tajbakhsh, an Iranian-American scholar.69  
Khamenei promoted this official narrative on many occasions: “I showed the 
evidence of at least ten, 15 years planning [by the IRI’s enemies] for executing this 
Fetneh to some of the friends.”70 On another occasion he emphasised: “This Fetneh 
was huge… Their goal was bizarre. In fact, they wanted to occupy Iran. Those who 
were the agents of Fetneh – in the streets, or their speakers (implying Mousavi and 
Karroubi) — most had unknowingly fallen into this trap. They were ignorant. 
Nonetheless, they were played by someone else.”71 Khamenei proclaimed the goals of 
this conspiracy as: “putting the people against the regime,”72 or that “the plan [of those 
conspirators] was to dismantle the Islamic Republic, not only to eliminate religion [in 
the state’s institution] but also religious values.”73  
In response to Mousavi’s claims the Green Movement was within Khomeinism, 
Khamenei argued: 
The principle of the revolution is not a matter of taste. Thus, 
anyone cannot come out of nowhere claiming to be standing up 
for the revolution... The principles of the revolution are Islam, 
the Constitution, Khomeini’s legacy, his will, and the overall 
policies of the regime... In this framework, disagreements are not 
negative but also positive. They are not [politically] harmful, but 
in fact they are beneficial… As long as people act within the 
                                                 
68 Fars News 10/5/1388 (1/August/2009). 
69 Ibid. 
70 Khamenei 4/8/1389 (26/October/2010), http://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=10456. 
71 Khamenei 12/8/1389 (3/November/2010), http://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=10552. 
72 Khamenei 16/2/1392 (6/May/2013), http://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=22494. 
73 Khamenei 19/10/1389 (9/January/2011), http://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=10832. 
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framework of the regime, do not use violence, do not disturb the 
security and peace of the society… the regime’s approach is 
‘maximum attraction [of electoral support] and minimum 
rejection [of the people]…’ But, if someone opposes the 
fundamentals of the regime and the security of the people, the 
regime must act and resist them.74  
 
As elaborated earlier, in this election, two different interpretations of the 
meaning of returning to the true path of Khomeini, and the role of people became the 
underlining ideological and theoretical line of factional disputes, and, in a wider frame, 
the schism between the main blocs of IRI politics. In this schism, Mousavi, Khatami, 
Karroubi, Rafsanjani and the main body of the Reformists, and a large number of the 
Modern Right and some part of the Conservatives, stood on one side facing 
Ahmadinejad, with the neo-Conservatives, Khamenei and a large section of the 
security forces on the other side. This schism reached its climax in this election and in 
post-election events. 
By this time, two groups were once again revolving around what seemed to be 
a traditional rivalry between Khamenei and Rafsanjani with their proxies; 
Ahmadinejad and Mousavi-Karroubi. The turning point of this divide occurred in a 
Friday Prayer a week after the election, when Khamenei declared the regime’s position 
in these debates and contested election results. He chose Ahmadinejad over his old 
comrade Rafsanjani. It was a significant event since for a long time the Rafsanjani-
Khamenei pact had been the symbol of the IRI. Now this symbol was broken over the 
line of popularisation of politics.  
In his sermon, Khamenei proclaimed: “There have been disagreements between 
the President and [Rafsanjani] since the 2005 election and they (these disagreements) 
still continue. Disagreements about foreign policy, the implementation of social 
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justice, and cultural issues; nonetheless, my ideas are closer to the President’s.”75 At 
the end of this prayer, Khamenei gave the ultimatum that if the protests continued, 
they would face the harsh reaction of the regime. This Friday prayer represented 
several turning points, in addition to its influence on the evolution of the 
demonstration. 
First, by taking Ahmadinejad’s side publicly, Khamenei jeopardised his 
supposed position of arbitrator between factional groups. While supervising and 
verifying the general direction of IRI policies was one of the Constitutional 
responsibilities of the Supreme Leader, the public perception was that he should not 
be openly involved in factional politics, nor engage in everyday politics, particularly 
disputed ones.  
Khamenei’s position as the Supreme Leader has been justified and propagated 
as a father figure sitting above everyday politics and factional disputes, who would 
remind political players upon spotting a deviation from the main IRI goals, whatever 
his definition of these goals was. Therefore, his comments in the Friday prayer of 19 
June 2009 damaged his image amongst Mousavi’s supporters because they expected 
him to play his supra-political role, but with this speech, this perception changed. His 
image was strengthened amongst those who believed he was acting correctly in 
tackling serious threats to the IRI. Khamenei’s declaration that Ahmadinejad was his 
preferred candidate, followed by the violent suppression of the protestors, weakened 
his popular legitimacy, to an extent.  
After this Friday prayer, the rumors about Khamenei’s involvement in the 
alleged electoral fraud gained momentum, especially in a country where conspiracy 
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theory has been part of its historical and cultural identity.76 These rumors gained some 
ground, since the election result was perceived by many as rewarding a candidate who 
had Khamenei’s support.  
Second, Khamenei’s comment showed a significant change in his relationship 
with Rafsanjani. It was a powerful blow to the authority and power of Rafsanjani, 
given that Rafsanjani always portrayed himself as an equal and in agreement with 
Khamenei and his policies. One could argue it was Khamenei’s final step in 
establishing himself as the sole power of the IRI and in ending any perceptions he was 
under the shadow of Rafsanjani’s political authority. To a large extent, the split that 
was created between Khamenei and Rafsanjani following Ahmadinejad’s first-term 
election reached its height in this public manifestation.  
Nonetheless, if he did not make these comments, Khamenei would have faced 
serious consequences as well. Khamenei was facing an impossible situation regarding 
his power, because even if he wanted to back down, two dangers would emerge. One 
would be that he backed down due to popular demands. The other would be that he 
backed down because of the power of the coalition of Rafsanjani and his allies 
Mousavi, Karroubi and Khatami. In both scenarios, they would unify after he backed 
down. He would have had very little room to manoeuvre and he would have faced 
difficulty in regaining his authority for some time. This also came at a price as 
Khamenei attached himself to Ahmadinejad.  
Whatever his feelings were for Ahmadinejad, given the power situation he was 
facing, he had to move toward Ahmadinejad. However this move weakened him, to 
an extent. He chose a man, who as shown in the previous chapter, was a political 
opportunist. One could argue that Khamenei thought Ahmadinejad could be managed 
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and would remain under his control, given that, in the previous four years, 
Ahmadinejad had proven his loyalty despite its ups and downs.  
Ahmadinejad’s popularity was damaged following the events of the Green 
Movement; hence, he would be an even weaker President during this term. However, 
Ahmadinejad soon recognised his newly found leverage. Ahmadinejad conceiving to 
have popular support, Khamenei had no option but to support him no matter what 
Ahmadinejad may do. This element drastically changed the Ahmadinejad-Khamenei 
relationship.  
Third, Khamenei’s comments in the Friday prayer sermon changed the 
dynamics of the protests. Ahmadinejad was initially the main opponent of the Green 
Movement’s claims. Ahmadinejad’s comments the day after the election, in particular, 
described the protesters as a bunch of dirt and dust (khas va Khashak),77 fueled the 
emotional resentment and the anger of protestors. Thus a large portion of the slogans 
targeted him.  
However, Khamenei’s Friday prayer and the subsequent suppression of the 
protests, gave momentum to the radicalisation of the protests. Khamenei increasingly 
replaced Ahmadinejad in the popular claims of the Green Movement.78 At the same 
time, Ahmadinejad chose not to comment on the unfolding contentious events, and 
also tried not to irritate the protestors and become their main target again. Therefore, 
the radicalisation of the movement translated into the strengthening of Ahmadinejad’s 
position. He used this opportunity to attempt to expand his institutional power. He 
appointed his close allies to different positions and went as far as to confront 
Khamenei. 
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Khamenei-Ahmadinejad  
To a certain extent, the power balance between Khamenei and Ahmadinejad shifted 
after the election, and after Khamenei’s comments in the 19 June Friday prayer. As 
will be explored in this section, Ahmadinejad increasingly contested Khamenei’s 
decisions and publicly denounced his verdicts, to the point where he questioned 
Khamenei’s institutional authority.  
 At the same time, in order to increase his popular support and to unify social 
forces behind his aggressive foreign policy and rising domestic socioeconomic 
discontent, Ahmadinejad attempted to build new discourses based on Iraniyat, 
surrounding pre-Islamic ancient symbols, mixed with claims of Iran as being one of 
the great contributors to global civilisations, along with elements of religious 
mysticism and apocalyptic hidden Imam paradigms. Ahmadinejad was creating a new 
discourse geared towards the greater popularisation of politics to secure his position 
in society against his opponents in the regime. Thus, it was yet another important 
reflection of the popularisation of politics.  
 Some components of this new discourse, such as its nationalism and 
mysticism, were in conflict with the main ideological elements of the Supreme Leader 
and other conservative groups, including Mesbah and his circle. These ideological and 
theoretical differences, in addition to continuous confrontations with Khamenei within 
the factional context of this period, led to a schism between the neo-Conservatives and 
the close circle of Ahmadinejad’s surrounding Mashaei.  
One of the first signs of this new dynamic between Ahmadinejad and Khamenei 
and their supporters came when Ahmadinejad appointed his close friend and ally 
Mashaei as Vice President. This appointment faced strong opposition from different 
parts of the Conservatives, the neo-Conservatives, and Marja’s. Mashaei’s 
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controversial comments and unclear ideological standings made him unpopular 
amongst these groups. He was perceived as someone with a lack of commitment to 
traditional Islam. In a speech, Mashaei proclaimed that the Era of Islamisation had 
ended.  
Another controversy was sparked by a speech in which he recognised the 
people of Israel. The skepticism about Mashaei was such that, in an editorial, Hossein 
Shariatmadari, chief editor of Kayhan, compared Mashaei with the radical Reformists 
and their role in the so-called Fetneh: “Mashaei is yet another agent of the Velvet Coup 
D’état. It is only the difference in the place of his mission that made him different from 
the other recent ‘seditionists’ (Fetnehgaran); but not his identity!”79 Ahmadinejad 
ignored these reactions and defended him.  
Eventually, Khamenei had to intervene. He sent a letter on 18 July 2009, 
stating: “The appointment of Mr. Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei as your Vice President is 
against the interest (maslahat) of you and your government. It is causing despair and 
schism amongst your supporters (alaqehmandan). It is necessary to cancel his 
appointment and to announce it ‘as it has not ever happened’ (‘Ke’An Lam Yakon’).”80  
At first, Ahmadinejad ignored this decree. However, Khamenei had to publish 
the letter a few days later in the media, forcing Ahmadinejad to accept it. It was an 
unprecedented action by Khamenei, which showed the seriousness of the conflict 
between them. Even then, Ahmadinejad accepted the resignation of Mashaei instead 
of dismissing him.  
He replied to Khamenei: “Attached is a copy of the resignation of Esfandiar 
Rahim Mashaei from the Vice Presidency on 24 July 2009. Please be informed that 
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your handwriting of 18 July 2009 has been implemented based on the Article 57 of the 
Constitution.” 81  Ahmadinejad’s action was perceived as being in some way 
disobedient because, first, Ahmadinejad did not respond to Khamenei’s letter, nor take 
appropriate action upon his receipt of it. He reacted after Khamenei’s letter was made 
public.  
Second, in his response, Ahmadinejad underlined the resignation and his 
acceptance of it based on the Constitution and not upon Khamenei’s decree. Third, 
Ahmadinejad referred to Khamenei’s letter in his response as “your hand writing” 
instead of your decree. Kayhan argued that the reason behind such action was: “to 
greatly increase the political cost of issuing [secondary ordinance] decrees for the 
Leader. In their disoriented mind, they thought that [by doing so] they might be able 
to stop Aqa (Khamenei) from issuing similar decrees.”82  
A significant turning point in Ahmadinejad’s relationship with Khamenei 
happened in April 2011, when Ahmadinejad stayed at home and refused to go to his 
office for almost two weeks. His dispute with Khamenei over Heydar Moslehi, the 
head of the Intelligence Ministry, was at the centre of this incident.83 Following his 
disagreements with the appointment of one of the Ministry’s deputies, Ahmadinejad 
pushed for Moslehi’s resignation, despite the opposition of Khamenei to this decision. 
This happened less than two months after Khamenei had visited the Intelligence 
Ministry for six hours and publicly endorsed Moslehi.  
This time, media close to Ahmadinejad published Moslehi’s resignation letter 
next to Ahmadinejad’s acceptance of it, perhaps to nullify possible attempts to undo 
this decision. However, this move faced the public reaction of Khamenei. He published 
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a letter to Moslehi in which he asked for the continuation of his service.84 In reaction 
to this letter, Ahmadinejad stopped going to work for 11 days, from 23 April to 3 May 
2011.  
During this period, the schism and internal disputes between the neo-
Conservatives, Mo’talefeh and the IRGC with Ahmadinejad’s circle of friends, in 
particular Mashaei, surfaced. Mohammad Nabi Habibi, the Mo’talefeh Secretary 
General, condemned Ahmadinejad’s actions and gave him the “brotherly advice” not 
to allow “his close cadres [to] interfere with different ministries’ appointments and 
dismissals.” 85  Ahmadinejad’s sit-in, following his previous confrontation over 
Mashaei, engendered the emergence of a new term in IRI political lexicon: ‘deviant 
group’ (hereafter Jaryan-e enherafi).  
To a large extent, Jaryan-e enherafi was another attempt to monopolise the 
political arena. It also emerged in the context of the popularisation of factional politics. 
As mentioned above, Ahmadinejad increasingly emphasised a new discourse geared 
towards the popularisation of politics. In response, part of the regime, including the 
Conservatives, neo-Conservatives and Khamenei, promoted new discourses and 
slogans in the popularisation of politics to get the people on their side as well as 
eliminating their rivals.  
On 22 April 2011, in part of a long interview with Fars News, a media outlet 
close to the IRGC, the IRGC commander, Mohammad Ali Jafari, explained the 
characteristics of Jaryan-e enherafi and its danger. He argued that “Jaryan-e enherafi 
means those who deviated from the path of ‘principlists/Conservative's (Osulgaraei).”  
He placed it as a continuation of Fetneh: “The previous events (Fetneh) ended 
and their intentions were revealed, however,,this new Jaryan-e enherafi aims to face 
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the revolution using new slogans and implementing new methods and tactics. This 
new movement will indeed rise against the revolution.” He then claimed that this new 
Fetneh was hiding itself behind popular and accepted figures. 86  Jafari continued: 
“Whatever the IRGC possesses is coming from the Islamic Revolution, not Iran, nor 
the Iranian school of thought.”87 It was clear opposition to Mashaei and Ahmadinejad.  
The ‘Iranian school of thought’ (Maktab-e Irani) was a theoretical initiative by 
Mashaei to mobilise some of Ahmadinejad supporters. Two days later, on 24 April 
2011, Jafari compared the revolution with a train and argued:  
Many have departed the revolutionary train, but [they] still think 
that they are on board. Also, many are on board and have no idea 
where this train is heading. The destination is the advert of the 
Hidden Imam [Mahdi] (zohur-e Imam), but those who claim that 
this zohur will happen in the near future. [Their claims] are the 
threats of ‘deviation’ (enheraf). It is true that the Reformists and 
nationalists are eliminated, but there are still threats from 
‘deviating forces’ (Jaryanat-e Monharef) domestically.88  
 
On 20 April 2011, the commander of Basij, Mohammad Reza Naqdi, warned 
about the emergence of a new Fetneh and described its characteristics: “In the next 
Fetneh, it will be very difficult to distinguish right from wrong. And we might find 
those who stand against the velayat under the name of Quran, prayer, appealing to 
justice, Mahdism and righteousness. ‘Deviants’ (Monharefin) most probably would 
stand against the revolution under the name of righteousness.” 89  Ahmadinejad 
returned after almost two weeks and publicly confirmed his allegiance to the velayat-
e faqih.  
This event represented another important step in the popularisation of factional 
politics. It was one of the first incidents that the IRGC publicly and to such degree 
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interfered in the factional politics and the republican executive affairs. The IRGC was 
in fact drawing the boundaries between who is inside and who is outside of the IRI 
political field. Placing the Reformists, Nationalists, Fetneh and Jaryan-e enherafi 
along the same camp by the IRGC highlighted its antagonism against republicanism 
given that the broad shared idea of the role of people and the republicanism was the 
only thing that these groups had in common. Ahmadinejad once again strengthened 
his anti-establishment figure, however, this incident became a turning point in already 
deteriorating relationship between Ahmadinejad and Khamenei.  
The perception of the rising disputes between Khamenei and Ahmadinejad 
reached the point where Khamenei had to deny them. On 19 April 2011, the same day 
that Khamenei sent his letter to Moslehi, Raja News, the media outlet close to Mesbah, 
published Khamenei’s comments in his meeting with JMHEQ, which had taken place 
almost five months earlier in which Khamenei rejected any kind of ‘dual power’ 
(hakemiyyat-e dowganeh) in the regime. He confirmed “The government, the Supreme 
Leader and other state institutions are all in cohesion with each other and are along 
one path.”90  
However, soon after the Moslehi case, once again Khamenei publicly had to 
deny that there were any disagreements amongst them: 
Look, just during these previous five or six days, what a fuss 
they make in the world over the issues that have no importance 
– I mean about the Intelligence Minister and so on. [The IRI’s 
enemies] propagated their analysis that a schism is emerging in 
the IRI, that there is dual power (hakemiyyat-e dowganeh), the 
President did not obey the Supreme Leader orders… Look how 
seriously they (enemies) are waiting for an excuse, look how 
like wolves they are ambushing to find an excuse to attack us 
in any way possible… Both the government and the President 
himself are working really hard… They are valuable for the 
country. I, as a humble person (bandeh-ye haqir), do not intend 
to interfere in state affairs because of the principles, after all the 
                                                 
90 Raja News 30/1/1390 (20/April/2011), http://www.rajanews.com/news/69113. 
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jurisdictions are clear in the Constitution. Everyone has their 
responsibility. Unless I feel that an [important] interest 
(maslahat) is in danger, that’s when one interferes to save this 
interest. Just like this recent issue [of the Intelligence Minister, 
where I intervened].91 
 
Approaching the next Presidential election (2013), Ahmadinejad’s 
confrontation with Khamenei and other state institutions escalated as the 
popularisation of politics rapidly increased, in the context where domestic social, 
economic and geopolitical situations were exacerbated following the tightening of 
international sanctions.  
By this time, the public began to feel the serious economic effects of 
Ahmadinejad’s economic mismanagement, in addition to the socioeconomic effects of 
international sanctions, which Ahmadinejad once called just a “piece of paper.” 
Inflation tripled from 2010 to 2012 and over these two years, housing prices increased 
drastically. 92  For instance, average house prices almost doubled over these two 
The IRI’s currency devalued and lost a large portion of its value by the end of 2012, 
based on unofficial market prices (from 1USD=11000 to 1USD=35000).  
 Ahmadinejad had always denied these economic difficulties and/or had 
blamed other institutions or hidden mafias for not allowing him and his government to 
do their job. Ahmadinejad understood to have any place in the near future of IRI 
politics, he might need to reinforce his anti-establishment image. However, despite the 
political motives behind Ahmadinejad’s confrontations, as will be explored below, 
these confrontations showed the institutional obstacles and inherent contradiction 
rooted in the Constitution. The climax of these confrontations happened during the 
impeachment of Ahmadinejad’s Minister of Cooperatives, Labour and Social Welfare, 
                                                 
91 Khamenei 3/2/1391 (22/April/2012), http://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=12163. 
92 Inflation, Consumer Prices (annual %) (FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG), World Development indicators. 
93 Tabnak (27/4/1392) (18 July 2013), http://www.tabnak.ir/fa/news/332712/. 
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which gained the title of ‘Black Sunday’ in IRI political lexicon.  
The reason for the impeachment was the appointment of Saeed Mortazavi as 
the head of the Social Security Organisation (SSO). Saeed Mortazavi had a very 
controversial career path. He was the infamous judge of the press court responsible for 
the closure of all Reformist newspapers during Khatami’s Presidency. He then became 
Tehran’s district attorney (2002–2009).  
Based on the inquiry of the eighth Majlis’ committee, regarding the 2009 
election events during the Green Movement, he was considered responsible for the 
death of dissidents of the 2009 election in Kahrizak Prison (an illegal prison facility in 
the south of Tehran, established to keep the detainees).94 He was also deputy of Iran’s 
district attorney until his dismissal. He was appointed as the head of the Anti-
Smuggling Bureau (2009–2012) by Ahmadinejad’s decree. However, it was his 
appointment as the head of the SSO which became the source of political disputes. The 
Social Security Fund, a subdivision of the SSO, is one of the largest economic and 
financial institutions in Iran. It consisted of the retirement pensions of all employees 
of the Iranian state and their insurance.  
Shasta, the investment arm of the SSO, owned more than 250 Iranian 
companies and a considerable share of large Iranian enterprises, including 
petrochemicals, refineries and power plants.95 By the end of the eighth Majlis (2008–
2012), the impeachment was initiated but was withdrawn, after Mortazavi promised to 
resign. 96  Ahmadinejad persisted with keeping Mortazavi as the head of SSO; 
therefore, the Majlis referred the case to the Administrative Court (Divan-e ‘Edalat-e 
Edari), a judiciary institution responsible for investigating administrative disputes.  
                                                 
94 Mardomsalari 21/10/1388 (11/January/2010). 
95 Official Webpage of SSO, http://www.ssic.ir/Default.aspx?tabid=85. 
96 Fararu 25/2/1391 (14/May/2012), http://fararu.com/fa/news/112669/. 
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The Administrative Court verdict was the removal of Saeed Mortazavi as the 
head of the Social Security Fund on January 2013. A few days later, Ahmadinejad 
changed the statute of SSO. The Social Security Fund was changed to Social Security 
Fund Organisation. After the dismissal of Mortazavi, he was then appointed by 
Rahimi, Ahmadinejad’s Vice President, as the head of the newly established 
organisation. 97  The struggle between Ahmadinejad and the Majlis led to the 
impeachment of the Minister Sheikhol Eslam, one of Ahmadinejad’s old comrades, by 
the ninth Majlis (2012–2016), close to the 2013 Presidential election.  
The impeachment session of the Sheikhol Eslam became a battleground for 
Ahmadinejad. He questioned the legality of the legislative and judiciary actions, which 
were headed by two Larijani brothers, Ali and Sadeq, known as Amoli. Ahmadinejad 
highlighted the Constitutional contradictions. The way the impeachment session 
unfolded showed the personal rivalry, while its aftermath revealed Ahmadinejad’s 
conflict with Khamenei.  
In the impeachment session, which was filled with Ahmadinejad’s sarcasm 
towards the Majlis and MPs, his main argument was that the Administrative Court had 
no jurisdiction and its verdict was a mistake. Thus the impeachment had no grounds: 
“If we allow the Administrative Court to act against the law, against the Constitution, 
then how could we govern the country?” He then began his criticism of the Majlis for 
its interference with his Constitutional prerogatives. He argued that “we should return 
to the Constitution” to solve our problems. He claimed the roots of these institutional 
conflicts were in the attempts of different institutions to go beyond their Constitutional 
jurisdictions. “No one should think that if we gain more jurisdiction beyond the 
Constitution, this will be good for us and our country’s interest. This would be against 
                                                 
97 Khabar Online 12/2/1391 (1/May/2012), 
http://www.khabaronline.ir/detail/232518/society/judiciary.  
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the national interest.”  
He also accused Ali Larijani, the Speaker of the Majlis, of exceeding his 
Constitutional power: “Not only has the Speaker of Majlis dominated the government, 
he also dominated the Majlis. This is wrong… The Speaker of Majlis is to rule the 
Majlis and the government. Then he should have been elected by direct popular vote 
and should sit in the President’s office.”  
He had already argued:  
“If the Constitution needed to be changed, it has its procedure. 
But if even the appointments of the President [for different state 
positions] could be dismissed by passing a new legislation or 
rejecting different government legislations, this could not be 
sustainable. If you strip the government from its rights of 
appointment and dismissal, what would it be left with to govern 
the country?”  
 
He then concluded that there should be some conspiracy behind this 
impeachment; he and his minister were the victims because of their rebellion against 
the mafia. To prove this claim, he threatened to display some footage. He played it 
after Larijani asked him to. This film, which was taken in the Mortazavi office using 
a hidden camera, showed Mortazavi in a meeting with Fazel Larijani, brother of Ali 
and Sadeq Larijani. In this meeting, Fazel asked Mortazavi to get him involved in some 
of SSO’s businesses, and in return he would help Mortazavi to have better access to 
his brothers. At the end of the session, when Ahmadinejad finished his speech, Ali 
Larijani responded to his accusation.  
Larijani’s comments revealed the Constitutional conflict and the maverick 
nature of Ahmadinejad. In response to Ahmadinejad’s claim, Majlis actions had 
disrupted the relationship between different government bodies, he said:  
The ‘arrangement of the relations between different state bodies’ 
(based on the Article 110 of the Constitution. This arrangement 
is one of the responsibilities of the Supreme Leader) is not 
disturbed. This is just your perception. We [the Majlis] passed 
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laws [but] you did not announce them. Then [in our response], 
you tell us: I have sworn [as a President] that it is I who should 
ensure whether or not these laws are against the Constitution?  
 
He called Ahmadinejad’s attitude unethical: “[Mr. President], do you think 
your actions (showing the footage) are ethical? Is it appropriate for a President to act 
like this? A President who always threatens everyone, threatens the Speaker of the 
Majlis, because of an impeachment, Mr President! These are the problems of the 
country, the problem of the country is this, (your) behaviour.”98  
This confrontation was the popularisation of factional politics at its height. 
Ahmadinejad once again wanted to play his card of being the anti-establishment figure. 
He chose a public session of the Majlis, broadcasted live on radio. However, since the 
symbols of establishment or ‘other’ in the Ahmadinejad rhetoric was shrinking due to 
political circumstances after the 2009 he had no choice but to turn against a camp 
which was once his ally.  
 Khamenei reacted. In his speech in Tabriz, a day after this event, he showed 
his dissatisfaction and his strong displeasure and frustration with these conflicts: “I, as 
a humble man (bandeh-ye haqir) became sad because of two things. First, the nature 
of this event, and second, seeing the sadness of the people.” He called the President’s 
action “against the law, against ethics and against the Constitutional right of the 
people.” He then condemned the Majlis action in pursuing the impeachment only a 
few months before the next Presidential election. He called Larijani’s reaction “a bit 
too much and unnecessary.”99  
Within a few hours, in an open letter, Ali Larijani thanked Khamenei, expressed 
                                                 
98 Jomhouriat 14/11/1392 (3/Februrary/2014), http://www.jomhouriat.ir/fa/content/10075/. 
99 Khamenei 28/11/1391 (16/February/2013), http://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=22042. 
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his apology and declared his obedience.100 His brother, Sadeq Larijani, head of the 
Judiciary, followed his brother and published a letter thanking Khamenei for his 
advice.101 However, Ahmadinejad wrote a letter to Khamenei a day after his sermon. 
It was a disdainful response.  
There was no reference to the impeachment events or to Khamenei’s criticism, 
he underlined: “I assure you that I would not step a foot against the national and 
country’s interests,” and ended the letter by stating “The devotion of me and my 
cabinet to you is permanent.”102   It symbolised the scale of the disputes between 
Ahmadinejad and Khamenei, as well as the popularisation of factional politics given 
Ahmadinejad’s concerns about his popular anti-establishment image.  
Ahmadinejad’s confrontations with Khamenei, and his increasing attempts 
toward the popularisation of politics, forced Khamenei to use his Leadership Decree 
to get different agendas pushed through. Ahmadinejad’s position in factional politics 
and his attempts towards the popularisation of politics had created paralysis across the 
system, which forced Khamenei to intervene even on everyday political issues and to 
play an increasingly active role in everyday affairs.  
Khamenei became the political symbol of the regime. He gradually became the 
one who was blamed for all the difficulties and the main target of societal 
socioeconomic and political discontent. However, Khamenei, arguably, was aware of 
the danger that this over-interference in state affairs might cause him, particularly 
given the state of his popular legitimacy.  
To settle these institutional deadlocks without his direct involvement, 
                                                 
100 Official website of the Majlis 28/11/1391 (16/February/2013), 
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Khamenei established the ‘Supreme Committee of Arbitration and Arranging the 
Relationship of the State Bodies,' a five-member committee under the supervision of 
Hashemi Shahroudi, former head of judiciary. According to the IRI Constitution, the 
arrangement of this relationship amongst these bodies is one of the Supreme Leader’s 
duties. In Khamenei’s decree, this committee was considered responsible for “the 
investigation and giving consultancy opinion to [the leader] in the disputes between 
different state bodies.”103  
The establishment of this committee added to the institutional structural 
complexity of the IRI. It was, to a large extent, an institution parallel to the Expediency 
Council. In the composition of the committee, there were no representatives from the 
Executive Branch. The establishment of this institution was yet another attempt to 
contain some of the jurisdiction of the Expediency Council, under the supervision of 
Rafsanjani. It was also an attempt to restrict the institutional authority of Ahmadinejad, 
as well as an attempt to clip the wings of the Executive Branch.   
To compensate for his shrinking popular legitimacy following the events of 
2009, Khamenei gave momentum to attempts to build a new class of religious 
admirers. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Khamenei’s religious authority, as an 
important component of his total legitimacy, was weak compared with Khomeini’s or 
other Great Marja.' To compensate for this element of weak traditional religious 
authority, he empowered other religious institutions and strengthened a new religious 
class, namely Maddahs.  
Maddahs are low-ranking religious figures who perform in religious 
ceremonies. Before the revolution and during the Khomeini Era they did not have a 
                                                 
103 Khamenei 3/5/1390 (25/July/2011), http://farsi.khamenei.ir/message-content?id=16782.  
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political role. On different occasions, Khomeini forbade them to talk about politics.104 
They resembled the lumpen proletariat of the religious establishment. Khamenei 
invested a lot in this institution and redefined its role. As elaborated below, he asked 
them to play a more active role in public religious and political debates. Maddah, and 
their activities in Hay’ats, gradually became a parallel religious institution to part of 
the ‘Shiʿa seminaries.' Hay’ats are the main organisation in which Maddahs perform. 
Religious Hay’at, at least in theory, is a grassroots religious organisation which 
is formed by people to organise religious ceremonies, particularly during the month of 
Moharram and the Mourning of Imam Hossein. After the revolution, the state raised 
its financial support for these institutions, given the role they could play in the making 
of homo Islamicus.  
By 2014, the number of Hay’ats had risen to more than 91,000, next to 72,000 
mosques. Some of these Hay’ats kept their traditional identity and remained temporal 
independent organisations, which only formed during religious ceremonies. There are 
also some permanent ones which enjoy a fixed budget and have an organisational 
structure and enjoy state support. The main organisation of Maddah are ‘Islamic War 
Veterans Hay’at,' Hay’at-e Razmandegan-e Islam, established in 1997.105  
This organisation was established by those Maddahs who performed during the 
Iran-Iraq War. Maddahs used to sing both revolutionary and religious rhymes to raise 
the spirit of the soldiers. They kept the structure they had during the war and, in 1997, 
made it an official organisation. They also played a political and a cultural role. They 
supported Ahmadinejad in 2005 and 2009. However, their support for Ahmadinejad 
ended following Ahmadinejad’s support of Mashaei.  
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Maddah’s organisational structure and their financial budgeting made them 
dependent on the SLO, thus a trustful ally for the Supreme Leader. To an extent, they 
enjoyed celebrity status amongst the Basijis. Enjoying the support of security 
institutions, they had no fear of public scrutiny. They criticised different governmental 
bodies, their decisions and political figures. It was another attempt to counter act the 
popularisation of factional politics by employing another semi-state group 
representing the regime. It was a reaction to the popularisation of factional politics. In 
reality, it was an attempt to limit the damage-perceived by the regime-because of the 
popularisation of factional politics.   
After the 2009 election, the process of strengthening Maddah gained 
momentum, given that Khamenei was facing a serious legitimacy threat, and he had 
doubts about the sincerity of the support of seminaries, given that all of his main 
opponents, Mousavi, Rafsanjani and Karroubi, enjoyed a great relationship with 
Marja’s in seminaries. As a result, Maddahs became increasingly involved in public, 
social, cultural and political debates.  
In Tehran’s Friday prayer sermon, Ahmad Khatami, a neo-Conservative cleric, 
asked Maddahs to analyse Fetneh in their ceremonies.106 Ezzat Allah Zarghami, a neo-
Conservative and the head of the National TV (2004–2014), underlined the loyalty of 
the Maddahs. He argued that the Maddahs passed the test of Fetneh, while many 
student activists and politicians failed.107  
He also responded to those who criticised the political role of Maddahs: “My 
answer to those who quibble that Maddah should not enter [politics]… If by politics, 
we mean increasing the ‘insight,' (basirat), and informing people, especially the new 
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generation, I think this is one of their [Maddahs] main duties.”108 Khamenei recently 
proclaimed of Maddahs’ duties: “Your main duty should be guiding the people, 
awakening and expanding ‘insight' (basirat) amongst the people.” 109  Maddahs 
proclaimed their ideological theme as ‘insight’ (basirat).  
‘Basirat’ containing the meaning of knowledge, cognition and faith is a rhetoric 
adopted by Khamenei which he has emphasised since the 2009 election to keep his 
ideological grasp on his supporters, and to justify, to an extent, the suppression of some 
members of the IRI political elite. Khamenei used this concept in his speeches since 
he became the Supreme Leader; however, after 2009, ‘basirat’ gained more discursive 
and rhetorical weight. In Islam, it refers to an insight that would allow one to have a 
deep understanding and clear conception of the truth and of right and wrong.110  
The official narrative used ‘basirat’ as a dividing line in political classification 
of the people and political parties, defining who is inside and who is outside of the 
current discourse of the IRI. ‘Basirat’ symbolised “the compass” that would help the 
homo Islamicus to find their way and enable them not to end up in the hands of the 
enemy.111 On 27 July 2009, Khamenei said: “If you do not have basirat, you cannot 
tell the difference between friends and enemies. Thus, you may end up attacking 
friends instead of enemies… Basirat is a necessary requirement in understanding who 
the enemies are.” 112 Khamenei also argued that “Most of the catastrophes that various 
nations faced were because of [their] lack of ‘basirat.'”113  
Almost a month later, on 27 August 2009, he underlined the relationship 
between ‘basirat’ and Fetneh: “In ‘times of sedition’ (‘fetnehgun’), it becomes 
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difficult to have a clear understanding of the [political] field. It is difficult to 
understand who is the invader and who is the defender. It is difficult to understand 
who is the oppressed and who is the oppressor. It is difficult to see who is the friend 
and who is the enemy.”114 A few weeks later, he proclaimed: “When there is basirat, 
the opaque of the Fetneh cannot fool them (the elite and the people).”115 He argued 
that many of the mistakes of the elites, whose mistakes are far more influential than 
the mistakes of ordinary people, have been because of their lack of basirat.116  
In less than six months, he again maintained this point: “We should know the 
nature of the enmities are [against the IRI]. The reason that I keep repeating this issue 
of the importance of the basirat amongst the elites, is that sometimes the enmities 
which are ignored are the ones targeting the foundations, [but] they (enmities) are 
reduced and perceived as enmities about minor issues.”117 In this line, by brineging 
quotes from Imam Ali and Khomeini, he also argued: “Even Imam [Khomeini] said if 
I leave Islam then people will leave me. It means that the gauge is Islam and not the 
persons.”118 
Perhaps Khamenei’s over-emphasis on ‘basirat’, to a certain extent, was a self-
imposed challenge for his authority. Highlighting ‘basirat’ as one of the necessary 
characteristics of the IRI elites and a pillar trait of homo Islamicus could become a 
double-edged sword, of which he himself could be a victim. ‘Basirat’, broadly 
speaking, meant the power of recognising what is right and what is wrong, which, in 
theory, everyone could acquire.  
By definition, it could, therefore, impose a challenge on traditional religious 
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authority, whose power laid in defining what is right and what is wrong. Furthermore, 
‘basirat’ could also undermine the Constitutional authority, particularly in the context 
in which Khamenei introduced and propagated it.  
Khamenei claimed neither the institutional position nor the reputation of elites 
should make their claims right, even if it was Khomeini himself. Meanwhile, he used 
the rhetoric of ‘basirat’ to de-legitimised different political elites who were once his 
old comrades and associates. This engendered, to an extent, contradictory dynamics, 
given the political context of this period. Khamenei increasingly depended on the 
loyalty of his supporters, which was reinforced through Khamenei’s religious, 
Constitutional and ideological authority, or his claims of righteousness.  
By propagating ‘basirat’, he was setting conditions for possible undermining 
of his Constitutional and religious authority indirectly; or undermining his exclusive 
authority on the righteousness of his claims. As a result, Khamenei’s ideological and 
political manoeuvrability was further limited. This limitation showed itself when 
Khamenei, in order to respond to the challenges imposed by the realities of the 
government’s affairs, needed to support official policies in conflict with the 
ideological premises of his discourse, i.e., the West and the relationship with the US. 
For instance, when Khamenei agreed with direct negotiations with the US over IRI’s 
nuclear programme, given the socioeconomic challenges in 2013, he faced a serious 
challenge of how to justify different outcomes of these negotiations for his supporters. 
This will be discussed in the next chapter. 
A turning point in the evolution of the popularisation of factional politics, came 
in the events of 2009–2013. Those factions who were promoting the republican aspect 
of the IRI and calling for more democratic aspirations were thrown out of the state 
institutions. The so-called Fetneh became a reference point according to which 
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different factions and political figures were categorised by the official hegemonic 
rhetoric.  
For instance, those who supported Mousavi and Karroubi, attended the first 
rallies and demanded a new election, were called ‘Fetneh’s companion’s (Ashab-e 
Fetneh). Subsequently, a large number were imprisoned, and prohibited from political 
activities. Many fled the country, while their correspondent political organisations 
were dissolved, for example, MII and Mohsarekat. During these events some members 
of the elite remained silent, waiting to see their conclusion. In other words, they were 
trying to play it safe. They were called ‘Fetneh’s quiets (Saketin-e Fetneh). Political 
figures from the Conservatives, such as Nateq Nouri, and organisations such as MRM, 
were amongst this category. Their neutrality cost them part of their power, but they 
remained in the state’s institutions.  
Rafsanjani’s position varied. Some called him Sakitin, while the neo-
Conservatives considered him the man behind the Fetneh. The remaining factions who 
came out strongly against Mousavi took advantage of this political opportunity offered 
by these events to strengthen their political power. This category included the hard-
line spectrum of the old establishment of the JRM, who kept their close relationship 
with Khamenei, the neo-Conservatives, part of Ahmadinejad circle, and Mesbah and 
his circle. This shift in the factional power balance became a significant element in 
future factional disputes over the Iranian Nuclear Deal and Rouhani’s Presidency 
(2013–the present).  
On the one hand, Fetneh became a rhetorical code name with which many 
Reformists and Moderates were labelled. Many were simply weakened or expelled 
from the political scene. On the other hand, the neo-Conservatives close to Mesbah 
labelled Ahmadinejad’s inner circle as Jaryan-e enherafi and contained its political 
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power. Soon after the election, the old disputes between Ahmadinejad and his 
supporters from the Mesbah camp or the neo-Conservatives surfaced. Fetneh, 
followed by Jaryan-e enherafi, provided a unique political opportunity for these neo-
Conservatives to consolidate their power.  
Therefore, less than four months after Ahmadinejad’s house sit-in, on 28 July 
2011, they established a new political organisation under the name of the 
Stability/Endurance Front (Jebheh-ye Paydari, hereafter Paydari). However, given 
that the neo-Conservatives showed strong support for Ahmadinejad in the 2005 and 
2009 elections, they could not change their position easily.  
Therefore, to justify their new position, they tried to separate Ahmadinejad 
from his circle, arguing that Ahmadinejad himself had been a ‘supporter of 
guardianship’ (‘velayatmadar’), but he needed to re-evaluate his relationship with 
those in his close circle and those who surrounded him. In sum, the establishment of 
Paydar was an attempt by the neo-Conservatives to solidify their power position and 
to institutionalise their identity by differentiating themselves from different political 
groups, including Ahmadinejad and his circle. 
The first statute of Paydari proclaimed that it was a supra-factional organisation 
protecting the Islamic Revolution values. Nonetheless, it distinguished itself from both 
Fetneh and Jaryan-e enherafi and declared its goal as: “the continuation of major 
premises of Khomeini’s school of thought, namely: rationality, spirituality and justice 
centring on the ‘velayat’”119  
This point is clarified in its second statute, which states that:  
Paydari’s membership is open to those who clearly stand against 
‘seditionists’ (fetneh garan) and those who are not part of the 
short-sighted elite (bibasirat) without ‘basirat’ and also have no 
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affiliation or agreement. However small, with Jaryan-e enherafi 
and have not been a member of any futile (batel) parties, such as 
Western Kargozaran and anti-religion Reformists.120  
 
Paydari has Mesbah as its father figure, who confirmed its political 
manifesto.121 Unlike the relationship between Rafsanjani and Kargozaran, or Khatami 
and Mosharekat, Mesbah has an organisational link to Paydari. Paydari has a 
‘jurisprudential committee’ whose membership consists of Mesbah and two other 
clerics, whose main responsibility is to determine the party’s strategy and its general 
policies. 122  Paydari was another aspect of the institutionalisation of Mesbah’s 
doctrine. Paydari is the most radical conservative faction in the IRI factional 
landscape. The main ideological pillars of Paydari are Mesbah’s ideology of the 
Islamic government, which was explained in the third chapter, in addition to the new 
concept of ‘basirat.'123 
By the time of the ninth Majlis election, in light of the fact that the Moderates 
and the Reformists had been sidelined, the divisions between the Conservatives who 
held power escalated. Both segments tried to increase their popular support, which 
influenced the popularisation of politics. The ninth Majlis election (2012) became the 
battleground for different streams of the Conservatives and the neo-Conservatives.  
Therefore, the electoral campaign had different Conservatives and neo-
Conservatives competing with each other. In Tehran alone there were five main 
groups: 1) the ‘United Front of the Conservative's, which had a close affiliation with 
Mahdavi Kani, head of JRM and a prominent traditional Conservative; 2) the ‘Voice 
                                                 
120 Second Statute of Paydari 29/5/1390 (20/August/2011), 
http://www.jebhepaydari.ir/main/index.php?Page=definition&UID=1493. 
121 Fars News 10/5/1390 (1/August/2011), 
http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13910510000278. 
122 Ibid. 
123 Official Website of Paydari, 
http://jebhepaydari.ir/main/index.php?Page=definition&UID=1284039. 
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of the People’ (Seda-ye Mellat), which was established by Ali Motahhari and Ali 
Abbaspour. Ali Motahhari is the son of Morteza Motahhari, a prominent cleric who 
had an important contribution to the ideology of the IRI. Ali Motahhari became one of 
the new political figures from the Conservative camp whose harsh criticisms against 
Ahmadinejad and his controversial views with regards to Fetneh made him famous 
and different from the neo-Conservatives; 3) ‘the Resistance Party’ (Hezb-e Istadegi), 
whose members were those close to Mohsen Rezaee; 4) ‘Basirat and Awakening 
Front’(Jebheh-ye Basirat va Bidari’), led by Shahaboddin Sadr, a group close to 
Paydari; and 5) Paydari. Following the electoral apathy of many pro-Reform camps 
and secular Iranians, the results of this election showed the divide in the systematic 
and organic vote of these groups.  
This internal schism led to the collapse of the Rahrovan coalition, which was 
formed in the eighth Majlis. The Rahpuyan coalition emerged as the main bloc against 
the Paydari in the ninth Majlis, having Ali Larijani as their main candidate for 
speakership.124 Thus the Conservatives had decisively moved toward and expanded 
true popularisation of factional politics.  
There were significant disputes between Ali Larijani and Paydari. These 
disagreements showed themselves in Larijani’s speech in Qom to his constituency, on 
10 February 2013. This was the anniversary of the 1979 Revolution and a few weeks 
after his clash with Ahmadinejad during Black Friday. Larijani’s speech was disrupted. 
He had shoes and ‘prayer stamps’ (mohr) thrown at him, while the crowd shouted 
slogans stressing the lack of ‘basirat’ in Larijani.125  
An inquiry by the ninth Majlis concluded that these actions were systemically 
                                                 
124 Khabar Online 7/3/1391 (27/May/2012). 
125 Slogans such as: ‘Shame on you’ (‘khejalat’), ‘Basirat, Basirat,' or ‘[You are] one of those elites 
who lacked Basirat.' 
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organised and found clerics close to Paydari and Mesbah’s Imam Khomeini Institute, 
namely the Parto circle, to be responsible. Based on this inquiry, the intelligence 
institutions, the governor of Qom and the IRGC branch of Qom also showed 
incompetence in the field of duty. This inquiry also confirmed that these groups were 
responsible for similar previous actions against political figures, including the 
disruption of Rafsanjani’s speech in Qom (2006), and the disturbance of Hassan 
Khomeini’s speech, the grandson of Khomeini, on the anniversary of Khomeini’s 
death (2010).126  
Khamenei also reacted to this event:  
I am against this trend that some people go to the streets and call 
people anti-velayat-e faqih, and/or without ‘basirat’ to accuse 
them. I do not agree with what happened in Qom (the Ali Larijani 
event). I do not agree with what happened at Khomeini’s shrine 
(the disturbance in the Hassan Khomeini speech). I warned the 
officials about these events. If these people are Hezbollahi and 
faithful people, they should not take these actions.127  
 
These so-called ‘spontaneous’ (khod jush) activities could also be analysed in 
the framework of the popularisation of politics. By this time, Khamenei was 
increasingly trying to organise popular groups to defend his line in response to the 
popular Green Movement as well as Ahmadinejad’s attempts to popularise politics. 
However, the problem emerged when these groups, more often than not, acted 
spontaneously, given their understandings of Khamenei’s wishes.  
So, in other words, on the one hand, Khamenei was trying to institutionalise 
popular support through these groups to defend his position, but the flip side of that 
was that he could not control these groups all the time. This point was reflected in what 
happened in Qom during Larijani’s speech. It was one of the first so-called 
                                                 
126 Aftab 15/5/1392 (6/August/2013), http://aftabnews.ir/fa/news/204493/. 
127 Ibid.  
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‘spontaneous’ (khod jush) activities of these hard-line groups which faced the explicit 
disapproval of Khamenei. Arguably, Khamenei’s increasing dependence on the neo-
Conservatives, given the 2009 election events and his continuous disputes with 
Ahmadinejad, had led to the empowerment of the neo-Conservatives.  
However, Khamenei’s reliance on this faction could impose a challenge to his 
position. The neo-Conservatives increasingly used these so-called ‘spontaneous 
reactions’ for political purposes. They justified these actions by the concepts of 
‘basirat’ and the defence of ‘velayat-e motlaqeh-ye faqih’. However, when Khamenei 
decided to support some policies against their views, some of their activities emerged 
against Khamenei’s wishes. An example of this situation is the invasion of the British 
Embassy in 2011 and Saudi Embassy by these groups in 2016.128  
Importantly, all of these domestic political events were unfolding in a 
geopolitical context. The continuation of UN sanctions targeting Iranian banking and 
financial services, as well as its export of oil, the threat of foreign bombing of nuclear 
sites, the emergence of the Arab uprisings and their evolutions, the US withdrawal 
from Iraq and Afghanistan, the intensifying of conflicts in Syria, and Turkey’s change 
of foreign policy, were some of these geopolitical challenges.  
These elements significantly influenced IRI domestic politics and its 
popularisation. For instance, Khamenei’s increasing use of security rhetoric, and the 
large involvement of the IRGC and Basij in different aspects of the sociopolitical and 
economic spheres, were justified under these geopolitical challenges and their possible 
security threats. Following the Arab Uprising, both Karroubi and Mousavi were placed 
                                                 
128 Following the Saudi’s execution of Nimr al Nimr, a Shia cleric, the Saudi Embassy in Tehran was 
stormed by these groups. This was after the nuclear deal, during the time when Iran was trying to 
reestablish its relations with Western countries. However, Khamenei disapproved of this action. The 
people involved were arrested and tried in court.  
BBC (3/January/2016), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-35216694.    
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under house arrest to nullify their grasp on the Green Movement. Khamenei introduced 
a new discourse of ‘Islamic awakening’ (Bidari-ye Islami) to provide some 
explanation for these popular uprisings that were sweeping the MENA region.  
Furthermore, Ahmadinejad’s attempts to construct a new discourse, based on a 
mixture of nationalism, Iraniyyat surrounding pre-Islamic ancient symbols, 
civilisational heritage, along with elements of religious mysticism and apocalyptic 
hidden Imam paradigms, were to a significant extent, responses to these geopolitical 
challenges. There were also more complicated consequences.  
Arguably, the sanctions, within the context of the escalating state security 
apparatus, opened the door for the institutionalisation of corruption; or in other words, 
state-supported corruption. To bypass the tight financial sanctions imposed by the 
West and to find a way to transfer Iran’s income from its exports back into the country, 
various laws and procedures were compromised. Transparency was portrayed as an 
unfavourable element, due to security reasons under the sanction regime. Therefore, 
sanctions became an excuse for systematic corruption. Consequently, a new economic 
class emerged by taking advantage of this situation. They were called the ‘sanction 
traders’ (dallalan-e tahrim).   
Conclusion 
The controversial 2009 Presidential election and its aftermath was a turning point in 
popular politics and the popularisation of factional politics. It represented the 
confrontation of social forces demanding change in the IRI political approaches to the 
‘role of people’ with totalitarian measures of the Conservative factions and guardian 
institutions of the Islamic/revolutionary pillar. In sum, in response to various social, 
economic, political, legitimacy and geopolitical challenges, Khamenei and 
Ahmadinejad increased the security apparatus of the state, strengthening the loyal 
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forces of IRI security institutions by providing them with more opportunities for rent 
seeking. The Green Movement was suppressed.  
 Consequently, the guardian institutions and Khamenei in particular, gained 
great institutional authority, arguably at the expense of their/his popular legitimacy. 
Therefore, in order to compensate for this weakness, he strengthened a new class of 
political spectrum, Mesbah and the neo-Conservatives, a new religious group, 
Maddah, and those factions within the IRGC who proved their loyalty in these events.  
 Furthermore, in order to compensate for legitimacy challenges, the nuclear 
ambitions, continuation of aggressive foreign policy and populist slogans — for a 
domestic audience — were situated at the centre of the IRI policy agenda and 
attempted to boost both their legitimacy and popular support. Khamenei also 
successfully contained the power of his rivals, namely Rafsanjani, prominent JRM 
members and almost all of the Reformists. Therefore, in this period, to a large extent, 
the authoritarian characteristics of the IRI overshadowed its republican characteristics, 
despite the fact that the structure of republican institutions remained unchanged.  
Nonetheless, the continuous confrontation of Ahmadinejad with other 
institutions and Khamenei, in addition to the increasing scale of social discontent 
following the international sanctions and the economic mismanagement of 
Ahmadinejad, was coupled with an ongoing battle to popularise politics. In response 
to the popularisation of politics that took place during the Green Movement and 
Ahmadinejad’s new discourse, Khamenei and his allies, namely the neo-
Conservatives, also moved in the same direction. They tried to indoctrinate their 
followers and increased the activities of their propaganda machine.  
Altogether, these elements created a critical political juncture by the time of the 
2013 Presidential election. Khamenei and the ruling regime, in general, were faced 
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with a difficult decision: either to continue this authoritarian path, or to open political 
space, to a certain extent, and to restore the competitive component of the electoral 
process to a degree; in other words, the restoration of the limited republican 
characteristics of the IRI. They chose the latter, which consequently engendered new 
political dynamics, given the new power balance of factions and the state of society. 
It restored political resilience to the system, due to the dispersion of responsibilities 
and duties, whilst increasing factional disputes on different levels.  
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Chapter Six 
Politics Factional and Policy Foreign Six: Chapter 
The popularisation of factional politics in the domestic sphere was accompanied by a 
gradual electoral popularisation of foreign policy, which reached a peak in the 
Presidential elections of 2013. During these elections, the main foreign policy issue 
dealt with the IRI’s approach to the nuclear negotiations: Should the hardline approach 
of Ahmadinejad and Khamenei continue? Or should Tehran be prepared to make 
concessions in the negotiating process and thus adopt a foreign policy open to limited 
cooperation with the West?  
The first section of this chapter explores the important elements of Khomeinism 
that played varying roles in the popularisation of IRI foreign policy in the post-
Khomeini Era. The second section explores the main foreign policy issues in post-
Khomeini Iran, the reasons for their importance in factional politics, and the 
approaches of the individual factions to these issues in electoral politics. Within this 
section, the roles of geopolitical changes and the dominant Iranian interpretations of 
them in these factional politics are also examined. The last section provides a review 
of the two main approaches in foreign policy by the time of the 2013 Presidential 
election, focusing on IRI foreign policy doctrines in regard to the West and the US.  
Khomeinism and the Rhetorical Popularisation of Foreign Policy 
IRI foreign policy, during the Khomeini period, was a mixture of revolutionary slogans 
and decisions— a degree of pragmatism allowed to the regime by Khomeini’s unique 
position as the revolution’s charismatic leader. The IRI followed a revolutionary, 
ideological foreign policy, whose main pillars were: 1) the export of the revolution, 2) 
rejection of geopolitical dependence on countries of the West and Communist East 
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(neither West nor East), 3) campaign against world hegemony and arrogance, 4) 
independence and self-sufficiency, and 5) Islamic unity and solidarity.1   
 Khomeini, as the Father of the Revolution, was able to justify contradictory 
foreign policies as circumstances demanded. Nonetheless, rhetorical aspects of foreign 
policy, the anti-West and anti-US slogans, remained an effective state-mechanism 
means to mobilise the people behind Khomeini.  
The rhetoric of anti-imperialism, anti-Americanism and anti-Westernism 
reflected strong sentiments during the 1979 Revolution. This united all opposition 
groups, from Leftist secular and Islamist- to- Conservative clerical- to the Pahlavi 
regime. The hostage crisis institutionalised enmity with the US and the West as a 
defining criteria of being a true revolutionary.2  
In September 1980, amid the hostage crisis, Iran faced yet another serious 
existential geopolitical crisis when Iraq invaded. The war came to play a defining role 
in IRI domestic and international rhetoric, in which revolutionary Iran, in its struggle 
against invading Iraq, was also fighting against the country’s traditional imperialist 
enemies, the USA, the USSR, and great European powers.  
If the start of the war was not in the hands of Iran, the decision to continue the 
war, [after the liberation of Khorramshahr, a border city in the south-west of Iran, in 
May 1982,] and to reject Iraqi calls for a ceasefire in June 1982, was, to a large extent, 
a choice made by the IRI. These decisions were influenced by the popular and 
mobilising slogan, ‘War, War up until victory,' in which both the elite and the masses 
                                                 
1 Rouhollah K Ramazani, Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Response in the Middle East (JHU 
Press, 1988); Kaveh L Afrasiabi, After Khomeini: New Directions in Iran's Foreign Policy (Westview 
Pr, 1994); ”Ideology and Pragmatism in Iran's Foreign Policy," The Middle East Journal 58, no. 4 
(2004) 1-11; Independence without Freedom: Iran's Foreign Policy (University of Virginia Press, 
2013). 
2 Joe D Hagan, "Domestic Political Explanations in the Analysis of Foreign Policy," Foreign Policy 
Analysis: Continuity and Change in Its Second Generation  (1995): 117-43, 
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believed. Khomeini and the IRI used such revolutionary, anti-West, anti-US, and anti-
Iraqi rhetoric to keep society mobilised behind the causes of the war. However, the 
slogans were not just politically cynical attempts to achieve this goal. The elite at this 
time believed in these slogans.  
However, divisions emerged in the elite over the continuation of the war, as a 
result of several domestic and international dynamics. The regime had used the 
political and emotional atmosphere generated first by the hostage crisis and then Iraq’s 
invasion of the country to neutralise its actual and potential enemies. This included 
Communist groups, the National Front headed by Bazargan, and the MEK. The regime 
was domestically stable by the mid-1980s. Concerns raised that a complete victory 
over Iraq could, perhaps, not be achieved. To address these emerging divisions, 
Khomeini, in one of his statements, quoted a Quranic verse and rephrased the slogan 
to “War, War until the elimination of ‘sedition’ (Fetneh) from the world."3  
Despite this emphasis on the continuation of the war, disagreements and 
worries remained. As explored in Chapter One, they represented the early signs of 
factionalisation within the elite. The IRGC promoted an offensive approach with long-
term plans for the elimination of Saddam Hussein himself. Meanwhile, Rafsanjani 
pushed for one major victory, to obtain better leverage in negotiating a peace 
agreement.  
This reflected Rafsanjani’s traditional pragmatism in foreign policy. Years 
later, an IRGC navy commander in the war, Admiral Ali Shamkhani, in an interview 
with Kayhan, described the different approaches of this period: “Khomeini’s slogan 
was ‘War, War until the elimination of Fetneh,’ while the IRGC propagated the slogan 
                                                 
3 Khomeini, Sahifeh, vol.19, 332. 
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of ‘War, War, until complete victory’ and Rafsanjani pushed for ‘War, War, until a 
victory.’"4 The war ended in 1988 with no clear winner.  
The successful completion of the war had become an essential part of IRI 
ideology and popular participation in this endeavour and was propagated as a religious 
national duty of its citizens. Therefore, ending the war before the achievement of 
complete victory presented political and legitimacy challenges to the regime. It could 
be perceived by society as the IRI’s abandoning revolutionary goals and surrendering 
to the realities of the world order. Nonetheless, Khomeini accepted the need to end the 
war.  
This step was another example of his pragmatic approach to foreign policy and 
his unique ability to take policy decisions that were, or seemingly, in contradiction 
with pillars of IRI ideology and slogans. He had shown this pragmatism earlier. In 
1985, he approved a secret arms deal with the Reagan administration, the (in)famous 
Iran-Contra scandal. In 1982, another occasion, in contrast to the rhetoric exportation 
of the revolution and the support of the Islamic nation, ommat, he did not agree to 
deploy part of the IRGC and/or army to engage in the Israeli-Lebanese conflict.  
This pragmatism, consequent ideologically contradicting policies and 
decisions, continue to provide factions in the post-Khomeini period with the 
opportunity to assume opposing positions. All while claiming to be the true 
representatives of Khomeinism. In addition to his worldview, there were other 
elements which exercised varied influences on Khomeini’s decisions: a) ideological 
factional disputes between different blocs of IRI politics, the Traditional Right and the 
Left; and/or b) particular political figures, such as Rafsanjani, Khomeini’s son Ahmad, 
and Khamenei.  
                                                 
4 Kayhan  8/7/1391 (29/September/2012). 
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However, it was Khomeini who made the final decision. To repeat, his unique 
position allowed him to make final, sometimes contradictory decisions on major 
foreign policies. This model was, however, impossible to continue after his death. 
Despite this pragmatism, he also showed a tougher side in the wake of his 
decision to end the war. In 1988, a few weeks after the ceasefire, in an attempt to 
overthrow the IRI, militias of the MEK, living in Iraq invaded Iran. Their mission 
failed. Khomeini, taking advantage of this attack, ordered the overnight execution of 
many political prisoners who supported it and Tudeh. This incident played, and 
continues to play, an important role in factional politics and the image of Khomeini, 
as well as in state-society relations. In February 1989, following the publication of the 
Satanic Verses, Khomeini called its author, Salman Rushdie, an infidel and issued a 
death decree against him. This decree provoked harsh reactions within the West. One 
could argue that, given the way the war ended, Khomeini hoped, with these decisions, 
to reinforce his image as a powerful leader. 
In sum, under Khomeini, the role of the people in foreign policy was minimal. 
In reality, on the one hand, the IRI used particular slogans associated with foreign 
policy to express their true beliefs; on the other hand, they used them to ensure popular 
support for their decisions. This process was, in reality, the rhetorical popularisation 
of foreign policy and it distinguished the IRI from the deposed Pahlavi regime. The 
public arena was not the site of discussions and debates about the elements and 
trajectory of IRI foreign policy. Rather, it was an arena for the rhetorical mobilisation 
of the people around the regime, its foreign policy, and the struggle against the West 
and the East.  
After Khomeini’s death, Rafsanjani, as part of his move towards rationalisation 
of the revolution, established the Supreme Council for National Security (SCNS). This 
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was to fill the need for an institution responsible for decision-making on major IRI 
national security issues in the post-Khomeini era. The hybrid characteristic of the IRI 
is reflected in the structure of the SCNS. The President chairs it, while the Supreme 
Leader appoints personal representatives to it— one of whom is its Secretary General 
appointed by the President. All major electoral and revolutionary/Islamic institutions 
have a representative in the SCNS. SCNS legislation needs to be approved by the 
Supreme Leader.5 The SCNS became one of the main institutions responsible for 
defining foreign policy doctrine, and, arguably, the institutional symbol of the entire 
official IRI elite in the post-Khomeini era. 
Electoral Popularisation of Foreign Policy  
The IRI’s relationship with the West and the US remained one of the main foreign 
policy issues in the post-Khomeini era. The fundamental issue was whether Tehran 
should have relations with countries of the West and, if so, the extent of these relations. 
These questions were not unique to the IRI, nor were they new in Iranian history. 
Similar to the experience of many non-Western countries faced with the military, 
technological and economic advancement of the West, Iran’s history for over the last 
three centuries has been, to a large extent, shaped by its historical contact with the 
West, which has gone through different phases.  
 On a state and intellectual level, Iran, during the late Qajar and Pahlavi periods, 
believed in implementing cultural, economic, and social Westernisation to overcome 
Iran’s backwardness vis-à-vis the West. However, by the mid-1960s, in the growing 
popularity of Third Worldism and intense Pahlavi Westernisation, the Iranian 
intelligentsia and then popular opinion, began a search for the definition of, and path 
                                                 
5 IRI Constitution article:176 
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to, true Iranian cultural authenticity and national identity. By the time of the 
Revolution of 1979, the rejection of Westernisation and calls for a return to Iranian 
cultural authenticity and national identity were major elements in the revolutionary 
mobilising and subsequent official IRI ideology, as noted in previous chapters.   
In the post-Khomeini and post-Cold War period the IRI faced new challenges 
to its official ideology regarding national cultural and political authenticity. New 
theories dealing with topics, such as globalisation, the clash of civilisations, the end of 
history, and transition to democracy, found their way into the academic and intellectual 
debates of the IRI and the public debates. These new theories also shaped the elite’s 
perception of the new world order and thus affected the IRI’s foreign policy decision-
making. The study of these conceptions and their effect on the IRI’s politics is beyond 
the scope of this thesis.  
However, these historical and cultural perceptions of the West together played 
an important role in the context in which IRI factional politics dealt with the issue of 
the country’s opening the country to the West. This section briefly investigates the 
extent to which the question of the IRI’s relationship with the West has interrelated 
with the evolution of factional politics and its popularisation. It also aims to investigate 
the effect of contingent geopolitical incidents and/or the interpretation of these 
incidents on the popularisation of foreign policy until the 2013 Presidential election.  
One of the main pillars of Rafsanjani’s programme of Tose’eh was the 
normalisation of IRI relations with neighbouring countries and the West.6 As explored 
in Chapter Two, in response to the rising economic, cultural and sociopolitical 
challenges of the war, and Khomeini’s death, Rafsanjani initiated a series of policies 
                                                 
6 Eva Patricia Rakel, "Iranian Foreign Policy since the Iranian Islamic Revolution: 1979-2006," 
Perspectives on Global development and Technology 6 no. 1 (2007): 170–171. 
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focusing on economic reform. For the success of his economic reforms, Rafsanjani 
needed sociopolitical stability, foreign financial investment and international financial 
organisation loans. In 2009, he summarised his policies: Our foreign policy doctrine 
was ‘normalisation.'  We improved our relationship with the West and then we 
succeeded in using Western [technological and financial] capabilities for 
reconstruction projects… We also befriended our neighbours.”7   
To implement this ‘normalisation’ Rafsanjani, with the initial support of 
Khamenei, modified IRI ideology to justify the shift in foreign policy. He had limited 
success in this endeavor. On the one hand, the Leftists, due to the end of the Cold War 
and their political elimination at the hands of the Conservatives, were no longer in a 
position to oppose Rafsanjani’s moves toward the West and the guiding of the 
economy toward a more liberal market one.  
As these policies gained momentum, new elements in the context of factional 
politics came to challenge his approach. The Conservatives regarded Rafsanjani’s 
export-oriented economy, the creation of the ‘mercantile bourgeoisie’ class, and the 
sociocultural consequences of Tose’eh, a threat to their social support base and their 
trade-oriented economy. As mentioned earlier, the factional dynamic between 
Khamenei and Rafsanjani led the former to strengthen his ideological and institutional 
ties with the Conservatives. An important part of his consolidation of power and 
struggle against Rafsanjani became his slogan of ‘cultural onslaught’ by the West 
against the sacred and authentic values of Islam, whose source and only defender was 
the IRI. Together these elements made ideologically and politically difficult moves 
toward the US and the West. 
In addition to factional elements, two geopolitical incidents in Rafsanjani’s 
                                                 
7 Rafsanjani 14/10/1388 (5/November/2009),  http://rafsanjani.ir/view.php?id=13319. 
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second Presidential term undermined normalisation with the West:  The first being, 
the murder of Iranian-Kurdish dissidents in 1992, in Mykonos restaurant in Berlin, 
Germany, allegedly on the IRI’s order. The second being, the alleged involvement of 
the IRI in the 1996 Shia dissidents bombing of the US military camp, Khobar Tower, 
in Saudi Arabia, that provoked the imposition of sanctions by the Clinton 
administration on Iran (the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996).8  
The hostage crisis and events such as these meant that the US approach to Iran 
was consistently tougher than that of the EU. Since 1992, EU official policy, with 
regard to Iran was based on the idea of ‘critical dialogue,' which was, to a large extent, 
based on its emphasis on the attractiveness of the West’s ‘soft power’ and on 
constructive engagement with Iran.9  
On 11 April 1997, the court in charge of the Mykonos incident convicted 
Iranian officials. Rafsanjani, Khamenei and Ali Akbar Velayati, without explicitly 
being named, were convicted of ordering the assassination of the Kurdish dissidents. 
A few months earlier, an international arrest warrant was also issued for the 
Intelligence Minister, Ali Fallahian.  
A diplomatic crisis dominated the final months of Rafsanjani’s tenure. Almost 
all European countries recalled their ambassadors.10 The EU’s ‘critical dialogue’ was 
                                                 
8 Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as Amended 50 U.S.C. § 1701; New York Times (24/July/1996), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/07/24/world/foreigners-investing-in-libya-or-in-iran-face-us-
sanctions.html;  
 Ali M Ansari, Confronting Iran: The Failure of American Foreign Policy and the Next Great Crisis 
in the Middle East (Basic books, 2007). 
9 Robert D Blackwill and Michael Stürmer, Allies Divided: Transatlantic Policies for the Greater 
Middle East (MIT Press, 1997); Bernd Kaussler, "European Union Constructive Engagement with 
Iran (2000–2004): An Exercise in Conditional Human Rights Diplomacy," Iranian Studies 41, no. 3 
(2008): 269-295. 
10 New York Times, 11 April 1997, http://www.nytimes.com/1997/04/11/world/berlin-court-
says-top-iran-leaders-ordered-killings.html?pagewanted=all; K. Pollack, The Persian Puzzle: 
Deciphering the Twenty-Five-Year Conflict between the United States and Iran (Random House 
Publishing Group, 2004); Seyyed Hossein Mousavian, Iran-Europe Relations: Challenges and 
Opportunities, (Routledge, 2008). 
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undermined and the US ‘containment’ policy gained momentum. From the point of 
view of domestic critics of Rafsanjani’s foreign policy, his eight years of normalisation 
efforts and détente ended with US sanctions, and a reinvigorated anti-IRI stance of the 
countries of the West.  
Khatami’s paradigm of political development had the normalisation of relations 
with the West at its centre, but had a different approach to that of Rafsanjani. He 
believed success in normalisation of relations, even economic relations, with the West 
required an initial ideological and political approach. Thus, Khatami utilised the 
discourse of the ‘dialogue of civilisations’ which underlined the philosophical shared 
values and goals between civilisations.  
Khatami’s and the Reformist's paradigm of ‘religious democracy’ was an 
attempt to reconcile Islam with different elements of the so-called Western model of 
democracy. Khatami’s emphasis on citizens’ rights, civil society and the rule of law 
were all perceived as the introduction of a new discourse that included values shared 
by the West. Therefore, the general conclusion in the West was that Khatami’s election 
was an additional sign of the IRI distancing itself from its revolutionary phase, which 
would evolve into detente with the West, and possibly the US.  
While the Khatami Presidency was a turning point in the popularisation of 
factional politics, this popularisation became an important challenge to the success of 
détente in foreign policy. In January 1998, soon after his election, in an interview with 
CNN, Khatami signaled his willingness to expand the IRI’s relationship with the West 
and the US.11 In September 1998, in his speech to the UN General Assembly, he 
promoted the discourse of the ‘dialogue of civilisations.' His views in regard to foreign 
policy were shared by Hassan Rouhani, the SCNS secretary general, Rafsanjani, and 
                                                 
11 Transcript of interview with IranianPresidentMohammad Khatami, CNN (7 January 1998), 
http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9801/07/iran/interview.html. 
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many figures amongst Reformists and the Modern Right. This relative unity provided 
him with political capital to follow his foreign policy.  
However, the Conservatives and Khamenei, whose authority had already been 
weakened by the election of Khatami, considered Khatami’s foreign policy approach 
a possible threat to their authority.  In response, they increased their anti-Western 
rhetoric.  Thus, whilst Khatami spoke about the dialogue of civilisations and the 
possibility of improved relations with the West, Khamenei articulated more than in the 
past the idea of a ‘cultural onslaught’ led by the West against Iran. The underlying 
message was that the West, headed by the USA, was determined to undermine the IRI 
by first destroying Iranian cultural authenticity and national identity. Khamenei 
ascribed to Huntington’s idea of ‘Clash of Civilisations.’ These conflicting messages 
coming out of Tehran which were also indicators of domestic factional politics, 
weakened any enthusiasm and willingness in the West, and especially in the USA, to 
make major positive moves in regard to the IRI.  
Similar to Rafsanjani’s tenure, geopolitical contingent incidents influenced the 
normalisation of relations with the West and the US during the Khatami era. Close to 
the end of his first term of Presidency, the 11 September attacks by Al-Qaeda on the 
US took place. They were followed by the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the 
invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the US foreign policy doctrine of War on Terror. These 
events influenced the electoral popularisation of foreign policy. 
The IRI was one of the first countries to condemn the attacks of 11 September. 
Khatami sent a message a few hours after the attack expressing his sympathy for the 
victims. In Tehran, many Iranians held candlelit vigils to show respect for the victims. 
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Khamenei also condemned the attacks.12  
When the US attacked Afghanistan, the IRI elite was divided on how to react. 
Khatami and his foreign policy team persuaded Khamenei to co-operate with the US. 
As a result, despite Khamenei’s pessimism with regard to trusting the US, the IRI 
provided intelligence to the US, mobilised in favour of US actions its anti-Taliban 
allies and, beginning in December 2001, provided financial and political aid in the 
rebuilding of Afghanistan.  
The supporters of cooperation, Khatami and his team, along with Rouhani and 
Rafsanjani, argued that the IRI’s national interests now converged with US interests 
in Afghanistan. Such support of US actions could play a decisive role in changing 
negative perceptions of the IRI in the international arena and show it could be a reliable 
geopolitical partner in the region if IRI concerns were addressed by the US. This 
position was similar to that taken by Tehran during the First Persian Gulf War (1990–
1991).  
However, George W. Bush dealt a serious blow to this IRI foreign policy 
approach when, in his State of Union Speech of January 2002, he called Iran, along 
with Iraq and North Korea, members of an ‘axis of evil.' He proclaimed: “Iran 
aggressively pursues these weapons and exports terror, while an unelected few repress 
the Iranian people’s hope for freedom.” 13  Khatami was personally offended. 
Khamenei reacted: “The IRI is proud that it is the subject of anger and wrath of the 
most hateful of all devils."  
                                                 
12 For Khatami’s message:  
CNN (12/September/2001), http://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/09/12/mideast.reaction/.  
For Khamenei’s message:   
BBC World (17/September/2001), http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/1549573.stm. 
13 The White House Archive, The President’s State of Union Speech, https://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html. 
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Khamenei stated in response to Bush’s claim that small unelected group ruled 
the people: “In contrast to the hollow and insipid election of the West, the IRI officials 
are elected based on the majority of the vote and the emotional support of the 
people.”14 This new US approach to the IRI had a series of consequences on different 
levels within the wider framework of factional politics and IRI foreign policy, given 
the strong historical pessimism about the ultimate motives of the US and the West held 
by a large number of IRI political and military elites. 
 Bush’s portrayal of the IRI played an important role in the electoral 
popularisation of foreign policy. Khamenei had shown his sensitivity, in this regard, a 
few years earlier in 2000, with the then Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright. 
Apologising for the role of the US in the 1953 coup against the democratically elected 
government of Mossaddeq, divided the IRI into two different segments:—elected and 
unelected. Albright commented:  
As in any diverse society, there are many currents swirling about in 
Iran. Some are driving the country forward; others are holding it back. 
Despite the trend towards democracy, control over the military, 
judiciary, courts and police remains in unelected hands, and the 
elements of its foreign policy, about which we are most concerned, 
have not improved. But the momentum in the direction of internal 
reform, freedom and openness is growing stronger.15  
 
 This portrayal of the regime as two segments, popular-elected and unpopular-
unelected, was seen by part of the regime as a new conspiracy and a plot by the US to create 
divisions between state and society in IRI. Mohammad Javad Zarif, the Iranian Foreign Affairs 
Minister and, at the time, Iran’s representative in the UN, illustrated this issue in his memoir: 
The main aim of Mrs Albright’s speech was to erase the past. 
However this speech created a whole new obstacle in Iran–US 
relations, namely [the concept of] elected officials and unelected 
officials. In other words, it divided Iran’s political society or [its] 
                                                 
14 Khamenei 11/11/1380 (31/January/2002), http://farsi.khamenei.ir/news-content?id=968. 
15 Madeline Albright, "Remarks before the American-Iranian Council," Retrieved November 10 
(2000),  http://fas.org/news/iran/2000/000317.htm. 
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regime into two groups, and underlined that those who were elected 
in this recent election (the sixth Majlis) were good and those who were 
not elected were bad… this in fact was questioning the [legitimacy of 
the IRI] political system. From the perspective of a large number of 
Iranian decision makers, the main point of Mrs. Albright’s speech was 
to undertake a deceitful move in the hope of dividing Iranian 
officials.16    
 
 In domestic politics, the Reformists hoped to take advantage of the foreign 
policy crisis in favour of their domestic factional interest. However, their attempts to 
take advantage of the international situation after Bush’s speech aggravated their 
relationship with Khamenei even further and led to deeper mutual mistrust. Within this 
context, and at the height of factional politics, in May 2002, a few months after Bush’s 
speech to capitalise on what they perceived as a political opportunity, Reformist MPs 
of the sixth Majlis wrote a letter to Khamenei putting him under pressure to limit 
restrictive actions of the GC and to allow the passing of the ‘twin bills (lavayeh)’… 
Perhaps in the tumultuous history of contemporary Iran, no 
period has been as critical as today… The current situation is 
unique because the [domestic factional] sociopolitical schisms 
have coincided with external threats and US plans for changing 
the geopolitical map of this region. Thus, the regime must 
inevitably act and respond to these actions.  
 
 They pushed their agenda by linking the IRI’s national security with the 
empowerment of electoral institutions and the weakening of parallel Islamic 
revolutionary ones:  
It is not tanks, cannons, missiles, or military arms that can nullify 
these external threats. It is the enhancement of the regime’s 
legitimacy, national unity and the unity of the nation and the 
state…. And this is only possible if the nation (mellat) is assured 
that its will, demands and votes could be a source of change…. 
National unity means submission to the vote of the people, it 
means all [of us to] be with the people, that ‘people’s votes is the 
yardstick’ (Khomeini’s quote). [Thus] adherence to this 
interpretation of national unity not only can neutralise foreign 
threats, but also can transform [these] threats into opportunities. 
                                                 
16 Mohammad Mehdi Rajii, Aqa-ye Safir ( Mr. Ambassedor) Interview with Mohammad J. Zarif 
(Nashr-e Ney, 2013):  212. 
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 At the end, by accusing Khamenei of hypocrisy, they argued: “One cannot promote 
free elections in that country [Iraq] from Friday prayer sermons while at the same time 
depriving one’s own people from such a basic right.”17 Arguably, Khamenei could perceive 
these comments as resonating with what the US and Bush were promoting and what he 
considered to be a US conspiracy.  
The ‘Axis of Evil’ doctrine influenced, to a certain extent, the IRI’s foreign 
policy approach with regard to the West and the US through reinforcing certain 
perceptions of the IRI’s political elites about the US and the West. The doctrine was 
the symbol of the essentialist neo-Conservative approach to US foreign policy. It was 
based on the idea that the US granted itself the right to rage war against whoever the 
US considered to be a terrorist or a supporter of terrorists.18  
This doctrine confirmed the image of the US constructed by Khamenei. 
Meanwhile, US pre-emptive attacks on Iraq, as well as increasing pressure on the 
Iranian nuclear programme, was perceived by part of the IRI elites as confirmation of 
their perception that the main US policy goal was the overthrow of the IRI. Therefore, 
the IRI considered the US to be an existential threat. It was the same position that the 
US had during the first decade of the IRI.  
Tehran’s cooperation with the US stopped. This US doctrine also influenced 
IRI foreign policy calculations in Iraq. The IRI’s policy now focused on ensuring that 
Iraq did not become a “client state of the US." They also had to ensure that the Shi’a 
majority would gain its share of power. From Washington’s point of view IRI policy 
in Iraq was adding to its difficulties in Iraq. Thus, “as the problems of the US 
                                                 
17 BBC Persian (4/February/2004), 
http://www.bbc.com/persian/iran/story/2004/02/040217_mps_letter_to_leader.shtml. 
18 Andrew J Bacevich and Elizabeth H Prodromou, "God Is Not Neutral: Religion and Us Foreign 
Policy after 9/11," Orbis 48, no. 1 (2005): 43-54; Mark LeVine, Why They Don't Hate Us: Lifting the 
Veil on the Axis of Evil (Oneworld Publications, 2013). 
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occupation became apparent, Iran has been emboldened to use its ability to support the 
insurgency in Iraq as a way of pressuring the US not to attack its nuclear facilities.”19  
A few months after Bush’s ‘axis of evil’ speech the MEK exposed the IRI’s 
activities in nuclear facilities in Arak and Natanz. The Iranian nuclear programme was 
placed under international scrutiny. It dominated the main IRI foreign policy agenda 
for the next decade. In September 2003, a few months after the US-Iraq invasion, The 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors adopted a resolution 
calling for Iran to suspend all its enrichment-related activities. After this resolution, in 
response to the request of Kamal Kharrazi, the Iranian Foreign Minister at the time, 
SCNS took charge of handling the issue.  
Hassan Rouhani became the chief negotiator. Iran voluntarily suspended its 
nuclear programme and invited European leaders to find a diplomatic solution. Iran 
also signed the additional protocol to Iran’s NPT safeguards agreement, an additional 
document which “grants the IAEA complementary legal authority to verify a state’s 
safeguards obligations.” 20  A series of negotiations followed. In July 2004, Iran 
resumed its enrichment programme, following domestic political pressure, and in 
August 2005, after a series of proposals and counter proposals, Iran agreed to 
temporarily suspend its uranium enrichment activities in exchange for a series of 
concessions.  
However, the agreement failed, given that the next IRI Presidential election was 
                                                 
19 Kamran Taremi, "Iranian Foreign Policy Towards Occupied Iraq, 2003-05," Middle East Policy 12, 
no. 4 (2005): 28-47. 
20 IAEA official website: https://www.iaea.org/safeguards/safeguards-legal-framework/additional-
protocol.  
For general timeline of these resolutions, see: https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iran/chronology-
of-key-events.  
For the period of 2002-2004 see:  
Great Britain. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Iran's Nuclear Programme: A Collection of 
Documents (Stationery Office, 2005); Joachim Krause, Iran’s Nuclear Programme: Strategic 
Implications (Taylor & Francis, 2012). 
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approaching. A few months later Ahmadinejad became the President, Ali Larijani 
replaced Rouhani and the Iranian diplomatic approach changed. Rouhani considers his 
handling of the negotiations to be a success. He stressed that he prevented the referral 
of Iran’s nuclear programme case from the IAEA to the UNSC. He claimed he used 
the negotiations to set a framework for Iran’s future co-operation with the West in 
order to reach a long-term strategic alliance. 21  The question of how successful 
Rouhani’s approach returned to public political debate eight years later, during the 
2013 Presidential election.   
Importantly, in light of the fact that by the time of the Khatami Era the general 
IRI foreign policy doctrine was conceived at the top of the regime with a framework 
of relative collective decision-making. Thus, the weight of different players in the 
decision-making centres, such as SCNS, would be a significant element in the 
selection of one direction of foreign policy over the other. Khamenei’s extent of 
influence has also dependended on his authority relative to that of other main political 
players.  
Zarif confirmed this approach:  
In all the time I was in charge, even one word has not been 
announced without the permission of the Supreme Leader. Of 
course it is possible that the Leader accepted some issues, such 
as suspension of the [nuclear activity] half-heartedly, but based 
on what I heard from a large number of friends, his (Khamenei’s) 
method in [decision-making] over these years was in such a way 
that he respected the collective decision and, in higher-level 
meetings, has made decisions after consensus.  
 
The Reformist’s return to power reflected the popularisation of domestic 
politics. It was during Ahmadinejad’s two terms as President that the popularisation 
of foreign policy escalated. Khamenei had gained more influence in decision-making 
                                                 
21 Hassan Rouhani, Amniyyat-e Melli Diplomasi-ye Hasteh-ei [National Security and Nuclear policy] 
(Markaz-e Tahqiqat-e Esteratejek, 2011). 
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with regard to the relationship with the West and the US, due to different domestic and 
international factors emerging after the election of Ahmadinejad in 2005. First, the 
dynamics of the factional political power balance changed in Khamenei’s favour. 
Second, Khamenei’s pessimism and cynicism regarding the West was reinforced after 
the events of 9/11 and during negotiations with the West over Iran’s nuclear 
programme. Third, the IRGC and security institutions increased their involvement in 
state affairs, securitising the sociopolitical and cultural spheres.  
Meanwhile, Khamenei’s doctrine of ‘cultural onslaught’ gained momentum, 
fueling the anti-Western rhetoric of the state.  This discourse was rephrased by another 
title: the ‘soft war’ (Jang-e Narm). The use of ‘Soft War’ by Khamenei in sermons 
and speeches reflected the degree to which he felt a threat from the West. For example,  
in 2009  his usage of it went up 2000 percent compared to the previous year.22  
Based on this discourse, ‘Soft War’ referred to the attempts of the IRI’s enemies 
to overthrow it by using cultural instruments and modern propaganda tools. The 
enemies of the IRI were aiming to transmute the IRI into a new regime by emasculating 
it from within. By making homo Islamicus question its values and principles, the IRI 
enemies aimed for change him from within. This discourse  largely shared common 
elements with the ‘cultural onslaught’ discourse used during the Rafsanjani period. 
In sum, a new foreign policy discourse emerged, arguing that the West not only 
could not be trusted, but if the IRI wanted to reach its goals, it needed to show 
resistance and implement a more aggressive tone. Or, in other words, instead of 
playing a passive role in the international order, the IRI should play an active role. 
This fear of the ‘soft power’ of the West was not a new element in the IRI, but 
Khamenei institutionalised this fear in IRI discourses. To mobilise their supporters 
                                                 
22 Khamenei’s official website published a comparative chart on the usage of ‘Soft War’ see: 
http://farsi.khamenei.ir/keyword-content?id=1016. 
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behind the new approach in foreign policy, rhetoric was increasingly used in both 
Khamenei’s and Ahmadinejad’s speeches.  
The revolutionary period of Khomeinism foreign policy gave this discourse 
enough material to justify its discourse. This change of foreign policy is depicted in 
the change of the main negotiator of Iran’s nuclear programme and the SCNS secretary 
general. Hassan Rouhani was replaced by Ali Larijani (2005–2007) who was 
subsequently replaced by Saeed Jalili (2007–2013).  
Similar to his populist rhetoric in domestic politics, Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric in 
foreign policy emphasised the return of revolutionary foreign policy that focused on a 
positive vision for the future of the world and the struggle against Western hegemony. 
Iran’s diplomatic and foreign policy rhetoric differed from that of previous 
administrations.  
In this context, Ahmadinejad and his supporters considered Ahmadinejad’s 
controversial comments and unconventional behaviour symbols of challenging the 
hegemonic world order. Ahmadinejad questioned historical aspects of the Holocaust 
while demanding the elimination of Israel from the earth. He sent a series of letters to 
different world leaders, including US Presidents and the Pope, in which he condemned 
the current world order, US politics and underlined the defeat of liberalism and 
Western democracies in meeting human needs. He thus invited them to follow the path 
of the prophets.23  
Almost all of his letters received no reply. He attended every UN General 
Assembly meeting that was held during his Presidency. This was where he denounced 
the US and Israel, as well as questioned the UN’s structure and the world order. He 
called for the need for global management and proclaimed that the Hidden Imam’s 
                                                 
23 BBC Persian (9/May/2006), http://www.bbc.com/persian/iran/story/2006/05/060509_ss-
iranletterbush.shtml. 
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reign will soon come.  
This new foreign policy discourse was reflected in Iran’s approach to the 
negotiations on Iran’s nuclear programme. The IRI retained its nuclear programme, 
raised its medium-level enriched uranium stockpile, and opened new facilities. This 
led to the increased isolation of the IRI in the international community. The Iranian 
nuclear case was referred to the UNSC, where the possibility of future military action 
against the programme was floated. The escalation of sanctions against the IRI, and 
the consequent intensification of rhetorical foreign policy in domestic politics, made 
the foreign policy approach of Ahmadinejad one of the main topics of the 2009 
election. 
As explored in the previous chapter, Mousavi and Karroubi criticised 
Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy by calling it unnecessarily damaging towards the IRI’s 
international standing and national interests. The dynamics of the electoral debates and 
the subsequent contentious events popularised the question of the IRI’s relationship 
with the West and the US.  
However, with the suppression of the Green Movement and the consequent 
securitisation of the sociopolitical domain, the regime restricted public debates about 
foreign policy with regard to the West and the US. The regime, defined as Khamenei, 
Conservatives and neo-Conservatives, increased the mobilisation of its followers with 
the hope of widening its support base. In this sense, it was similar to the rhetorical 
popularisation of foreign policy during the first decade of the IRI. On various 
occasions, the regime used the Basij and other institutions to mobilise their supporters 
in the streets.  They escalated their anti-US rhetoric in order to portray the image of 
popular support for its foreign policy doctrine. To keep his supporters mobilised, 
Khamenei intensified his anti-US rhetoric by introducing new elements into the old 
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discourses and/or constructing new discourses.  
After the 2009 electoral events, while the sanctions against Iran tightened, the 
IRI increased propaganda efforts to show that the sanctions were ineffective and 
underline the positive role of sanctions in making the country self-sufficient.24  In 
addition, large amounts of money was spent on programmes showing IRI self-
sufficiency and development, such as the space programme, sending animals into the 
stratosphere and satellites into orbit.  
Criticising previous administrations for their efforts to make ties with a few 
powerful Western countries with whom the IRI had had the most disagreements, in 
terms of values, and also to counter the image of isolation, the Ahmadinejad 
administration tried to increase its cooperation with other countries who claimed 
shared values. For instance, the IRI expanded its relations with the Chavez government 
in Venezuela, arguing that they both shared anti-hegemonic world order sentiments.  
However, the more that the IRI propagated the ineffectiveness of sanctions, the 
more it solidified the link between the sanctions and deterioration of the living 
standards for most of the Iranian population. Within this discourse was the implicit 
issue of the IRI’s relationship with the West and the US.  
Thus, since these official claims contradicted the reality of the socioeconomic 
situation as experienced by the people its effectiveness was limited. People concluded 
that their deteriorating socioeconomic situation had been a direct outcome of the 
mismanagement of foreign policy. In other words, foreign policy increasingly became 
popularised. Nonetheless, in light of the events of 2009–2010, the IRI sought to use 
the issue of the nuclear programme to strengthen its domestic legitimacy, claiming 
credit for making Iran a member of the exclusive club of nuclear countries, which was 
                                                 
24 Khamenei, 14/11/1390 (3/Februrary/2012), http://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=18923. 
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fighting against Western hegemony. IRI propaganda tried to enflame nationalist 
feelings by drawing a parallel between Mussadeq’s struggle against the British for the 
nationalisation of Iranian oil and the IRI’s struggle with the West over its nuclear 
programme.25  
Ultimately, these propaganda efforts made the nuclear programme, and thus the 
foreign policy, main elements in the electoral popularisation of foreign policy. This 
electoral popularisation of foreign policy reached a peak during the Presidential 
elections of 2013. Foreign policy with regard to the West and the US, became the main 
subject of the electoral debate, over the management of Iran’s nuclear programme 
negotiations.  
Normalisation Doctrine versus Active Doctrine 
By the Presidential elections of 2013, Khatami’s promotion of a ‘dialogue of 
civilisations’ and the ‘normalisation’ of relations, which were offshoots of 
Rafsanjani’s foreign policy, had become a part of electoral politics. Despite their 
differences, these two former Presidents did not share rhetorical anti-West views and 
considered cooperation with the West and integration into the world order the best way 
to secure the IRI’s national interests.  
 They believed this approach would allow the IRI to be able to fulfil part of its 
revolutionary goals and to become a significant geopolitical player, at least in the 
region. In response, the Reformists and the Modern Right were promoting 
normalisation with the West and the US. The Traditional Right gave birth to the neo-
Conservatives, who defined their ideological foreign policy in the mirror of the 
discourses of Rafsanjani and Khatami.  
                                                 
25 For an example of this comparison see:  http://farsi.khamenei.ir/others-note?id=11860. 
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 The main components of their discourse were protection and propagation of 
true revolutionary values, a foreign policy based on pure Islamic values, with anti-
hegemonism as its main pillar, and on struggling against the hegemonic powers of the 
world. They sought renewed propagation of the claimed superiority of the Islamic 
universalist modernity. In IRI political lexicon, the first general approach is referred 
to as the ‘normalisation doctrine.’ The second one is called the ‘active doctrine,' which 
has other labels, including ‘threat containment,' ‘revolutionary doctrine’ or sometimes 
‘justice-driven principilism.’  
Saeed Jalili, a second-generation revolutionary similar to Ahmadinejad, is one 
of the main promoters of the ‘active doctrine.' The EU officials who met Jalili during 
their meetings over the Iranian nuclear programme described him as “a true product 
of the Iranian revolution."26 He received his PhD in Political Science from Imam 
Sadeq University, which had been established by Mahdavi Kani to educate the future 
cadres of the IRI. His PhD thesis was entitled the ‘Foreign Policy of the Prophet 
Mohammad.' He was a war veteran and an IRGC member who lost part of his right 
foot in the Iran-Iraq War.  
After a year of serving in the SLO as Khamenei’s consultant, he was appointed 
as his representative to the SCNS in 2002. Jalili criticised the foreign policy of 
Rafsanjani and Khatami while claiming to have a new discourse of foreign policy. 
 Jalili underlines his belief that a strong political theory must be the catalyst for 
the domestic and international actions of any politician. He believes that today’s 
politicians lack such theory and thus their political behavior is only a “caricature” of 
the type of behavior life demands. He has concluded that the main problem of the IRI 
                                                 
26 Reuters (25/February/2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-nuclear-iran-jalili. 
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political elite and factions lay in their lack of comprehensive political theory that sets 
the framework for their actions and thought. 27 
He proposes that “religious thought” is a substantial framework which contains 
the best political theory and model for such thought and actions and offers the path to 
the earthly Islamic utopia. He places the short history of IRI within this discourse, 
arguing that the Islamic Revolution is the depiction of this ideology.  The IRI 
experience of the Iran-Iraq War shows the “practicality” of this discourse.  
He considers the election of Ahmadinejad as another opportunity that emerged 
after “some period of stagnation (implying the Khatami and Rafsanjani 
Presidencies)…”28 He rejects the “de-ideologisation," “de-principalisation” and “de-
idealisation” of foreign policy. Thus, he diagnoses that the main problem in foreign 
policy is the compromising over principles. 29  In response to the normalisation 
discourse of the 16 years of the Khatami and Rafsanjani era, he proposes that our 
principle should be “threats containment."30 He believes that the IRI should have an 
active foreign policy and, instead of being in a weak position, defined as trying to 
justify itself to the world, it should go on the offensive, attacking the hegemonic 
powers using their own standards and language with example from both their domestic 
conditions and support of Israel.  
Jalili’s foreign policy doctrine echoed that of Khamenei, who also linked 
foreign policy with the revolutionary values and Islamic principles of the IRI. In 2003, 
Khamenei proclaimed: “the main principle in the foreign policy of Iran is the 
protection of the identity of the Islamic regime, its principles and values." He then 
                                                 
27 Asr Iran 2/8/1386 (24/October/2007), http://www.asriran.com/fa/news/27767/. 
28 Ibid. 
29  Soureh  9/6/1384 (31/August/2005).  
30 Ibid. 
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argued that these principles should not be compromised: “We should not abandon our 
principle in order to please the West,” since these principles are “our national and 
collective identity."31  
In 2004, amid nuclear negotiations and his pushing for ending the suspension 
of the enrichment programme, he again emphasised this link between the revolution 
and foreign policy.32 Almost a month later, in September 2004, in the same context, 
by quoting a Quranic verse, Khamenei declared that ‘persistent’ protection of values a 
main element in his foreign policy doctrine. Jalil follows this line.33 Khamenei argued 
that “our motto in the pursuit of our goals and our principle should be to ‘persist the 
way in which you were ordered’ (Quran).”  
Khamenei created room for manoeuvre by distinguishing between persistence 
over the goals with timely flexibility over tactics to justify the possible changes 
regarding policy directions in the future. He argued: “The [revolution’s] goals are 
divine goals… [where] no deviation from them is permitted… [However] we prescribe 
‘persistence’ with regard to our goals. We should not mistake the goals by the means... 
With regard to the methods, there is trial and error… but in terms of goals, we should 
stand solid and strong and not take even a step back.”34   
In 2007, Khamenei emphasised the importance of an active foreign policy. 
Referring to the last years of Khatami’s Presidency he argued:  
Back then, in a meeting with officials, which was broadcast on 
TV, I told them that if they (Western countries) insist on their 
continuous demands, I will intervene personally. I did it, I told 
[the officials] you should stop this pattern of retreat and change 
                                                 
31 Khamenei 27/5/1382 (18/August/2003), http://farsi.khamenei.ir/news-content?id=1022. 
32 Khamenei 25/5/1383 (15/August/2004), http://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=1173. 
33 Jalili stated in 2015: “Those who promote de-ideologisation in the foreign policy of the IRI, should 
know that, even America, explicitly and bullyingly underlined the right of the use of coercion or force 
for defending its disgraceful values, such as the rights of homosexuals.” Thus, resistance over our 
values is the path to our success.” 
Entekhab 6/2/1394 (26/April/2015), http://www.entekhab.ir/fa/news/200876/. 
34 Khamenei 31/6/1383 (21/September/2004), http://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=3250. 
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it into active advancement. The first step should be that the very 
government who started these retreats should stop them and 
begin an active approach, and this happened.35 
 
In sum, this approach believes that in foreign policy as well as in other spheres, 
one should define its ideology, its values and its principles first. The foreign policy 
also should be defined in this ideological framework, which is rooted in the 1979 
revolutionary values. It considers ‘religious thoughts’ as its ideology. The only way to 
achieve the promises of this ideology and its success would be to have faith in its 
principles, values and ‘persistence’ in implementing them. Ahmadinejad’s foreign 
policy rhetoric also fitted within this theme of foreign policy.36 This approach became 
official IRI policy during the Presidency of Ahmadinejad regarding the West and the 
US for almost the next eight years.  
The ‘active doctrine’ positioned itself as the antithesis of the ‘normalisation’ 
doctrine. The normalisation doctrine also evolved and integrated different elements 
into its main debates. Mohammad Javad Zarif is one of the main diplomats promoting 
this foreign policy doctrine over the years. Zarif’s educational path in the US 
acquainted him with Western theories of international relations. Having lived in the 
US for around 30 years, he obtained a realistic view of the US. His career path 
familiarised him with the dynamics of international organisations. He served as Iran’s 
permanent representative to the UN from 2002–2007.37 A few months after Jalili was 
appointed as the main negotiator for the Iranian nuclear programme, in July 2007, he 
returned to Iran and entered academia.  
Zarif links popular sovereignty with international relations. Thus, this 
                                                 
35 Khamenei 13/10/1386 (3/January/2008), http://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=3416. 
36 BBC Persian (9/May/2006), http://www.bbc.com/persian/iran/story/2006/05/060509_ss-
iranletterbush.shtml. 
37 See Zarif CV for UN, 
http://portal.unesco.org/en/files/40284/11926255963CV_Dr_M._Javad_Zarif.pdf/. 
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interpretation could be an important element in the popularisation of factional politics. 
In his memoir, broadly speaking, Zarif presents the main elements of this foreign 
policy doctrine. He argues that the international order, similar to the sources of state 
sovereignty, is changing.  It is now the support of citizens which legitimises a 
sovereign.  
Thus, a state only has the right to oppose a foreign intervention if it enjoys 
internal popular legitimacy. He points to the UN Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan’s thesis of sovereignty, as being responsibility not authority, and concludes:  
“The fact that the meaning of sovereignty is changing from 
authority to responsibility is a growing trend… I personally feel 
that the concept of sovereignty as the authority, or the authority 
of the sovereign, is gradually crumbling. Authoritarian states 
may still exist, but they (these states) would be delegitimised to 
the point that their lifespan in the international society would be 
limited.”38  
 
In sum, this doctrine links the popular legitimacy of the state to its acceptance 
in the international community.  
This approach stressed that cooperation with the West and integration into the 
world order were the best ways to secure the IRI’s national interests, enabling it to 
fulfil part of their revolutionary goals and to become a significant geopolitical player, 
at least in the region. Defending Khatami’s foreign policy, Zarif highlighted this goal 
and argued that this position of being a regional player was taken away by Turkey. 
During the Ahmadinejad [tenure], because of Turkey’s better foreign policy, “the flag 
that Khatami wanted to raise in the Islamic world, [which would be] the flag of 
moderation, the flag of dialogue, the flag of rational opposition to Israel and the flag 
of independence, this flag is now erected by the hands of Turkey."39  
                                                 
38 Rajii, Aqa-ye, 311–337. 
39 Ibid., 356. 
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This view of the West and the international order always preferred diplomacy 
and negotiation. This anti-confrontational position was depicted in Mohammad Javad 
Zarif’s response to those who called him a liberal during his tenure as a diplomat in 
the IRI’s embassy in the US. Soon after the revolution, “the confrontation with the 
hegemonic order and imperialism needs rationality, logic, and knowledge, not a war-
mongering spirit.”40  
This theme could be found in Rafsanjani’s justification for ending the war, for 
negotiation attempts with the US, or for promoting Khatami’s dialogue of civilisations 
and/or for Rouhani’s negotiations with the West over Iran’s nuclear programme.  The 
confrontation of these two main themes with regard to the IRI’s foreign policy doctrine 
in relation to the US and the West, and over the IRI nuclear programme, dominated 
the 2013 Presidential election debates. Part of the next chapter aims to place these 
confrontations in factional politics and elaborates this confrontation.  
Conclusion 
In sum, the hybrid characteristics of the IRI, as well as the myriad different, sometimes 
parallel, decision-making centres, played a significant role in the dynamics of the 
relationship between foreign policy and factional politics. These characteristics have 
given the IRI an ability to shift its foreign policy direction easily and to lower the risk 
of possible legitimacy challenges emerging from such changes.  
 By giving opposing factions ideological and political room to contest the nature 
and trajectory of IRI foreign policy, this hybrid regime has also opened the way for 
different factional forces to hinder the implementation of policies considered 
ideologically, politically, and/or economically threatening to their interests. In other 
                                                 
40 Ibid., 137. 
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words, since the success of certain foreign policy decisions could translate into 
popularity for a faction and thus strengthening it, these characteristics of the hybrid 
regime gives the opposing factions powerful tools and institutional authority to hinder 
the implementation of foreign policy. As a result, the implementation and continuation 
of major foreign policy issues, particularly those that can render popularity to the 
faction(s) behind them dependends significanty on factional politics.  
 Over the 16 years of the Rafsanjani and Khatami administrations, Khomeini’s 
rhetorical popular foreign policy approach — exercised during the 1980s — was 
overshadowed by the electoral popularisation of foreign policy, which gained 
momentum from the mid-1990s. However, this popularisation of foreign policy greatly 
increased because of Ahmadinejad’s intense use of the rhetorical aspects of foreign 
policy to bolster his position in his struggles with various factions and the concomitant 
growing economic crisis emerging from the tough international sanctions placed on 
the country over its nuclear program and Ahmadinejad’s approach to negotiations. By 
the time of the 2013 Presidential elections, the electoral popularisation of foreign 
policy reached a new peak. 
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Chapter Seven 
Presidency Rouhani The Seve n: Chapter 
As the 2013 Presidential elections approached, the popularisation of factional politics 
as well as the electoral popularisation of foreign policy continued to reach new heights, 
given the country’s increasingly serious domestic and international problems and the 
consequent increasing factional and personal rancor between the main members of the 
IRI elite.  
The deteriorating socioeconomic situation added to the increasing tension 
among the factions and played an important role in the increasing disunity within the 
Conservatives and neo-Conservatives. Increasing public dissatisfaction with these 
conditions led to a weakening of their electoral support and thus their positions within 
the factional struggles. The socioeconomic situation was at crisis level; stagflation had 
set in. A fact even the major figures of the IRI recognised. Inflation hovered between 
30-35 percent in the period 2011-2013. The costs of housing and rent were double this 
rate, while growth rates were negative: -6.8 percent and -1.9 percent in 2011–12 and 
2012–13 respectively.1   
Official unemployment statistics showed a persistent rate of 10 percent and 
above. Unemployment amongst the youth, ages 15- to- 24, remained between 25 and 
30 percent during this period. These figures were artificially low given the new criteria 
used by the Ahmadinejad government to determine who is unemployed.2 Contrary to 
Ahmadinejad’s slogans and promises, people’s overall living standards suffered a 
continual and precipitous decline while a small group became wealthy in a short period 
                                                 
1 Economic Research and Policy Department, "Key Economic Indicators," ed. No.83 Fourth Quarter 
2015/16 (Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 2015/16). 
2 IRI Statistical Center, Unemployment Report, 
https://www.amar.org.ir/Portals/0/Files/abstract/1394/ch_ntank_94.pdf. 
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of time.3  
The IRI was suffering from these economic difficulties when oil prices 
remained above $85 a barrel added to growing popular outrage over economic 
conditions. As noted in the previous chapter, popular opinion blamed both the regime 
and UN sanctions for the deteriorating socioeconomic conditions. This thus added to 
the popularisation of factional politics and the factional popularisation of foreign 
policy.  
Ahmadinejad, continuing to project his populist anti-establishment persona, 
railing against established elites and declaring personal war against figures, such as 
Ali Larijani, the Speaker of the Majlis, and Rafsanjani, and implicitly against the 
authority of Khamenei. As the economic situation deteriorated, he, also increasingly 
on the defensive in factional politics, intensified his efforts in this direction and thus 
gave great momentum to the continuing popularisation of factional politics.  
At the same time the Conservatives, realising the dangers both Ahmadinejad 
and the Reformist-Modern Right could pose to their power position, given conditions 
also turned to the electorate in an attempt to garner support, talking in broad terms 
about the importance of the role of the people in the political life of the IRI.  Reformists 
and the Modern Right, led by Khatami and Rafsanjani, witnessing the growing 
disunity within the neo-Conservative and Conservative camps in the face of challenges 
from below and within the factional dynamic, began to think of paths that could return 
them to the republican institutions.  
Concomitantly, the establishment, whose pillar is the Supreme Leader, found 
itself assailed on all sides given socioeconomic conditions and the increasing blame 
public opinion put on both the Ahmadinejad government and the UN sanctions, a result 
                                                 
3 Donya-e Eqtesad 22/4/1393 (13/July/2014), http://donya-e-eqtesad.com/news/814592/. 
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in the people’s mind of a specific foreign policy implemented by Ahmadinejad and the 
Supreme Leader. In addition, the establishment had not yet recovered from the events 
of 2009-2010. The ongoing state propaganda attempts, including frequent speeches 
and remarks made by the Supreme Leader and other high-ranking establishment 
figures, to inculcate the idea of Fetneh in the context of these events underlined the 
regime’s realisation that they continued to represent a threat to its legitimacy and 
stability, especially in light of the upcoming 2013 elections.  
In addition to these domestic issues and challenges, the geopolitical situation 
also added pressure on the country and thus played a decisive role in factional politics. 
First, as mentioned in the previous chapter, public opinion seeing in the sanctions a 
major cause for the deterioration in living standards made change in foreign policy, 
and in particular in the approach to nuclear negotiations, both an electoral and factional 
issue.  
Second, changes in the region posed serious challenges to the IRI’s 
international interests-challenges that could not be effectively managed without some 
form of reconciliation with the West over the nuclear program. At the time the 
negotiations were at a dead end whilst rumors spread that Israel or possible the USA 
would launch bombing raids of the country’s nuclear sites in response to Western 
claims of Iranian intransience in the negotiations. 4 It will be remembered that Jalili 
was the head of the Iranian negotiating team. Concomitantly, the ongoing civil war in 
Syria, increasing instability in Iraq, and the battle against ISIS required increasing 
amounts of financial, political and/or practical aid from Tehran when the country’s 
domestic political and economic situations were in crisis.  
In this overall context and because of it, factions were bitterly divided over 
                                                 
4 NY Times (19/April/2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/19/world/middleeast/israeli-officials-
stress-readiness-for-lone-strike-on-iran.html?ref=world. 
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electoral strategies. With increasing paralysis within institutions resulting from the 
breakdown in Conservatives and neo-Conservatives co-operation, all groups sought to 
garner increasing levels of electoral popular support to wage factional war at the top. 
All groups during this period actively participated in the greater popularisation of 
factional politics.  
The Reformists were divided into two camps. One argued for the need to 
participate in the elections, given the seriousness of the challenges facing the IRI while 
the other promoted the idea of boycotting them. This latter group stressed that 
participation in the election would be of little value since most of the Reformist's main 
political figures, with some popular following, were in prison or would face rejection 
by the GC. 5 
In addition, a substantial part of their political base would conclude that 
participation in the elections, while Mousavi and Karroubi were still under house 
arrest, would be tantamount to a betrayal of these men, as well as the goals of the 2009-
2010 events. Eventually, Mohammad Reza Aref, a moderate Reformist who had been 
Khatami’s Vice President announced his candidacy. He had maintained links with 
establishment during the events of 2009-2010. For example, he, unlike most 
Reformists, had attended Khamenei’s Friday prayer of 29 June, which started the 
violent suppression of Fetneh or the Green Movement. Thus, it was believed he could 
survive the GC vetting process.  
Rafsanjani, having transformed himself into a popular political figure by 
implicitly and explicitly supporting Karroubi, Mousavi, and elements of the Green 
Movement, also announced his candidacy on the last day allowed for registration of 
possible candidates. The establishment recognised and feared his popularity. The GC 
                                                 
5 Aseman, 20/3/1391 (9/June/2012), Tasnim 16/10/1391 (5/January/2013). 
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thus did not approve his candidacy, citing his old age. The Modern Right, whose 
candidate had been Rafsanjani, supported Rouhani.  
The Conservatives and neo-Conservatives found themselves hopelessly 
divided. Attempts similar to those used in 2005 to unify the different groups behind 
one candidate were unsuccessful.6 However, the process of coalition building within 
these camps shows the extent to which the popularisation of factional politics had 
fundamentally changed the political calculations of these groups.  
Mahdavi Kani, played the role of arbitrator, created a coalition made up of the 
three main conservative candidates, all of whom represented various elements within 
these groups: Haddad Adel, Velayati and Qalibaf. Haddad Adel was close to 
Leadership Office and the neo-conservative Paydari. Velayati enjoyed the support of 
traditional Conservatives and those sharing views with Rafsanjani, and/or Ali Larijani. 
Qalibaf enjoyed the support of a part of the neo-Conservatives, while trying to gain 
the support from both the SLO and the Modern Right. He did not succeed.7   
They agreed that the extent of the popularity of each candidate would determine 
which one of them would enter the first round of the Presidential elections. They did 
not want the Conservatives and neo-Conservatives share of the overall vote to be 
distributed between three candidates. This would bring defeat, as it did to the 
Reformists during the 2005 Presidential elections. Personality conflicts trumped group 
unity and none of these candidates respected the pact.  
Almost a week after the election, in a long interview about the role of Kani and 
the overall dynamics surrounding this attempt at a coalition, Mir Lohi, Mahdavi Kani’s 
chief of staff, emphasised an important point that touches on the points made in this 
work. He admitted that, although from the elite’s point of view, “one candidate might 
                                                 
6 Khabaronline 9/4/1392 (30/June/2013), http://www.khabaronline.ir/detail/300815/Politics/election. 
7 Alef (4/3/1392) (25/June/2013), http://alef.ir/prtcs4qs02bq418.ala2.html. 
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be more competent than others,” it is important to take into account the popularity of 
different candidates, and “in this situation the elite will not stand against the popular 
will as long as he (in other words the candidate with less competency) does not show 
a clear deviation [from Khomeinism].”8  
Even though it seems trivial in the electoral process worldwide, it was an 
important shift within the JRM’s ideological views. Mahdavi Kani himself had always 
stated that the JRM role is to choose the ‘best qualified candidate’ whom the people 
should follow. In sum, the criterion for choosing the Presidential candidate from the 
main organisation of the Conservatives, the JRM, had become popularity instead of 
competency.  
In this election, disputes surfaced between the two main clerical organisations 
of the Conservatives, the JMHEQ and JRM that reflected disagreements between Kani 
and Mesbah. Paydari, as the main group of the neo-Conservatives, supported Jalili, 
after their initial candidate, Baqer Lankarani, Ahmadinejad’s health minister, a 
favorite of Mesbah, withdrew, given a possible GC rejection. The disputes between 
these two leading clerics were such that Jalili announced his candidacy without 
discussing it with Kani.  
Such an action violated IRI political custom. Before entering the electoral race, 
nominees meet with high-ranking religious clerics, seeking, as a matter of formality, 
their permission. Mir Lohi confirmed Kani’s umbrage: “Even Aref and Rouhani… met 
Kani before announcing their candidacy."9  
Two controversial candidates in this election were Mashaei and Rafsanjani. 
Mashaei, with Ahmadinejad by his side, announced his nomination. Rafsanjani also 
announced his candidacy at the last minute. The GC rejected both men. Despite 
                                                 
8 Jamaran 1/4/1392 (22/June/2013), http://www.jamaran.ir/fa/NewsContent-id_27491.aspx. 
9 Ibid.; Hajjarian comments in Qanoun 4/4/1392 (25/June/2013). 
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behind-closed-doors, efforts by the GC to stop Rafsanjani from entering the election, 
he announced his candidacy. He later claimed Khamenei gave his consent to the 
candidacy.10 The GC’s rejection of Rafsanjani arguably damaged the legitimacy of the 
GC. Rafsanjani’s announced candidacy and the GC’s rejection of it added to the 
electoral fervour. Rouhani, who had said he would withdraw after Rafsanjani’s 
rejection, stayed in the race. Mashaei’s rejection, however, was not surprising. 
Ahmadinejad’s support of him was an opportunistic move by this group to distinguish 
themselves from other factional players. It was, to an extent, a political investment for 
future elections.  
One priority held by Khamenei was to obtain high voter participation which 
could be propagated as popular acceptance of the regime. The regime had overcome 
the challenges to its legitimacy that had emerged in 2009-2010. Two days before the 
election, in an unprecedented move, Khamenei invited even those who were against 
the regime to vote: “Some people may not support the Islamic regime — for whatever 
reasons — but they want to show their support for their country, these [people] should 
also vote."11  
Khamenei showed his support for the foreign policy approach of Jalili and 
Haddad. On 4 June 2013, he stated:  
Some have this wrong analysis that we should give concessions 
to the enemies of the IRI in order to assuage their temper. [These 
people] in practice are preferring the interests of [the enemies] 
over our national interests. This is wrong. Their (enemies’) anger 
is because… the IRI exists… The anger of the enemy should be 
responded to by the national authority.12 
 
 Just two days before the election, he announced: “[The] international field is 
                                                 
10 BBC Persian (14/January/2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/persian/iran/2014/01/140124_l45_kadkhodaei_hashemi_rafsanjani.shtml. 
11 Khamenei 22/3/1392 (12/June/2013), http://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=22900. 
12 Khamenei 14/3/1392 (5/June/2013), http://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=22788. 
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not one of compliment and polite society. The more weakness you show and the more 
retreats you make, the more the enemy will advance."13  
Electoral Popularisation of Foreign Policy  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, in this election, the two main themes of IRI 
foreign policy with regard to the West and the US, and the conception of national 
interest, became the subject of public debates. The height of the pubic confrontation 
of these two themes was during the candidate’s live televised electoral debates. During 
which the nuclear deal and these two approaches in foreign policy were discussed.14 
In this debate, Rouhani, Aref and Velayati represented the ‘normalisation theme,' and 
Jalili, Hadad Adel and Qalibaf represented the second theme: the ‘active approach.'  
 Qalibaf summarised his views in diplomacy as follows: “the US claims power 
(authority) is my right, but we say right is power. This is the Islamic approach in 
diplomacy.”15 However, the main advocacy of the second approach was Jalili, who 
was, at the time, the chief negotiator of Iran’s nuclear programme. Jalili’s arguments 
were similar to those published ten years earlier.  
 By claiming that “the foreign policy is the sphere of thoughts (ideology) 
(andisheh)," he stated: 
We managed the [nuclear] negotiations based on [the discourse 
of] pure Islam…In the negotiations, we should believe in the 
discourse of pure Islam in order to get results in IRI foreign 
policy. If we cannot achieve this (a belief in the discourse of pure 
Islam) we will become weak. Thus, a strong government able to 
act [strongly] in foreign policy will not be established.16 
 
 He underlined his anti-hegemonic stance by criticising part of Qalibaf’s 
                                                 
13 Khamenei 22/3/1392 (12/June/2013), http://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=22900. 
14 There were three rounds of debates covering three main areas: economy, politics and culture, and 
foreign policy. The last debate, that took place a week before the election, was about foreign policy. 
15 Asr Iran 17/3/1392 (7/June/2013). 
16 Ibid. 
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diplomatic plans in which it was mentioned that, “If we are pursuing the establishment 
of a new [world] order, this [pursuit] should not be portrayed as challenging the 
hegemonic world order.” Jalili pointed out that “one of the fundamental principles in 
the [IRI] foreign policy is that we do not accept the hegemonic world order and our 
Islamic Revolution is founded on this belief.”  
 He also defended the foreign policy of Ahmadinejad: “The power of our 
regime is in its foreign policy and different state institutions should coordinate 
themselves with this policy.” He criticised the normalisation approach and argued:  
In the Hashemi [Rafsanajni] period, two arrest warrants were 
issued for Hashemi (referring to Mykonos), [and] in the Mr 
Khatami [era]. After all of the cooperation with the Western 
countries in Afghanistan, Iran was called part of an ‘Axis of 
Evil’… Thus, this approach (normalisation) is wrong … If we 
follow this approach [again], we will end up just as we did in 
those times.17 
 
Rouhani and Velayati criticised these views. By linking the sanctions to 
economic hardship and admitting the effects of sanctions on everyday life, Rouhani 
argued: “It is very good if the centrifuges continue spinning, but as long as the people’s 
lives could progress, the wheels of industries could also spin. I think it is possible [to 
achieve both]."  
He then blamed the incompetence of the current foreign policy team:  
Those for whom the opposite of whatever they had predicted 
happened, should know that they were unable to correctly 
understand international issues. [They] told [people] that there 
will be no referral of the nuclear issues to UNSC, no resolution 
(against us), no sanctions (imposed on us). [They are] the ones 
who celebrated every day that the nuclear issue was over, 
resolved, finalised. 18 
 
While international isolation and sanctions continued to exercise a deleterious 
                                                 
17 Ibid. 
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influence on the country’s socioeconomic conditions.  At the same time he defended 
Rafsanjani and Khatami’s diplomatic approach.  
He concluded: “These issues (concerning the nuclear programme) could be 
resolved with rationality, strategy, and negotiation and dialogue with world.” In the 
same vein, Velayati criticised Jalili’s achievements and argued:  
Mr. Jalili, the diplomatic field is not the class of philosophy 
where you go (to the negotiation table) to proclaim [afterwards] 
that our (IRI) logic was stronger [than theirs] and they were 
condemned… What people are seeing, is that you have been in 
charge of the nuclear case and not only was not one step forward 
taken, [but also] the sanctions have increased on a daily basis.  It 
is the people who feel the pressure…T he art of diplomacy is 
preserving the right to the nuclear programme whilst decreasing 
the sanctions. It is not [the other way round] namely causing 
sanctions to increase.  
 
Rouhani concluded: “I think our situation is very sensitive. Thus, those who 
obtain power should have the required expertise. They should know the world so that 
they can solve the nuclear issue based on negotiations and rationality.” 
Rouhani linked foreign policy to the concept of the role of the people in politics. 
After underlining that “our foreign policy issues could be resolved” through 
negotiation and rationality, he highlighted: “Yet, for resolving these issues, we first 
need to strengthen domestic national authority and… for increasing the domestic 
national authority, we should give all people freedom. All people should enjoy the 
freedom of expression.”19  
Then he touched on republicanism versus Islamism:  
Unfortunately, today some people think that the Islamic Republic 
means only Islamic. That it means only velayat-e faqih. Of 
course velayat-e faqih enjoys a great position from the religious 
and Constitutional perspective and should be followed. But the 
position of the people and republicanism is also very important… 
In the Islamic Republic, almost all state affairs should be based 
                                                 
19 Ibid. 
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on the popular vote. According to Article 6 of the Constitution, 
and state management should also be based on that (popular 
vote). 20 
 
His remarks were not only an additional sign of the expanding extent of the 
popularisation of politics, but also the expanding view in regard to the role of people 
and the institutionalisation of electoral politics reflecting the views of secular Iranians. 
He also linked elections to Khomeinism, arguing: “This very election… is a symbol 
of republicanism and religious democracy which is a legacy of the Imam [Khomeini]." 
In response, Jalili touched on this issue of republicanism versus Islamism. He claimed 
that the 2009 election was the triumph of republicanism. He thus denounced Fetneh as 
an act of treason. He then proclaimed: “The sovereign government is not a government 
with police protocol and such and such… [It] should work based on [the discourse of] 
pure Islam, which we saw in the ‘velayat-e motlaqeh-ye faqih’ thesis.”21  
Even though he also underlined the people, as explored in Chapter Three, his 
emphasis on the discourse of pure Islam and ‘velayat-e motlaqeh-ye faqih’ was the 
promotion of a different conception of the role of people in politics. It was a counter 
discourse to Rouhani’s conception. Jalili believed in the necessity of strong 
guardianship institutions. In this election, they both presented their conceptions of the 
people’s role in live televised debates. 
Rouhani obtained 50.88 percent of the vote. He was followed by Qalibaf (16 
percent) and Jalili (11 percent). Khatami and Rafsanjani played a significant role in 
Rouhani’s triumph. Similar to the 1997 election, this election was a coalition of the 
Modern Right and the Reformists, but this time the coalition figure came from the 
Modern Right. Rafsanjani explicitly supported Rouhani, while Khatami played a 
                                                 
20 Ibid. 
21 Tabnak 17/3/1392 (7/June/2013).  
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crucial role in his success when he persuaded Aref to withdraw his candidacy, which 
he reluctantly did the night before Election Day.22  
As the two most popular politicians in the country, Rafsanjani and Khatami 
mobilised the social support of the Reformists and the Modern Right. In just a few 
days before the election, through their open support of Rouhani, they transformed the 
electoral apathy of these social groups as well as secular Iranians into active 
participation. This included street demonstrations and rallies across the country in 
favour of Rouhani, even in areas where he did not have electoral offices. In response, 
Haddad withdrew in support of Jalili, while Velayati refused to withdraw despite 
exhortations of fellow Conservatives.23  Once again the trajectory of the election and 
its result surprised observers, both in Iran and outside it.  
The Rouhani election was a return to centre. Arguably, a large part of society, 
by voting for him, showed that it had abandoned the idealism and romanticised views 
of rapid change dating from the Khatami period. For the first time a candidate’s main 
promises were clear targets, rather than ideals. Rouhani promised to lower inflation, 
to settle the nuclear issue with the West, to pass the bill of citizen covenant, to reform 
the healthcare system and to follow up on the house arrests of Mousavi and Karroubi.24 
It was a large agenda that would require serious and skillful politicking. Thus, human 
agency would come to play, once again, a determinative role in IRI politics.  
Hassan Rouhani 
Hassan Fereidon (later Rouhani) (b.1948) was born in a rural middle-class 
                                                 
22 Isna 21/3/1392 (11-June-2013), http://www.isna.ir/news/92032111793/. 
23 However, the efforts to convince Velayati to withdraw in favour of Jalili were unsuccessful. There 
were rumours that Velayati was unhappy with the organic support of the SLO that had been switched 
to Jalili. He decided to stay in the election, a step that helped Rouhani, since Velayati shared the same 
voter base as Jalili and Qalibaf.  
24 Mashreghnews 25/3/1392 (15/June/2013), http://www.mashreghnews.ir/news/223978/. 
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merchant family. Rouhani claimed that from a young age he earned his living expenses 
by working as a farmer and a carpet weaver. In 1961 he started his religious studies in 
Qom. It was during this time, he changed his last name to ‘Rouhani’ (meaning clergy). 
Similar to Khatami, Rouhani belonged to the younger segment of the first 
generation of revolutionaries. However he was more active in the Khomeini 
Movement from its early days in Qom. He was arrested around 20 times in the period 
1961–78. During his time in Qom, he met Beheshti, who had a great influence on 
him.25 Rouhani’s clerical traits were similar to those of Beheshti and Mousa Sadr. He 
was not actively involved in theoretical aspects of Khomeini’s political ideology, nor 
was he part of those groups who sought less of a political role for the seminary.  
Similar to Beheshti, he was more concerned with the strategic planning and 
structural details of institutions of any Islamic state.26 In his meeting with Khomeini 
in Paris during the revolution, he raised his concerns with regard to the structure of the 
future judiciary system. He also suggested that Khomeini raise women’s rights and the 
form of government in his speeches. 
Rouhani’s academic and career path was, to a certain extent, different to those 
of other clerical revolutionaries. Upon completing his religious studies, on Beheshti’s 
advice, he entered university.27 In 1972, Rouhani graduated with a Bachelor’s degree 
in Judiciary Law from Tehran University. He then joined the army as part of 
mandatory military service. Most clerics refused to perform their military service, 
considering it cooperation with a dictator.  
After his military service, he used his oratory skills in giving political speeches 
to propagate Khomeini’s Movement. In 1978, in one of his speeches, he called 
                                                 
25 Hassan Rouhani, Khaterat-e Dr. Hassan Rouhani [Rouhani’s Memoir] (Markaz-e Asnad-e 
Ingqelab-e Islami, 2009). 
26 Ibid., 400–420. 
27 Ibid., 111. 
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Khomeini, Imam, a sacred title. This title has stuck with Khomeini ever since. With 
the encouragement of Motahari and Beheshti, in 1978, he went abroad to continue his 
studies. Beheshti provided him with financial support. To improve his English, he first 
went to London. His next destination was Harvard in the US, but after the revolution’s 
success in 1979, he returned to Iran.  
However, years later, in the 1990s he received both his MPhil and his PhD from 
Glasgow Caledonian University in Scotland. His MPhil thesis, entitled ‘The Islamic 
Legislative Power,' discusses the legislative structure of the IRI as an alternative 
prototype for current legislative systems, while comparing it with Western models.28 
His doctorate thesis, ‘The Flexibility of Sharia, Islamic Law,' discusses that “no laws 
are immutable” in Islam, which could be placed within the religious intellectual 
movements of this period to respond to certain challenges of Modernity.29  
After the revolution, Rouhani was part of a group in charge of organising the 
army. During this time, both the Islamic and the secular Left did not trust the army. 
The IRGC, had been established as a parallel military organisation to counter any coup 
attempts by the army. In the 1980s, Rouhani stopped the IRGC’s attempts to merge 
the army with it.  
Later on, during the Rafsanjani Presidency, Rouhani advocated the IRGC 
integration into the state. He stated his concerns about possible interference of the 
IRGC in politics on many occasions.30 He was also a Majlis MP for five consecutive 
terms (1980–2000). His life in parliament ended when the Reformists refused to put 
his name on their list in the elections to the sixth Majlis. His realistic approach in 
                                                 
28 Hassan Rouhani (Fereidon), The Islamic Legislative Power (Glasgow Caledonian University).  
29 Hassan Rouhani (Fereidon), The Flexibility of Sharia, Islamic Law (Glasgow Caledonian 
University).  
30 Akbar Rafsanjani, Payan-e Defa Aghaz-e Baz Sazi [End of Resistance, Begining of Reconstruction 
] (Tehran/Iran: Nashr-i Ma'arif-i Imam, 2011): 244.   
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foreign policy could be seen during the early years of the Iran–Iraq war. While he was 
in the Majlis in the 1980s, he established a faction called the ‘Association of Wise 
Men,’ in which a process for a possible truce between Iran and Iraq was discussed.  
Khomeini criticised this association’s activities.31  
Rouhani and Rafsanjani shared similar sociopolitical views and pragmatism. 
They cooperated with each other frequently. He was, to an extent, Rafsanjani’s 
protégé. When Rafsanjani was the Commander of Iran’s Joint Chief of Staff in the late 
1980s, Rouhani was his deputy. Rouhani was also involved in the McFarlane case as 
Rafsanjani’s trustee and in negotiations for the Iran–Iraq ceasefire amid the UNSC 
resolution 598. When Rafsanjani offered him his Intelligence Ministry position in the 
early 1990s, he refused. He then moved to the SCNS.32 Rouhani also had a close 
relationship with Khamenei, which went back to 1968 in Qom. He served as 
Khamenei’s representative in SCNS for almost 20 years. Khamenei also praised him 
on different occasions.33  
Rouhani’s studies in law following his religious studies, and his few years’ 
experience in the army, all solidified certain normative, objective views regarding 
what is right and wrong, or what is legal and illegal. Thus, to a degree different to 
Khatami, who always seemed to have certain self-reservations, he seemed more 
confident with his views, while not being dogmatic. He had a pragmatic approach. His 
experiences after the revolution, and his involvement in decision-making concerning 
national security affairs, helped him to have a multifaceted understanding of the IRI.  
Unlike Ahmadinejad, Rouhani was one of the IRI’s prominent establishment 
                                                 
31 Fars News 28/7/1392 (20/October/2013), 
http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13920722001056. 
32 Biography of Hassan Rouhani, 25, online access, 
http://rouhani.ir/zendeginame.php#samples/docs/34.  
33 Ibid., 26. 
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figures. He was a technocrat with an elitist attitude. Some of his colleagues found him 
to be arrogant, but an intelligent politician. He was rather unpopular amongst some 
politicians.34 Although he did not enjoy the support of the neo-Conservatives, given 
their fundamental ideological differences, he was familiar with their main political 
figures and worked with them frequently.  
Rouhani’s factional and social support base was linked to Rafsanjani’s base and 
political network. Unlike Khatami, he lacked an attractive cohesive political discourse. 
His ‘moderation’ discourse was more of an electoral slogan than a cohesive political 
paradigm. It was different from Khatami’s idealistic project of ‘political development.' 
His Presidential victory was due to the successful mobilisation of the pro-reform social 
groups by Rafsanjani and Khatami.  
A few days after Rouhani’s victory, Mohammad Qouchani, the Shargh editor, 
elaborated the difference between Rouhani and Khatami:  
Rouhani is a diplomat not an intellectual. He is a man of 
compromise, not a philosopher. He is a lawyer, not a philosopher. 
Not only does he stand against the colonels, he also stands aside 
from the philosophers. If there was a need for elaboration of the 
political philosophy of freedom, it had already been done by 
Khatami… Now we should find the path to freedom and the 
science of politics could open the doors.35  
 
Soon after Rouhani’s electoral victory, the direction of foreign policy regarding 
to the West and the US changed, which was reflected in a new round of negotiations 
on the IRI nuclear programme.With the people voting for Rouhani, he gained a popular 
mandate for changing the IRI’s foreign policy approach. This popular mandate 
strengthened his position in the factional struggles over the approach to the nuclear 
negotiations, while weakening that of his rivals. 
                                                 
34 Mirsepassi, Democracy in Modern Iran,139–49. 
35 Mehrnameh No. 29 (June–July/2013).  
370 
 
New Foreign Policy Direction 
Domestic political circumstances in both Iran and the US, and wider geopolitical 
changes on an international level, created a unique window of opportunity for 
resolving the IRI nuclear programme. In Iran, the realities of socioeconomic hardship, 
caused by sanctions, constituted a serious existential threat to the IRI. Therefore, a 
consensus formed amongst the elites about the necessity of change in IRI foreign 
policy.  
 Rouhani was one of the best options to shift this direction. He had proven his 
loyalty to the regime and enjoyed the trust of Khamenei. He knew how to deal with 
high-ranking IRGC and military officials, given his experience as the head of SCNS, 
while being familiar with the dynamics of factional politics. He had clear perspectives 
on the IRI’s national interests with strategic plans to achieve these views. In the US, 
the Obama administration had signaled that it wanted to settle the ongoing nuclear 
issues.  
 In addition, Obama’s noninterventionist approach to foreign policy, and his 
realistic views about the IRI political situation compared with former US Presidents, 
made agreeing possible. Cooperation between Iran and the US became a possibility. 
Both the IRI and the US administration took advantage of this window of opportunity. 
Soon after they came to power, Zarif and Rouhani signaled their interest in conducting 
serious negotiations within the framework of ‘win-win.' This was welcomed in Europe 
and the USA.36  
This new direction needed Khamenei’s support to be successful. Only he could 
curtail the IRGC, which since 2003 had become an influential player in foreign policy 
                                                 
36 Rouhani’s article in the Washington Post, Wahshington Post, 19/September/2013, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/president-of-iran-hassan-rouhani-time-to-engage/. 
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decision-making. After the events of 2009, a large section of the IRGC’s high-ranking 
officials were supporting Jalili’s approach. Khamenei, who had already agreed with 
the secret direct talks with the US a few months earlier in March 2013, gave Rouhani’s 
approach a chance.  
However, Khamenei was in a politically delicate situation. As elaborated 
above, for at least the last eight years, Khamenei had expressed the untrustworthiness 
of the West and the US in particular. He had denied any serious social and/or economic 
effects of sanctions on the IRI.  
Therefore, allowing the direct talks with the US and accepting certain 
concessions during the negotiations could be perceived by his supporters as an 
ideological compromise. This provided an electoral boost to the factions supporting 
Khatami and Rafsanjani. Thus, the bilateral negotiations with the US seemed to 
weaken his power. For instance, in an extreme scenario, part of his fanatic supporters 
might accuse Khamenei of a lack of revolutionary will; Khamenei could become a 
victim of his very ‘basirat’ discourse.  
Khamenei and the IRI needed to justify this shift in foreign policy. Khamenei 
fine-tuned the official ideology once again. He introduced a new discourse of ‘heroic 
flexibility’ (narmesh-e qahramananeh). It was part of the title of a book (Imam 
Hassan’s ‘Peace’) which he translated and published 40 years ago. This book aimed 
to justify why Imam Hassan chose peace with the perceived unjust government of 
Muawiyah in 661 CE, while his successor, his brother, Imam Hussein, raised war 
against Muawiyah’s son in 680. Khamenei called Imam Hassan’s peace treaty 
‘glorious heroic flexibility.' In his meeting with the commanders of the IRGC, 
Khamenei proclaimed:  
We are not against proper and reasonable moves, whether in the world 
of diplomacy or in the world of domestic policies. I believe in the idea 
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which was referred to as ‘heroic flexibility.' Flexibility is necessary in 
many areas. It is very good and there is nothing wrong with it. But the 
wrestler who is wrestling against his opponent and who shows 
flexibility for technical reasons, should not forget who his opponent 
is and what he is doing. This is the main condition. Our politicians too 
should know what they are doing, who they are faced with, who their 
opponent is and which area the opposing side wants to attack.37  
 
This speech came a day after Rouhani in a meeting with the IRGC stated: “The 
IRGC should not get involved in politics because its position is far higher than 
factional politics and should not be associated with one faction or group.” Perhaps to 
gain their approval of the nuclear deal, Rouhani compromised on their economic 
activity and asked the IRGC to help in the national construction projects and war 
against smuggling.38  
In this vein, to justify this shift of foreign policy based on Khomeinism, a week 
after Khamenei’s announcement of ‘heroic flexibility’, Jamaran, a news outlet close 
to the Institute for Compilation and Publication of Imam Khomeini Works, published 
an article investigating the IRI–US relationship from Khomeini’s perspective. It 
highlighted two of Khomeini’s speeches after underlining it was the US who cut its 
diplomatic relation.  
In the first quotation, Khomeini put people in charge of making decisions 
concerning their relationship with the US: “In case our awake and dignified nation 
allows it, Iran will regain a very normal relationship with the United States similar to 
other countries.” In the second quotation, national interest was highlighted: “If the US 
stops spying against the [IRI] movement, the door to negotiation on those parts of our 
relationship which are about the interest of the nation are open.” 39  The article 
                                                 
37 Khamenei (17/September/2013), official English translation, 
http://english.khamenei.ir/news/1827/Leader-s-Speech-in-Meeting-with-Commanders-of-Islamic-
Revolutionary.  
38 Official website of the Presidency 25/6/1392 (16/September/2013), http://president.ir/fa/71272. 
39 Jamaarn News, 2/7/1392 (24/September/2013), http://www.jamaran.ir/fa/NewsContent-
id_31929.aspx.  
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concluded that according to Khomeini those who should have the final say were the 
people. The popular will depicted in Rouhani’s election should decide the trajectory 
of foreign policy regarding the US and the West. 
This shift in official ideology could also be interpreted as forgetting the values 
of the revolution and its ideals, given the eight years of propagating the ineffectiveness 
of sanctions and rhetorical popularisation of foreign policy. However, since the 
factional popularisation of foreign policy opened the way for a new direction in the 
nuclear negotiations, the regime portrayed its acceptance of the new direction as its 
obedience to the popular will.  
A new group opposing the negotiations soon emerged under the name of ‘the 
worried’ (delvapasan). Most of these were the neo-Conservatives, members of Basij, 
the IRGC and ‘lebas shakhsi’; part of the support base of Khamenei. Those who 
benefited from the sanctions also encouraged the delvapasan activities. Delvapasan 
defined their collective identity based on their worries that the ideals of the revolution 
and the IRI’s national interests might be compromised through Iran–US negotiations.40  
The mobilisation of delvapasan was a calculated move by the neo-
Conservatives to take advantage of possible political opportunities emerging in the 
factional and popular debates about the nuclear programme. Thus, it was another 
example of the symbiotic effect of factional politics and foreign policy. Using their 
state-sponsored media delvapasan put the Rouhani government under pressure. From 
their point of view, if the negotiations failed, they would regain the position in foreign 
policy which they enjoyed during Ahmadinejad’s Presidency.  
If the negotiations reached an agreement, it would allow them to attack Rouhani 
on different aspects of the possible agreement. It would also allow for leverage in 
                                                 
40 Qanon, Aftab Yazd, Shargh 14-18/2/1393 (4-8/May/2014); Rajanews 14/2/1393 (4/May/2014), 
http://www.rajanews.com/news/171620.  
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factional politics during the negotiations. This would also allow them to respond to the 
criticism of their involvement in the eight years of economic mismanagement of 
Ahmadinejad’s Presidency by moving to an offensive position. Khamenei had to 
address these worries. Almost a month after proclaiming ‘heroic flexibility,' in his 
meeting with Basij, he declared that this ‘heroic flexibility’ was not a departure from 
IRI ideals and goals:  
When we used the phrase “heroic flexibility," some people defined it 
as abandoning the ideals and the goals of the Islamic Republic. Some 
of the enemies too used it to accuse the Islamic Republic of betraying 
its principles. These interpretations were wrong and they 
misunderstood this phrase. “Heroic flexibility” means an artful 
manoeuvre for reaching one’s goal. It means that the followers of 
God’s path — any divine path — should utilise different methods, in 
any way possible, in order to reach their goal and this should be done 
whenever they move towards the different ideals of Islam. “If any do 
turn their backs to them on such a day — unless it be in a stratagem 
of war, or to retreat to a troop (of his own) — he draws on himself the 
wrath of Allah.” [The Holy Quran, 8: 16]41  
 
In sum, Khamenei justified the act of negotiations with the ‘Great Satan’ as a 
political tactic, while declaring that the US could not be trusted. He positioned himself 
in a way that enabled him to keep his supporters mobilised, but not to be blamed for 
the failure of negotiations by the pro-deal groups.  
After two years of negotiations, on 14 July 2015, the Joint Comprehensive Plan 
of Action (JCPOA) was reached. Based on this agreement, Iran suspended part of its 
enrichment activities, eliminated much of its uranium enriched stockpile, gave the 
IAEA access to monitor its nuclear programme, and halted activities of its heavy water 
plant.  
In return, IRI kept its right to the enrichment programme and gained certain 
                                                 
41 Khamenei (20/November/2013), official English translation, 
http://english.khamenei.ir/news/1839/Leader-s-Speech-in-Meeting-with-Basij-Commanders. 
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concessions, including the lifting of all sanctions imposed because of its nuclear 
programme.42 
While the electoral popularisation of foreign policy made reaching a nuclear 
deal possible, it also opened the way for criticism of opposition groups. Thus, the 
moment that JCPOA was announced it became the main subject of IRI factional 
politics. Those factions who criticised Rouhani’s foreign policy approach perceived 
that Rouhani and the factions backing him would obtain great popularity including 
strengthening their links to the secualr Iranians. Therefore, these factions joined forces 
to attack Rouhani, JCPOA, and his factional and popular supporter base. As a result, 
if Khatami faced one serious crisis every nine days, Rouhani faced one crisis every 
four days.43  
Rouhani’s initial economic plan was to focus on controlling inflation whilst 
settling an international deal, then to take advantage of foreign investment and the 
lifting of sanctions to initiate economic growth. However, expected economic growth 
did not materialise. This became an issue with which Conservatives and neo-
Conservatives attacked the Rouhani administration. The anti-Rouhani factions, similar 
to moves by Conservatives in the Khatami era, targeted his social base.To disappoint 
his supporters, his critics, using their control of parallel institutions, restricted the 
sociocultural space, criticised Rouhani’s cultural programmes and propagated the 
economic ineffectiveness of JCPOA.  
In this context, Khamenei, who had approved JCPOA, not only did not show 
his explicit public endorsement of it, he also allowed his supporters to attack Rouhani 
using his institutional facilities. Khamenei’s mixed signals were to deprive Rouhani 
                                                 
42 For the information regarding JCPOA in European Union see: 
https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/2281/iran-and-eu_en.  
Based on US government see: https://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/jcpoa/. 
43 Etemad 21/4/1395 (11/July/2016). 
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and the factions behind him from an electoral windfall that could change the dynamic 
of factional politics in favor of Rafsanjani and Khatami.  
Khamenei feared the spread of Western cultural and political mores emerging 
from opening up to the West that could undermine efforts to create the homo Islamicus 
and the regime itself. He was also wary of a growing economic relationship which 
could bring with it both the spread of West’s soft power and economic dependence. 
These worries were part of the reasons behind the regime’s decision, during the 
Ahmadinejad period, to shift Iran’s economic relations from the West to the East, 
China.  
Conclusion 
The hybrid regime by creating the conditions for the electoral popularisation of foreign 
policy, combined with the popularisation of factional politics, provided a means by 
which the IRI responded to an existential challenge posed by international sanctions 
imposed because of its nuclear programme. Rouhani’s electoral mandate enabled him 
to change the direction of foreign policy regarding the West and the US with limited 
ideological and political damage to the IRI, at least in the short-term. If during 
Ahmadinejad’s tenure, the shifts in foreign policy were, speaking, justified by their 
reference to the revolutionary/Islamic pillar of the IRI, this time, it was the republican 
pillar which allowed this change to happen.  
 By 2013 the electoral popularisation of foreign policy reached a peak. Factions 
now approached the people with varying prescriptions for the trajectory of IRI foreign 
policy and to garner electoral support that would enable them to fight more effectively 
in the factional struggles at the top of the system. However, by doing this, the role of 
the people became implicitly and explicitly more important in the domestic and foreign 
policies of the country.  
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Conclusion 
The IRI was established, consolidated and legitimised as a hybrid regime, a concept 
redefined throughout this thesis as a derivative of neither democracy nor 
authoritarianism, but rather a distinct political structure embodying both republican 
and authoritarian/guardian institutions that coexist with and exert pressure on each 
other. These characteristics distinguish it from the regimes coined hybrid in the 
literature. 
The death of Khomeini in 1989 opened a new chapter in the political history of 
the IRI, whose conclusion remains ambiguous and unpredictable. Whilst the Grand 
Master was alive, the various factions and individual political figures won and lost 
political and ideological battles amongst each other depending on the views and 
opinions of Khomeini and the extent of their closeness to him. In addition, the 
dynamics of the IRI’s unique hybrid political system that is made up of republican and 
revolutionary Islamic/guardian institutions provided additional momentum to the 
emergence and evolution of factional struggles. By the time of his death even 
Khomeini faced increasing difficulties in managing the warring factions. 
With his passing ideological production became decentralised, as factions 
claimed to represent the true ideology and vision articulated by Khomeini. They were 
forced to find within Khomeini’s large body of written and public statements, which 
constitute Khomeinism, this support and approval once given by the Grand Master 
himself. The ideological and political vacuum that emerged with Khomeini’s death 
was filled by competing conceptions of Khomeinism. This decentralisation of 
ideological production, the IRI’s hybrid institutional structure and the seriousness of 
the economic, social, and international problems facing the regime after the end of the 
war with Iraq created the conditions for the rapid popularisation of factional politics.  
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The first major steps in the popularisation of factional politics were taken when 
Rafsanjani and Khamenei, the two political pillars of the early post-Khomeini period, 
worked in tandem to remove the Leftists, who had enjoyed the support and protection 
of Khomeini, from the political arena, and to establish conservative control over both 
republican and revolutionary Islamic/guardian institutions.  Rafsanjani and Khamenei 
shared short-term political and ideological goals in the problems the regime faced, 
while regarding the Leftists as their common enemy. The Leftists, ejected from the 
political arena, sought ways of returning to the country’s political life.  
Meanwhile, the Grand Conservative Coalition headed by Rafsanjani and 
Khamenei fell apart as a result of increasing factional disagreements about the 
direction in which post-Khomeini Iran should go. The supporters of Rafsanjani then 
found themselves the victim of attempts by conservative factions around Khamenei to 
fatally weaken them in the political arena. Fighting a rear-guard action, they split from 
these conservative factions and created a new one, the Modern Right.  
By 1997, the year of Khatami’s election to the Presidency, the popularisation 
of factional politics was entering a new phase and picking up momentum. The 
Reformists, who were once the Leftists, and the Modern Right, had realised that the 
only means by which they could return to the political arena and struggle against the 
attempts by conservative factions around Khamenei to monopolise political, 
ideological and institutional power were to seek and obtain active support from below. 
From society and thus capture for themselves the republican institutions of the IRI.  
The factional struggles of the post-Khomeini period produced losers on an elite level 
who were forced to move toward the popularisation of factional politics.  
During the Rafsanjani and Khatami periods this popularisation of factional 
politics produced a political and ideological challenge to Khamenei and the 
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Conservatives. Thus, these Conservatives were forced to modify, expand and increase 
their attempts to create and maintain popular support. One result of these activities was 
the emergence of the populist neo-Conservatives under Ahmadinejad.  However, once 
these two groups, the Conservatives and neo-Conservatives, obtained control over 
both the republican and revolutionary Islamic/guardian institutions with the election 
in 2005 of Ahmadinejad to the Presidency, their political partnership fragmented.  
When the neo-Conservatives, during Ahmadinejad’s second administration, 
fought a rear-guard action against the Conservatives, they too took the path travelled 
by the Leftist/Reformists and Conservative/Modern Rightists. They sought to mobilise 
popular opinion, to fight more effectively in factional struggles. By 2013 the 
popularisation of factional politics was reaching a peak as Khamenei and the 
Conservatives found themselves assailed, not only from the left by the Reformists and 
Modern Rightists, but also now from the Right by a wing of the neo-Conservatives. In 
sum, every Presidential administration since the death of Khomeini has produced a 
new major faction. Each has claimed to represent true Khomeinism, setting itself 
directly against the status quo, the Conservatives surrounding the Supreme Leader and 
implicitly against him.  
The popularisation of factional politics has at its ideological and political centre 
the debates about the proper role of the people within the political life of the IRI, 
debates which date back to the days of the revolution but which were muted in the 
context of the Iran-Iraq War and the towering figure of Khomeini.  
The role of the people in this hybrid regime became both the catalyst and 
subject of the popularisation of politics. As this thesis showed the IRI Constitution, 
with its hybrid characteristics, enshrined state institutions that symbolised and justified 
the competing factional claims about the role of the people in the political arena. 
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Ambiguities in Khomeinism provide enough ideological material for factions to justify 
their respective political positions and claim to be the true representatives of the 
ideology and vision of Khomeini. This hybridity allowed for emergence and evolution 
of the popularisation of factional politics.   
The Reformists and the Modern Right, which share broad visions of the role of 
the people in the IRI’s political life, and a significant part of the neo-Conservatives 
challenge Khamenei and the Conservatives on this point. This thesis has shown that 
conceptions of the role of the people, have exercised a determinative influence on the 
dynamic and trajectory of the popularisation of factional politics, despite the different 
interpretations of this role held by the different factions. These different conceptions 
provide for the political cohesion of the factions. They also influence the factional 
power struggle between each other and the Supreme Leader, within the grounds of 
Constitutional politics.  
The hybrid character of the IRI plays no small part in the emergence of factional 
politics and its dynamic as it sets against each others republican institutions. This to 
an extent represents popular aspirations, expectations and revolutionary 
Islamic/guardian institutions, which protected the system from popular aspirations and 
expectations, deemed to threaten and damage the system and the interests of those 
holding power. 
The Constitutional changes made at the end of the 1980s provided the SLO 
with supreme power and the ability to sit atop the entire IRI system in the way 
Khomeini did. However, this institutional power did not immunise Khamenei from the 
effects of the popularisation of factional politics and from losing the veneer of a supra-
factional political figure. Khomeini, as the father of the Islamic Revolution and Grand 
Master, was the source of legitimacy for the system.  
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He gave it its legitimacy. Khamenei, however, has less room for ideological 
and political maneuvering than Khomeini did as he, similar to the factions, must 
compete with varying interpretations of Khomeinism to justify his policies and actions. 
He thus is always open to the possible criticism of deviating from true Khomeinism. 
No one could accuse Khomeini of doing this as he was the source of the state’s 
ideology and legitimacy. He could change ideological signposts because the ideology 
was his. Given his unique position he could manage, raise, and politically eliminate 
groups and figures much more easily than can Khamenei. Unlike Khomeini, Khamenei 
obtains his legitimacy from the system and is thus constrained by its ideology.  
Khamenei’s political and ideological position faced increasing challenges as 
the popularisation of factional politics emerged and evolved, carrying with it the 
debates over the role of the people and the tendency of factions to position themselves 
explicitly and/or implicitly against the Islamic revolutionary/guardian institutions, at 
the top of which he stood.  As society distanced itself from revolutionary ‘activism’ 
and gave more attention to worldly affairs, the social support base of Khamenei 
weakened. Exercising his power through Islamic revolutionary/guardian institutions, 
Khamenei, to maintain his support base, had no choice but to articulate new ideological 
approaches justifying the powers of the revolutionary Islamic/guardian institutions. 
This included the increasing use of claimed threats posed by foreign and internal 
enemies, and, second, to expand the patronage network within his support circle and 
institutions linked to the SLO. He did not limit himself to these actions. He intensified 
state propaganda campaigns, and strengthened existing semi-state mobilising 
institutions, such as the Basij, and/or creating new ones such as the Maddahs.  
The move to generate greater levels of active popular support for the SLO and 
the revolutionary Islamic/guardian institutions was a response to the growing 
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popularisation of factional politics since the Rafsanjani Presidency. They also created 
new challenges for the SLO.  Khamenei became dependent on Basij, plain-clothes 
forces, the IRGC, Hezbollahis and similar religious fundamentalists, whose 
ideological support he needed to maintain. This limits further his political and 
ideological room for maneuver in the face of the popularisation of factional politics 
and geo-political challenges.  
In addition, the consequent greater involvement of these groups in the people’s 
private sphere, which damaged his popular political standing, and in the political and 
factional life of the country led to creeping securitisation of society. This result 
exercised a strong influence on the dynamics of factional politics by creating societal 
discontent and increasing momentum amongst factional groups to use this discontent 
to obtain and solidify control over republican institutions and present themselves as 
the bearers of positive change.  
The revolutionary Islamic/guardian institutions have hindered the efforts of 
those factions promoting the republicanism of the IRI and the increasing role of the 
people in the political arena. These institutions operate on a rational reading of the IRI 
Constitution and Khomeinism, just as other factions opposing them claim in regard to 
their understanding of these elements. Those who have controlled these institutions 
over the last three decades, namely the Conservatives, have also enjoyed the support 
of certain parts of society, such as the traditional middle-class, rural and small-town 
populations, and parts of the bazar class.  
With the emergence of the popularisation of factional politics and increasing 
socioeconomic problems, they were forced to expand their social and electoral base 
beyond these groups. The Conservatives, too, contributed to the popularisation of 
factional politics.  In addition, they, similar to the SLO, mobilised their traditional 
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supporters through institutions such as the Basij to project an image of popular 
acceptance. These methods produced limited results. The Conservatives based around 
the SLO were forced to expand their patronage network, while, expanding the use of 
authoritarian means to strengthen their power position in factional struggles and IRI 
institutions.  
The popularisation of factional politics within this hybridity intensified the 
Janus-face dynamic of the IRI system. Since the Khatami Presidency contentious 
politics has become a vital aspect of electoral politics. As noted above, candidates 
running on anti-establishment platforms, however defined, have gained control of the 
republican institutions. This shows the reality of socioeconomic and/or political 
discontent within society.   
However, these elections reenergise the fundamentals of the system while 
giving hope for change, similar to an extent to democratic systems in the West. So far, 
the elections have allowed factions and their popular constituencies to compete and to 
offer differing solutions to fundamental issues and existential challenges facing the 
regime. Factional politics, its popularisation, and their expression in elections provide 
hope and the opportunity for positive change within the existing political framework.  
These elements play a key role in preventing factions and their supporters from 
deciding to leave the IRI political arena and become opponents of the IRI system. 
However, popularisation and hybridity offer factions a path of return to the political 
arena and to countering possible threats to the regime. The revolutionary 
Islamic/guardian institutions have hindered the success of any sustainable 
popularisation efforts to impose limitations on their power or public scrutiny of their 
institutions.  
Yet, the popularisation of factional politics has led to a situation in which the 
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revolutionary Islamic/guardian institutions and Khamenei face antiestablishment 
factional claims from both the right and left. The political elements constituting the 
establishment since the Rafsanjani period have been reduced to Khamenei and 
Conservatives holding power within the revolutionary Islamic/guardian institutions as 
well as several traditional conservative factions. This could present a challenge to the 
regime. This danger is exacerbated by the fluidity of the tactics and strategies used by 
factions in dealing with each other and with the revolutionary Islamic/guardian 
institutions.  
This thesis has provided clear examples of this fluidity. For example, the 
evolution of Rafsanjani, who was considered a major enemy by the Reformists during 
the Khatami Presidency, to being their preferred candidate in the Presidential elections 
of 2005. Further evolving to a pillar of the movement against the Conservative and 
neo-Conservatives after the Presidential elections of 2009. The same can be said for 
evolution of Ahmadinejad and his wing of neo-Conservatives.  
The emergence of the Green Movement in 2009-10 and its continuing influence 
on factional and popular politics showed that this hybridity also has certain limits, and 
that the popularisation of factional politics contains a danger for the regime when the 
hopes and aspirations for positive change are blockaded by the revolutionary 
Islamic/guardian institutions. The events of 2009-2010 symbolised how the 
popularisation of factional politics and unfilled expectations and hopes for positive 
change can break out of the limits imposed by the system.  
This movement and its suppression was the consequences of the attempts by 
the Conservatives, in the face of this danger, emerging from the popularisation of 
factional politics to establish their control over both republican and revolutionary 
Islamic/guardian institutions and thus neutralise the hybrid nature of the regime.  
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However, four years later, during the 2013 Presidential election, domestic and 
international circumstances forced them to return to this hybridity and recognise it as 
necessary for the survival of the regime.   
The institutional development of the IRI has been strongly influenced by 
factional politics. While factional power in the IRI is linked to control over institutions 
controlled by factions, the very power of each institution is also linked to the factional 
power balance. In other words, the source of institutional power is not solely 
determined by Constitutional power. When a faction gains control of an institution, it 
tries to use the jurisdiction of that institution to restrict the institutional power of other 
institutions occupied by rival factions.  
The ambiguities in Khomeinism and the Constitution allow such institutional 
battles. This dynamic has led to a conflict of jurisdiction between different institutions 
and/or the different jurisdictional authority of one institution. Institutions have 
experienced contraction and expansion of their responsibilities and jurisdiction to 
where sometimes an entire organisation or institution was eliminated due to factional 
politics. The influence of factional politics on the power of various institutions 
explains to a certain extent why the dynamics of institutional power are changing so 
frequently between the Majlis, GC, the President’s office and other state institutions, 
depending on which faction is in control.  
In sum, as we have seen, ongoing debates about the role of people is at the 
centre of the popularisation of factional politics have created ideological, political, 
economic and social opportunities for the IRI which has resulted in a certain degree of 
political resilience against serious political and ideological challenges. This resilience 
is strengthened by the hybridity of the IRI.  
However, this hybridity and popularisation of factional politics has also led to 
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the escalation of institutional conflicts. These institutional conflicts take place in 
conditions in which political parties are not institutionalised and the rule of law is 
weak. Therefore, the role of human agency in these political trajectories increases in 
importance. The reality and importance of this role creates uncertainty about the 
factional and political trajectory of the IRI.  
Therefore, as this thesis shows, any analysis of IRI factional politics must 
examine both the dynamic of resilience and the role of human agency, which, as we 
have seen, have acted as opposing forces.  In this context, soon the IRI could face at 
least two serious challenges. One is the challenge of choosing a successor to the 
Supreme Leader and the other is the sociocultural and domestic political consequences 
of Rouhani’s attempts at opening to the West. How the IRI, in particular Khamenei 
can accommodate the 30 years of his anti-Western stance with this new approach 
towards the West. The outcome of these challenges might rest in the role of human 
agency.  
This thesis has shown what roles human agency plays in factional politics and 
its popularisation. First, factions form around particular leading political personalities 
rather than around specific ideologies and ideas. After Khomeini’s death and the 
consequent decentralisation of ideological production factions and political groups 
emerged surrounding main political figures: Namely, Rafsanjani and Kargozaran, 
Khatami and Mosharekat, Mesbah and Paydari and Ahmadinejad and first Abadgaran 
and then Rayeheh-ye Khosh-e Khedmat. Second, since political parties in the IRI are 
not institutionalised, it is these personalities determine a faction’s position in the 
political spectrum and its relationship with other factions and state institutions.  
These personalities play a large role in not only the overall popularisation of 
factional politics but also in the form and extent of the popularity of the faction.   In 
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this context, the decisions, mistakes and personal views of these personalities strongly 
influence the evolution of factional politics and its popularisation. For instance as was 
shown, Khamenei and Rafsanjani, who enjoy a long history of friendship and political 
cooperation and have enjoyed almost the same power and authority, have held their 
different views regarding foreign policy, in regard to the shape and extent of relations 
with the West. Khamenei institutionalised his deeply held anti-West views. As chapter 
six showed, many of Khamenei’s decisions and ideological initiatives, such as the 
slogans emphasising the West’s ‘cultural onslaught’ and ‘soft war’ played a significant 
role in the trajectories of IRI foreign policy. At the same time Rafsanjani’s different 
approach, which is rooted in his personal views and perception about the West, led to 
contradictory policy decisions. This exercised a strong influence on the dynamics of 
the factions in the camp’s of both men.  
Another example is the influence of the personal relationship between 
Khamenei and Mousavi on the 2009 election and the events following it. The political 
dynamics surrounding this rancorous personal relationship form the framework for 
understanding these events. The personal charisma of Khatami and his consequent 
ability to mobilise the people play a decisive role at sensitive points in factional and 
popular politics, despite societal disappointment with his inability to implement his 
reform programme when he was President.  
He played this role in 2009 when he transferred his popular political support to 
Mousavi which raised Khamenei’s already heightened sensitivities regarding Mousavi 
and the direction of factional politics.  The Khatami-Rafsanjani coalition in the 
elections of 2013 and their joint support of Rouhani brought to life a moribund 
electoral atmosphere and mobilised the people to vote for Rouhani in a way that 
surprised even the most seasoned observers of IRI factional and popular politics.   
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This thesis has shown that the IRI, during the Khomeini era, unlike the Pahlavi 
system, implemented the rhetorical popularisation of foreign policy. This was done to 
maintain mass mobilisation in support of the regime. The people had no real role in 
determining the trajectory of foreign policy, but rather were to mobilise around the 
decisions taken by the regime. With the passing of Khomeini, factional politics 
underwent popularisation. This thesis has shown that the expansion of the 
popularisation of factional politics in the domestic sphere led to the factional electoral 
popularisation of foreign policy.  
The hybrid characteristics of the IRI, and the myriad different, sometimes 
parallel, decision-making centres, played a significant role in the dynamics of the 
relationship between foreign policy and factional politics. These characteristics, 
similar to domestic policy, have given the IRI a resilience to shift its foreign policy 
direction, while lowering the risk of possible legitimacy challenges. By giving 
opposing factions enough authority and room to manoeuvre, it also opened the way 
for different factional forces to hinder the success of different policies. Since the 
success of certain foreign policy decisions could translate into popularity and the 
strengthening of the factions promoting it, these characteristics would give the 
opposing factions powerful tools and institutional authority enabling them to intervene 
implementing these policies.  
As a result, implementation and continuation of major foreign policy issues, 
particularly those that can engender popularity for a faction, such as opening to the 
West, is sensitive to the domestic politics and its popularisation. Thus, the 
popularisation of factional politics came to exercise an increasing influence on foreign 
policy decision-making.  
In conclusion, as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the death of 
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Khomeini and the emergence and evolution of factional politics and its popularisation 
opened a new chapter in the history of the IRI, whose conclusion is ambiguous and 
unpredictable. The IRI has survived and evolved to this point given the interaction 
between practice of different ideological conceptions of the role of people in politics, 
hybrid characteristics of its system and its dependence on personalities. This thesis has 
shown that the hybridity of the IRI political system and the popularisation of factional 
politics do not fit well into the literature on democratisation and hybrid regimes.  
This thesis argues that despite the emphasis in this literature on a specific end 
point of political development, namely Western forms of democracy, other forms of 
political change with possible different end points exist. Too often the IRI has been 
examined in the framework of this dominant literature, which has resulted in 
conclusions that fail to grasp the dynamics of factional politics, their popularisation 
and the trajectory of political change in the IRI. This thesis hopes to fill this gap.  
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